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UNIVERSITY OF WINCHESTER 
ABSTRACT 
Facilitating reflective practice in higher education professional programmes: reclaiming and 
redefining the practices of reflective practice 
Joanne Helen Trelfa 
ORCID 0000-0001-6651-9209  
Doctor of Philosophy  
April, 2020 
The aim of this thesis is to reclaim, redefine and re-imagine reflective practice in the 
context of higher education.  Literature concerning mainstream understanding and practice 
highlights how reflective practice, popularised by Donald Schön, takes the form of 
reflection-on-action, retrospective critical inquiry into one’s implicit and explicit social 
professional practice judgements, decisions and activities. Contending that only by fully 
scoping the discipline of professional practice can one come to a rich, deep appreciation of 
the professional artistry involved and the essential role and nature of reflective practice, 
this thesis offers Professional Practice: Connected Practice.  Yet bringing that theory into 
juxtaposition with lived experiences of 16 “percipients” (Myers, 2008) engaged in reflective 
practice during Practice-Led-Research via Reflective Practice Groups brings to light 
significant issues: reflective practice has always, or has become, appropriated by neo-
liberalism formulating it as a reified, cognitively dominated, panoptical form of therapeutic 
analysis and professional assessment, a narrowing process into which 
students/practitioners are ‘broken-in’ (Lefebvre) through a slow incremental violence of 
imposed habitualised and repetitive routines.  ‘Percipients’ (Myers), purposefully 
employed, values their lead in the entire research process, through which the method of 
critical phenomenology approached via dialogue emerged.  Here they signified reflection-
in-action, the least theorised, most confused element of Schön/Schönian-inspired reflective 
practice.  In the liminoid space of social science and the arts, and drawing on European 
phenomenology, the contribution of this thesis is to theorise understanding and practice of 
percipients ‘threshold concepts’ of: Gaze, mainstream reflection-on-practice, offering a 
reimagined creative, playful alternative; Glance, embodied and bodied reflection-in-action 
informed by Gendlin’s Focusing; and, the ‘insight cultivator’ of Leaving Go.  These being 
interwoven, ‘rhythm’ and ‘rhythmanalysis’ (Lefebvre) lends to further appreciation and 
their facilitation.  Named Mittere, the frame for the rhythm of this radical reclaimed, 
redefined and re-imagined reflective practice is proposed, becoming organising chapters 
for the thesis.  
Key words: radical reflective practice; higher education; social professional education; 
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PREFACE: STARTING OUT 
From the title it is clear this thesis concerns reflective practice.  Broadly, ‘reflective practice’ 
refers to critical inquiry into one’s judgements, decisions and actions, so the assumptions, 
values, beliefs and theories that implicitly and explicitly shape and inform opinions, 
decisions made and actions taken, to better understand oneself, one’s behaviour, and 
effect future interventions. To illustrate, Osterman & Kottkamp (2015:1) define it as a 
“systematic” process involving “self-awareness, self-understanding, and critical thinking [to] 
create meaningful and enduing change by changing [oneself]”.  Widely attributed to 
American philosopher Donald Schön and his research into the practice of architects, town-
planners, and ‘science-based’ professions (Schön, 1983), he positions it as essential to the 
practice of professional artistry.  His theory was swiftly adopted by the social professions, 
initiating, in Schön’s (1991:5) words, “the reflective turn” that created “a kind of 
revolution”.  Social professions are the interest of this thesis, those that  
comprise practitioners whose role it is to work with [individuals, groups, 
communities] who are regarded as in need of support, advocacy, 
informal education or control. They work within a shared set of values 
stressing a commitment to individual and social change, respect for 
diversity and difference and a practice that is participatory and 
empowering (Banks & Nøhr, 2003:8).   
The key resource for their work in its multifaceted, complex, rich interactions is oneself: 
practice is mediated through the practitioner.  Thus, systemic inquiry of the kind referred to 
above is essential in their day-to-day engagement, and, consequently, because higher 
education programmes are “charged with” responsibility for the transition of “aspiring 
professionals [as they] are prepared for the challenges in their chosen profession” 
(Dall’Alba, 2009:35) and for providing opportunities for continuing professional 
development opportunities afterward, reflective practice:  
• is part of the hegemonic practices embedded into undergraduate and postgraduate 
programmes;  
 
• has become central to relevant underpinning higher education teaching 
approaches; is expressed in curricula and programme expectations; and,  
 
• is named in (UK) professional standards to which those programmes are mapped.  
To illustrate, the National Occupational/Professional Body Standards for youth and 
community work (QAA, 2019), nurses and midwives (MMC, 2018) social work (Social Work 
England, 2019) and teachers (TDA, 2010) explicitly reference ability to and engagement in 
reflective practice.  Indeed, reflective practice has become more broadly recognised as 
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significant to ‘graduateness’ in general, a sector term for the “orientating framework of 
educational outcomes that a university community agrees its graduates should develop as a 
result of completing their studies successfully” (Hill et al, 2016:156), linked to engaging in 
research inquiry, a skill required for employability and lifelong learning, and named in 
information and digital literacy (Barnett, 1997).   
In sum, Hill et al (2016:156) describe reflective practice as facilitating 
intellectual curiosity, analytical reasoning, problem-solving and 
reflective judgement; effective communication; leadership and 
teamwork skills; …[and] personal attributes such as self-awareness, self-
confidence, personal autonomy/self-reliance, flexibility and creativity; 
and personal values such as ethical, moral and social responsibility, 
integrity, and cross-cultural awareness;  
and Barnett (1997:13) goes further, reflective practice as key to ‘the business of university’ 
through which “the civic character of society is extended and deepened”. 
In terms of how reflective practice is facilitated, Slade et al (2019:7) explain whilst “unique 
to each learner, it does not occur by chance. Educators must provide exercises, strategies, 
and practical tools to promote” it.  Therefore, as will be discussed in more detail later, in 
the higher education programmes outlined above this typically takes the form of tools 
based on writing (diaries, journals, logs, portfolios, blogs) and dialogue (individual, group 
and peer supervision, action learning sets, reflective practice groups, practice session 
review/debrief), with the expectation or requirement that students engage in whichever or 
all of these as deemed necessary by teaching staff, constructively aligned with curricula, 
assessment, Learning Outcomes , programme aims, National Occupational Standards, 
Quality Assurance frameworks and any public body professional requirements related to 
the programme.  As noted above, the main aim of reflective practice is change - of self, and 
individual, shared and organisation professional practice, ‘practice’ defined as a “sequence 
of actions undertaken by a person to serve others” (Argyris & Schön, 1974:6). 
Thus, I define reflective practice as a rigorous, disciplined approach for noticing, attending 
to, and inquiring into aspects of practice, where ‘practice’ means service to others.  My own 
interest in this and it being a focus for research tells a tale in itself.  Whilst a research 
project has an “arbitrary starting point of entry” [emphasis added] (Trimingham, 2002:57), 
Trimingham explains that as researcher/author I bring my “own level of understanding and 
knowledge” to it, and this has a “natural history” (Silverman, 2013:352).  In the words of 
Bordage (2009:313), “We all have assumptions, explicit or implicit, about the way things are 
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and how they work. It is the researcher’s and author’s responsibility to make [them] 
explicit”.   
To do so begins to illuminate the scope, focus and organisation of this thesis, and its 
doctoral worth in its radical reclaiming and redefining of the practices of reflective practice 
is evinced at the end of chapter 2. 
* 
I am a Senior Lecturer1 and Head of Academic Professional Development at a university in 
the south of England.   
This has not always been the case.   
20 years ago I was working as a youth worker, community worker and psychotherapist.  I 
worked in those roles for 12 years in the UK, Western Asia, and on projects in South America 
and the Caribbean, with individuals, groups and communities on issues of abuse, violence, 
mental health and well-being, before moving into higher education to teach those areas in 
professionally qualifying undergraduate and postgraduate programmes and continuing 
professional development for the social professions.  In other words, having practiced in the 
social professions I engaged in the education of future and current social professionals and 
more recently am responsible for the teaching development of lecturers of all disciplines in 
higher education.    
I am a ‘mid-aged’ cisgendered White woman living in a predominantly economically 
comfortable geographic area in south west England.  I happily juggle my doctoral studies 
and full-time job, with working, living and commuting across three counties, and with being 
a mother of a daughter, and a daughter myself.  
I am of working-class roots, previous generations employed in foundries, coal mines, retail 
and domestic service, my parents striking out, wanting something different for themselves 
and their family.  My two sisters and I were first-generation university, our parents viewing 
education as a path to change.                                                                                                                                                           
 
1 ‘Lecturer’ is also a recognised role in Further Education (Post-16), however this doctorate focusses 
on higher education (18+ education provision). 
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I like to dance, sing, run, write, read, and I adore being a mother and daughter.  I enjoy the 
creativity, spontaneity and improvisation all these bring to life – and thus also appreciate 
the value of creativity, spontaneity and improvisation in professional practice. 
I am dyspraxic. This was only identified in my late 40’s whilst studying for my PhD.  Whilst 
the diagnosis may have been irrelevant or paralysing, for me it was liberating, an 
explanation for past experiences and a way to articulate those of the present.  It also 
provides context for my resilience, as well as my lifelong valuing of creative thinking. 
I am… 
I am… 
What to include, what to leave out? 
* 
For me the answer to that question lies in reflective practice.  Characterising my work - 
professional, parental, and personal - is the myriad of implicit and explicit decisions I am 
called to make, am affected by, and effect - the macro, meso, and micro levels of influence 
and influences (Mulvale et al, 2016).  This, along with the extent of my awareness of them, 
involves: 
• thoughts, images, feelings and emotions triggered by infinitesimal actions, behaviours 
and dynamics in myself and others;  
 
• the impact of changes within and between the spaces and places we inhabit;  
 
• the occurrence of welcome and unwelcome associations and memories triggered as I 
interact;  
 
• my (and our) evaluations, judgements and prejudice; and,  
 
• the multitude ways that all these interact, within me and between myself and every 
other person, directly and indirectly, overtly and tacitly, consciously or not.   
 
Informing, influencing, constructing and shaping all these elements are individually held 
and collectively shared values, beliefs and assumptions: our interactions do not exist in a 
vacuum.  ‘Values’ are “principles to live by, [so] what is important to the individual”, 
‘beliefs’ being “indicative of a particular understanding of the way the world works”, and 
‘assumptions’, the “premises or understandings that underpin values and beliefs, i.e. what 
the individual takes for granted” (Fisher, 2003:321).  Applied to professional practice 
reflective practice is a process of, and tools for, being/becoming aware of and analysing 
these as elements and their influence on decisions and activities, with a view to 
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development.  Importantly, however, this is development not for its own sake ‘in the 
service of me’: whilst engagement in reflective practice might be personally cathartic, self-
revealing, even therapeutic, it is not personal therapy because its purpose is to critically 
consider and as a result develop service to others.  It is indeed a ‘practice’.   
The “profound philosophical” (Fisher, 2003:321) implications of this whilst ‘constructing an 
epistemology of practice’ (Schön, 1983:31; 2001:194) in my own career trajectory led me to 
become a passionate supporter and practitioner of reflective practice.  Working in 
communities with people of all ages who were struggling, at times unpredictable, violent 
(internally, externally) and distressed, then moving to be a lecturer to support others to do 
such work in the less volatile but equally free-flowing higher education classroom contexts, 
reflective practice was, and remains, my anchor in the ‘hot action’ (Eraut, 1994:53) of 
professional practice.  Furthermore, becoming an academic meant that I could also explore 
its scholarship, bringing theoretical underpinning to that passion.   
During that time, I became intrigued by the extent to which the concept and practice of 
reflective practice permeates social professional education.  Indeed four decades on from 
Schön’s 1980s writing, in the UK and the rest of Europe, as well as America, Canada, 
Australia, and emerging in Japan (see Tamai et al, 2016) and Indonesia (Cirocki & Widodo, 
2019), reflective practice is embraced in a “wave of euphoria” (Horgan, 2005:33 cited in 
McGarr & Moody, 2010:580), “a natural fact of life that furnishes the ‘fix’, the ‘this is it’” 
(Gergen & Gergen, 2008:11) of higher education and professional practice programmes, 
therefore also understood and approached as “the bedrock of professional identity” (Finlay, 
2008:2).  So, embedded as an imperative to learning and development, reflective practice 
has become “relied” on (Clegg et al, 2002:131) as a “promised land” (Papastephanou & 
Angeli, 2007:604) of salvation for students/practitioners and practice alike.   
The course of that inquiry took a pivotal leap, indeed lurch, when I came across Ecclestone 
& Hayes’ (2009) critique of reflective practice (see Trelfa, 2016b2).  In contrast to typical 
understanding and facilitation of reflective practice in higher education as a neutral tool for 
engagement in professional practice, their contention is that it is a particular ideological 
and cultural script imposed on students through assumptions and expectations travelled 
out via its required practices.  Therefore Saltiel (2010) marks reflective practice out as a 
 
2 Full references for my own work can be found in Appendix A 
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discourse, striking when appreciated that ‘discourse’ means “not what is said [but] that 
which constrains and enables what can be said” [emphasis added] (Barad, 2003:819). 
It brought my passionate support of reflective practice up short.  I questioned whether in 
my own practice, the professional programmes I taught on, and indeed social professions 
and its education in general, reflective practice had always been, or had become, a 
standardising mechanism that controls the process and outcomes of what otherwise could 
be an unfettered inquiry into one’s own experience in professional practice.   
I set about exploring the features that might have that effect, as well as those that enable a 
more positive reflective practice, via Masters research with undergraduates and 
postgraduates on social professional programmes in two universities in two jurisdictions of 
the UK by garnering their perspectives on the purpose of reflective practice.  It revealed 
fundamental issues in theory, rhetoric and practice of reflective practice (Trelfa, 2010), 
findings that echoed Cranton’s (2006:111) argument that reflective practice is - or has 
become - a process that  
allow[s] educators ‘inside the heads’ of learners and encourage[s] self-
surveillance as people try to write what they expect the teacher to want 
[and] feel obligated to live up to the (often implicit) ideas 
 of what reflective practice is and involves.  Its conclusion offered that the practice of 
reflective practice does not capture nor result in that which is claimed in its mainstream 
literature.  I followed that MA with smaller exploratory research with a colleague involving 
trainee teachers in a university in a different continent, the same broad findings arising 
there too (Trelfa & Tamai, 2014).  Consequently, Starting Out3 on this doctoral research 
began from there although it struck me that typical absence of this critical regard by those 
who facilitate reflective practice risks its practices being adopted as if inherently positive, 
embedded as if entirely neutral, leading to uncritical assertion of reflective practice as a 
controlling process with those unintentional (I assume) outcomes.  Thus, rather than its 
original roots of enhancing and articulating professional artistry, reflective practice 
comprises/had come to be about control of self and situation through controlling practices.  
Yet I also knew from my own experience as well as some accounts in the Masters research, 
and from students I taught, reflective practice as an anchor, enlightening, valuable.  So, this 
 
3 I use capital letters to distinguish words in their action as thesis concepts from what would 
otherwise be generic usage.  They are: Professional Practice: Connected Practice and its elements 
(The Trappings, Connected Practice, Being Prepared, Performance, and Qualities of Me); Gaze, 
Glance, and Leaving Go; and Mittere and its elements (of Starting, including Starting Out, and 
Starting On, as well as Capturing, Describing, and, Narrating). 
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doctoral research also Started Out with curiosity: would new research come to the same or 
different conclusions of my earlier research, and if typical mainstream understanding and 
practices of reflective practice were not enabling and enhancing professional artistry what 
did it need to involve?  In sum, would it be possible to reclaim and redefine the practices of 




PROLOGUE: STARTING ON 
The same reasons that make it important to express oneself as author into a thesis apply to 
being explicit about the world of the research inquiry.  As an analogy I conceive this as a 
gateway, so, I invite you, the reader, to imagine yourself at the gate of this thesis through 
which you can see a vista comprising familiar features that you would expect to see in a 
PhD, those of theory, practice and research, but it is now understood as vital that I describe 
those features to convey its particular landscape.  In doing so I utilise three metaphors as 
devices for descriptive effect, those of ‘spirals’ (cf. Trimingham), ‘strands’ and ‘props’4. 
- Theory:  
This thesis draws on established theory of reflective practice that forms the platform that is 
taken for granted and commonly understood platform of principles, aims, practices and 
facilitation in professionally qualifying programmes, continuing professional development, 
and graduateness in higher education.  Referred to from here-on as ‘mainstream 
literature’, by this I am not claiming the theory to be exhaustive, nor that there isn’t 
variation, not the least because literature emerging in Schön’s wake is “vast” (James, 
2019b), but as shorthand to literature that is widely accepted, understood and used in 
higher education.  This thesis also draws on and in theory other than that of reflective 
practice of course, this being led by the primary research.  
- Practice:  
The centrality of practice to reflective practice means it is a theme that runs throughout the 
thesis, introduced now and critically interrogated in chapter 2.  Indeed, this thesis takes the 
view that to fully appreciate reflective practice one first needs a rich, complex, critical of 
professional practice, ‘practice’ defined as service to others, here being 
lecturers/facilitators as they ‘serve’ students/practitioners who are developing their own 
‘service’ to current and future clients. 
- Research:  
Therefore the focus of my primary research is also practice, the lived experience of 
students as they practice reflective practice in their own practice settings.  I apologise in 
advance, that sentence a case in point!  Given the focus of reflective practice, the latter 
 




word being unavoidable in its label, and ‘practice’ being the way it is facilitated, and the 
contexts in which it happens, ‘practice’ is a word that appears a lot.  Even so, relevant in 
this section, as Trimingham points out, not all practice is research: it “is relevant to it” but 
will not necessarily contribute unless and until it is “subject to analysis and commentary” 
(2002:54).  Moreover, and of further significance to this thesis, practice is messy which does 
not easily lend to the tidy ordering implied here, a central motif in my research inquiry that 
in more general terms also faced Trimingham in her work.  She developed her research 
through ‘spirals’, “where progress is not linear but circular, a spiral which constantly 
returns to its original point of entry but with renewed understanding” (Trimingham, 
2002:56), a frame that I adopted.  My research comprises five spirals of activity that happen 
broadly to correspond to: 2012-13; 2013-14; 2014-15; 2015-17; and 2017 to submission.  
Therefore, to discuss the features of my research I depict the spirals as follows, 
 
Figure 1: five spirals                                                                                                                                                 
but given their centrality to the research they are detailed in chapter 1.   
Four strands 
These are not free-standing spirals as it were.  Weaving through them, linking their 
elements and features together, are four strands.  Therefore, describing the world that my 




Figure 2: five spirals and four strands 
The four strands are explained in order of appearance rather than priority or significance.  
Indeed, they are of equal importance.  The strands also have relevance to reflective 
practice, thus are related to the focus of the whole thesis. 
The first strand is the overall structure and style of the thesis. 
Structure is indicated by the chapter titles.  The title of each chapter relates to their focus 
created from themes that emerged through the research process: Starting, Capturing, 
Curating, Describing, Narrating, and Mittere.  Each chapter title (excepting the final one) is 
followed immediately by a brief description in italics, and together the concepts and their 
relationship to reflective practice are the focus of Mittere, the final chapter.  Therefore, 
Mittere focusses on the process of inquiry through which the findings of the other chapters 
emerged, offering this to be central to a reclaimed radical reflective practice. 
Style is conveyed through my writing.  In this I am inspired by Cixous’ (1976:876) rallying call 
for “women’s writing”, her contention that women “have been driven away [from writing] 
as violently as from their bodies – for the same reasons, by the same law, with the same 
fatal goal”.  So “Woman must put herself into the text – as into the world and into history – 
by her own movement” (ibid).  Noted already, the subscript to this thesis reflects my 
personal journey from working class silence in academic contexts wherein academic writing 
was “too high”, “reserved for the great” therefore “too great for me” (1976:876), to 
discovering my Voice in and through academic writing as “an act […] marked by seizing the 
occasion to speak” (1976:880).  I characterise my writing style as clarity and complexity, 
simplicity and multidimensionality, criticality and reflexivity, that “arrives, vibrant, over and 
again” through an intention to “un-think” (1976:882).  More, as shall be seen, that 
description has resonance with a radical reflective practice. 
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The second strand that weaves through this thesis is closely related to the first but still a 
strand in its own right: my deliberate use, where relevant, of ‘personal in pronoun’ (Cixous, 
1976:888).  Use of (judicious) first-person “creates the conditions for reflexivity and makes 
power relations more visible” (Erdmans, 2007:8): it points up my authorial privilege as 
researcher and writer, and in doing so marks out a perspective that is different to claims of 
objectivity behind which the researcher hides.  My use of ‘I’ acknowledges my decisions 
tensioning argument from Preface to Epilogue.  However, in use of ‘I’, I also trouble my 
positionality.  This second strand, then, is about how, in aim and intention, this thesis is 
“never simple or linear or ‘objectified’, generalised” (Cixous, 1976:881); I am embedded in 
process and text.  This too is concomitant with a radical reflective practice. 
It is salient to highlight that these two strands reflect a feminist “standpoint” to, and in, my 
work (Harding, 1986:26).  Feminist standpoint theory emerged in the 1970’s and 1980’s, its 
primary concern not of specific changes for women but with questioning who creates 
knowledge, what kind of knowledge, and to what ends.  Yet even in its growth its 
foremothers were asking whether there can be such a perspective given that “women’s (or 
feminists’) social experience is divided by race, class and culture” (Harding, 1986:26).  
Intersectionality is key here: I am this woman: of working-class heritage in a middle-class 
life, White, ‘mid-aged’, culturally English and for generations, with an invisible disability, 
etc.  So, in the evolution of feminist standpoint it became clear it does not imply 
homogeneity but applies the questions about knowledge to ‘philosophy, epistemology, 
methodology and political strategy’ (Harding, 2004:2) to consider who is privileged and 
how, to what ends, and who is excluded.  One might denote a contradiction between this 
and my use of the word ‘woman’ (or any other singular term I use to signal forms of social 
relations), therefore clarity is required.  Thinking with Cixous (1976:875-876),    
When I say ‘woman’, I’m speaking of woman in her inevitable struggle 
against conventional man; and of a universal woman subject who must 
bring women to their senses and to their meaning in history. 
That is, they are linguistic signals to the body of scholarship that recognises them as “key 
organiser[s] of social life”, and to the belief that “understanding how things work is not 
enough” (Sprague, 2016:3), action is required. 
The third strand that runs through the spirals of this thesis is theory.  It is, as noted, a 
feature one would expect to see in an academic doctoral endeavour.  However, in my work 
Sutton & Staw’s (1995:378) “strong theory” is relevant.  Strong theory is “a set of 
convincing and logically interconnected arguments” created from “connections among 
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phenomena” leading to “a story about why acts, event, structure and thoughts occur”.  
Developing strong theory requires “burrowing deeply into microprocesses, laterally into 
neighbouring concepts, or in an upward direction, tying itself to broader social 
phenomena” (ibid).  Development of strong theory informs this thesis – and strong theory is 
also important to practitioners as part of reflective practice: it illuminates that which is 
otherwise unseen by a “naked (or theoretically unassisted) eye” (1995:378).  Although 
discussed in detail in chapter 1, a brief explanation of ‘practitioner’ and ‘professional’ is 
pertinent at this point. They appear throughout the thesis sometimes interchangeably as a 
stylistic choice to avoid word repetition but there is a difference.  Whilst both refer to the 
“active” and accountable “practicing of a learned occupation”, ‘practitioner’ refers to an 
individual who can and is performing a specific set of practice skills but who may, or may 
not, be formally qualified (Reid & Green, 2009:166); whilst ‘profession’ (and professional) 
refers to 
an occupational group with specific higher education, expert knowledge 
and a professional integrity framework that underpins community trust, 
respect and recognition (Professional Standards Council, 2015:5).  
Finally, and of course, theory is important to research.  Research needs to have “catalytic 
validity” (Lather, 1986:67) via its location in established scholarship and its contribution to 
understanding, here being reflective practice and its facilitation in higher education.  
Therefore, these three strands weaving through the thesis are informed by Lather’s 
(1986:67) notion of ‘impact’, the “consciously channelled” aim that the work will be 
“reality-altering”. 
The fourth and final strand weaving through the thesis is the voices of research 
‘percipients’.  Deliberate adoption of the word ‘percipients’ is integral here, reflecting 
Myers (2008) use of a term with broader meaning to describe a particular approach to 
research and involvement of those more typically referred to as ‘participants’, or even 
‘subjects’.  Percipients are recognised in terms of their “active, embodied and sensorial 
engagement” in process and outcomes (Myers, 2008:173), aligning this strand to the first 
three as well as to a radical reflective practice.  My adoption of the term also represents a 
methodological journey that began with my Masters research (Trelfa, 2010), described 
earlier, where I considered those involved as participants and so I continue to use that term 
when referring to that work, as well as to research where position is unclear or unknown.  
The centrality of percipients means that they lead this doctoral research, its process and 
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outcomes; and stylistically where their voice must be the foreground, mine moves into the 
background – as will be seen, for example, in chapter 4. 
Core props 
The strands that weave throughout the spirals of research and therefore this thesis, 
connecting elements and features together, would need to be extremely rigid if only 
secured at two points of the thesis, its beginning and end!  Therefore, there are a number 
of core ‘props’ linked to and supporting them along their way.   
 
Figure 3: five spirals and four strands with four props 
They are the props of:  
• “radical research” (Neill, 1960; Freire, 1996; Schostak & Schostak, 2008);  
• the liminoid (Turner, 1974) space of art with social science; 
• Practice-Led research; and, 
• the value and significance of emerging research method from the research process 
itself.  
Each prop is explained in chapter 1 (following this Prologue), although it is germane to 
highlight that the props as well as the strands they support became pronounced through 
and by the research, in which the percipients and I were a part of a “creative 
social/relational process [that occurred through] dialogue, collaboration and co-ordination” 
(Bava, 2014:168).  As I (re)create this in the thesis I hope to convey “the liveliness, the 
involvement, and even the passion” (Reason & Hawkins, 1988:79) of the percipients’ 




So here we are at the gateway to the thesis!  An introduction to reflective practice, the 
roots to the research, and the world of the inquiry now expressed, I invite you, the reader, 









Starting   
Doctoral research – like reflective practice - Starts somewhere; and 
indeed, with a nod to Heidegger and Sartre, one could argue it is 
always-Starting, always-becoming.  However, for research and 
writing, but also germane to any period of reflective practice, there is 
a Start somewhere.  As has been seen Trimingham (2002:57) writes of 
the “arbitrary starting point of entry” to which we bring our “own 
level of understanding and knowledge”.  Having set out my own 
‘starting point’ in the Preface (or, ‘Starting Out’) and the ground on 
which this thesis being framed in the Prologue (or, ‘Starting On’), this 
chapter details the scholarly Start of the thesis. 
1. Introduction 
As for reflective practice, this thesis, in Preface and Prologue, Started with me, because as 
explained “no two people would start at the same point” (Trimingham, 2002:57).   
Understanding this from a research perspective, the ‘four strands’ show concern with 
“consciousness that emerges from personal participation in events” (Foss & Foss, 1994:39).  
Accordingly, it is now understood that, and how, the personal participation of researcher is 
always present in research; at issue is the extent to which this is expressly acknowledged, 
and, of what the researcher is conscious.  The influence of feminist standpoint in social 
science can be seen in the work of Bordage (2009): he describes researcher leverage “on 
choices and interpretations” at every stage of a research project, likening it to a lighthouse 
that illuminates some parts of an ocean whilst leaving other parts dark (2009:313).  So, in 
contrast to embracing hegemonic patriarchal positivist claims of neutrality and objectivity 
(Ellingson, 2009), my Starting is that “I occupy a specific social location and am informed by 
a specific biography, which operate together” (Sprague, 2016:3).  Inherent within this is 
that you, the reader, should be able to determine for yourself the extent to which and 
when this is imposed unhelpfully and, indeed, the reach and impact of this general 
perspective is that it is now viewed as essential in qualitative research methodologies (May, 
2001; Denzin & Lincoln, 2013).   
Thus, my Starting in Preface and Prologue began with introducing myself and my interest in 
reflective practice, the ‘natural history’ (cf. Silverman) of appreciating reflective practice as 
enhancing and articulating professional artistry, this being defined as the ‘art of 
implementation and improvisation’ that characterises professional practice (Schön, 
1987:13), to questioning whether and the extent to which it is or has become reduced to 
‘knowledge work’ (Quill, 2011:328).  That is, rather than development – or change – in a 
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student/practitioners service to others, they learn, adopt, adhere and perform expected 
knowledge of the practices of reflective practice, controlling themselves appropriately 
through controlling practices.  Here, then, there it is suggested that what could/should have 
been a liberal endeavour has been turned on its head by and in neo-liberalism in its 
relationship to freedom and democracy.  Given that liberalism “has become a nebulous 
concept” with ‘varied usage’ (Einar Thorsen, 2010:191), for clarity the position here sits 
between modern liberalism and libertarianism.  Similarly vague, neo-
liberalism/neoliberalism can be used “pejoratively” as a “catch-all term of abuse” 
(2010:188).  Instead, Einar Thorsen explains that it can be conceived as a new positive 
paradigm, a continuum of liberalism, or a ‘great reversal’ (Palley, 2005 cited 2010:196) 
turning the liberalist practices of democracy and freedom into stability through self-
regulation by a “State which reserves for itself the right to intervene in the marked only in 
order to preserve the market economy as such” (2010:199).  Depending on 
conceptualisation, then, the purpose of this is to liberate human potential and well-being 
(e.g. Harvey, 2005); or, to protect the interests of some by dehumanising others cruelly, as 
if disposable, through corrupt, ‘illiberal anti-democratic’ practices (Giroux, 2019:28).  In my 
argument, I draw on the latter, a neo-liberalism (hyphenated to emphasise this position), 
characterised as “a crisis of agency, representation and resistance” (2019:38) in which 
higher education has a vital, essential role to play, either by reinforcement or questioning 
and troubling capitalist institutions and discourse that provide the ‘incubator’ for neo-
liberalism (2019:39; Quill, 2011).  Giroux refers to the latter as ‘profane illumination’, i.e. a 
process 
by which the dominant common-sense assumptions of a capitalist 
hegemony are subject to the process of denaturalisation, critical 
analysis and the shock of new forms of recognition. This is a practice of 
making the familiar unfamiliar by treating it as a source of 
astonishment (2019:40). 
 
1.1 Research aim 
Thus, the central aim of the research, to 
reclaim reflective practice from neo-liberal appropriation that 
formulates it as a reified, cognitively dominated, panoptical form of 
therapeutic analysis and professional assessment, a narrowing process 
that imposes habitualised and repetitive routines (via models and pro 
forma) on to what otherwise could be innovatory practices.   
Starting that endeavour here, this chapter: 
• introduces theories of reflective practice; 
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• explicates the vital elements of ‘experience’ and the self who is experiencing; 
 
• elucidates the four core ‘props’ to the research introduced in the Prologue as 
radical research, the liminoid space of art with social science, Practice-Led research, 
and, the value and significance of an emerging research inquiry from the research 
itself;  
 
• and, closes by introducing the chapters that follow.   
2. Introducing theories of reflective practice. 
Reflective practice was defined earlier as critical inquiry into the assumptions, values, 
beliefs and theories that implicitly and explicitly shape and inform decisions made and 
actions taken (Osterman & Kottkamp, 2015).  The context of professional practice has been 
marked out as the scope of this research inquiry, and therefore my own definition of 
reflective practice is of a rigorous, disciplined approach for noticing, attending to, and 
inquiring into aspects of practice, where ‘practice’ means service to others.  To better 
understand this, and in context of the ‘vast’ (cf. James) growth in literature on reflective 
practice and its varying array of priorities, preferences and dimensions, it is useful to Start 
at its roots, Schön’s most commonly cited theory of the 1980s.   
2.1 Adult learning and critical thinking 
Schön’s work is widely respected as “inspiration” (Moon, 1999:54) for the growth in 
popularity of, and literature on, reflective practice that has blossomed, his most frequently 
cited texts being The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think In Action (1983), and, 
Educating The Reflective Practitioner (1987).  He built his theory on the Pragmatist 
Movement of the Chicago School and John Dewey.  In essence, the challenge offered there 
was too late 19th century empirical claims of universal truth wherein ideas were rational, 
“static, inert” ends in themselves (Dewey, 1916/2007:156), which, in turn, extended from 
earlier work of Charles Sanders Peirce and William James.  Briefly, Peirce’s theory of 
communal meaning offered that ‘our conception of effects is the whole of our conception 
of the object’ (1878/1992:132), which was developed by James in his theory of 
individualised truth:    
ideas (which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true 
just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other 
parts of our experience, to summarize them and get about among them 
by conceptual short-cuts instead of following the interminable 
succession of particular phenomena (1909/2000:x). 
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These Pragmatist roots in their claim of truth as reality as it means to those who are 
perceiving it can be seen in Schön’s theory of reflective practice.   
Dewey extended Pragmatism through his notion of “instrumentalism”: 
knowing is literally something which we do, that is ultimately physical 
and active, that meanings in their logical quality are standpoints, 
attitudes and methods of behaviour towards facts, and that active 
experimentation is essential to verification (Dewey, 1916/2007:331-
332). 
In this context an adult’s ideas for action are “prospective”, “intentions (plans and 
methods)” (1916/2007:156) that make learning and change possible, with emphasis on 
“progress rather than with lapse and fail” (Dewey, 1920:116).  Consequently, the world 
cannot be fixed: it must be “uncertain, unpredictable, uncontrollable and hazardous” 
(Dewey, 1925:71), even “precarious and perilous” (1925:42).  On that basis adults actively 
experience the world through “initiative, inventiveness, varied resourcefulness, assumption 
of responsibility in choice of belief and conduct” (Dewey, 1920:194).  Through this lens he 
contrasts four different kinds of thinking:  
1. thought in its broadest sense, so “everything that […] goes through our minds”, 
such as “idle fancy, trivial recollection, or flitting impression” without sequence 
(1910/1991:2);  
 
2. “imaginative incidents and episodes” that have “a certain coherence, hanging 
together on a continuous thread” (1910/1991:3);  
 
3. thought that “denotes belief resting upon some basis […] real or supposed” 
(1910/1991:4); and, finally,  
 
4. “reflective thought”.   
The first is reflection, a concept described by Cirocki & Widodo (2019:16) as “probably as 
old as educational discourse itself”; the second, dreaming; the third just as described.  It is 
the fourth, reflective thought, that Schön took forward.  For Dewey, reflective thought is 
where ‘judgement is suspended’ (1910/1991:13) and inquiry follows into the 
reasonableness, probability or improbability of the content of ones thinking, beliefs and 
behaviours via ‘close study, scrutiny, revision of evidence, working out the implications of 
various hypotheses” (1910/1991:5).  It involves conscious and deliberate critical 
signification through “Active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or 
supposed form of knowledge in the light of grounds that support it, and the further 
conclusions to which it tends” (1910/1991:6).  In that way “clear and coherent” meaning is 
made, with control experienced in situations that were previously “obscure, doubtful and 
perplexing” (1910/1991:120).  Thus, when Schön first wrote of reflective practice as “a 
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dialogue of thinking and doing through which one becomes more skilful (1983:31) he did so 
in the context of gaining control as a “learning system”: 
A learning system […] must be one in which dynamic conservatism 
operates at such a level and in such a way as to permit change of state 
without intolerable threat to the essential functions the system fulfils for 
the self. Our systems need to maintain their identity, and their ability to 
support the self-identity of those who belong to them, but they must at 
the same time be capable of transforming themselves (Schön, 1971:70), 
a statement that announces Schön’s Pragmatism in uncertainty of the world and its control 
via self and situations as adults learn and think critically.  Schön’s concern was with applying 
this to professional practice as practitioners engage with perplexing situations they 
encounter and find solutions: reflective thought that “converts action that is merely 
appetitive, blind and impulsive into intelligent action” (Dewey, 1933/2008:125) has salience 
to practice artistry.   
2.2 Practice 
Schön was explicit in his assertion that reflective practice is what practitioners do, it is their 
professional artistry (Schön, 1983) and through it, in his words, practitioners can ‘acquire 
new skills or insights’ and as a result ‘construct an epistemology of practice’ (Schön, 
1991:5).  Indeed, it was this application that, by his own assertion, “induced” (Schön, 
1991:1) the widely established popularity of reflective practice outlined earlier.   
To better understand his claim, ‘practice’ requires clarification.  Although introduced briefly 
in the Prologue as service to others, it is complex such that Schatzki refers to “a field of 
practices” [emphasis added] (2001a:2).  Practice is therefore integral to chapter 2 to ‘get at’ 
a rich appreciation of reflective practice.  To lead into that discussion, it is prescient to 
consider its meaning in the term reflective practice.  An often referred to example used in 
mainstream literature is taken from Educating the Reflective Practitioner where Schön 
describes the “topography of professional practice”: 
[…] there is a high, hard ground overlooking a swamp.  On the high 
ground, manageable problems lend themselves to solutions through the 
application of research-based theory and technique. In the swampy 
lowland, messy, confusing problems defy technical solutions. The irony 
of this situation is that the problems of the high ground tend to be 
relatively unimportant to individuals or society at large, however great 
their technical interest may be, while in the swamp lie the problems of 
greatest human concern (1987:3). 
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For Schön, then, ‘practice’ in reflective practice both describes how, and enables a 
practitioner to, control the “messy, indeterminate situations” (Schön, 1987:4) of 
professional settings so that they can provide effective service to users.   
When considered in relation to the range of theories blossoming out of Schön’s originating 
work, it will be seen that some place predominant or sole emphasis on adult learning and 
critical thinking, others on practice, others still a combination of both.  Although one might 
regard these as intertwined, it will be argued that more often adult learning and critical 
thinking, and practice, are problematically conflated, creating significant confusion in 
understanding and practices of reflective practice.   
3 Experience and the ‘self’ who is experiencing. 
I have established that reflective practice is mediated through the self of a 
student/practitioner and their experience.  So, in the spirit of articulating the ‘beam of light’ 
(cf. Bordage) of Starting, it is necessary to unpack ‘experience’ and the ‘self who is 
experiencing’ in their centrality to this thesis and to all theories of reflective practice.  
Typically not named and defined in mainstream reflective practice literature, the concepts 
have been “explored, turned over and dissected in almost every conceivable way” (Walters 
& Unwin, 2016:np), over time, and from a range of perspectives.  Whilst full exposition 
would distract from the focus of the thesis, clarifying my own conceptualisation supports a 
careful research inquiry (and holds to the metaphor of strand two weaving its way through 
this thesis). 
First, rather than ‘experience’ per se, the focus of this thesis is ‘lived experience’.  Even if 
stylistically I use the former, lived experience “announces [my] intent to explore directly the 
originary of prereflective dimensions of human existence as we live it” (van Manen, 
2016:39).  Clearly lived experience has fit with a research focus of reflective practice.  
Further, and resonant with the original Pragmatism of reflective practice, the subjectivity of 
lived experience is such that it is inscribed on and through body, felt sense, and cognitive 
processes, through culture, beliefs, language and values (Varela & Shear, 1999; Cixous, 
1976).  From this view there is no distinction between physical phenomena and one’s 
percept of it, so no ‘public and objective’ that contrasts with ‘private and subjective’.  So,  
while perceived objects are in one sense ‘physical’ (there really are 
objects there that have appearances), they are in another sense 
‘psychological’ (the way that they appear depends not just on the 
objects themselves but on the way that those appearances are 
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constructed by our visual systems) […] we don’t have any experience of 
an object ‘in our mind’ or ‘in our brain’ in addition to the object as 
perceived out in the world. Rather, such phenomenal objects constitute 
what we experience (Velmans, 2009 in Velmans 2017:15). 
Secondly, definitions of the ‘self’ who ‘lives experience’ are just as contested, so by the 
same argument I will not explore that in full but will clarify what I mean by the term as used 
in this work.   
Thinking with van den Hengel (1994:467) and linked to my notion of lived experience, I take 
a view of ‘self’ as a “complex interplay” of  
constancy (a self that remains the same, hence "sameness"), [and] with 
a self that, on the other hand, projects itself into the future and commits 
itself to change and transformation (a self that is not yet but becomes). 
Here, self is both "sedimented" (Ricoeur, 1992:167) and “stabilised” (1992:122), an identity 
that endures, “identified again and again as being the same” (van den Hengel, 1994:467) 
and can be ‘refigurated’ (Ricoeur, 1992:164) through innovation, initiative and change, “the 
fragmenting plurality of ever-changing shards of selves” (van Manen, 2016:139).  
Conceptualised in this thesis, self is not a fixed “logical or scientific certainty” (Pellauer, 
2016:np), but a “lived conviction” (ibid), which, again, clearly has fit with a research focus 
on reflective practice.  
This self as a lived conviction is held in “narrative” (Samuel, 2015:2), that is, “the identity of 
a person lies in the story that self narrates” (van Manen, 2016:138).  Ricouer (1992:141) 
uses the term "emplotment" to signify the production and nature of this narrative, 
describing its emergence from the dynamic interplay of  
competition between a demand for concordance and the admission of 
discordances, which, up to the close of the [narrative], threatens […] 
identity. 
Van den Hengel (1994:467) stresses that in one’s narrative self can also “[become] other 
without losing personal identity”, a Phenomenological perspective that emphasises the 
‘mystery and indeterminacy of consciousness’ (Samuel, 2015:3).   
Thus in articulating my conceptualisation of ‘experience’ and ‘self’ I came to van Manen’s 
Phenomenology of Practice (2016), specifically his connection of lived experience to 
professional practice, a text providing nuanced understanding of the sedimented, stable, 
changing, and emplotted self in the context of professional practice.  As will be seen, it 
became central to my research inquiry into reflective practice. 
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Having articulated key concepts underpinning the research inquiry, it becomes relevant to 
explicate the four ‘props’ that undergird the five spirals of research process (introduced in 
the Prologue). 
4 The four ‘props’ 
- Prop 1: radical research 
It will have been noted I have declared the work of my research to be exploring and 
theorising a radical reflective practice.  A common interpretation of ‘radical’ is 
‘revolutionary’, a big claim that I am not making.  I draw on the term in two ways: the first 
in the spirit of Neill’s (1960) “radical approach” to learning and being and the “radicalism” 
of education proposed by Freire (1996); the second in accord with Schostak & Schostak’s 
(2008) ‘radical research’. 
Neill, Freire – and I, if I may mix myself with such esteemed company – refer to ‘radical’ in 
its Latin origins of radicalis and radix, meaning ‘roots’, so, getting to or expounding the 
roots.  To elaborate, Fromm’s elegant foreword in Neill’s Summerhill (1960:iix) describes 
‘radical’ as “true principle […] without fur”.  Thus, emphasis in my thesis is on reclaiming 
reflective practice from its neo-liberal appropriation to get back to or expound its roots of 
professional artistry, to its ‘true principle without fur’.  In this way it is radical. 
Referring to ‘radical research’, Schostak & Schostak (2008:15) clarify an inquiry self-defining 
in this way “implies some counter-stance to the world as it is, a stance that is active, 
engaged and committed to bringing about change”.  The ‘counter-stance’ of this thesis is to 
hegemonic understanding and practice of reflective practice.  Be that as it may, I am 
mindful of neo-liberal appropriation of this too, the risk of a radical stance becoming 
hollowed out to exist in appearance only (Talpade Mohanty, 2013).  How would my 
research into reflective practice which “has [already] been turned on its head by the 
neoliberal individualisation of experience” maintain its stance to “think provocatively, 
critically and reflexively” (Baer, 2014:197-198)?  The ‘prop’ of radical research is helpful 
here. 
- Prop 2: the liminoid space of art with social science 
For research to be ‘radical’ it must work across disciplines and ‘refuse’ “to be reduced to 
the confines” of traditional structures (Schostak & Schostak, 2008:8).  From the outset I 
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elected to ‘home’ my research within the Faculty of Arts at the University of Winchester.  
With a “study provision” of English, Creative Writing, American Studies, Media, Film, and, 
Performing Arts (University of Winchester, nd), its relationship to social professional 
education in general, and reflective practice in particular, was not immediately obvious.  
Yet, it struck me that cross-fertilisation of social science and arts theory and practice (from 
here on referred to as ‘the arts’) could offer synthesis beyond that of one or the other, a 
“transcend[ing of] existing disciplinary norms” through ‘collaborative fusion’ that might 
enable me to “advance dialogic encounters between different formations of knowledge 
production and creativity” (Puwar & Sharma, 2012:46).  Working in this liminoid space 
(Turner, 1974) offered exciting promise to an aim of radical engagement with reflective 
practice in contrast to the socially structured and maintained order of liminality.  For Turner 
(1974:65) liminoid spaces are interstitial, “an independent and critical source” of “creative 
activity” rather than “a distorted mirror-image, mask, or cloak for structural activity”, and 
offers the potential for “radical change”, matching Schostak & Schostak’s radical research 
as “a kind of critical philosophical refocussing of research and action on the political, the 
cultural and the social without splitting them into separate disciplines” (2008:8). 
- Prop 3: Practice-Led research 
Clearly, then, maintaining research as ‘radical’ would not come from an inductive position 
of wanting to ‘strengthen or problematise well-established theories’ of reflective practice, 
nor from deductively working on a hypothesis “based on existing theory” (Tavory & 
Timmermans, 2014:5).  My project was based on abductive curiosity and aspiration to 
“create new narratives about the phenomenon” (ibid) of reflective practice.  Whilst writing 
a thesis necessarily involves “deductive and inductive consistency and clarity” (van Manen, 
2016:344), abductive research is “a creative inferential process aimed at producing new 
hypothesis and theories based on surprising research evidence” (Tavory & Timmermans, 
2014:5), achieved through “describe[ing] the moment when a sudden leap occurs that 
makes insight possible” (van Manen, 2016:344), a description that mirrors processes of 
professional and reflective practice, and, it transpires, perfectly sums up the research 
process that took place. 
Apart from the ‘trans-disciplinarity’ (cf. Puwar & Sharma) possibility of University of 
Winchester’s Faculty of Arts, it was also their embrace of ‘Practice-As-Research’ that drew 
my attention.  Growing out of arts-based scholarship as a response to the neo-positivist and 
Cartesian roots of traditional doctorates, Practice-As-Research challenges “some of the 
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fundamental assumptions about ‘research’ and knowledge” (Nelson, 2013a:4) through its 
concern with  
the creation of new knowledge […] generally taken to mean ‘new 
readings’, ‘approaches’ and ‘interpretations’ of existing data, processes 
and/or practice which is supplemented by the contribution of your own 
work in your chosen field (Boyce-Tillman in Boyce-Tillman et al, 
2012:14). 
Clearly of relevance to my abductive endeavour, on further exploration according to Candy 
(2006) because my research would not actively and directly draw on arts practices Practice-
As-Research would not fit.  But she proceeds to describe ‘Practice-Led-Research’, 
“concerned with the nature of practice […] lead[ing] to new knowledge that has operational 
significance for that practice” (2006:3).  This did have relevance, a compelling way forward, 
and one that was also supported in the Faculty of Arts.  So, Practice-Led-Research became 
the broad frame of my work, which in turn contributed to the creation of my research sub-
aims:  
• To explore, discuss and propose innovative and creative ways to consider, work with, 
and facilitate reflective practices in radically different ways within higher education 
programmes as a meaningful and political personal, individual and collective 
engagement; 
 
• To engage with the liminoid space between the disciplines of social science and Arts 
and the rich messy nature of professional practice in action research (as a spiral 
method) that involves students as percipients; and, 
 
• To present and disseminate the radically different way/s of approaching, facilitating 
and working with reflective practices in appropriate and relevant formats. 
 
 
- Prop 4: the value and significance of an emerging research method from the 
research process itself 
Schostak & Schostak’s (2008:8) contention is that ‘radical research’ cannot follow form as a 
“straightforward recipe [...] culled from a textbook and applied mechanistically”.  Instead it 
should involve critical consideration of “what counts as proof”, transparent key concepts 
(2008:9), and, an “overall motivation […] to drive democracy further down to individuals” 
(2008:13).  It is as if they were speaking directly to my intentions documented so far, 
epitomised in centering percipients.     
Originally attributed to Leighton (1916:128) in his articulation of ‘percipients’ as “localised 
centres”, he distinguishes between percipients and a ‘real world’ that exists objectively, 
clearly not a view I extoll.  However, adopted and further developed by Alfred North 
Whitehead (a contemporary of Dewey), in his 1919 lectures published under the title of The 
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Concept of Nature (1920/2015) he notes the preoccupation of science with that which is 
perceived yet “We do not ask about the percipient or about the process” - “percipience is 
taken for granted” [emphasis added] (1920/2015:20).  In my research the percipients and 
their processing and process/es are not taken for granted.  To this end North Whitehead 
(1929/1978:212) goes further, conceptualising each person as a “multiplicity of private 
centres of feeling” wherein “origin” and lived experience have “unity”, and “ingress into the 
situation” (1920/2015:153).  These are ‘brought forth, begot, produced’ in a “particular 
form […] infusing its own particularity into creativity” (1929/1978:213).  He elegantly refers 
to this as a “percipient event”, explaining 
The complete foothold of the mind in nature is represented by the pair 
of events, namely, the present duration which marks the 'when' of 
awareness and the percipient event which marks the 'where' of 
awareness and the 'how' of awareness (1920/2015:70). 
In Process and Reality (1929/1978:312) he beautifully (I feel) encapsulates this as “the 
withness of the body”.  Whilst he developed the term essentially to describe forms of 
experience, Myers (2008) utilises it in ways explained earlier to contrast with participants as 
prescribed and inscribed objects in a research process.  In this thesis it declares that the 
shape and detail of any counter-stance will come from the percipients and not (just) my 
own world-view.   
This said, North Whitehead’s exposition of the process of percipience as the "concrescence 
of prehensions," (1929/1978:35) by which he means ‘growing together’ into something 
‘concrete’ enabling individuals to ‘grasp’ albeit not necessarily consciously, spoke to the 
possibility of the research process itself.  In other words, “process is the becoming of 
experience” (1929/1978:166) which matched the nature and intent of the form I wanted 
the research to take. 
Alongside and in-keeping with my feminist standpoint, it still follows that I explicate the 
research methodology, ‘methodology’ being “the constitutive character of the conceptual 
frameworks within which [my] understandings of the world subsist” (Buckler, 2011:73).  
Given that a methodology articulates the “fundamental or regulative aims which underlie” 
the research (Lazar, 2005:8) and the “fundamental assumptions and characteristics” of its 
underpinning perspective (van Manen 1990:27), a feminist standpoint to research 
advocates its ‘disclosure’ so that researcher and reader “confront and justify their own 
ideas, beliefs and positions” (Bates & Jenkins, 2007:57).  Merely stating it will ‘concresce’ is 
not be enough!  However, research methods stem directly from and in correspondence 
with methodology, the researcher solidifying the set of choices and creating the path to be 
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followed by participants through the research process (Silverman, 2013), a ‘path-
dependence’ (Bates & Jenkins, 2007:56) that creates a neat meta-narrative over, and as if 
more valid than, the messy subjective experience of the percipients themselves.  But, I 
wanted the percipients to develop their own research process, not one that I contain and 
control by my chosen methods; as Ashworth (1999:716) puts it, “it must be the research 
enterprise itself in its attempt to reveal the lifeworld which should suggest methods, not 
certain methodological presuppositions” [emphasis added].  This was not only a political 
standpoint.  It more closely resonates with principles of process in professional practice: a 
practitioner has professional values and assumptions, but the method by which they work 
with, for and alongside users becomes most effective when it is responsive, collaborative, 
with emphasis on being user-led (Fish, 1988).  Thus, research method that is fresh and 
responsive, honouring the process of practice as a messy, rich, co-constructed engagement 
from and within complexity, temporality and embodiment, entangled with context, was 
essential to my research process; and fitting to an exploration of reflective practice cut free 
from external control and imposition.  Hence the ‘prop’ of valuing and signifying emerging 
research method from the research process itself.  
5 Inquiry, not methodology 
I recognised this to be ambitious, but, in exploration, Reynolds’ (2014:13) focuses on 
“engagement with inquiry” [emphasis added] rather than ‘methodology’ proved fruitful: 
“inquiry allows for the messy, fluid, emergent dialogues” and is “more generative and 
useful than categories, evidence or truth”.  Therefore, inquiry and not methodology offers a 
fitting Start in my research context, structure and multi-emerging, of moving with and 
where the flow takes the work.  That said, in the social sciences ‘inquiry’ is typically 
understood as interrogation to get at the truth of something, to expose and gather facts 
(Woodward, 2013), not the association I wanted.  So it was positive to note in the arts an 
‘inquiry’ refers to the way in which “multiple perspectives” are garnered (Taylor, 1996:39) 
through creative processes that enable ‘a possible new perspective or rethinking of an 
ingrained belief’ (1996:44).  Therefore, research inquiry as opposed to methodology, and as 
conceptualised within the arts, is a relevant ‘prop’ to my endeavour.   
Even so, the building blocks of this inquiry still require articulation.   
A cursory interpretation of Preface and Prologue might be that my perspective of what 
knowledge “looks like, what units make it up, and how these units interact with one 
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another” (Blaikie 2007:3) reflect a Realist perspective, that “pre-existen[t] structural and 
cultural emergents shape the social environment to be inhabited”, meaning in and of past 
actions transferred into current situations.  However, my emphasis was that I make 
decisions, I interpret my world, i.e. recognising structural and cultural influences: I am this 
particular woman.  Interpretivism acknowledges the social creation of knowledge, focus not 
on observable cause and effect but the subjective meaning attached to them: an 
interpretivist researcher gathers, interprets and offers understanding of those meanings 
(Filmer et al, 2005).  Of concern, however, was this would/could put me in an omniscient 
position of gatherer and interpreter in relation to the percipients.  Whilst there is a reality 
to this, I am the researcher, I have authorial privilege, it is my desire is to acknowledge and 
work with this rather than it be the platform of the research, and indeed and anyway being 
researcher is only one intersection of several dynamics at any point in time in a researcher-
percipient relationship with which it would be important to work.   
Critical Theory troubles relationship, power, role and context dynamics in its consideration 
of reality as a “state of tension and contradiction” resulting from “the ‘presentation’ of 
what ‘appears to be’” (Carroll, 1996:76).  Its focus is problematizing the surface by 
unearthing what lies beneath.  Critical Theory also “deliberately refutes the dichotomy of 
researcher and researched by classifying all those involved as […] researchers” [emphasis 
added] (1996:73).  This has fit albeit I would be wrong if I thought of it as a truly 
“democratic partnership” (Gray, 2009:313) given my role as lecturer to some percipients 
(students), and known to be employed as lecturer by all. 
Yet my description of percipient, self and experience introduced above was framed as 
Phenomenological, a paradigm that acknowledges specific, unique and personal lived 
experience through explication of an individual’s own meanings and interpretations (van 
Manen, 1990).  In its “philosophy of experience” (Stoller, 2009:707) this must have 
relevance to reflective practice and an inquiry into it, indeed this Start has already indicated 
a presumption towards valuing subjectivity.  Further, not only is reflective practice first-
person and subjective in focus and method, it is accessed through introspection: 
introspection “make[s] possible an apprehension of subjective experience” (Vermersch, 
1999:17) and is core to Phenomenology. 




There are two problems here.  The first stems from a traditional Kuhn-ian perspective in 
social science that a researcher must select a single paradigm on the position that “one 
must choose sides” (Donmoyer, 2006:16), and here I have three.  
The second problem lies with the element that distinguishes Phenomenology from the 
other paradigms, its method, and method was the aspect I did not want to impose. 
In response to the first problem, it is reassuring to note Denzin & Lincoln’s (2013:11) point 
that more recently qualitative research sees no need to ‘privilege any single approach over 
another’, developing the concept of “qualitative-researcher-as-bricoleur” (2013:8).  Rather 
than one or another ‘competing perspective’, the researcher “works between and within” 
(2013:11) as required and as generated by the research context and question.  Therefore, 
my work can, and does, work between and within a feminist standpoint, Critical Theory and 
Phenomenology as generated by the research. 
In terms of the second problem, it is the extent and nature of introspection as method that 
provides the ground for Phenomenology, so its method cannot be severed from it.  And, in 
some quarters, introspection has been discredited (Bitbol, 2019), criticism ranging from 
rejecting it altogether (e.g. Behaviourism, positivism) to recognising its role but only in 
conjunction with and validated by other methods (Vermersch, 1999).  Under question is the 
validity of gathering plausible judgements of percipients about their experiences when 
those judgements exist prior to and independent from it, in the sense of what this can tell 
about the experience itself, in our case about reflective practice? (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).   
But reflective practice – and therefore my research – is all about those plausible 
judgements that practitioners draw on during their professional practice: the research is 
inquiry into the impact of, in the words of Vermersch (1999:19), the “‘presentification’ of 
past lived experience”, in our case, in the context of professional practice.  Rather than 
grounds not to carry out research based in and on introspection, concern instead is with 
how to capture it and to what ends.  In my research inquiry this involves integrity to 
‘percipient’ such that how and to what ends would emerge through and from them, an 
approach in common with Tuhiwai Smith’s (1999:i) call for “researching back”, i.e. 
“disrupting the rules of the research game towards practices that are more respectful, 
ethical, sympathetic and useful”.   
Finally, and linked, despite having pointed up issues related to research as a ‘democratic 
partnership’ (cf. Gray) in light of my position as researcher, my research inquiry has 
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integrity because of this: lecturers facilitate and assess the reflective practice of their 
students.  The research works with and understands that dynamic as well as recommends 
ways forward. 
But, would this mean I could not confidently refer to my research as Phenomenology?   
Added to this, in classic form the “scienticity” (Patkul, 2016:76) of Phenomenology requires 
focus on reduction via researcher questions to invite ‘bracketing’ of ‘natural attitude’ to get 
to ‘pure consciousness’ (Husserl, 1913/1982) but ‘pure consciousness’ was not a concern of 
my work.   
Finally, whilst indeed wishing for rich description of ‘‘that which shows itself in itself” 
(Moran, 2000:229), my research aims are that the action of this would be to conceptualise 
and explain a radical reflective practice, and ‘conceptualise’ and ‘explain’ are not the 
auspices of Phenomenology (Finlay, 2011).   
So, if I framed my work as Phenomenology (with feminist standpoint and critical theory) 
would it merely produce weak research? 
In exploration of Phenomenology and its (to me, confusing) branches and various 
instructions on how to do it (so to speak), Wild’s (1942:85) assurance of no “specialist 
technique” just different “disciplines and points of view” was reassuring, asserting 
Phenomenology should “not be confused with the opinions of certain Phenomenologists”.  
His work being somewhat dated, I was assured by van Manen’s (2016:29) more recent 
reinforcement that phenomenology “cannot be fitted to a rule book, an interpretative 
schema, a set of steps, or a systematic set of procedures”.  Indeed, his interpretation of 
Husserl’s ‘epoché’ is of “enter[ing] a space of openness to the experience or phenomenon 
we are trying to understand in its prereflective sense” (van Manen, 2014b:np), which had fit 
to the practice and spirit of my endeavour.  Moreover, Varela & Shear (1999:3) assert a 
distinction between Phenomenology in its classical sense, and phenomenology, non-
capitalised.  In contrast to a capitalised version, the focus of phenomenological inquiry 
explores “conscious experience and subjectivity” (ibid) but is both hermeneutic and critical.  
The relevance of this to a focus on experiences of reflective practice, on how those 
engaging in it interpret that experience, and to the critical frame apparent in my work, is 
significant.  As Welton (1987:xiii) offers, phenomenology  
becomes critical when it discovers that a simple, reflective apprehension 
of ‘the things themselves’ is not possible and that analysis involves a 
‘dismantling’ of what would otherwise not speak.   
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Whilst prioritising subjective aspects of conscious experience at the same time it “remains 
cautious”, seeing it as neither “incorrigible, complete or unrevisable” (Velmans, 2007 in 
Velmans, 2017:77).  In the words of critical phenomenologist Hannah Arendt, rather than 
being truly “faith[ful] to experience as it presents itself” phenomenology “is enclosed within 
theoretical commitments arising out of” it (Canovan, 1992:102), a critical stance that must 
lead to ‘action’, a theme that has significance later in this thesis.  Her critical 
phenomenology recognises the accounts of experience from percipients and researcher, 
acknowledging that they “refine” each other (ibid), having fit with my research intentions 
and principles, and the way that I use words and sentence structure in chapter 5 reflects 
the percipients phenomenology (explained further in the chapter overviews). 
6 The course of the doctoral inquiry 
Identification of critical phenomenology emerged towards the end of (and within) spiral 2 
of the research inquiry.  Essential to include here whilst signposting the scholarly ground of 
this thesis it is important to note that I Started the research with a clearly articulated scope 
(reflective practice in professional practice education to support professional practice); a 
clear focus (identified through the aims of radically reclaiming and redefining reflective 
practice and its sub-aims); but questions about its paradigmatic frame (as tracked above 
and reflected in my upgrade writing).  I knew I would ‘research back’ (cf. Tuhiwai Smith) 
with method that was fresh and responsive, led by the percipients, honouring the process 
of practice as a messy, rich, co-constructed engagement from and within complexity, 
temporality and embodiment, entangled with context; and, I had found supervisors 
grounded in Practice-Led-Research who appreciated and could support the nature of such 
an inquiry.  The methods would emerge. 
Inspired by Reason’s (1988) ‘co-operative inquiry group’ I identified that it would take the 
form of Reflective Practice Research Groups (RPRGs).  Given its focus and scope, the 
percipients needed to be working with reflective practice as part of their higher education 
programmes, and although all were based in a single university in the south west, their 
undergraduate and postgraduate programmes were at two different higher education 
institutions.  My facilitation of those RPRGs was informed by my community development 
practice skills, described by Gilchrist (2009:37-8) as “the seven ‘e’s”: ‘enabling, encouraging, 
empowering, educating, equalising, evaluating, engaging communities to do things for 
themselves’.   
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The make-up of the RPRGs is described in more detail later, but to aid clarity, the doctoral 
inquiry is depicted below in terms of the 13 RPRGs and their relation to each of the five 
spirals of research: 
 
 
Figure 4: The five spirals of the research inquiry 
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In the context of understanding professional practice to richly appreciate reflective 
practice, spiral 1 involved informal interviews with six professionals, two lecturers, two 
actors and two community workers in the charity sector, to excavate ‘practice’ beyond my 
own experience and opinion, identifying the elements of difference and in common.  This 
forms the focus of chapter 2. 
Spirals 2 and 3 centred on the RPRGs, the percipients discussions of their ongoing lived 
experiences of reflective practices and their/our experiments with a range of created (and 
creative) reflective activities, this informed by van Manen: by “focusing on a particular 
situation or event” (2016:313) the percipients were encouraged to describe their 
experience “as much as possible in experiential terms” (ibid) without “causal explanations 
or interpretive generalisations” (2016:314) to “develop a richer and deeper understanding 
of” reflective practice (ibid).  This method emerged from the research process.  Preceding 
that, and linked to the RPRGs being initially set up with open membership, the predominant 
methods called forth were group interview (Denscombe, 2010) and focus group (Krueger, 
1988).  Membership, along with the impact of this being open, is explained below and 
discussed further in chapter 4, but by the end of spiral 2 and throughout spiral 3 critical 
phenomenological inquiry was the only method called for from percipient engagement.   
Spirals 4 & 5 involved transcript analysis.  Working with transcripts is a “complex and 
creative process of insightful invention, discovery and disclosure […], a free act of ‘seeing’ 
meaning” (van Manen, 2016:320), and, continuing to draw from van Manen, included 
several stages.  First is “wholistic reading”, attending to the 13 transcripts as a whole work, 
the “phenomenological meaning or main significance” (ibid) of them as an entire text.  This 
was followed by “selective reading”, i.e. noticing “what statement(s) or phrase(s) seem 
particularly essential or revealing about the phenomena being described”, which are 
articulated in “thematic expressions”, so ‘possible gems for developing and writing the text’ 
(ibid).  At that point, ‘insight cultivators’ emerge, reflecting the ‘gems’ in the RPRGs.  Van 
Manen defines ‘insight cultivators’ as the emergence and realisation of that which  
give us the sense of ‘Oh now ‘I see’!’ [that] help us to interpret lived 
experience, recall experiences that seem to exemplify these insight 
cultivators, and stimulate further creative insights and understandings 
with respect to our phenomenon under investigation (2016:324). 
This leads to “detailed reading” of the transcripts, where ‘every sentence and sentence 
cluster’ is considered in light of “what [it] may reveal about the phenomenon or experience 
being described” (ibid).   At this stage, two of the percipient’ ‘insight cultivators’ took on life 
as “threshold concepts”, that is they became concepts that enabled crossing a threshold,  
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akin to a portal, opening up a new and previously inaccessible way of 
thinking about something. It represents a transformed way of 
understanding, or interpreting, or viewing something without which the 
learner cannot progress (Meyer & Land, 2003:1). 
Finally, another ‘detailed reading’ explored ‘what every sentence and sentence cluster 
revealed’ about their lived experience of those threshold concepts. 
Mindful of the research form of groups, it was important that I remained attentive to each 
percipient’s “own private phenomenal” experience (Velmans, 2007 cited in Velmans, 
2017:67) whilst identifying shared understanding.  This is always a tension for 
phenomenological inquiry with groups, but more so in the context of critical 
phenomenology in its purpose of action, in our case, research aiming to discuss and 
propose innovative and creative ways to consider, work with, and facilitate a radical 
reflective practice in higher education programmes.  Helpfully Velmans (2007, in 2017:68) 
writes of “intersubjective agreement”.  He explains that whilst always subjective, there can 
also be ‘intersubjective experience’, where views and descriptions are shared, converging in 
the expressions of lived experience.  As will be seen, the overall degree of ‘intersubjective 
experience’ in the RPRGs was strong, whilst at the same time I honour individual difference, 
although the potential problematic of strong intersubjective experience is considered in the 
Epilogue. 
Transcripts of each audio-recorded RPRG were read through before the next meeting, 
although where not possible due to time pressures the recording was played back (and 
transcribed as soon as possible) so that I could mindfully mark the percipients discussion, 
themes, and potential insight cultivators to re-mark them in the subsequent RPRG.  Thus, 
and in-keeping with the research process and its underpinning principles, these were 
shared, named and described by the percipients, held by my responses as they emerged 
and (re)marked to stimulate their ongoing inquiry.   
7 The RPRGs 
The evolution and nature of the research inquiry, along with the process for emergence of 
methods and analysis, reveal a finely grained line of direction, principles and actions that 
informed and shaped this thesis, which are relevant and commensurate to a focus on 
reflective practice.  So it now follows that I clarify membership of the RPRGs. 
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The RPRGs comprised combinations of 16 self-selecting percipients over a two academic-
year journey, all of whom were involved with reflective practice as part of their university 
programmes.  Volunteering their engagement, the percipients were:  
• undergraduate students on a range of programmes that involved professional 
fieldwork and would ultimately qualify to work in the social professions, some of 
whom were also in part-time related employment;  
• undergraduate students on generic social science degrees who were also employed 
or volunteering in the social professions; and  
• postgraduate students who were specialising in their careers in the social 
professions by taking Level 7 and 8 study at two universities.   
They ranged in age from 18 who alongside studies were leaving home for the first time, to 
individuals joining higher education later in their lives, and in this project some of these had 
caring responsibilities5.  The RPRGs met on dates agreed between the percipients, and 
ranged in frequency from two to six weeks in the academic year structure (i.e. two sets of 
12-week semesters, September to January, January to June).   
During spiral 2 of the project, 14th November 2013 to 29th March 2014, the first year of the 
RPRGs, I Started with inclusive participation: percipients could join at any time.  In reality 
this meant that four out of the six RPRGs in that period were themselves ‘Starts’ (as shown 
in Figure 5).  This unintended consequence blocked process given that dialogue was not 
able to travel far from what became well-trodden ground.  This was still their research 
process, of course, and important in that too, but spiral 3 was distinguished by closed 
membership: percipients could still withdraw (consent and/or involvement) at any time, 
but there was a ‘Start’ period after which the RPRGs were closed to new members.   
The stated aim to which percipients volunteered their engagement was to share, listen, 
explore, discuss, and experiment with their experiences of reflective practice.  Posters 
announcing the research invited interested people to meetings where the scope, focus, and 
Starting place of principles and purpose along with the underpinning research ethics were 
explained, including the necessity to have an ongoing practice to which they could apply 
reflective practice.  Those electing to take part signed consent forms (with copies returned) 
and the date of their first RPRG agreed.  The RPRGs are listed below.  Throughout this thesis 
percipients are referred to by pseudonyms and I have removed personal information that 
might easily lead to their identification. 
 
5 Further distinction by identifying which individuals fall into these ‘categories’ is not relevant to 






































Joseph √ (1st)             
Jeanette √ (1st)  √  √         
Becky √ (1st)  √  √         
Dawn √ (1st)             
Duma  √ (1st )            
Sadie  √ (1st)  √   √ √      
Carol    √ (1st)  √ √ √      
Mary      √ (1st)   √      
Clare      √ (1st)  √      
Jason       √ (1st) √ √ √  √  
Debra       √ (1st) √ √ √   √ 
Geoff       √ (1st)  √ √ √ √ √ 
Rob       √ (1st)  √ √ √ √ √ 
Jack       √ (1st)       
Dasia       √ (1st)    √ √ √ 
Sally   
 
     √ (1st)      




8 Signposting the thesis that follows 
Having now presented an analysis for navigating theories of reflective practice; explicated 
the vital elements in this of ‘experience’ and the self who is experiencing; and, elucidated 
the four core ‘props’ and spirals of research inquiry, to close I will set out the layout of the 
thesis, signposting to aid its reading.    
8.1 Thesis writing 
First, whilst working to ensure that the ‘counter-stance’ (cf. Schostak & Schostak) of the 
thesis would be led by the percipients, I am not implying a corollary of me as ‘neutral 
researcher’: not only am I in the research, as discussed, I am in the thesis construction.  But 
I dance these lines with care: my aim is that from Preface to Epilogue the thesis will not be 
the positioning of a “coloniser writer”, and6 I will ‘keep intact its wholeness’ (Erdmans, 
2007:8); indeed, by doing this I will not be adopting the very trajectory already levelled 
against typical approaches to reflective practice in higher education.  In this regard, in the 
words of van Manen (2016:20), “writing is not just a process of writing up or writing down 
the results of a research project. To write is to reflect; to write is to research”.  In my work a 
deep appreciation of the notion of percipient holds colonisation in check: it ensures that 
the writing ‘recovers and expresses’ (ibid) the ways that the percipient narrative was 
constructed; that their lived experiences expressed in the research process are told ‘as 
lived’ (ibid); and therefore whilst I acknowledge my role I work to ensure that when 
appropriate and necessary my voice is quiet to ensure those of the percipients is loud – and 
where my voice is expressed it is led by the percipients.  In doing this the quality of the 
thesis and research can be “scrutinised” via van Manen’s “criteria” of: 
• “Heuristic questioning: Does the text induce a sense of contemplative wonder and 
questioning effectiveness? 
 
• Descriptive richness: Does the text contain rich and recognisable experiential 
material? 
 
• Interpretive depth: Does the text offer reflective insights that go beyond the taken-
for-granted understandings of everyday life? 
 
• Distinctive rigor: Does the text remain constantly guided by a self-critical question 
of the meaning of the phenomenon [in our case, reflective practice]? 
 
 
6 Included in thesis writing I use italics in four ways: as a tool for emphasis, a common form of 
drawing attention to a word or phrase; Latin words italicised for clarity; formatting style immediately 




• Strong and addressive meaning: Does the text ‘speak’ to and address our sense of 
embodied being? 
 
• Experiential awakening: Does the text awaken prereflective or primal experience 
through vocative and presentational language? 
 
• Inceptual epiphany: Does the study offer us the possibility of deeper and original 
insight, and perhaps an intuitive or inspirited grasp of the ethics and ethos of 
[reflective practice] commitments and practices?” (van Manen, 2016:355-6). 
 
8.2 Thesis structure  
In broader terms writing took place during all five spirals of the doctoral project, but the 
final spiral comprised doing so in depth and detail – specifically, to work such that the 
research retained its integrity and authenticity through content and structure.  Whilst 
inevitably in this process the percipients lived experience becomes fixed by words, it was 
also crucial that their original vibrancy and dynamism was not lost, frozen, or ‘stripped of 
meaning, depth and subtlety’ (van Manen, 2016:42).  Thus spiral 5 involved me “revisiting 
the point of entry, and reviewing theory in the light of the journey just undertaken” 
(Trimingham, 2002:57) to fully articulate the percipients themes, insight cultivators, 
threshold concepts, and the process through which these emerged.  
In outline, the structure of the thesis is as follows, identifying the contribution of each 
chapter (with core chapter-relevant terms in bold): 
This chapter, Chapter 1: ‘Starting’, in conjunction with Preface: Starting Out, and Prologue: 
Starting On has worked from the informed position that a doctoral project, like reflective 
practice, begins somewhere.  I have introduced my interest in reflective practice and my 
own journey from reflective practice being a ‘natural fact’ to regarding it critically, and how, 
consequently, I became curious whether and how it was possible to reclaim and redefine 
the practices of reflective practice to return to its roots of professional artistry.  I have set 
out the focus of this doctoral research and explicated key terms.  In-keeping with its main 
aim and sub-aims, set within a frame of ‘radical research’, it is articulated as Practice-Led 
inquiry, in the Faculty of Arts, underpinned by a feminist standpoint, critical theory and 
critical phenomenology paradigms, with methods that would emerge through deliberate 
siting of percipients as central, this being resonant with professional practice.  Chapter 1 
has described the form and nature of RPRGs, the process of transcript analysis, identified 
‘scrutiny criteria’ (van Manen) for the research and thesis, and emphasises my intention to 
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convey “the liveliness, the involvement, and even the passion” (Reason & Hawkins, 
1988:79) of the entire endeavour. 
Chapter 2 is entitled ‘Capturing’; it ‘Captures’ literature and practices involved in and by 
theories of reflective practice, but does so distinctively.  Chapter 2 argues that only through 
a rich, complex appreciation and comprehensive examination of the messy nature of 
professional practice can reflective practice be fully understood, this being alternative to 
mainstream texts that miss the depth this brings.  The “discipline” (Clark, 1995:563) of 
professional practice is scoped through Professional Practice: Connected Practice, a 
heuristic tool from spiral 1, Capturing the complexity of professional practice through The 
Trappings, Connected Practice, Being Prepared, Performance and Qualities Of Me.  The 
contention here is that individually and collectively, practitioners are prescribed and 
inscribed in particular professions, working in and with agreed notions of person, procedure 
and policy, in a landscape wherein these territories are contested and discourses clash.  The 
Trappings is about a rigidity and fixing of practice and self in professional education, of 
adopting and adhering to, building on Schechner, the relevant Identity-Of a professional in 
a specific profession.  But with reflective practice at the core of the heuristic scoping tool, it 
is shows how practitioners weave The Trappings in their daily, indeed moment-by-moment, 
decisions, actions, thoughts, feelings, of what it is to be that particular profession and 
professional, in that particular situation and context of space and place.  In their Identity-As 
that professional in their profession they scribe their practice.  This analysis leads to a rich 
appreciation of and for reflective practice, Capturing key themes, tenets and claims in its 
mainstream literature.  The action of Capturing works in the liminoid space of social science 
and arts theory, enriched through the critical perspective it enables, and brings to light 
analysis of theories of reflective practice related to reflection-in-action and reflection-on-
action.  Reflection-in-action is Captured as the least theorised element of Schön’s work, and 
one that he confuses and conflates with reflection-on-action, a situation that persists in 
mainstream literature and understanding. 
Chapter 3 is ‘Curating’.  Rather than applying research to a literature review as if 
instructions to “solve puzzles”, “radical research begins with a drawing out […] a calling 
forth of questions” with a view to “dis-solv[ing] the puzzles” (Schostak & Schostak, 
2008:13).  In this thesis that takes place through Curating, “bring[ing] the elements” (Ulrich 
Obrist, 2015:1) of Captured mainstream key themes, tenets and claims of reflective practice 
from chapter 2 “into proximity with” (ibid) and jostled by percipient lived experiences of 
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reflective practice from the RPRGs.  It is a ‘meddling’ (McWilliam, 2009 cited in Kershaw, 
2009:5) that creates ‘unexpected combinations’ (Puwar & Sharma, 2012:44): Curating 
“makes junctions, opens new routes” (Ulrich Obrist, 2015:1) and in this way ‘draws out’ and 
‘calls forth’ critical questions about reflective practice, discussing them through relevant 
theory.  The argument ‘drawn out’ shows mainstream reflective practice to be a 
domesticating process that inscribes and prescribes practitioners, and reveals this to be 
experienced as a slow, incremental violence of being ‘broken in’ (Lefebvre, 1992/2004) to 
its required assumptions, expectations and practices. 
 Chapter 4: ‘Describing’, is the act and process of giving semblance (Langer, 1953).  In this 
case, it is the act and process of giving semblance to, or the “logical expression” (Ryan, 
2012:210) of the ‘junctions and routes’ Curated in chapter 3.  The “dynamic patterns and 
ideas” (2012:210) within percipient lived experiences of reflective practice, as well as their 
‘vision of what might be’ (Hicks, 1988:81-82) are Described, but crucially two vectors stand 
out here.  First, Describing is not mapping something out, but expressing somebeing, that 
is, conveying meaning as it was meant by the percipients, this informed by critical 
phenomenology.  To do that work, chapter 4 ‘dwells in’ the percipients voices, so to their 
act and process of semblance.  Here, then, the “writerly space” (van Manen, 2016:363) of 
chapter 4 is devoted to “grasp[ing] the naked now” (2016:369) expressed by the percipients 
themselves, in its “rich, subtle, complex and depthful character”, with minimal authorial 
“overlay” (2016:324) from me/my voice.  Second, in the context of the aims and sub aims of 
the research towards action, the content of Describing is based on percipient 
‘intersubjective experience’ whilst also noting individual difference.  In this way, Describing 
is a vehicle for revealing the percipient phenomenological lived experience of reflection-in-
action as the central aspect of a reflective practice for professional artistry.  Chapter 4 
expressing the nature and qualities of their ‘insight cultivators’ (van Manen, 2016) and 
‘threshold concepts’ (Meyer & Land, 2003) of Gaze (reflection-on-action) and Glance 
(reflection-in-action) , and a final ‘insight cultivator’ that broadens understanding of 
reflective practice further still, that of Leaving Go, the deliberate activity of not engaging in 
reflective practice. 
Chapter 5: ‘Narrating’, takes the ‘naked now’ of chapter 4 and builds it into a Narrative.  In 
this way, Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go are “rescue[d] from the just now” of percipient lived 
experiences (van Manen, 2016:363) and ‘emplotted’ (Peters & Besley, 2012:119) in 
Narrative.  Of significance is that this Narrating is not an “exercise of imagination” (ibid), 
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nor is it controlling and domesticating the messiness of their experiences into a neat “story” 
(Cobley, 2014:5).  It is a process that is steeped in, connects, frames, and gives expression 
to that which has been Described, ‘drawing’ Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go into a ‘plot’ 
(Peters & Besley, 2012:119) by: reflecting the phenomenology through word usage and 
sentence structure; and, connection with relevant theory to illuminate the insight 
cultivators and threshold concepts through European critical phenomenology of: Henri 
Lefebvre (1992/2004), Eugene Gendlin (1962; 1978; 1984; 1996; 1997; 2004), and Hannah 
Arendt (1958; 1971) (along with her renowned commentator, Canovan, 1992).  In this way 
reflective practice is reclaimed from neo-liberal appropriation that formulates it as a reified, 
cognitively dominated, panoptical form of therapeutic analysis and professional 
assessment, a narrowing process that imposes habitualised and repetitive routines on to 
what otherwise can be innovatory practices.  Narrating of Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go 
broadens the relevance of the percipients lived experiences to a radical reflective practice.    
Chapter 6: Mittere, acknowledges the significance of the process through which this radical 
reimagined and redefined reflective practice emerged.  Set within a summary of chapters 1-
5, and retaining the principle of being percipient led, a frame of Mittere is proposed, a term 
offered in the spirit that “language opens and transcends itself into image – the image 
wherein meaning speaks and resonates” (van Manen, 2016:370).  It is a Latin word, the 
etymology of ‘mess’, but means letting go, a surprising synergy with the theme to not 
domesticate and control running throughout the thesis.  I revisit the transcripts with this in 
mind, a final “detailed reading” (cf. van Manen), and through this offer Mittere as stepping 
into the unknown in order to creatively and innovatively emplace oneself and one’s 
practice, its nature being dialogue, courage, and the “necessary discipline” (Trimingham, 
2002:57) involved in delaying storytelling and prioritising creativity, such that what emerges 
is authentic and fresh, refusing the watchful eye and scrutiny of performativity.  In turn this 
leads me to pick up on a growing thread, that simply replacing the Gaze of reflection-on-
action with insistence and expectation of Glance of reflection-in-action is an unhelpful 
duality and falls in to the same trap that has beset reflective practice in its insistence of the 
former, and furthermore omits Leaving Go.  So, I offer Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go as a 
rhythm (Lefebvre), building on the rhythmic qualities and nature of percipient Descriptions, 
but also the rhythm of moving in (reflection-in-action), out (reflection-on-action) and away 
(Leaving Go).  Where established mainstream theory considers reflection-in-action, if it 
does at all, it gets snagged in a vortex of what constitutes ‘in’ action, and when ‘in’ 
becomes ‘on’ (as in reflection-on-action).  Given its possible similarity to currere (Pinar), 
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Mittere is compared to and distinguished from this.  Mittere is understood as facilitating 
the rhythm of the reclaimed and redefined reflective practice, comprising Starting, 
Capturing, Curating, Describing, and, Narrating.  Thus, the Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go of 
the radical reflective practice are vehicles in its practice, not forms to become new 
normative drivers.  What is offered as normative is the new knowledge of rhythm of 
reflective practice facilitated through Mittere, an alternative radical perspective as well as 
different practices. 
The Epilogue: Starting Out Again, precis the thesis, determining this to be the Start for 
what comes next, i.e. post-doctoral work.  The epilogue also highlights shortcomings of the 
research so they might be avoided in future developments.  
* 
Articulating the thesis structure, it is compelling to note Schostak & Schostak’s (2008:12) 
outline of the way that ‘radical research’ must comprise four integral “moments”:  
• description (“what’s going on”);  
• analysis (“deconstruction – reframing”);  
• action (“implementation of innovations”); and,  
• evaluation (“setting in train a further cycle of description, analysis, action and 
evaluation”).   
In this regard, the Preface, Prologue and chapters 1 and 2 can be understood as ‘what’s 
going on’; chapter 3 as ‘analysis and deconstruction/reframing’, chapters 4 and 5 ‘action, 
implementation of innovations’, whilst chapter 6 and the Epilogue ‘sets in train a further 
cycle’.  In outcome and process this thesis is radical. 
9 Core contribution of this thesis. 
Having positioned this thesis as radical in outcome and process and the contribution of 
each chapter to that endeavour, it is fitting to a doctoral project in departing chapter 1 to 
determine the overall contribution being made to knowledge and understanding.  
This thesis works within the liminoid space of social science and the arts through Practice-
Led Research, an execution that reveals the value of the arts to social science, to the cross-
fertilisation of these disciplines. 
This thesis contends that to appreciate reflective practice a rich understanding of the 
complexity and messiness of professional practice is required, and offers the heuristic tool 
of Professional Practice: Connected Practice to that end. 
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This thesis presents a robust critique of reflective practice, and theorises the qualities of 
Gaze, reflection-on-action, and Glance, reflection-in-action.  It contends that where 
reflective practice means Gaze this should be stated and would do better to be aligned with 
the established standards and practices of critical thinking.  In its theorising of Glance this 
thesis contends that there is need for language and practice that positively connotes 
embodied knowing and offers theory and facilitation to those ends.  It also contends that 
Leaving Go, the deliberate activity of not engaging in reflective practice through mind-
wandering tasks is as important to reflective practice as Gaze and Glance.  This thesis 
proposes Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go as a rhythm, together the rhythm of reflective 
practice.  
Finally, this thesis contends that in contrast to mainstream understanding and practice of 
reflective practice, the rhythm of reflective practice facilitated in higher education through 
Mittere reclaims and redefines the practice of reflective practice from neo-liberal 
appropriation that formulates it as a reified, cognitively dominated, a narrowing process 
that imposes habitualised and repetitive routines on to what otherwise are innovatory 
practices, such that, as a result it is returned to its roots of professional artistry in the 
service of others.   
* 
Having set out the Starting landscape of this thesis and its research, attention now turns to 
chapter 2 and Capturing the literature and practices involved in and by reflective practice 
through a rich, complex appreciation and comprehensive examination of professional 




CHAPTER 2    
Capturing 
Capturing is reliant on noticing.  Noticing is active attention and marked 
consciousness; it is an awareness to be honed. Indeed “every act [of 
practice] depends on noticing: […] what you do not notice, you cannot 
act upon; you cannot choose to act if you do not notice” (Mason 2002:7). 
De Waal’s (2011:13) moments of “reverence and respect” could equally 
apply here. Here, then, one Captures what one has noticed.  
In this chapter, focus is on Capturing theory to elucidate a rich 
description of professional practice and reflective practice, drawing from 
social and political science, social geography and performance theory. 
 
1 Introduction   
It is now established that the principle behind a Schönian understanding of reflective 
practice is that an effective practitioner is one who can systematically engage in and 
critically evaluate their professional practice.  Its core proposition is that engagement 
generates awareness through which a student/practitioner better understands, develops, 
and changes their beliefs, values and assumptions that underpin their practice in order to 
effect enhanced control over self and situation in professional contexts.     
The concept and theory of reflective practice as a “specialised tool” for professionals 
(Moon, 1999:4) was, as charted in chapter 1, articulated in the mid to late 1980s by Donald 
Schön (1983; 1987a).  To pick up where that earlier introduction left off, Schön’s research 
applied Dewey’s ideas about learning from experience to professional contexts, asserting it 
to be integral to the “artful practice” of practitioners (Schön, 1983:19).  Although social 
professions were not the original focus of Schön’s research, it came at a time when they 
were seeking equity with occupational groups of higher status (Gobbi, 1975, cited in Platzer 
et al, 1997), making reflective practice a timely adoption.   
However, more broadly (and relatedly), Schön was writing at a time of “crisis of confidence 
in professional knowledge” [emphasis added] (Schön, 1983:3), debate concerning the 
extent to which professions can and should have control of their own ideologies and 
practices, one that still persists (or never resolves) (e.g. see Yelloly, 1996; Grundmann, 
2017).  Reflective practice held political potential in its principle of starting ‘from within’ 
(Evetts, 2003) and moving outward to collectively held understanding of what makes for 
effective professional knowledge and practice in particular professions, an opposing 
dynamic to incursions on professional practice from external drivers, such as, economic 
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(only) based policy change, and imposed action that conflicts with professional values (ibid).  
Therefore, the work of reflective practice in approach and processes is an anchor for 
practitioners, practice and professions alike.  In sum, and according to Barnett (1990:76), “It 
is recognised that a profession will be the stronger if its practitioners are used to plan, to 
execute, to accept responsibility for, and to critically evaluate their actions”.   
Therefore, ‘reflective practice’ refers to process, outcome, as well as to the tools that 
facilitate it, and in this way Schön’s (1983:19) illumination of “artful practice” is intelligent 
inquiry in the hands of its professionals. 
This said, Dohn (2011) and Gergen & Gergen (2008) assert attributing rapid growth in 
popularity of reflective practice to those reasons alone is over-simplistic.  To appreciate this 
line of argument, one needs to attend to and amplify its core factors of professional 
practice, and the practitioners engaged in it.  Accordingly, and in contrast to typical 
approaches in mainstream literature that foreground the what and the how of reflective 
practice within which reference to professional practice appears, I contend that a rich 
appreciation of professional practice is required first to fully understand reflective practice.  
Without this, appreciation of, and inquiry into, reflective practice will be limited in scope 
and reduced in focus.   
But, how to convey and satisfactorily discuss the complex individual, collective and 
structural endeavour that is professional practice?  Indeed, such a question may well offer 
insight into why it is a less travelled road to get to reflective practice.   
Explained in chapter 1, the first phase of ‘radical research’ is “drawing out” (Schostak & 
Schostak, 2008:13), this being the intention of Capturing in the thesis.  So, to explicate 
professional practice attention will turn to Capture the concepts of practice and 
professional, briefly introduced in the Prologue. 
Wilding (1982) and Brint (1994) track early 20th century trait theorist assumptions of 
professions and professionals being inherently moral, and positively intervening for public 
good on to more recent debates about their role and value in society, specifically, whether 
their status is divisive and might overwhelm any claim to ‘good’.  Detailed historical 
exposition is beyond the scope of this thesis, but in the spirit of clarity in terms, as well as 
entry to a rich appreciation of reflective practice, it is relevant to amplify the concepts of 




2 Practice, professions, and professionals 
Earlier I referred to Argyris & Schön’s (1974:6) definition of practice as a “sequence of 
actions undertaken by a person to serve others”.  In that vein Brunner (2006:135) writes of 
the practice of professionals as “distinctive action to help solve the problems or realise the 
opportunities of others”.  Distinctiveness is important: according to Yelloly (1996:3) the 
actions of practice are shaped through an “area of expertise” within “boundaries” that are 
defined by and responsible for particular “discipline[s], standards and integrity” informed 
by a “service ethic and explicit ethical code”.  Rather than boundaries, Coulter (2001:38) 
refers to “activities”, these being “partitioned off” into “membership categories” associated 
with specific professions in contrast to “‘categorically open’” activities that anyone might 
engage in.  Partitioned, closed membership activities are restricted sets of “institutional 
practices presupposing and/or instantiating the operations of macro-social phenomena” 
(ibid).  
So, we can understand ‘profession’ to refer to a specific service organised around broad 
institutionally established activities determined for categorisable service to others; and 
‘professional’ to mean those who have, to some level, studied the ‘partitioned’ knowledge 
this involves and are therefore qualified to deliver them. 
Critical extension comes from Zygmunt Bauman’s scholarship on modernity.  Bauman 
(1999:xiv) contends that practice is “order making”.  Here, bounded or categorised, the 
practice of a profession ‘trims down the range of possibilities’ thereby increasing “the 
probability of certain patterns of behavior while diminishing, or eliminating altogether the 
likelihood of other kinds of conduct” [sic] (1999:xiv).  His charge, then, is that ‘practice’ 
shapes, impinges on and restricts in its demand for ‘obedience to desired preferences’ 
(ibid).  These ‘desired preferences’ are shaped over time by bodies of knowledge and 
professional narratives, which may take sudden trajectories in reaction to ‘chosen traumas 
and glories’ (Volkan, 1988:xxv), but more typically endure over time.  As epitomised by 
Evetts (2003:397), professional practice is the “structural, occupational and institutional 
arrangements for dealing with work associated with the uncertainties of modern lives in 
risk societies”. 
Indeed, the practice of professionals grows in complexity when the contexts in which they 
operate become more contested.  As highlighted, professional practice and the professions 
in which they work have always been contested arenas where “conflicting interests, 
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interpretations of reality, moral and ethical standards, visions and hopes” of employers, 
consecutive governments, professions, professionals, diverse communities, and multi-
faceted global financial and social economies “exist next to each other” (Philippart, 
2003:70).  Around all of this, in the UK, Global North free-market domination requires 
citizens maintained and sustained as “compliant with the needs of the State” (Runswick-
Cole, 2014:1118), a neo-liberalism that dissolves “public issues into utterly privatized and 
individualistic concerns” (ibid) through processes that delineate ‘us’, those who are 
compliant, from ‘them’, those who, for whatever reason, cannot or do not operate to the 
demands of the neo-liberal market.  In this way, public structural issues become the private 
responsibility of professions and individual professional’s incompetence, frailty, or lack of 
action, i.e. their inability or incompetence to work to ‘their potential’ and bring ‘problem 
citizens’ into line.  The daily professional practice of practitioners is the landscape wherein 
these tensions are enacted, incorporated, reinforced and resisted.   
In sum, ‘practice’, ‘professions’ and ‘professionals’ are contested concepts and processes 
that are located culturally, politically and historically.  Reflective practice also being a 
‘practice’ can be considered in such terms as well as a vehicle of systematic inquiry to make 
meaning in those complex, contested working environments. 
Yet even with that stated, it still reinforces Schatzki’s (2001a:1) contention that 
‘professional practice’ is constructed as a “primary generic social thing”.  It remains unclear 
what ‘professional practice’ actually entails, and the extent to which and how it might be 
the same or different across professions.  Borrowing from Whicker & Kronefield (1994, 
cited in Macfarlane, 2004:54), it is somewhat of a “secret garden”.  Therefore, Capturing 
theory for explication of professional practice beyond its generic meaning is essential for a 
rich appreciation of reflective practice. 
3 The discipline of professional practice 
In his work on professional practice, Clark (1995:564) points up that  
No one is in favour of incompetence, and perhaps this partly explains 
why its antithesis is, on the face of it, so appealing, even 
incontrovertible. 'Competence' conjures the expectation of efficient 
and trustworthy service, the antidote to the frustration and waste 
which result when someone is incompetent. 
Thus, steer to a more nuanced understanding of professional practice could come from 
elucidating what it is that social professionals need to be competent in, but Clark’s own 
response to this is telling.  He highlights confusion created by epistemological differences 
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dependent on whether response is informed by “expert consensus”, ‘models or theory’, 
‘the “natural history” of the practice, “job analysis” or “insider views”, a situation leading to 
‘net outcome that is little more than fragmentary’ (1995:565).  His way forward is through 
“discipline”, that is: 
good practice must be based on a deep appreciation of the 
foundation principles, and the fundamental logic and method, of 
relevant fields of enquiry; this in addition to drawing on relevant 
findings from diverse topics (1995:570). 
From this perspective, the discipline of practice comprises:  
- observational knowledge, that which is taken for granted within a profession;  
- contextual knowledge, application in the specific situation and circumstances of the 
action;  
 
- abstract knowledge, such as social and cultural awareness, and  
- theoretical knowledge, specific frameworks and explanations (Clark, 1995). 
These elements work in different combinations, at different levels, at different times, and 
to varying visibility and awareness.  Therefore, ‘discipline’ infers “adherence to canonical 
knowledge, and orthodoxy in the application of rules of evidence, methods of enquiry and 
standards of performance”, a “mastery” (Clark, 1995:576) reliant on “conformity to 
authority—precisely, to be disciplined” [sic] (1995:575).   
At first this appears to take argument back to Bauman’s ‘ordering’ rather than moving it 
forward as hoped.  But Clark argues differently.  In contrast he offers the discipline of 
practice also involves “creativity” and “imagination” (1995:575), so, an “educated” 
(1975:576) “deliberate and premeditated” “rule-breaking” (1995:576).  Clark’s notion of 
‘discipline’ offers an exciting and alternative avenue through which to explicate 
‘professional practice’, one that resonates with Schön’s own contrasting of mere 
competence with professional artistry.  But even so it still frames professional practice as a 
‘generic social thing’.  A more determined scoping of the discipline of professional practice 
in the social professions is necessary, per se, but also if I am to Capture theory sufficient to 
develop a rich appreciation of reflective practice. 
To this end I scope the ‘discipline’ of professional practice through Professional Practice: 
Connected Practice, a heuristic tool to Capture professional practice.  Professional Practice: 
Connected Practice emerged during spiral 1 of my doctoral research, refined throughout 
the other four spirals that comprise this thesis, iterations tested and honed in conference 
presentations (Trelfa 2016c, 2017c) and published papers (Trelfa 2016a, 2016b, 2017a, 
2017b, & Trelfa & Telfer 2014).  Broadly, Professional Practice: Connected Practice draws 
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on the rich liminoid space (defined earlier) between social science and the arts to Capture 
and convey its messy complexity, not to reduce it to “something orderly” (Newman, 
2006:84) but for its heuristic value in enriching discussion through deep consideration of its 
elements, ultimately bringing into being a discussion of reflective practice, made rich 
through this critical lens. 



















Figure 6: Professional Practice: Connected Practice 
I offer the discipline of professional practice mapped through five embedded circles: 
• The Trappings, 
• Connected Practice,  
• Being Prepared,  
• Performance, and 
• Qualities of Me, 
 
capitalised to identify them as being part of Professional Practice: Connected Practice.  
Specifically, embedded within Connected Practice are Being Prepared, and Performance.  
The overlapping area between them is Qualities of Me.  All four are encompassed by The 
Trappings, and running through the core of all is reflective practice7.  Discussing the 
discipline of professional practice starts from the outer circle and moves in to the core, so 
The Trappings leading to and ending with a rich appreciation of reflective practice. 
 
 
7 This is not capitalised from here on given that it is the focus of the thesis. 
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The word ‘trappings’ has associations with specialised tack for riding a horse in its purpose 
of control, containment and restriction, becoming more broadly drawn in to lexicon that 
describes anything that has that same effect, a signifier of power, powerlessness, and 
control.  In scoping the discipline of professional practice, I offer The Trappings to consider 
the circumstances, characteristics, symbols and artefacts shaped by ideology, discourse and 
policy that characterise and define as well as control and restrict a student/professional in 
their practice, a concept that incorporates the theories of Bauman, Coulter and Evetts 
discussed above, thus, by nature, exemplify the profession and demarcate its limits: The 
Trappings includes and excludes role and responsibility, trapping practitioners within the 
practice of what it is to be that particular kind of professional, therefore depicted as 
shaping, defining and suffusing all other aspects of professional practice.  This aligns with 
Schatzki’s (2001a, 2001b) position that such arrangements prefigure the individual actions 
of practitioners, and Kemmis & Grootenboer’s (2008) ‘practice architectures’, the practice 
of professions and professionals being already designed and built-in to societies in which 
they are found.  These Trappings may be implicit or explicit, but in contrast to the “primary 
generic social thing” (Schatzki, 2001a:1) of typical descriptions of professional practice, it is 
a concept that enables analysis to reveal them as defined and contained in ways that are 
distinct.  Indeed, part of The Trappings is purpose.  Put simply, a practitioner will identify 
with being a particular kind of professional in any context, but they would not have a role 
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or responsibility to act as such, nor recognition and expectation to do so from others 
(Barnes, 2001).  Thus, purpose gives role and responsibility life.   
Therefore, the three key aspects of The Trappings to be Captured and discussed are: 
• ideology, discourse and policy 
• purpose, and 
• identity. 
 
4.11 Ideology, discourse and policy 
Ideologies are the “fundamental beliefs” of a community and its members which act by 
“structur[ing] [their] overall self-image […] as well as [their] relations to other groups” (van 
Dijk, 2015:178) through discourse.  Defined earlier as “not what is said [but] that which 
constrains and enables what can be said” [emphasis added] (Barad, 2003:819), discourses 
“express and reproduce” ideologies (van Dijk, 2015:176).  Finally, social policy is the “web 
of decisions and actions” that work to regulate behaviour and “allocate values” (Easton, 
1953:132) based on those ideologies.  In this way ideology, discourse and policy work to 
determine, reinforce, influence and maintain each other – and, in our case, professional 
practice. 
To further explicate their relationship to professional practice, a New Institutionalism 
perspective from social and political science proves useful.  It sits within a broader school of 
theorisation about the role of institutions and their impact on individual agency, ‘bringing 
the State in’ to analysis in when it had become marginalised.  It comprises several 
perspectives and is not without its critics (Lecours, 2005), too broad a discussion for this 
thesis, but offers fruitful ground on which to consider the impact of ideology, discourse and 
policy on professional practice.  To this end I draw on the work of Hall & Taylor (1996).   
Their contention is that whilst the State is “an overall system of interrelated parts”, its 
institutional arrangements “structure collective behaviour and generate distinctive 
outcomes” (1996:6), thus State and institutions are not ‘neutral brokers’ (ibid).  Indeed, 
New Institutionalism amplifies how the ‘rules, procedures, norms, symbols, cognitive scripts 
and moral templates frame meaning’ (1996:14) in ways that ‘distribute power unevenly’ 
[emphasis added] (1996:9). Further, those scripts and templates are “relatively persistent 
features of the historical landscape” (1996:9), resistant to change “because they structure 
the very choices about reform that the individual is likely to make” (1996:8).  Consequently, 
practices can become “so ‘conventional’ or taken-for-granted that they escape direct 
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scrutiny” (ibid).  All of this is put into social policy, and social policy is enacted by 
practitioners.  It is a perspective that offers insight into The Trappings of professional 
practice, the enactment of institutional rules, procedures, norms, symbols, cognitive scripts 
and moral templates in professional contexts for the service of others, Trapping 
practitioners into what it is to engage in a particular profession whilst providing them with 
“degrees of certainty (Hall & Taylor, 1996:7) about practice (thus explaining how practice 
‘orders’, cf. Bauman).  To the same extent it also exposes the process by which professions 
are eroded via external incursions into and control of their practice.  By this I am not 
suggesting that institutions and practice are one and the same.  Institutions are “concerned 
with” the production of “external goods” and practice is the “bearer” (MacIntyre, 
1981/2013:226), however they are weft and warp of relationship, an important 
discernment and appreciation in later discussion of reflective practice.  In sum, ideology, 
discourse and policy determine ‘doctrine’ (aims and expectations), ‘formula’ (methods in 
accordance with the doctrine) and ‘miranda’, that which is “to be admired and emulated 
(Brunner, 2006:144), ‘bound’ into distinct categories, the specific activities of which being 
partitioned according to individual professions.   
4.12 Purpose 
To elucidate that distinctiveness, I could drill down into the ‘ideas, beliefs, rules and norms’ 
(cf. Barnes) that ‘bound’ each profession in turn but this would be a task of enormous 
proportions.  Instead, I suggest a more effective line is consideration of purpose.   
The ‘bounding’ together of ideology, discourse and social policy into “organised nexuses of 
activity” (Schatzki, 2001b:48) to which professionals of a particular profession are obliged 
to “cleave” (Barnes, 2001:17) provides purpose.  Purpose bridges across time to retain 
consistency, and allows effective behaviours to develop. Indeed, and significantly, 
Csikszentmihalyi (1992:226) writes that ‘by itself action is blind’ and “reflection impotent”: 
it is purpose that gives direction and enables connection of reflection with action.  Thus, 
purpose can also counter the neo-liberal pull towards “a loss of direction, masquerading as 
openness to every direction” [emphasis added] (Kuspit, 1996:1).  In other words, if 
understood generically, practice risks being devalued, fragmented and atomised (Dormer, 
1994) and practitioners steered towards operating without a “hierarchy of values” (Kuspit, 
1996:1) as if specialist knowledge can be taken “down from a supermarket shelf” (1996:38-
39) and applied like ‘components on a production line’ (1996:30).  Purpose ensures artistry 
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is not ‘denied, subverted or made to be the least important aspect’ of professional practice 
(Dormer, 1994:26).   
So, whilst New Institutionalism suggests that professionals will rationally choose from the 
institutional ‘rules of the game’ and play that game in accordance with their own “fixed set 
of preferences or tastes” (Hall & Taylor, 1996:6), The Trappings reinforce this cannot be a 
free choice but critiques and extends that analysis.  Although the choice of this or that with 
reference to purpose is held and managed by ideology, discourse and policy, within it 
practitioners express artistry. 
4.13 Purpose: space and place 
Advancing this is to consider the relationship of purpose to context (Coulter, 2001).  Indeed, 
Boud & Walker (1998:196) assert that context is “the single most important influence” on 
professional practice, yet remains underdeveloped in mainstream literature on professional 
practice (Green, 2009a).   
Context is best appreciated through the lens of space and place, or, put otherwise, practice 
is situated in and by space and place which has a direct relationship to purpose, and is 
therefore relevant to understanding The Trappings of professional practice.  In light of 
limited attention to context in literature on professional practice, theory from social 
geography becomes useful.   
According to Tuan (1977), ‘place’ refers to territories of space that are marked off, in our 
case, to places that particular professions operate in.  Places have history, stories that are 
familiar and satisfy certain needs, and become synonymous with a profession.  ‘Space’, on 
the other hand, is about ‘openness, freedom and threat’ (1977:6), the wider environment 
that becomes marked into ‘place’.  Clearly there is a tension here, so unsurprisingly people 
respond to and engage with space and place in ambivalent and “complicated ways” 
(1977:4).  Applied to professional practice this can be considered in terms of: distance, 
intimacy, spaciousness and crowding; the stable objects that create and define the place; 
the artefacts that exist within the place; the passing of time and its impact on space and 
place; the myths, stories and stereotypes associated with profession’s space and place; and, 
movement (ability, speed, range) within and through the space and place.  These are 
distinctive in The Trappings of different professional practices, an appreciation that 
underscores Green’s concern that this is unrecognised in mainstream literature on 
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professional practice.  As Bachelard (1960/1969a:86) asserts, “we are the space where we 
are”.   
4.14 Identity 
Consequently, it also explains how The Trappings “constitute [the] most basic preferences 
and very identity” of professionals (Hall & Taylor, 1996:15), shaping “self-images” and 
“shared cognitive maps” (1996:17).  Barnes’ (2001:17) notion of ‘cleaving’ points up the 
nature of that process, effect felt in terms of not only what “one should do but also […] 
what one can imagine oneself doing in a given context” [emphasis added] (Hall & Taylor, 
1996:15).  In this sense ‘bounded’ professions demand a ‘relevant identity for the 
performance of the practice’ (Coulter, 2001:38).  However, these theories stop short of 
exploring the relationship of individual practitioners to that construction.  Without this, The 
Trappings alone could imply that professional practice is entirely externally determined 
albeit with some element of practitioner self-orientation.  Yet, clearly argument above is 
developing practice as 
undeniably experiential, at least part of the time, and perhaps [in] 
different ways and senses.  One ‘experiences’ practice, one lives through 
it, aware that it is happening; one remembers it afterwards; one looks 
forward to it, or not. It is an object of fear, or fantasy, and always of 
imagination. It is therefore, as well as being undeniably material, a 
matter of consciousness, however defined (and also, of course 
unconsciousness) and of thought (Green, 2009a:8). 
So, even though practice is routinized, stabilised and regularised (Green, 2009b), 
practitioners are its “carriers” (Reckwitz, 2002:250 cited in Green, 2009b:47), indeed this 
being Schön’s own observation.  As such, then, we can consider that regularity need not be 
conflated with mindlessness.  Green (2009b:49) writes of “knowing practice – of the 
knowingness in practice, as well as the activity of knowing itself regarding practice” [sic].  
He asserts the significance of how one represents practice to oneself in contrast to, in our 
case, New Institutionalism’s prioritising of only that which is externally ‘privileged and 
endorsed as truth’ (2009b:52).  Representation to oneself is a “resource […] in and for how 
to go on, the ongoingness of practice” [sic] (2009b:52).  Core to this is one’s sense of 
purpose, the relationship between an individual’s professional practice and their identity.  
To develop this further, arts theorist Schechner (2013:38) and his focus on performance 
proves fruitful, his contention that “historical and social context, convention, usage and 
tradition” determine what a performance “is”, compared to “any behaviour, event, action 
or anything can be studied “as” performance” [emphasis added] (2013:41).  Borrowing 
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from this to lend to professional practice, I suggest that the relationship of identity, agency 
and The Trappings can be understood through ‘Identity-Of’ and ‘Identity-As’.   
4.15 Identity-Of 
Identity-Of is epistemological; it is knowing the delineated pre-existent discipline and 
practices or ‘sets of actions’ (Schatzki, 2001b:48) that define what it is to be a professional 
of a particular profession and ‘cleaving to’ them (cf. Barnes).  It is “practising a profession” 
(Green, 2009a:6) by knowing of “the orderings” (Tonso, 2008:157; Bauman, 1999) of what 
it is to be a professional of a particular profession which “[call] the tune for the piper to 
which all [its practitioners] dance” (Tonso, 2008:157).  Thus, an individual would refer to 
themselves in terms of one profession rather than another and adhere to and adopt the 
Identity-Of that profession, an identity that is consciously, experientially, and unconsciously 
learned through professional education.  Jarvie (1972:161) writes of the maps constructed 
in practitioners’ minds of “possible paths which will lead them to their goals, and of the 
hazards along each path”, inherited from the “whole tradition in which particular activities 
are related together as part of a social project or mission” (Golby, 1993:4).  Students/ 
practitioners experience ‘competence and being recognised as competent’ as they meet 
“expectations about how to interact, about how people treat each other, and about how to 
work together” (Schippers & Wildermeersch, 2007:167).  Thus, Identity-Of describes the 
process of The Trappings as practitioners “[come] ever more fully into membership of a 
tradition of practice” (Golby, 1993:8) and through that allegiance organisations succeed in 
building and sustaining its particular service to others (Kleinig, 2013), one that can be 
considered as an arc commencing from an individual’s own (variable) starting point to 
adopting the ‘institutional rules of the game’ (cf. Hall & Taylor).  A practitioner might 
consider they are freely making their own decisions and choices, whereas in reality those 
are Trapped.  Barnett (2008) sums this up in his provocative description of the current 
landscape of professional practice wherein professional judgement is no longer left to the 
individual.  Their own voice and authenticity, in our case, through reflective practice, is 
‘dislocated’ (2008:196), “under siege” (2008:201) wherein being ‘swept’ along rather than 
“stopping to think” becomes more likely (2008:199). 
4.16 Identity-As 
Yet it has now been understood that professional practice also requires ‘knowingness’ of 
practice and its representation to oneself (cf. Green) – or agency.  Indeed in early writing 
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Schön (1971:30) characterises a general belief held in society of a ‘stable state’ yet notes 
that “all of our institutions are in continuing processes of transformation” [sic], and 
individuals react in different ways.  Unhelpful reactions include calls for “localism” 
(1971:28) due to a myth of stability, or “revolution” (ibid), “reactionary radicalism” 
(1971:29), and the “mindlessness” of ‘escaping the anguish and uncertainty’ by “evading 
reflective consciousness itself" (ibid).  To “avoid [their] perpetual disruption” his thesis is 
“we must learn to develop learning systems” (1971:201).  Aligned with Dewey’s (1958:178) 
advancement of interaction as a “cooperative activity” and Biesta’s (2007:9-10) discussion 
of how “meanings are shared, recreated, and reconstructed”, Identity-As underscores the 
learner in that system.  Arendt’s (1971) distinction between reason, thinking and work 
compared to knowing and action is significant here.  Reason and thinking are passive, “the 
point at which mental activity comes to a rest” (1971:15); ‘work’ is the instrumentality of 
“means and ends” (Arendt, 1958:4); ‘action’ is untidy and unpredictable, but also “our 
potential to do something that has not been done before”: it is about “invention and 
creation” of the “mundane” as much as the “exceptional and spectacular” (Biesta, 
2007:12).  Yet reason, thinking and work have become so tied together that they risk being 
conceived as one, externally determined, and valued above knowing and action.  It is an 
argument that both reinforces the concept of Identity-Of, at the same time as underscores 
the problem if only Identity-Of minus Identity-As.  Accordingly, from this view, Identity-As 
“is judged by its ability to disclose the identity of the agent, to affirm the reality of the 
world, and to actualize [their] capacity for freedom” (Passerin d'Entreves, 2014:np).  So, 
whereas action in Identity-Of in The Trappings is “entirely eliminated” (Arendt, 1958:223), 
students/practitioners ‘normalised’, ‘made to behave’ (1958:40), with practice the “mere 
execution of orders” (1958:223), Identity-As enables “the unexpected [to] be expected” 
(1958:178).  
Therefore, Identity-As suggests an ontological position of an ‘imagined or supposed’ (Tonso, 
2008:154) sense of what it is to be a particular professional.  Schatzki (2001b:49) writes of a 
person’s ‘mental states of affairs expressed in behaviour’ that ‘inform activity by 
determining what makes sense for them to do’ [emphasis added].  To this end Green 
(2009a:6) refers to “practising professionalism” [emphasis added] because predetermined 
notions “neither provide accurate predictions […] nor [capture] all behaviours” (Tonso, 
2008:159) tacit or espoused, that are performed by a practitioner because these are 
“necessarily partial and will change over time” (Furlong, 2000:29).  Moreover, professional 
identity is not only predicated on role and responsibility; it is intersected with gender, 
61 
 
ethnicity, culture, race, sexuality, age, disability.  Identity-As appreciates that individuals 
“[act] and [interact] within a context of history, cultural norms, power relations and social 
institutions” (Litvin, 1997:206) and the extent to which these aspects of personal identities 
are “acknowledged or uncovered” (Schippers & Wildemeersch, 2007:166), per se and at a 
particular time.  Therefore, Identity-As allows for participation in communities where we 
“learn and become who we are” (2008:167), the intersectionality of the personal and 
professional and its impact on practice, and an acknowledgement that being a particular 
professional is only one of multiple identities or constructions of self, the “idiosyncrasy” of 
appreciating that “one’s situation is too complex to be mastered by a single” concept of self 
at any one time (Kuspit, 1996:5).  We can consider it in terms of “identity performances, 
revealing and concealing parts of the self across myriad situations” (Davis, 2017:771): 
practitioners  
enact different versions of the self across time, across networks, and 
amid new settings […calling] forth particular identity meanings 
[…working] to maintain these meanings through performance and 
interaction (ibid). 
So, whilst a nurse/social worker/teacher (etc.) cannot be any kind of practitioner, in 
contrast to the arc of Identity-Of, Identity-As has “a definite beginning” (Arendt, 1958:32) 
or can “proceed from nowhere” (1958:190); “acts into a medium where each reaction 
becomes a chain reaction (ibid); “never has a predictable end” (1958:144); and, can 
comprise “action arising from their witnessing” in ways that are “subversive”, this being 
helpfully defined by Briskman & Zion (2014:279) as “act[s] of kindness” that are not ‘valued’ 
and might even be ‘prohibited’ by institutions.  Identity-As also lends to a more nuanced 
appreciation of professional loyalty because through it we can comprehend dual and 
competing loyalties, from clients, colleagues, employers, State, as well as within an 
individual themselves.  Indeed, in a climate “beset with alternative voices providing rival 
readings of the world” (Barnett, 2008:192) professional practice must focus on ‘being in the 
world’ (2008:2000).   
4.17 Artistry 
Thus, appreciating The Trappings through Identity-Of and the significance of Identity-As 
brings us to artistry (Schön, 1983).  Whilst some practices and situations involve a higher 
proportion of routine and uncomplicated solutions, and some professionals hold less 
autonomy, Schön’s (1987a:13) thesis is that practice always involves the “exercise of 
intelligence, a kind of knowing” (Schön, 1987a:13) that is not about merely ‘knowing the 
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orderings’ (cf. Tonso; cf. Bauman).  Schön (1987a:22) explains artistry as a “high powered, 
esoteric variant of the more familiar sorts of competence all of us exhibit every day in 
countless acts of recognition, judgement and skilful performance”, in itself taking argument 
beyond elucidation of competence (cf. Barnes) alone.  Moreover, student/practitioner 
artistry as the texture of everyday suggests it to be less mysterious than might otherwise be 
inferred, pointing up how it is always present in professional practice, hence Schön’s 
(1987a:13) emphasis that the judgement and skill it comprises makes it “rigorous in its own 
terms”. 
The Trappings of professional practice elucidates the significance of ideology, discourse and 
policy; and analysis through New Institutionalism explicates the processes involved.   
Purpose and context extend appreciation of professional difference, but artistry and its 
relationship to identity invokes a deeper appreciation of this and the significance of 
practitioner agency. Identity-As underscores practitioners as not simply carriers of ideology, 
discourse and social policy.   
Even so, focus now needs to turn to the nature of that agential practice.  Whilst a finely 
grained analysis of each social profession would do this, as argued earlier it would distract 
from scope and focus.  Therefore, attention turns to the second of the circles in Connected 
Practice: Professional Practice. 



















Figure 8  
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Whilst scoping the ‘discipline’ of professional practice through informal interviews with six 
social professionals in three different professions (spiral 1), it became clear that they share 
in common an intention behind their activities to forge Connection (with users, colleagues, 
managers and stakeholders).  Purpose, context and the overarching Trappings, as well as 
individual Identity-As, will influence the shape and nature this takes, making it distinctive to 
professions and individual practitioners, but Connection is the goal. 
In this I am aware it troubles the traditional assumption of ‘relationship’ being core to 
professional practice.  Typically perceived as “essential” (Zandvliet et al, 2014:1) to best 
practice for social professions (Gibbs & Jenkins, 1992), if considered that ‘relationship’ 
involves security, belongingness and attachment (e.g. Argyle et al, 1985; Baumeister & 
Leary, 1995), it cannot be assumed as always desirable in professional contexts.  
Consequently, Connection is more appropriate, evoked in respect of Field Belenky et al’s 
(1996) concept of ‘connected knowing’, where they distinguish between ‘understanding’ 
and ‘knowledge’: ‘understanding’ being “personal acquaintance with an object” involving 
“intimacy and equality”, whilst ‘knowledge’ is “separation from the object and mastery over 
it” (1996:101).  From here the authors distinguish between two different “epistemological 
orientations”.  ‘Connected knowing’ is empathic engagement and responsiveness, or 
“response to others in their terms” (Lyons, 1983 cited in Field Belenky et al, 1996:10), 
‘separated knowing’ is objectivity, so detachment from feelings.  It is their contention that 
women’s ways of knowing relates to the former, although despite having established the 
feminist standpoint of this doctoral work, I am taking ‘connected knowing’ forward as 
applicable to all regardless of gender (and in doing so, support the point made by Baxter 
Magolda, 1992, and Schommer-Aikins & Easter, 2006).   
Thus, Connected Practice declares practice having a goal of empathic engagement and 
responsiveness.   
Social Exchange Theory (Thibault & Kelley, 1959) provides theoretical underpinning to why 
Connection is appropriate to understanding this element of professional practice in its 
contention that individuals weigh up ‘outcome’ by calculating the reward/s and cost/s of an 
interpersonal alliance in ‘comparison’ with alternative options.  For example, a practitioner 
may be forced upon a user/client (e.g. teacher-student, nurse-patient, etc.) but their work 
of compassion, engagement and responsiveness to build a Connection is more likely to lead 
to this being their alliance of choice, which is more likely lead to positive outcomes.  This is 
not to ignore or deny the wider context of The Trappings, indeed Connected Practice: 
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Professional Practice scopes Connected Practice as embedded within it.  But analysis 
through Connected Practice also recognises the ways in which professionals counter or 
resist The Trappings, such as authenticity, “the courageous and resilient sticking fast to the 
true self when the surrounding circumstances are pointing in another direction” (Barnett, 
2011:98).  Whilst later in this thesis I take issue with ‘true self’, authenticity suggests 
conscious and deliberate agency in order to Connect.  Akin to this definition of authenticity, 
Kuspit describes “idiosyncrasy” (1996:3) as an “inner conviction” generated by integrity and 
autonomy, which enables a professional to “survive” postmodernity (1996:4).   
In sum, Captured through Connected Practice, the nature of professional practice as artistry 
that facilitates compassionate, authentic, and idiosyncratic engagement, responsiveness 
and awareness of self and other that can act to counter neo-liberalism is brought to light.   
4.4 Being Prepared, and, Performance 
With that in view, a deeper excavation of authenticity and idiosyncrasy becomes relevant, 
emerging in the 3rd and 4th circles of Connected Practice: Professional Practice, specifically 
‘Being Prepared’ and ‘Performance’, understanding enriched by performance theory.  




















Walkden (1995) likens artistry to building a brick wall, artistry being that which is between 
the bricks that creates a structure, not the individual bricks themselves.  It has been 
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contended this involves the practice of Connection.  However, Connected Practice does not 
happen by chance.  Scoping the discipline of professional practice Captures Being Prepared 
as ‘a thread within a larger cloth of being wise’ (Smith & Smith, 2008:63).   
Being Prepared involves “disposition” (Ryle, 1949/2000:46) and “innovation” 
(1949/2000:61), or “knowing how” (1949/2000:3), ingredients that Nelson (2013b:60) 
asserts are essential for “liquid knowledge”.  ‘Liquid knowledge’ recognises “human 
subjectivity” as bound up in “the production of knowledge”, i.e. not everything can be 
“understood through measurement” and ‘knowledge comes from experience’ (ibid).  
Therefore, Being Prepared concerns rehearsing the regularities of practice but also 
rehearsing the ‘intelligence’ of applying specialist knowledge in a range of situations in 
specific professional context, the action of ‘carefully, skilfully and critically’ (Ryle, 
1949/2000:29) Being Prepared for future practice.  As Schön observes, “each kind of 
learning feeds the other” (1987:165).  Indeed, one could assert it is the role and 
responsibility of a professional to Be Prepared (Brown & Atkins, 1988; Horgan, 2001), 
underscoring the significance of professional education, that which “precedes and/or gives 




Thus, Capturing Being Prepared builds appreciation that the discipline of professional 
practice involves ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how’, which Ryle (1949/2000:31) discusses 
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through his concept of ‘performance’, hence, in our terms, Performance is embedded 
within a Connected dynamic and overlaps with Being Prepared.   
Looking to definitions of performance, Conquergood’s (1995:138) explication of it as 
“action that incessantly insinuates, interrupts, interrogates, antagonizes, and decenters 
powerful master discourses” strikingly resonates with Arendt’s ‘action’ identified before.  
Therefore, what marks out Performance in Connected Practice: Professional Practice is 
practitioner action experienced by others, even if only tangentially or tacitly.  Indeed, 
according to McKenzie (2001:50), a view of professional practice that involves appreciation 
of Performance creates a particular perspective of “spatial, temporal and symbolic ‘in-
between-ness’ [that] allows for social norms to be suspended, challenged, played with and 
perhaps even transformed”.  On its own this has relevance to my research aim.  Therefore 
Performance provides “an especially productive vantage point” (Bauman, 1992:xiv), in our 
case, to professional practice, conveying the way that knowledge from practice 
experiences, education/training and enculturation in the community of practice and its 
external drivers are enacted, interrupted, and critically, carefully considered in intelligent 
acts of Performance of practice artistry. 
Identifying the ways this is the same or different between each social profession would be 
unwieldly for reasons posed previously, but important given that, as noted, Schechner 
(1998:361) contends anything can be considered ‘as’ performance.  Therefore in scoping 
the discipline of professional practice, with regards to Performance brief reference to Bell’s 
(2008) literature review framed around mimesis, poiesis and kinesis proves significant 
(i) Mimesis    
Mimesis refers to performance theories focussing on imitating or mirroring the “action of 
life” (Bell, 2008:12).  Applied to the discipline of professional practice, it points up 
practitioner Performance that mirrors behaviours not bound by the profession, so, for 
instance, verbal interaction based on turn-taking, observation of body language through 
visual scanning, and responses that engage with energy levels, i.e. mimetic professional 
Performance mirrors behaviours involved in effective general interaction (e.g. see Argyle & 
Trower, 1979).  However, for Bell (2008) this can involve falsehood, faking and make-
believe for the purpose of manipulating real emotions in the audience, in our case, 
clients/users, suggesting that the Performance of professional practice can be “mere show” 
(Geertz, 1980:172) with professionals “not to be trusted (Bell, 2008:12).  Importantly, then, 
authentic or manipulated, mimetic Performance offers insight into professional practice 
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that emphasises the significance of intent and builds appreciation of practice beyond that 
of a ‘generic social thing’, even if it sits uncomfortably to consider a professional 
practitioner using their skills of ‘praxis artistry’ (Higgs, 2012:75) to ‘trick and deceive’ (Bell, 
2018:12).  Embedding Performance within Connected Practice suggests that at least the 
overarching goal might be one of compassionate connection, plus in that lens it is 
refreshing to acknowledge that in some circumstances falsehoods and fakery may be 
required, indeed the ‘right’ action to take.  In that vein Higgs’ (ibid) contention that 
everyday expressive devices should always be performed with “expertise, humanity, 
morality, and finesse embodied in high-quality graceful care” can equally apply to 
professional practice in Performance.   
(ii) Poiesis  
Poiesis refers to performance theories that focus on making and creating (Bell, 2008; 
Turner, 1994), stemming from the Greek root meaning “that which ‘pro-duces or leads (a 
thing) into being'" (Whitehead, 2003:np).  Applying this to professional practice, 
Performance without poiesis would equate to ‘sterile’ application and replication of a 
‘technical service to customers’ (Rowland, in Rowland et al, 1998:134) or even a 
mimetically manipulated Performance of a “grandiose” nature (Green, 2009b:51).  Such 
Performance may appear strong, secure and predictable, but, in reality, ‘merely shows 
something’ (Biesta, 2014:53), i.e. emphasis on outcome rather than the journey to get 
there.  As such Biesta (ibid)) calls for “weak practice” [emphasis added], i.e. Performance 
that may not be predictable but is responsive to risk and uncertainty, that recognises 
“something really entered our being from the outside” (ibid) as opposed to the pretence of 
it being in the practitioner’s sole control.  A poeisic approach to Performance works with 
the contingent nature of compassionate practice within – and at times despite - prescribed 
guidelines, expectations and conventions, in the ‘beautiful risk’ (Biesta, 2014) of creation; it 
is the art of varying activity and engagement appropriately and sensitively, a unique-to-
some-degree professional Performance by a professional every time.  Hence, Barba 
(1995:8) writes of “literally put[ting] the body into form” [sic].   
(iii) Kinesis 
Extending from there, and in the final element of Bell’s (2008) analysis, more than 
creatively making Performance, kinesis refers to performance theories that ‘break and 
remake’ (Conquergood, 1995:138 cited in Bell, 2008:13) through “movement, motion, 
fluidity, fluctuation, all those restless energies that transgress boundaries and trouble 
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closure” (ibid).  In this sense kinesic Performance makes Barba’s ‘body into form’ the 
primary focus.  Macintyre & Buck (2008:324) write of practices (teaching) as “bodily 
participatory engagement”, and in his discussion of acting Oida (& Marshall, 1997:14) 
describe the importance of practitioners ‘learning the geography of their body’ through 
“active awareness”.  Thus, kinesic Performance “substitute[es] inert abstract formulations 
for a bodily involved and situationally attuned” professional practice (Bordieu 1976:77 cited 
in Green 2009b:51).  The ‘active awareness’ (Oida & Marshall, 1997:14) this requires is 
described elegantly by Oida as a ‘thread of concentration’: 
if the ‘thread’ of the actor’s concentration becomes slack, the 
performance doesn’t work.  When the ‘thread’ remains taut yet 
invisible, the performance will look truthful and unmechanical: 
completely alive (1997:17). 
Applied to Professional Practice: Connected Practice, rather than Performance as a smooth 
transaction possessed and produced by the performer-practitioner conveyed by mimesis 
and to an extent poiesis, it exemplifies ‘active awareness’ in messy, complex, ‘bodily 
participatory engagement’ that ‘breaks and remakes’ in conjunction with others (client, 
user, colleague, stakeholder).  Kinesic Performance lends to appreciation of the energy of 
that engagement, Performance-as-Connection as a ‘co-construction’ (Walker & Burgess, 
2011), and brings to the fore improvisation, defined by Smith (nd:np) as “creating on the 
fly”, or “freedom-to” and “freedom-from” (Peters, 2005:301).  To better understand this, 
Smith (nd:np) describes improvisation as a “natural technique” available to all if we ‘open 
our eyes and give attention to that which is beyond ourselves but present’, although for 
Peters (2005) it requires instruction.  Instruction for ‘creation on the fly’ may seem a 
contradiction in terms, until understood as a skill that requires preparation and rehearsal 
(Barrett, 1998; Mirvis, 1998).  In sum, improvised Performance is about process and 
outcome, but also could be negative and chaotic (Vera & Crossan, 2005), hence support 
“based on a realistic understanding of improvisation and what it involves” (2005:204) 
becomes salient.  At the same time, it makes improvisation ‘less intimidating, less of a 
mystery’ (Peters, 2005:404) - and thus more possible.  So, in Connected Practice: 
Professional Practice, Performance is in conjunction with Being Prepared, signalling that 
rather than ‘freedom’ ‘on the fly’ where practice happens ‘naturally’, it is skilled and alerts 
students/professionals to the need to ‘carve out space for it, to produce it’ (Peters, 
2005:305).   
Schechner (20013) goes further, linking improvisation to play, and the relevance of this to 
professional practice can be seen through Gordon’s (nd:14) observation that “Creativity 
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produces artefacts, play produces possibilities”.  Resonant with Oida and Barba, Bell 
(2008:73) emphasises the way in which play is “created in the moment in and through 
bodies”.  Therefore, play can be considered as kinesic Performance in its aim of ‘fun, 
hav[ing] no immediate practical goal or benefit, consist[ing] of actions or thoughts 
expressed in novel combinations, and an indicator of well-being’ (Bateson & Martin, 
2013:12).  It calls on “playfulness” [emphasis added] (2013:13), i.e. a “positive mood state” 
(ibid) and “special state of mind” (Martin, 1991:35) involved in “spontaneous and flexible” 
(Bateson & Martin, 2013:12) Performance.  Indeed Key (2013:186) highlights the artistry in 
“restless imaginative and creative practices and the inventive and playful activities” of 
professionals. 
Thus, professional practice understood through the lens of mimetic, poiestic and kinesic 
Performance reveals the finer grained nature of professional practice and how it is different 
between professions, practitioners, their different contexts, and the artistry of individual 
engagement and interventions. 
4.5 Qualities Of Me 
 
Figure 11 
Through this process of Capturing it is becoming increasingly clear that the discipline of 
professional practice “cannot be reduced to technique” (Palmer, 1998:10) alone, nor only 
knowledge, or theory, or the outcome of external drivers.  It is a dynamic of phronesis and 
praxis, a ‘blend of practitioner qualities, skills and creative imagination processes’ (Titchen 
& Higgs, 2001:274-5) that  
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cannot be mapped effectively because it transgresses boundaries, it 
goes where it is not expected to be. It is inherently ‘in between’ and 
therefore cannot be pinned down or located exactly (Schechner, 
1998:360).  
Therefore, the overlapping area between Being Prepared and Performance in Professional 
Practice: Connected Practice is Qualities Of Me: Qualities Of Me creates the “magic” (Revell 
& Wainwright, 2009) of professional practice.  Ellett’s (2012:13) discussion of ‘practical 
reason’, or “how one should act” [emphasis added] has relevance to this but it is Stout’s 
(1990) discussion of justice, courage and hope as well as Nussbaum’s (1990:95) description 
of this as a “loving conversation” between the general and particular which supports this 
particular location of Qualities of Me.   
To offer understanding here, Fromm’s (1979) work in sociology and psychology proves 
helpful.  He contrasts ‘having’, so the ‘having’ of knowledge, plans and procedures through 
subsumption where relationship between practitioner and user/client is “dead” (1979:77) 
(resonant with Field Belenky et al’s ‘separated knowing’, and Ryle’s ‘knowing that’) with 
‘being’, (or, ‘connected knowing’, and, ‘knowing how’), where the relationship between 
practitioner and others is the subject of activity.  ‘Being’ is the quality of that engagement.  
Applied to Professional Practice: Connected Practice, ‘having’ resonates with Being 
Prepared and ‘being’ with Performance, but the interplay of knowledge base, the ability to 
communicate that and engage in the processes involved (including make, break, play and 
improvise) are necessary for effective social professional practice.  Connected Practice 
highlights the fundamental aim of this as connection with others; Being Prepared to learn, 
rehearse and prepare; with Performance that can be mimetic, poiesic and/or kinesic.  
Together these offer insight into the artistry involved and Qualities Of Me focusses 
attention on the “orientation” (Fromm, 1979:88) of the student/practitioner themselves. 
Qualities of Me is about the extent of enthusiasm (Ramsden, 1992), so the tone and 
intensity of Performance, the ability to vary these according to the nature of interaction 
(Lacoss & Chylak, 1998), and therefore, behaviours and attitudes significant to specific 
situation, context and purpose (Macfarlane, 2004).  Qualities of warmth, rapport, ability to 
arouse interest and curiosity through “discursive creation” (Barnett, 2008:204), and, 
thoughtful engagement in ethical and moral inquiry (Banks & Nøhr, 2003), are all germane 
here.   
Intuition is also worthy of consideration, indeed, Claxton (2000) writes of this as essential in 
professional artistry, defined as “feelings, hunches, ways of recognising complex patterns” 
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(2000:28) that are unpremeditated, implicit, and sensitive, drawing on a “well of experience 
in novel, flexible and integrative ways” (2000:41).  Intuition is “the ‘glue’ that holds 
together our conscious intellect and our intelligent action” (2000:36).  Yet it is salient to 
note that “exclusive contemporary focus on more conventional ideas of knowledge” 
(Furlong, 2000:28) has led to it being an under-developed, under-theorised, and, even, at 
times, feared aspect of professional practice.  Qualities Of Me posits that appreciation of 
intuition will significantly contribute to an ‘understanding of professionalism’ (Furlong, 
2000:29).  To such an end Claxton articulates it as “heightened sensitivity to cues” 
(2000:37) and “the abilities to make use of them (2000:38), challenging the ‘mystical, 
transcendental, supernatural’ way it can be referred to, the “fuzzy, emotional kind of gut 
feeling […] ‘I just know it’ claim (2000:32-3).   
It is for this reason that Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1986) discuss intuition as solely in the repertoire 
of expert practitioners, the stage when ‘knowing how’ is tacit and ‘knowing that’ is 
inexplicable.  In contrast, Field Belenky et al (1986:54) consider it to be a core component 
of “subjective knowing” available to all, “novice” (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986) and expert alike 
because it concerns “a shift in orientation […] from external authority, which binds and 
directs our lives, to an adherence to the authority within us” (Field Belenky et al, 1986:54).  
This clearly does not have to, and arguably should not only be, the auspices of experts, 
indeed one could argue that intuition is essential to the artistry of all recalling Evetts 
(2003:397) emphasis on ‘uncertainty’ and ‘risk’ as characteristic of daily professional 
practice.   Indeed, uncertainty and risk were the same elements of interest to Schön in his 
original writing on reflective practice (1983; 1987a), his premise being they are distinct to 
the lifeworld of professionals (1987a).  In contrast to mundane and routine activity where 
technical and procedural responses operate through ‘inductive judgement’ (Dewey, 1910), 
the ‘swampy lowlands’ of complex ethical and moral decisions involved in the 
unpredictability of professional practice require a different response (Schön, 1983; Banks & 
Nøhr, 2003).  The ‘formulae or blueprints’ of inductive judgement do not work, being 
unreliable or even inapplicable in particular unique sets of circumstances.  In this he was 
building on Dewey’s (1910:94) ‘deductive judgement’, where “Ideas as they first present 
themselves are inchoate and incomplete” requiring reflection because this enables “their 
elaboration into fullness and completeness of meaning”.  In this way Schön’s application of 
Dewey’s ideas to professional contexts valued artistry, and in doing so pointed up as 
insufficient established notions of professional knowing based on assumptions of 
unproblematic linear application of theory. 
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At the heart of this professional artistry, then, is reflective practice, signifying its place, role 
and purpose in professional practice, which explains why it has been ‘euphorically 
embraced’ (cf. Horgan).  Through professional education programmes, “the personal 
knowledge base of working professionals which informs their judgement becomes 
embedded in their performance” (Eraut, 1994:17).  Thus, Qualities of Me is not about some 
kind of ‘alienated narcissism and self-actualization’ (Crouch, 2007:107), but qualities and 
actions that support bringing about particular outcomes, those aimed at Connection, and 
Connection is always an ongoing process.  We now also understand this ‘loving 
conversation’ (cf. Nussbaum) of ‘transgression, interruption and movement’ may intuitively 
or consciously involve trickery or deception, a useful antidote to the association that 
Qualities of Me in the service of others must always and inevitably equate only to a 
particular kind of practice. 




















Therefore, we can now appreciate how and why reflective practice is situated at the core of 
Professional Practice: Connected Practice.  Whilst The Trappings construct a practitioner  
as an entity deeply imbricated in a world of institutions, composed of 
symbols, scripts and routines, which provide the filters for 
interpretation, of both the situation and oneself, out of which a course 
of action is constructed (Hall & Taylor, 1996:8), 
Capturing theory that explains Connected Practice, Being Prepared, Performance and 
Qualities Of Me points up practitioner agency in this, and together those five elements 
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reveal artistry as knowing and being, so when, how, and the skills, imagination and qualities 
to “go beyond” (Fish, 1998:56) in the “fumbling act of discovery” (Hamilton, 2005:288) of 
professional practice.  Indeed, it is from such a frame that Schön’s (1987a:42) reflective 
practice describes professional practitioners as “makers of artifacts” [emphasis added].  As 
Fish (1998:88) warns, practice that is entirely “regulated by procedures, decided 
beforehand and outside the situation would be both dangerous to the public (because life 
is not like that) and inimical to professionalism”; it would be “act[s …] from sheer habit, 
blind impulse, or in a fit of absence of mind” (Ryle, 1949/2000:40). 
Professional Practice: Connected Practice reveals professional practice as imposed, stable, 
prescribed and created, expressive, creative, and subjective.  Engaging in reflective practice 
means that a practitioner “become[s] aware of that which they know through [their] 
practice” (Moffatt, 1996:53) as they “bring forward” decisions made and actions taken 
related to situation, context, purpose and the ways and extent to which that is Trapped, “in 
a manner that it can be considered for inquiry and critique” (ibid).  To this view, Titchen & 
Higgs (2001:275) refer to ‘practice wisdom’, “practice experience and knowledge together 
with the ability to use them critically, intuitively and practically”.   
Capturing this complexity of professional practice by scoping it as a discipline leads to rich 
appreciation of reflective practice.  It also directly responds to critique levelled against 
reflective practice, that “professional knowledge is so personal and so situationally specific 
that it cannot be defined or held to account” [emphasis added] (Furlong, 2000:29).  
Discussion has shown professional practice to be complex, personal, situational, and 
institutional, but also that it can and should be named, described and accounted for.  Schön 
(with O’Reilly, 1999:14-15) differentiates the “indescribable”, aspects of professional 
practice that are “hard to describe” (because they are complex, personal, etc.), from the 
“undiscussable”, that which a practitioner chooses not to, does not, or cannot discuss.  His 
concept of reflective practice is underpinned by the view that ‘undiscussable’ practice 
‘remains under the table’ and will become dysfunctional, out-dated, inappropriate, 
entrenched in bad/poor habits, and unconscious therefore out of reach.  Through mindful 
identification and scrutiny of norms and practices of the profession from the perspectives 
of institutional and organisational drivers, users/clients and other stakeholders, as well as 
the individual practitioner’s own norms, qualities and values, they reflect on how these 
impinge on, predict, shape and inform their practice in response to others.  So whilst The 
Trappings suffuse practice, such that a social professional cannot somehow sit outside of 
what it is to be a nurse/social worker/teacher (etc.), we can consider that every decision, 
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action and intervention is mediated through the person of the practitioner: they unpick The 
Trappings, it is their Being Prepared, Performance and Qualities of Me that influence 
engagement, and they can compare this to desired immediate and/or longer term outcome 
or impact, as well as imagined and possible alternatives – and then then take that learning 
in to future practice.  Put the other way around, reflective practice is a process of becoming 
and being aware of the ways in which Qualities of Me interweave in Performance, Being 
Prepared, and Connected Practice, and their interplay within The Trappings.  In this way, 
reflective practice is posited as a 
meaning-making process that moves [an individual] from one 
experience into the next with deeper understanding of its 
relationships with and connections to other experiences and ideas 
(Rodgers, 2002:845). 
It situates practitioners as inscribed, prescribed and scribes of professional practice, and 
professional practice as complex, multifaceted and multileveled.  Practitioners critically 
unpack their practice “in ways that may reconstitute how [they] act and even reshape the 
very nature of [their] identity itself” (Ferguson, 2003:199), the ‘refiguring’ of ‘shards of self’ 
of chapter 1.  To illustrate, consider the significance of context and its space and place 
Captured as part of purpose in The Trappings: a practitioner might grow in awareness of 
the impact of, their response to, and negotiation of, space and place, and as a result 
consider how they might inhabit it differently and/or make changes to advantage the 
clients/users.  Mimetic, poiesic, and kinesic theories of Performance draw attention to their 
use of everyday expressive devices, creation of intervention through intuition and 
improvisation, and practice as embodied.  In this way students/practitioners can grow their 
awareness of self-in-practice beyond perhaps the most obvious and initial areas that draw 
their attention.   
It is for such reasons that mainstream literature of reflective practice describes it as 
transformative, a “tool for critical praxis” (Kilminster et al, 2010:3; Burgoyne & Reynolds, 
1997; Mezirow et al, 1990; Cranton, 2006; Escobar et al, with Freire, 1994) that enables 
‘radical movement for change’ (Bolton, 2006:6).  Student/practitioners engaging in 
reflective practice become “active, engaged and responsible thinkers capable of developing 
[…] critical consciousness” (Canaan, 2004:3), and the professions in which they will or 
already work become “stronger” (Barnett, 1990:76).  
Emphasis on the self of the practitioner does not negate the ‘selves’ of the users/clients.  As 
shown in Connected Practice, Performance, and Qualities Of Me, those for whom 
professional activity is for are by no means passive or inconsequential.  An interpretation of 
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Walkden’s (1995) analogy of wall building in Being Prepared is of it privileging the position 
of practitioner, as if they alone define that which is between the bricks that create the 
structure.  But he also writes of all contributions being meaningful and adding to the whole.  
So, whilst practice is the critical application of specialist knowledge by practitioners 
appropriate to context, plus their individual (and collective) professional agency, it is at the 
same time an experience with others and is responsive to others (Barnett, 2008).  Drawing 
on the work of Martin Buber (1970), Rodgers & Raider-Roth (2006) discuss this in terms of 
‘I’, the practitioner, ‘It’, the focus and purpose of professional activity, and ‘Thou’, others.  
As McCarron & Savin-Baden (2008:57) observe, clients ‘respond, contribute and impose 
themselves and their views’ in ways that are direct and indirect, subtle and forthright, such 
that they ‘shape dynamic and direction’ of practice.  Reflective Practice encourages 
acknowledgement and awareness of this through the nature of Connection, mimetic, 
poiesic and kinesic Performance, and Qualities Of Me. 
Reflective practice still requires that practitioners do not deny or ignore their own power.  
It is their “professional inquiry” (Shapiro, 2010:312) that holds the broad shape of practice 
so they should reflect on the ways in which they use and maintain their power all the time 
via their role and authority to intervene in people’s lives.  As Barnes (2001:20) states, “to 
engage in a practice is to exercise a power”.  More, power does not only stem from 
professional role: the extent to which the ‘self’ of a student/practitioner ‘fits’ with 
hegemonic notions of what is perceived as ‘typical’ in relation to age, gender, race, 
sexuality, ability/disability, subculture and economic status and thus inhabits and is 
ascribed linked privilege or powerlessness should also feature (Shohet & Hawkins, 1989), a 
complex intersectionality manifest in all elements of  Professional Practice: Connected 
Practice and acknowledged in Identity-As.  Bringing to awareness the ways these variables 
of power manifest and are utilised (Lukes, 2005; Orford, 1992), their action to undermine, 
support or take precedent over role power, and the impact on and in co-produced 
relationships and practice dynamics, are fields of focus for reflective practice. 
Finally, emphasis on reflective practice at the core of professional practice does not negate 
The Trappings of professions themselves.  It explicates the relationship between Identity-Of 
and Identity-As.  In sum, the practice of reflective practice can be better appreciated as:  
• supporting and encouraging professional decision making, action and intervention;  
• promoting the unpacking and understanding of practice, policy, and the relational 




• promoting the unpacking and understanding of the relational dynamic with users 
and colleagues; and,  
 
• valuing and promoting professional practice as an important way of knowing and 
being, a landscape wherein these territories are contested and discourses clash. 
5 Professional Practice: Connected Practice, and Reflective Practice 
In this thesis, my contention is that only through Capturing the discipline of professional 
practice can one come to such a rich, deep appreciation of the professional artistry of 
reflective practice as student/practitioners are prescribed, inscribed and scribes of practice.  
As such it can be appreciated why reflective practice is held up as an alternative paradigm 
to “linear thinking as the primary mode for professional problem solving and knowledge 
building” (Papell & Skolnik, 1992:20): reflective practice offered a “new epistemology of 
practice” (Schön, 1983:31; Schön, 1992; Schön, 1995) and a “high-impact pedagog[y]” 
(Slade et al, 2019:7). 
Captured in this way also means that key tenets of reflective practice in its mainstream 
literature become clear: that the practice of Reflective Practice is widely accepted as clear 
and understood; that reflective practice involves the development of emotional, affective, 
self-awareness; that self-development happens and leads to positive change in practice 
competence of individuals; that individual development leads to change at an 
organisational level; and, that one needs to learn and develop reflective practice as a skill in 
order to be able to engage in it.   
6 ‘Drawing out’ reflective practice 
Capturing the discipline of professional practice ‘draws out’ (Schostak & Schostak, 2008:13) 
reflective practice, isolating and bringing to light key tenets.  However, these have also 
been questioned by my MA research, my Starting to this thesis.  Moving in to spiral 2 of the 
research inquiry I was curious to explore them further by bringing them alongside the lived 
experience of the percipients as they engaged in reflective practice in the RPRGs.  
Specifically, to what extent would jostling theory with their experience support the tenets 
or reinforce the argument of neo-liberal appropriation of reflective practice in my Starting?  
If the latter, I was curious whether reflective practice is needed, and if so, whether and how 
it would be possible to reclaim and redefine the practices of reflective practice so it is 






‘Curating’ follows ‘Capturing’, a process of bringing what has been 
Captured ‘in to proximity’ (cf. Ulrich Obrist), in our case, with lived 
experience of reflective practice, to see what is in common, what is 
different, what is distinct, and what surprises.  Curation ‘makes junctions 
and opens new routes’ (ibid), and in doing so “calls forth” (cf. Shostak 
and Shostak) questions, here regarding reflective practice.  The process 
of Curation is equal in importance to any outcome arising from it. 
 
1 Introduction 
The first phase of ‘radical research’ is “drawing out” (Schostak & Schostak, 2008:13).  
Capturing professional practice by interweaving social science and arts theories for scoping 
Professional Practice: Connected Practice has worked to ‘draw it out’ such that it can no 
longer be considered a “primary generic social thing” (Schatzki, 2001a:1).  Doing so has also 
‘drawn out’ a rich appreciation of the significance, role, and nature of reflective practice 
that, I suggest, would otherwise be missing.  Indeed, in this way Capturing has shown 
reflective practice and professional practice to not just be ‘intertwined’ but ‘entangled’ 
(Barad, 2010:251). 
The key tenets of the Captured and ‘drawn out’ reflective practice are that:   
(i) The practice of reflective practice is clear and understood; 
(ii) It involves the development of emotional, affective, self-awareness; 
(iii) This self-development happens, and leads to positive change in practice 
competence; 
 
(iv) This individual practice development leads to change at an organisational level; 
and, 
 
(v) One needs to learn and develop reflective practice as a skill to be able to engage in 
it. 
In radical research, ‘drawing out’ must be followed by ‘calling forth questions’ because this 
facilitates critical exploration its key concepts, social conditions and “what counts as proof” 
(Schostak & Schostak, 2008:9).  I propose Curation to be instrumental for this, in our case, 
Curating theory with percipient lived experience of engaging in reflective practice.   
Curation is the “art of carving out” (Davis, 2017:771), likened by Davis as “turn[ing] a 
sensory flood into a guided stream” (ibid).  Ulrich Obrist (in the title description) works in 
the arts, and Davis (above) is writing on ‘curatorial processes in everyday life” (ibid), but 
78 
 
both approach it as a process that is important in its own right, a deliberate way to re-
imagine, rearrange and surface the possibilities of “new practices, new meanings, values 
and relations between things” (O’Neill, 2010:6), “unexpected combinations” that enables 
“becoming otherwise” (Puwar & Sharma, 2012:44), a process elegantly described by 
McWilliam (2009 cited in Kershaw, 2009:5) as “meddling” and “pruning”.   
Curating, in this thesis, will be structured around each key tenet in turn, jostling theory with 
percipient experiences of engaging in reflective practice from the 13 RPRGs that took place 
in 2013-2015 during spiral 2 and 3 of the doctoral period, with the purpose of “burrowing 
deeply into microprocesses, laterally into neighbouring concepts, or in an upward direction 
[…] to broader social phenomena” (Sutton & Staw, 1995:378).  Whilst I am the curator-as-
author in this, my lead comes from the percipients in-keeping with the principle that they 
“alter and determine [the] process and its outcomes” (Myers, 2008:173), and the inquiry is 
to see if the ‘carved out’ (cf. Peters) elements create a “set of convincing and logically 
interconnected arguments” required of a ‘strong theory’ (ibid).  The aim is not to generate 
“easy ammunition” (Ellingson, 2009:41) of critique for its own sake, but to see if and how 
Curation supports or troubles current mainstream understanding and practice of reflective 
practice.  As Boud & Knights (1996:32) assert, reflective practice “has attained the status of 
being ‘a good thing’” but “there is a need for critical debate about the nature of reflection, 
its role in learning and its inclusion in university courses”.   
Percipient quotes are picked out in italics and not indented to distinguish them from 
literature quotes, taken from the transcribed RPRGs, and indicated by: ‘date, month, year 
of RPRG, percipient pseudonym, transcript line’ (for example, 9Mar2014, Jeanette:130).  To 
aid rendition, consecutive statements and single statements of three lines in length or more 
are tabulated.   
2 ‘Drawn out’ key tenet (i): the practice of ‘reflective practice’ is clear and 
understood 
Principally chapter 2 sets out the significance and constituents of the “reflective turn” 
(Schön, 1991:5) that took hold in the 1980’s and has been ‘euphorically embraced’ in higher 
education programmes for future and current practitioners working in the difficult 
landscape of social professional practice.  In that enterprise a significant body of literature 
has built up, scholarship and practice widely and typically adopted in higher education 
programmes.  Given the elements of Professional Practice: Connected Practice working 
within the “hot action” (cf. Eraut) and “stream-of-consciousness flow” (Lyle, 2002:212) of 
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professional practice, a messy process wherein they are not immediately obvious (Schön, 
1983) and/or are unconscious, tacit and implicit (Argyris & Schön, 1974; Polyani, 1958), 
reflective practice offers a deliberate and conscious approach to develop self and situation 
control and higher education programmes enable students/practitioners to develop that 
stance.  Without it they cannot “explicate full justificatory grounds for what they are doing, 
and they are not aware of the pattern of their activities” (Dohn, 2011:674).  Reflective 
practice is not always easy, or necessarily straightforward, but at least professional practice 
would be ‘indescribable’ rather than ‘undiscussable’ (cf. Schön).   
This is an experience expressed by percipients.  Jeanette talks of working with “messy lives 
and messy people” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:130) and in a different RPRG, Jason and Geoff 
share similarly, this time related to a specific work-based session.  Geoff says it was “hairy 
[…] just like the whole night was a bit mad”.  With that in their minds as representative of 
their experience of professional practice generally, they go on to describe practice as: 
24 Jason …fast, fast, fast. 
25 Geoff … going on all the time’ you know. 
26 Jason So like Geoff said fast pace and you know those minutiae of decisions and 
information you’re taking on all the time, […] 
(10Jan2015)  
In a different RPRG Sadie says, “our practice is a difficult terrain”, and the more “we unfold 
in looking at it, looks to be a very difficult terrain” (15Nov2013, Sadie:87).  Invited to 
describe the ‘hairy’ session, Geoff tells of a fast-moving situation in which young men begin 
to fight, and his immediate reaction, that he did not action, was to grab and pull them 
apart.  It wasn’t until he reflected on it later for his reflective diary which he was keeping 
for university course requirements that he ‘stopped’ to think about it: the activity of 
reflecting-on-practice “made [him] stop and think ‘oh how am I going to do that because I 
can’t actually …” (10Jan2015, Geoff:39) “… hit them round the head or grab them or push 
them apart or split them up just in case I end up hurting them or they end up hurting me or 
something happens” (10Jan2015, Geoff:44) to which Jason agrees saying “that’s where later 
reflection is perhaps more positive than the initial” (10Jan2015, Jason:52).  As Sadie 
(15Nov2013, Sadie:24) puts it, they all have “a responsibility” to engage in a “professional 
way”, and it is reflective practice that makes this possible. 
Indeed it is in this vein that Schön’s (1987:6) original exposition of “artistry” positively 
connoted and explained the way in which professionals work to consciously explicate their 
practice: they recall what happened, identify the contributory elements, and consider what 
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they would repeat and what they would do differently to more effectively manage and 
control themselves and the situations in which they find themselves.  Thus, in what is 
essentially an extension of Deweyian (1910) deductive judgement, Schön (1983:50) 
describes how students/practitioners reflect “on the understandings which have been 
implicit” in their ‘actions and understandings’ through a process of ‘surface, criticize, 
restructure and embody in further action’.   
His research identified two ways this happens, by ‘reflection-in-action’, i.e. when Geoff 
didn’t grab and pull apart the young men who were fighting, and, ‘reflection-on-action’, 
Geoff’s unpacking the incident later.  Thus, reflection-in-action refers to the process 
whereby practitioners “think about doing something while doing it” (Schön, 1983:54) in “a 
stretch of time within which it is still possible to make a difference to the outcomes of 
action (Schön, 1995:np).  Reflection-on-action, on the other hand, refers to how, 
in the relative tranquillity of a post-mortem, [practitioners] think back 
on a project they have undertaken, a situation they have lived through, 
and they explore the understandings they have bought to their handling 
of the case. (Schön, 1983:61). 
The focus of Schön’s writing of the 1980’s, along with the literature that has blossomed 
ever since, pays substantial attention, indeed for the most part sole attention, to theorising 
and honing the practice of reflection-on-action to which these percipients lived experience 
fit.  Indeed, reflection-in-action is the least theorised aspect in Schön’s 1980’s work (Eraut, 
1994) and where it does appear it is ‘incoherent and illogical’, focusing only on “the 
knowledge produced” (Gilroy, 1993:139 cited in Newman, 1999:154) rather than detailing 
its process and without clarifying how it is distinct to the process of reflection-on-action, 
particularly pertinent when ‘knowledge produced’ can only fully be defined as such by 
reflection-on-action anyway. 
This dominance of reflection-on-action has firmly established a developmental perspective 
to mainstream understanding of reflective practice, one that devotes attention to 
increasing finer detail concerning the nature of suitable activities that foster the control of 
practitioner thought and situation.  The broad forms these take in higher education were 
explained in the Preface, and students are expected or required to engage in whichever or 
all according to their programme of study. 
The dominance of reflection-on-action, the widespread adoption of these activities, and the 
mainstream acceptance of its concomitant literature, means that reflective practice has 
come to be equated with, indeed mean reflection-on-action.  Even a brief internet or 
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journal search using the key words ‘reflective practice’ shows this to be the case.  
Subsequently, popular integration of reflective practice (read ‘reflection-on-action’) into 
the social professions along with unanimity in mainstream literature indicates, conveys and 
reinforces the practice of reflective practice as clear and understood, and this follows into 
the way in which it is embedded in higher education programmes for social professionals.  
Given this backdrop there can be a number of specified module and/or course outcomes 
(Moon, 1999), but in common to them all is that they involve a necessary and essential 
expression of vulnerability, candour and disclosure. 
When jostled with percipient experiences of engagement in reflective practice through 
Curation, three matters pertinent to a discussion of points raised here in relation to 
whether the practice of reflective practice is clear and understood are ‘carved out’ (cf. 
Peters), ‘calling forth’ questions about:   
• what to reflect on;  
• conflation of reflection and reflective practice and therefore confusion in 
definitions;  
 
• and, the overarching transformative aim of reflective practice. 
2.1 What to reflect on 
Debra wonders about how to bring what is implicit in, and inherent to, her practice to the 
fore when she reflects-on-action.  She asks “how do you qualify” something like “having a 
way with young people” (30May2015, Debra:113), and this when, in a different RPRG, Geoff 
points out that one’s practice is “just you, it’s who you are” (13May2015, Geoff:115).  
Jeanette attempts to describe the process of reflection-on-action from her experience, 
referring to it as “dredging” and “layers” – she says  
22 Jeanette trying to dredge all this stuff up and lots of things have happened in-
between and you think about it differently and you’ve got to dredge 
through all that stuff if you are going to get any reflection through the 
layers [...] and it’s easier not to 
(29Mar2014) 
Geoff speaks of practice followed by thinking about that practice as a cyclical ingression of 
“emotional load” (30May2015, Geoff:88) and, indeed, Sadie fears that if she was to work at 
being better at reflection-on-action the emotional load would mean she would become 
paralysed by thoughts of “what is the right thing to do and I’m afraid of doing the wrong 
thing” (15Nov2013, Sadie:72) leading to her “going up [her] own fundament!” (15Nov2013, 
Sadie:72).  As observed by Davies & Gannon (2006:90), the practice of reflective practice 
requires practitioners to 
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invent [their] own methods of meaning-making as [they] go and catch 
[them]selves in the act of engaging in old practices and modes of 
meaning-making that [they] are in the process of deconstructing and 
moving beyond. 
 
The experiences of Debra, Geoff, Jeanette and Sadie reinforce Davis & Gannon’s 
argument, that it is indeed a “fraught practice” (ibid). 
It could be considered the intention behind the facilitated reflective activities of 
writing and dialogue is structure to help manage the load of this fraught practice 
(Gourd, 2014).  Even so, it is not obvious how practitioners can capture the 
complexity of their professional practice.  Therefore, it follows that choice of 
which elements of practice to emphasise and explore and which to leave out is 
essential and integral to reflection-on-action.  Jason talks of his concerns about 
“which bit you’re supposed to pinpoint and they all interact and interrelate and 
how are you supposed to make sense of all that” (10Jan2015, Jason:44).  Geoff 
shares how his practice is “so ingrained […] I don’t always notice it” (30May2015, 
Geoff:92).  Sadie differentiates between the process to reach a decision and the 
decision itself (15Nov2013, Sadie:91); the former is “the backchat that’s going on 
in your head…[that] you have with yourself” (15Nov2013, Sadie:70) and she 
struggles to identify which elements to focus on in her diary.  Rob describes his 
practice as “background” (30May2015, Rob:110), Geoff agreeing, “it’s so generic, 
it’s not like I did 60% this and 60% did that” (30May2015, Geoff:109).  Therefore, 
for Jason, to engage in reflective practice his efforts centre on diary construction, 
selecting “which bits I will say more about, which I won’t say about” (21Nov2014, 
Jason:121).  Clare also “produce[s] a lot more” but “picks […] what ones I’ll put in 
[and] won’t put in” (6Oct2014, Clare:113).  Jeanette likens it to forcing her 
“multifaceted” practice  
127 Jeanette …into a table, like a grid, like they say ‘this is how you write your diary 
and your portfolio and this what you have to do’ and so you do it, you 
know it’s false. It contradicts itself 
(29Mar2014) 
Indeed, Geoff describes writing a diary as “a game to play” (30May2015, 12:169), 
a process that is no different to writing an essay (30May2015, Geoff:173).  Setting 
aside the inauthentic nature of this for now, mainstream literature jostled with 
these experiences points up how the practice of reflective practice is not clear. 
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2.2 Conflation of reflection and reflective practice 
Their discussion of this fraught practice goes further, ‘calling forth questions’ about the 
nature of reflective practice itself, specifically querying the extent to which reflective 
practice is different to reflection, the latter being an important element in learning that 
comprises thinking about something and making connections with ones established 
schemata and associations (Finlay & Gough, 2003).  To illustrate, in his review of literature 
on reflection, Lachman (1997:479) defines it as the 
process by which a relatively stable modification in stimulus-response 
relations is developed as a consequence of functional environmental 
interaction via the senses. 
Jeanette, Carol, Jason, Debra, Geoff, Rob & Dasia in four different RPRGs discuss reflective 
practice as a “life skill” (6Dec2014, Debra:275, Geoff:272, Jason:274) that is ‘unconscious’ 
(7Mar2015, Geoff:123), “natural” (7Mar2015, Geoff:108 & Geoff:112), “innate” (7Mar2015, 
Dasia:114, Debra:113), based on “common sense” (7Mar2015, Geoff:133).  As Carol puts it, 
it is something “you do automatically” (18Oct2014, Carol:6) and Jeanette says that she 
“reflect[s] […] on everything […] it’s like such a normal process if you like that you kind of 
forget about it” (28Nov2013, Jeanette:94), ‘if you like that’ suggesting, perhaps, that some 
have to put in more effort whilst for others it is more enjoyable or comes easier to them.  In 
a similar vein but to the other extent, Dasia speaks of it as not always utilised or necessary, 
giving the example of people who “have everything they don’t need to think” (7Mar2015, 
Dasia:145) or it being a “luxury” for people in survival situations (7Mar2015, Rob:143, 
Dasia:133).  In the same RPRG Geoff and Dasia speak of not engaging in reflective practice 
when not required or encouraged to do so in one’s job (7Mar2015, Geoff:98 & Geoff:123, 
Dasia:120, Dasia122 & Dasia:126).  Rob and Geoff wonder if it is a ‘concept’ that is only of 
significance in academic contexts (7Mar2015, Rob:101, Geoff:132).  Similarly, having first 
described reflective practice as ‘normal’, noted above, Jeanette says that at university “they 
say ‘reflection’ you kinda think ‘what’s that, I don’t know what that is, that’s really hard” 
(28Nov2013, Jeanette:94).  Similarly, Sadie shares “I don’t think I’ve reflected before and 
this is something very new to me” (6Oct2014, Sadie:8). 
Here, then, they are talking about reflective practice, but appear to be referring to 
reflection as metacognition involved in learning, but then conflating and confusing the two.  
Equally, their expressions of ‘natural’, ‘normal’, etc., could evidence Ryle’s (1949/2000:40) 
claim that ‘knowing how’ may only be an “interior acknowledgement” (1949/2000:31), 
meaning that “there need be no visible or audible difference between an act done with skill 
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and done from sheer habit” such that it has become “second nature” (1949/2000:41).  
However, Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1986) assert that ‘second nature’ performance is only the 
auspices of ‘expert', and the percipients are ‘novices’ according to their theory, for whom 
conscious performance is essential.  Indeed Bauman (1992:48) characterises performance 
as activities that are “shaped and crafted” through “intense engagement and 
contemplation”, here, then, a very conscious act.   
Thus, taking the percipients conflation and confusion as a lead, and despite the seemingly 
apparent clarity of definitions and explanations of reflective practice in mainstream 
understanding Captured earlier, broader exploration of theory is required.  This reveals 
similar conflation and confusion.  For example, Vaughn (1990:ix) describes reflective 
practice as much a “state of mind as it is a set of activities”, which is the same for reflection 
involved in any and all learning.  Going back to Dewey (1933/2008:3) on whose work Schön 
built his theory, reflection is described as “the kind of thinking that consists in turning a 
subject over in the mind and giving it serious and consecutive consideration”, similar to 
Boud et al’s (1985:20) later ‘model of reflection’ comprising “recollection of the salient 
event, the replaying of the initial experience in the mind of the learner or the recounting to 
others of the features of the experience” (1985:26).  Similarly, Kolb’s (1984:26) “four stage 
learning cycle” sets out to explain the “process whereby knowledge is created through the 
transformation of experience” via “the polarities of actor/observer and 
involvement/detachment”.  Here stage one is the ‘concrete experience’, followed by two, 
‘reflective observation’, three, ‘abstract conceptualisation’ and four, ‘active 
experimentation’.  Gibbs (1988) work is expressly a “guide” (1988:9) to ‘stages for a 
reflective debriefing’ [emphasis added] (1988:49) comprising “description”, “feelings”, 
“evaluation”, “analysis”, “conclusion”, and “action plan” (1988:49-50).   
All three concern reflection, and are commonly used sources and processes referred to in 
literature on and practice of reflective practice.   
It is perhaps little wonder that percipients confuse and conflate reflection and reflective 
practice. 
Even when attention turns to mainstream literature explicitly positioned as reflective 
practice, the difference is not always clear.  For instance, Rolfe et al’s (2001) stages of 
reflective practice require that practitioners consider: ‘What’, the original experience, one’s 
feelings about it now and what one (thinks one) felt at the time; followed by ‘So What’, the 
meaning made of that reflection and how that links to theory; and finally, ‘Now What’, 
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feeding forward any resulting insight and learning into future practice.  In a similar vein Kim 
(1999) writes of constructing a descriptive narrative, followed by connections with 
espoused theory and knowledge, and identification of how this will be applied.  Comparing 
those well used models to Boud et al, Kolb and Gibbs work on reflection, how they are 
distinct is not obvious, and indeed all are typically used in higher education programmes for 
reflective practice interchangeably and without comment.  Similarly, when describing 
control of self and situation as a result of reflection, Dewey uses the metaphor of ‘climbing 
a tree to get a more commanding view of a situation’ (1910/1991:11), an idea adopted by 
Brookfield (1987), Kemmis (1985), Mezirow et al (1990) and Moon (1999) in their theories 
of reflective practice.  In Lachman’s (1997:479) discussion of reflection, he offers that 
“unless there is a change in behaviour […] there is no evidence that learning has occurred”, 
which could equally describe the intention of reflective practice.   
Perhaps this conflation does not matter, after all we can understand the authors’ 
intentions; or perhaps the overlap between reflection and reflective practice is so 
comprehensive that they are easily conflated.  But, in which case this juxtaposition and 
jostling of percipient experiences of engaging in reflective practice with theory leads to the 
question why ‘reflection’ is not enough on its own.  Yet in higher education it is typical to 
see reflective practice being unquestioningly treated as a ‘specialised tool’ in professional 
practice and professional identity formation.  If that claim is to be upheld then it requires 
justification and clarification.  In any case, Berry & Dienes (1993) warn that sovereign 
positioning of reflective practice stalls implicit learning given that people learn and act in 
complex situations and structures all the time without its conscious recall and Claxton 
(2000:36) points up that practitioners who are unaware but observant “master […] faster 
than those who keep struggling for conscious comprehension”.   
2.3 Definitions 
Explanation could come from Adams et al (2002) and Burgoyne & Reynolds (1997:1) in their 
contrasting of ‘effective practitioners’ with ‘reflective practitioners’.  In brief, they 
distinguish between practitioners who reflect, so merely ponder on situation, context and 
self, with those who do so deliberately and then make sense of that information by 
identifying alternative possibilities to better understand and control their professional 
practice and develop themselves as practitioners.  Indeed, this differentiation could go 
some way to explain why the percipients are effective in their practice illustrations even 
whilst describing how they do not deliberately reflect on their practice.  ‘Effective’ in these 
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terms would arguably be luck more than judgement given that in such stage theories of 
reflective practice, ‘effective practitioners’ are perceived as merely ‘technically competent’ 
(Gourd & Kingdon, 2014:214) and therefore inferior – or at least less desirable – than 
‘reflective practitioners’, who  
analyse or evaluate one or more personal experiences and attempt to 
generalise from that thinking.  They do this so that in the future, they 
will be more skilful or better informed or more effective, than they have 
been in the past (Cowan, 1998:17). 
So Sadie, Jason, Debra, Geoff, Rob, and Dasia would only be effective practitioners, and 
their practice would be inferior to peers who are reflective practitioners: they would not 
develop fully as practitioners and therefore presumably they would not progress in their 
higher education programmes.  But considered in the context of the transcripts as a whole, 
this would appear not to be the case.    
Either way this is further confused through another definitional variation, that of critical 
reflective practice.  How or if this is different to ‘reflective practice’ is not always clear yet 
professional programmes and literature will often use the terms ‘reflection’, ‘critical 
reflection/critical reflective practice’ and ‘reflective practice’ interchangeably, or favour one 
without always clarifying why.  Kim (1999) and Burgoyne & Reynolds (1997) characterise 
critical reflective practice as the formation of emancipatory connections and outcomes 
which are not present if engaged in ‘effective’ and ‘reflective’ practice.  To illustrate, 
Burgoyne & Reynolds (1997:2) describe a critically reflective practitioner as one who is 
informed by a 
rich and diverse mixture of descriptive, interpretative and critical 
theories and also an understanding of a range of rival normative 
theories to a preferred one. 
 
Therefore, critical reflective practice would appear to be different and superior to reflective 
practice.  Indeed, Gourd (2014:106) contends there to be “a great deal of difference” 
between them, although reinforcing my point, proceeds to discuss the former by conflating 
it with ‘reflection’.  Further, Gourd & Kingdon (2014:215) describe critical reflective practice 
as a “prerequisite for professionalism” [emphasis added] that it is uniquely performed by 
graduates, therefore implying one can only ‘learn’ critical reflective practice through a 
degree programme, and any other forms of learning (or, for that matter, via any other 
route) do not compare.   
If not enough, further confusion arises in established literature through the term 
‘reflexivity’.  Whilst Fook (2002) advises that it is no different to ‘reflective practice’ but 
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evolved specifically in social work, D’Cruz et al (2007) discusses reflexivity as a critical 
stance to location of self in contrast to reflective practice which only involves “[generating] 
theory from one incident that is generalizable to other incidents and situations” (2007:83).  
However, Bolton (2014); Bolton & Delderfield, (2018), Proctor (1993), and Thompson & 
Thompson (2008:27) (as well as myself) contend that an approach to reflective practice that 
does not adopt critical location of self “would produce poor-quality practice and, in some 
respects, dangerous practice”.   
In any case, what is clear is that reflective practice is not clear and understood.   
2.4 Transformative aim 
The gold standard of reflective practice running through mainstream theories in higher 
education programmes is the epistemological and developmental goal of transformation, 
whether explicitly expressed and whatever the clarity or confusion of definition (Bleakley, 
1999).  It was introduced in chapter 2, reflective practice to transform self, practice and 
organisations for the betterment of service to others (Kilminster et al, 2010; Burgoyne & 
Reynolds, 1997; Mezirow et al, 1990; Cranton, 2006; Escobar et al with Freire, 1994; Bolton, 
2006).  However, the number of aspects in one’s professional practice that must change to 
be deemed ‘transformed’, in what way/s, and who decides it is transformation rather than 
mere change are all unclear.  Further, mindful of The Trappings in the context of 
professional practice, to what extent can practice, structures and the way one thinks and 
acts transform anyway?  A social worker/teacher/nurse must still act as a social 
worker/teacher/nurse, no matter how they interrogate their practice.  What is 
‘transformation’ in these circumstances?  The reason for this point is that it is a confusion 
seen in the lived experience of reflective practice in discussions between percipients Carol, 
Mary and Clare in their RPRG of October 2014.  Mary says  
177 Mary Like I don’t know how to critically reflect on myself.  I don’t know what 
that entails.  I don’t know how to do it.  All I know is that if I do something 
I’ll talk about it and think of a different way of doing it.  That’s just how I 
see reflection.  It’s hardly life-changing though is it 
(6Oct2014) 
Carol replies to Mary that she is accurately describing reflective practice (6Oct2014, 
Carol:181), but Mary comes back with “critically, what makes it critical?” (6Oct2014, 
Mary:183).  Carol’s response to this is “well you look at theory” (6Oct2014, Carol:184) 
although Mary wonders if it is about “looking at the other ways” she could take action 
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(6Oct2014, Mary:185).  To this Carol (6Oct2014, Carol:186) says it is about “criticising, ‘did I 
do that right? Could I have done it differently?”, but Clare and Mary ask “Who says I did it 
wrong?” (6Oct2014, Clare:188, Mary:189).  Agreeing that reflective practice is about 
criticising, Clare and Carol tell Mary that she is already “doing it” after all (6Oct2014, 
Clare:191 &Clare:193; 6Oct2014, Carol:192 & Carol:194), she is “a natural” (6Oct2014, 
Carol:194).  In a different RPRG, Geoff expresses similar confusion: “might [reflective 
practice] just be me and how I think I should be reflecting, you know how deep I’m meant to 
go with it and maybe as a result I just get myself in a muddle with it” (10Jan2015, Geoff:23).   
Here, then, the meaning of ‘critical’ and confusing it with ‘criticism’, confusion about the 
purpose of theory, whether they should only focus on what goes wrong, whilst wondering 
who decides what is ‘wrong’, all makes it difficult for them to determine if and how their 
reflective practice transforms anything.  Of course, picked out earlier, Dreyfus & Dreyfus 
might suggest this is because they are ‘novice’ practitioners, but in the literature on 
reflective practice transformation is the overarching purpose for all, regardless of length of 
experience, although and anyway it is obvious now that how that is the case is far from 
clear and understood. 
3          ‘Drawn out’ key tenet (ii): reflective practice involves development of emotional 
and affective awareness and competence 
The essential constituent in reflective practice of examining one’s feelings and emotions in 
practice situations to develop oneself as a practitioner and one’s practice was established in 
chapter 2.  Indeed, Howe (2008:2) marks out professional practice as “emotional work of a 
high order” because of the involvement of, and toll on, emotions and feelings.  We are, 
after all, “creatures saturated by feelings” (2008:1).  Hochschild’s (2012:30) analysis goes 
further.  She too describes the significance of emotion but additionally “locates the 
position” of the individual experiencing them as “viewer”, such that emotions act as a 
“warning system” and “guidelines to the self-relevance” of that experience.  Applied to 
reflective practice it can be presumed that social professionals who are aware of their 
warning system and guidelines for self-relevance will be better able to “understand how 
their feelings affect them as they work with users and engage with colleagues” (ibid) hence 
its articulation as a “core skill” of emotional intelligence (Howe, 2008:2).  For Howe (ibid) 
professional practice without emotional intelligence is ‘ineffective and lacks humanity’ 
(ibid).  It is a theme that arises in the RPRGs, but first, given the weight of this claim a brief 
foray into ‘emotional intelligence’ is prescient.   
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Stemming from Thorndike’s (1920:228) concept of social intelligence being the ability to 
understand, manage and “act wisely in human relations", a literature search reveals 
‘emotional intelligence’ first appearing in 1966 through the work of Leuner, although widely 
popularised in the 1990’s by Daniel Goleman (1995; 1998).  Goleman built on Salovey & 
Mayer’s (1990) model of five linked elements: self-awareness, managing emotions, 
motivating oneself, empathy, and handling relationships.  A reflective practice that involves 
and supports development of this emotional intelligence can only be welcome in 
professional contexts (e.g. see Osterman & Kottkamp, 2015; Zwozdiak-Myers, 2012) as 
students/practitioners learn to identify, articulate and master their emotions and feelings.  
It reinforces the self as integral to understanding and practice of reflective practice; indeed, 
the self as interpreter, mediator, constructor, is involved in every element of Professional 
Practice: Connected Practice, including The Trappings.  Jeanette speaks of the importance 
in professional practice of “consider[ing] your own values and self on a professional level” 
(14Nov2013, Jeanette:14), which for Sadie enables her to be “more effective […] in the 
workplace” (15Nov2013, Sadie:100).  It is in this way that reflective practice is, as Sadie puts 
it, a “tool for professional work” (15Nov2013, Sadie:100). 
However, it is the questions ‘carved out’ (cf. Peters) by the percipient lived experiences of 
engagement in reflective practice that draw attention.  Duma expresses “fighting between 
my mind, my body and my soul so that I can bring them together and actually become one 
[…], become a person, become a person that I am” (15Nov2013, Duma:130), pointing up the 
enormity of the task as he experiences it.  Moreover, ‘fighting’ suggests the quality of that 
experience, not obvious in the theoretical claims of reflective practice where it seems that 
if one simply adheres to the staged models, reflective practice happens.  If we consider 
‘fighting’ to mean struggle then it finds further expression in the RPRGs.  Geoff and Debra 
are talking about reflective practice and how 
24 Debra …You don’t want to be digging about in all of your stuff… 
25 Geoff …but you are feeling like you have to… 
(18Oct2014) 
Jason joins in, commenting on the requirement to keep a reflective journal whilst knowing 




26 Jason And I guess then there’s showing that to people, like you were describing, 
showing 
27 Geoff Yes you choose to have a therapist and you know its confidential and 
private, you don’t expect random people to be reading it 
28 Debra It would be like people coming and sitting in every now and then 
[laughs]… 
(18Oct2014) 
Therefore, not only is the emotional load and intrusion of reflective practice keenly felt, it is 
compounded by the demand for that to be public.  Becky describes the emotional load just 
from having to put things in “black and white” (29Mar2015, Becky:88), to which Jeanette 
concurs: 
89 Jeanette Yes it’s like saying ‘I got that wrong’ but then isn’t that the whole point 
of reflection, like to see where you went wrong as well, but it’s like 
letting someone else know that, and as soon as you let them you don’t 
know what they will do with that information, it’s like you are no 
longer in control of you 
(29Mar2014)  
It is not surprising in a different RPRGs, Sadie speaks of feeling ‘exposed’ and ‘vulnerable’ 
(29Nov2013, Sadie:14).   
There are three arising issues here, then.  
First, their lived experience of the developmental frame to reflective practice is ‘fight’ and 
struggle to construct themselves - and be constructed by others - as suboptimal and 
requiring growth.  Indeed, it is such a point that leads Cranton (2006:59) to characterise the 
practice of reflective practice as being one can “only reintegrate at the end and […] only be 
disorientated at the beginning”.   
Furthermore, we can appreciate that this creates the need for someone who is (more) 
optimal in self and practice to read, instruct and guide that person’s reflection on their 
practice: it is on such a platform that reflective practice is embedded into higher education 
programmes.  Whilst the form of activities was explained in the Preface, here we can see 
the extent to which students – and higher education programmes – associate reflective 
practice with writing (journals, diaries).  The full implications of this are explored later. 
The third issue is the lived experience of emotional toll from the development of self which 
necessarily requires a level of commitment, a focus on one’s interiority, as well as 
vulnerability expressed through disclosure and candour.  More can be heard about this 
from Geoff whose expression of cyclical ingression was referred to previously; he talks of 
the emotional load of “dwelling on things” explaining that he would “rather leave it there 
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and not bother about it, not think about it, shut it away” but instead he is required to “sort 
of dwell on it and it’ll get worse and I get myself more and more worked up about it and it 
ends up going in a massive vicious… [interrupted] (18Oct2014, Geoff:31).  Carol talks of 
“sit[ting] and chew[ing] and then it starts eating me up” (18Oct2014, Carol32).  On that 
note, Clare explains how her reflections on practice “run[s] the next day”, and she doesn’t 
know “how to stop that”, explaining “Your emotions are going […] and then you beat 
yourself up about, you’re beating yourself up” (21Nov2014, Clare:58).   In the same RPRG, 
Jason expresses his issue with having to be “always critiquing” because “it can easily 
become that tipping to really giving yourself a hard time, self-critical all the time…” agreed 
by Carol (21Nov2014, Carol:353).  In a different RPRG, Debra speaks of “over analysing, 
reflective practice is over analysing things” (18Oct2014, Debra:33), and earlier says she is 
“quite a pessimist when it comes to reflecting on” herself (18Oct2014, Clare:20).  Geoff 
responds that reflective practice “play[s] into that, making you dwell even more” 
(18Oct2014, Geoff:21).  In a later RPRG he speaks of how the act of deliberately reflecting 
on his practice “spoils it” – so “even if I can remember once I sit down to reflect on it, yeah, 
but once it becomes an actual thing you’re meant to be doing, and that spoils it” 
(10Jan2015, Geoff:21).  He elaborates, “once you start to analyse you think then, I don’t 
know, maybe I try and go too deep or [unclear word] too much but it doesn’t always flow 
off, you know it’s…”, tailing off (10Jan2015, Geoff:21), which means he ensures that his 
reflective diary is not “too personal because when I write my diary you know, I know what 
I’m going to write and where it’s going to go” (18Oct2014, Geoff:115).  Debra explains “how 
I feel at the time I may not want to share”, an experience that is given shape by the 
requirement of her higher education programme to write down that which is private; she 
says writing it down means that “anyone can see it” (18Oct2014, Debra:18) and although 
she is “an emotional person” writing it down feels to be a very different and uncomfortable 
activity (18Oct2014, Debra:28). 
3.1 Confession 
In sum, their experiences of engaging in reflective practice illuminate the extent of 
emotional load incurred from confession and uninvited personal intrusion brought on by 
the expectation to (publicly) express disorientation to ultimately reintegrate.  Looking to 
theory, Bleakley (2000:406) argues this stems from its Protestant Humanist roots (that are 
also seamed into the Pragmatism movement).  To exemplify, Carl Rogers (1961:105), widely 
cited as bringing the wider Humanist movement to psychology, bases his theory on the self 
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being available to optimal development as “fully functioning”, this being the “ideal human 
condition”.  Accordingly, "The good life is a process” (Rogers, 1961:186) within which the 
self is conceptualised as a natural, ‘organised, consistent, gestalt’ (Rogers, 1959:200) that 
can – and indeed should - develop if one wishes to be fully functioning, integral to which is 
developing conscience by confessing one’s wrongs (Remer, 1996).  The fit with reflective 
practice Captured in chapter 2 is obvious – but now it’s lived experience is also clear.  It is, 
of course, difficult to see how effective scrutiny of practice can avoid oneself, but jostling 
the key tenet with percipient experiences reveals the impact of that Protestant Humanist 
(and, indeed, Global North) concept of self and notion of development which determines 
both means and ends, and creates emotional load, a “narrative frame” (Rosenwald & 
Ochberg, 1992:2) that is incorporated “in the marrow of individual self-representation” 
(1992:5), within which pre-occupation to confess is wrapped up in notions of cathartic 
salvation (Fejes, 2013).  With reflective practice being situated in this “confessing society” 
(2013:52) and dominated by self-representation then impetus to confess will drive 
engagement even if the facilitation is differently intentioned (Ecclestone & Hayes, 2009; 
Furedi, 2004; Bradbury et al, 2010).   So, and despite those who endeavour to orientate/re-
orientate the focus of reflective practice to criticality and service to others, such as Fook 
(2002; 2016), Fook & Gardner (2007), Newman (1999), Bleakley (1999) and Atkinson & 
Claxton (2000), the percipients experience of the key tenet of development of emotional 
and affective awareness is that the self is broken and needs fixing through confessional 
engagement.  Indeed, Becky sums this up in her understanding that reflective practice 
means only learning from her professional practice when she “doesn’t do well” 
(28Nov2013, Becky:50) although worries, as a result, that her good practice “gets 
forgotten” (28Nov2013, Becky:48), an experience shared by Jeanette (28Nov2013, 
Jeanette:52 & 56), Claire (6Oct2014, Clare:107, 109, 111,) Geoff (18Oct2014, Geoff:19), 
Sadie (21Nov2014, Sadie:376) and Jason (21Nov2014, Jason:374). 
3.2 Acceptable reflective practice 
It could be that this particular lived experience of reflective practice stems from their 
misunderstanding of critical, confusing it, as they do, with ‘criticising’, and criticising tends 
to be emotionally negative work.  It could also be that this is further compounded by the 
word ‘reflective’ if taken to be an emotionally laden never-ending cycle of soul-searching, 
and not, for example, a disciplined approach to practice for the service of others.  For all 
that, though, and akin to discussion above, Jeanette, Becky, Geoff and Rob attribute 
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responsibility for this to wider society, so to how “we become conditioned [...] to look at our 
failures. Our Western system, education system points, is to our failures all the time” 
(28Nov2013, Becky:54), to “targets and league tables” (28Nov2013, Becky:70; 6Dec2014, 
Geoff:306), and the “huge amount of pressure to do well” (18Nov2013, Becky:70).  Jeanette 
observes they have “brought into that meritocracy”, pointing out “we, we’re actually for 
merit, we’re not here to just say oo I got to university, great, we are here to do the best we 
can, and even getting here is on merit that’s unfair” (14Nov2013, Jeanette:38).  For Rob and 
Geoff this all means a diminishing of emphasis on and valuing of “thinking for yourself” 
(6Dec2014, Geoff:304).  Rob refers to a line from a song, “‘from the moment I could talk I 
was ordered to listen’” (6Dec2014, Rob:299), adding “the minute you start, it’s like ‘shut 
up’” (6Dec2014, Rob:301), that “thinking for yourself” is “something that gets squashed” 
(6Dec2014, Rob:297), a sentiment echoed by Becky (28Nov2013, Becky:70).  This is 
troubling given the centrality of self to reflective practice.  Indeed, extending his own 
critique further Furedi (2004:66) characterises the “cultural climate” of the Global North as 
one that “fosters suspicion about private behaviour” [emphasis added] and emotions.  
Here, ‘the private’ is a problem unless and until it is open to public scrutiny albeit then 
judged to be a different kind of problem, in our case whether it evidences suitable 
reflective practice, professional behaviour, even suitability to practice at all in a particular 
profession indicative of a general “erosion of the boundary that separates the private from 
the public” inherent to neo-liberalism (Furedi, 2004:40).  From the percipient experiences it 
can be offered that this dissolution has had a two-fold effect on Schön’s ‘reflective turn’, 
reinforcing, even propelling a focus on interiority beyond all else – which therefore, at the 
same time strengthens the external control of reflective practice.  In this way reflective 
practice becomes – or considering its Pragmatist Humanist roots has always been - a certain 
version of presentation and a specialized form of self-culture (Lasch, 1991).  So, starting her 
higher education programme feeling positive about reflective practice and planning to 
approach it as an ‘authentic experience’ (14Nov2013, Dawn:28), Dawn shares how she 
quickly began to “lie and ham up” her reflective diary because it is better to “keep their 
private real anxieties and how they’re really feeling quiet” (14Nov2013, Dawn:30).  She 
explains this to be the consequence of “trying to impress those deemed to be in high 
authority” (14Nov2013, Dawn:28), i.e. not a misunderstanding of ‘critical’ or ‘reflective’ but 
a correct appraisal of reflective practice.  Those “at the top of the tree”, her higher 
education lecturers, decide what “constitutes a pass”, and therefore students perform 
reflective practice accordingly (14Nov2013, Dawn:41).  More specifically, if her university 
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tutors knew that she was “feeling really low about this or weak or I’m not actually coping” 
then she “might not get the grade”, likening this to an interview whereby if you “reveal how 
you really are” you “might not get the job” (14Nov2013, Dawn:30) and as long “as that 
dynamic exists then people are always going to lie […] it’s not in their interests” to do 
otherwise (14 November2013, Dawn: 41).  Jason says he “know[s] [he’s] got to show some 
reflection” in his diary (6Dec2014, Jason:94), emphasis on ‘show’ as opposed to anything 
deeper, and Debra talks about ‘making something up at the last minute because [she] 
knows [she] has to do it’ (6Dec2014, Debra:222, Debra:224).  
So although the development of emotional and affective awareness and competence is a 
key tenet of reflective practice, not only are there impacts from and consequences to 
having to express ‘being broken in order to re-integrate’, the performance of this is 
analysed and judged by others in power therefore attention is taken up with doing it in an 
acceptable manner.  As will be seen later, the percipients also speak positively about 
(some) broader purposes of reflective practice.  But their lived experience patently points 
up dissonance between “overtly expressed beliefs about knowledge and learning” on the 
one hand and “actual ways of organising reflective activities on the other” (Dohn, 
2011:674), these requiring “management of feelings” (Hochschild, 2012:7), i.e. the 
requirement “to induce or suppress feeling to sustain the outward countenance that 
produces the proper state of mind” of being professional (2012:9).  This ‘proper state of 
mind’ is conveyed through partitioning off the unacceptable and an acceptable “publicly 
observable facial and bodily display” (ibid), a state of affairs likely to lead to inauthentic 
outward expression of emotions (Lazányi, 2011), inhibition and restriction of spontaneous 
actions (Wharton & Erickson, 1993), and students/ practitioners becoming alienated from 
their actual feelings (Hochschild, 2012).  In such circumstances students/practitioners are 
more likely to draw on thoughtless and clichéd repetition of behaviours (Stanislavski, 1945), 
resulting in separation between themselves and their client/users rather than Connected 
Practice of professional practice.  All of this changes reflective and professional practice, 
with the risk/likelihood that students/practitioners end up feeling ‘guilt, cynicism and 
estrangement’ (Hochschild, 2012:187), apt descriptions that could characterise percipient 
experiences Curated above.   
Curation around the first three key tenets of reflective practice with percipient experiences 
of engagement and using that as a track to direct an excavation of relevant theory ‘carves 
out’ (cf. Peters) significant issues.   
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4            ‘Drawn out’ key tenet (iii): self-development happens and leads to positive 
change in practice competence 
Attention now turns to the third key tenet Captured in chapter 2, that, essentially, 
reflection on experience ‘x’ will lead to positive personal (professional) change ‘y’ and in 
turn a positive practice outcome ‘z’.  For this to happen a practitioner’s priority must 
necessarily be given to identifying which self and practice elements to focus on, making 
essential both conscious recall of events and accurate awareness of self. 
4.1 Reflective practice leads to self and practice development 
Curation requires understanding Schön’s (1983) notion of ‘knowing-in-action’, “knowledge 
which has been sufficiently integrated into or connected with personal practice to be either 
automatically or very readily called into use” (Eraut, 1994:17).  Knowing-in-action underlies 
his principle that when unpacking one’s practice after an event, a student/practitioner can 
recall aspects for scrutiny and then integrate that ‘new’ understanding so it can be ‘called 
into use’ in future practice.   
Yet, Schön’s elucidation of this core pillar of reflective practice is confusing.  He writes that 
reflective practice involves the creation of an account, therefore practice scrutiny occurs in 
its creation (Schön, 1987) but later positions scrutiny as being on the account, so scrutiny as 
taking place after its creation (Schön, 1992).  It is a theoretical confusion unbeknown to the 
percipients but reflected in their experiences of diary keeping.  Geoff talks about “double-
reflecting” (10Jan2015, Geoff:62).  When invited to say more he explains:  
64 Geoff you put your initial reflections down and then you go back and look at it 
again and […] it gives you more time to actually look at it properly and 
pull it apart and think ‘right that was that, would I change that or would I 
do it exactly the same’ and linking it back into theory 
(10Jan2015) 
At first take this appears just as Schön describes in his second elicitation of knowing-in-
action and indeed Jason says that Geoff’s ‘double reflecting’ is “exactly what” reflective 
practice is “meant to be about” (10Jan2015, Jason:71), adding when that professional 
practice situation “come[s] up again” (10Jan2015, Jason:76) the new understanding “kick[s] 
in” (10Jan2015, Jason:71).  But, in that RPRG as a whole, reinforced by percipient 
experiences in other RPRGs, the picture is problematic.  Jason says that he struggles to 
know “which bit you’re supposed to pin point” (10Jan2015, Jason:44) in the written account 
and that his “later reflection”, his reflecting on his reflective account, “is perhaps more 
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positive than the initial” (10Jan2015, Jason:52), such that, as a result, he starts “to wonder 
‘am I reflecting or reporting’” (10Jan2015, Jason:44).  It contradicts his earlier statement 
that his reflection-on-action feeds forward to positively impact on his practice in the 
moment.  He concludes “So my question is how, how do we make those decisions in the 
moment. How do we get more effective in the moment?” (10Jan2015, Jason:101).  Debra is 
clear: creation of the account is not about practice development but proving to lecturers 
that she can “handle something well” (10Jan2015, Debra:78).  Geoff shares another 
dimension, that his scrutiny of his reflective journal is “personality driven” (30May2015, 
Geoff:86) and this shapes how he reviews what he has written.  Similarly, in a different 
RPRG seven months earlier, Debra shares that because she is “quite a pessimist” this is how 
she reflects on herself in her diary (18Oct2014, Debra:20), and, even though Geoff’s 
supervisor encourages him to pay attention to the content of his diary accounts to learn 
about himself, his experience is that this only tells him about himself as a writer not 
practitioner.  He posits that “the writing could help” but only if “it has meaning, we’re not 
just writing ‘coz we have to” (30May2015, Geoff:92) and writing a diary, he is clear, is 
definitely because he has to, it is “a game to play” (30May2015, Geoff:169).  Consequently 
his ‘double reflecting’ “doesn’t help [him] deal with things” when in practice (10Jan2015, 
Geoff:81).  Debra describes how their accounts of practice merely ‘sing the same tune’ 
(30May2015, Debra:133), no self and practice development, but a re-statement of what 
they already know about themselves appropriately furnished for task and audience.  
Understanding this, it is pertinent that Schön (1992a:127) describes reflective practice as 
only taking place when ones ‘knowing-in-action’ does not accord with actual outcome: 
practitioners are prompted to “make sense” of “unique cases”, triggered by surprise or 
breakdown in routine practice (Schön, 1983:5), so when there is “an error to be corrected, 
an anomaly to be [understood], an opportunity to be exploited” (Schön, 1992a:127).  
Presumably, then, if one’s knowing-in-action fits with events as they play out a practitioner 
would not – indeed need not – engage in reflective practice at all.  Perhaps this explains 
why, despite hours of working in his professional setting, Geoff speaks of “struggling” 
(6Dec2014, Geoff:102) “to find something to reflect on” (6Dec2014, Geoff:97), and of 
waiting for “something that happens to change something” (6Dec2014, Geoff:105) such as 
“incidents” as opposed to the “mundane, the ordinary” (6Dec2014, Geoff:91), experiences 
echoed by Jason (6Dec2014, Jason:100).  Indeed, Jason says that his university tutor and 
supervisor advise this (6Dec2014, Jason:100), so they too appear to be waiting for 
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something out of the ordinary to warrant reflective practice.  Thus, their experience could 
be perceived as entirely in-keeping with theory on ‘knowing-in-action’.   
Yet Schön (1983) also writes of novice practitioners’ merely applying rules and following 
procedure unthinkingly, inference being that competent professionals would not do this.  
What is unclear is if he is arguing that novice practitioners have no knowing-in-action, 
empty vessel-like, so simply follow rules without reflective practice – although how this 
relates to his point of practice being ‘undiscussable’ is unclear.  Or, perhaps he is arguing 
that they have yet to learn how to engage in reflective practice, matched later by Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus – but established is that he expresses reflective practice as something practitioners 
do, albeit honed through rehearsal.  Finally, if novice practitioners lack knowing-in-action 
one could assume they are constantly ‘surprised’ in practice contexts and therefore would 
need or should engage in reflective practice all the time.  In any case, established knowing-
in-action assumes that in general it is up-to-date, it is good practice, need not be further 
developed, and therefore does not require scrutiny.   
In contrast, Argyris & Schön’s (1974:4) earlier work (which evolved into Schön’s reflective 
practice) refers to “theories of action” that a practitioner holds, “espoused theory” to 
which s/he gives public “allegiance”, but that it is their ‘theory-in-use’, their tacit 
underpinnings of practice, that “actually governs his action” [sic] [emphasis added] (ibid).  
This “may or may not be compatible” with that which they are conscious of and express, 
and significantly, they may not be aware of that discrepancy (1974:7).  In essence, when 
practitioners express their knowing-in-action as compatible with events as they play out so 
there is nothing to reflect on, it may well be this fits with their espoused theory but not 
their ‘theory-in-use’ which would benefit from reflective practice.  With ‘knowing-in-action’ 
suggesting gaps in what is focussed on – and ‘theory-in-use’ suggesting this will be more 
commonplace than a practitioner is aware – there is a contradiction with Schön’s notion 
that ‘under the table’, unscrutinised practice will result in becoming dysfunctional, out-
dated, inappropriate, entrenched in bad/poor habits, unconscious and therefore out of 
reach for any future reflective practice (Schön, 1999). 
What is clear is that the ground on which the tenet of reflective practice rests regarding 
self-development happens and leads to positive change is, at least, shaky.  It also points up 
how the ‘vast’ literature and higher education programmes that unproblematically 




4.2 Linear dynamic with a positive outcome 
We can also consider the assumed linear relationship between a change in self-
development and positive change in practice competence, already ‘carved out’ (cf. Peters) 
through Curation as problematic, but the percipients experiences speak further to this.  For 
Joseph reflective practice is “mapping” his practice (14Nov2013, Joseph:2), which is quite 
different to changing it in some way.  Geoff says “yeah you sort of focus as before” 
(6Dec2014, Geoff:77), “you describe things that went on, but focus as before, no changes” 
(6Dec2014, Geoff:81), “in hindsight we tell ourselves the same things even if we think we 
aren’t” (30May2015, Geoff:136) to which Debra agrees (30May2015, Debra:133), her 
experience of “singing the same tune” referred to above.   
This patently contrasts with models that articulate the linear developmental stages that 
practitioners should move from ‘effective’ to ‘reflective practice’ and, for some, ‘critical 
reflective practice’ that are typically used in higher education programmes.  Even if 
considered in terms of the complexity and messy nature of professional practice Captured 
in chapter 2, this already seems simplistic and one-dimensional.  It is therefore little wonder 
that evidence of a linear dynamic between reflection-on-action and positive outcome of 
change is not obvious from the RPRGs.  In any case, mainstream literature does not agree 
on the number of developmental stages involved nor, therefore, what they entail.  So, 
along with Burgoyne & Reynolds, Kim, and Rolfe et al, van Manen (1977) writes of three 
stages, but for him the first is ‘largely uncritical and unreflective’ (1977:206), although it 
involves the ‘technical application of knowledge and principles to attain a given end’ 
(1977:226).  His other two stages are “higher” (ibid).  Yet, King & Kitchener (1994), whose 
work is also frequently referred to in literature on reflective practice, suggest seven stages, 
the first three of which are “pre-reflective” [emphasis added], and the final two, “reflective” 
albeit that their research is rooted in age-related development and concerns reflective 
judgement, a fact that is rarely noted when adopted in mainstream text books and higher 
education programmes.  Sparks-Langer et al (1991) also suggest seven stages, but a 
different seven (three levels of language and four levels of thinking).  Another often 
referred to stage model from Perry (1970) advocates nine “positions”, the first being 
unreflective, similar to van Manen’s first stage, so “unconsidered” dualistic (1970:66) 
‘obedient’ (1970:10) thinking, but only the last three of his nine are reflective, and the final 
is not ‘critical’ but a lifestyle commitment to reflection as ‘ongoing and unfolding’ 
(1970:11). Moreover, his focus is intellectual and ethical growth as part of post-18 
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development during higher education, but again typically referred to in mainstream 
literature as if originating as reflective practice.   
Setting aside adoption in higher education programmes to explain, facilitate and assess 
reflective practice without comment concerning original focus, which anyway brings to bear 
questions about whether, or the extent to which, they can be transferred to reflective 
practice, the final stage in all of them, even though different, is viewed as optimal in 
development, so the best evidence of engaging in reflective practice.  Further, and 
significantly, common to them all is focus on the development of intellect and thinking 
(Furlong, 2000), a critique that Furlong levels against a Schönian reflective practice in 
general.  Generally, different kinds of engagement and different kinds of knowing are 
neither considered nor advocated – nor, indeed, that other forms of engagement and 
knowing could be more appropriate at times, even overall.  As Berry & Dienes (1993) and 
Claxton (2000:49) observe, there are a range of “ways of knowing” that are “ignored, 
marginalized, romanticized, or denigrated in mainstream educational cultures”.  For 
instance, whilst not reflecting is positioned as the ‘lowest’ stage so therefore should be 
avoided, it could be the best or only strategy a practitioner can take in some circumstances, 
i.e. rather than suboptimal or indicative of lacking in skill or practice maturity, in the ‘hot 
flow’ of professional practice and the emotional intensity of different kinds of interactions 
and interventions it could be a wise practitioner who “turns reflection on and off to meet 
the demands of the situation” (Ferguson 2018:421).  And if not reflecting is a wise strategy 
in the complexity of professional practice, then it would be equally wise for higher 
education programmes to facilitate discussion about how practitioners can not reflect in 
ways that do involve a “thorough-going closure down of the self rather than a temporary 
suspension and defence of that self” (Ferguson, 2018:423), to be able to skilfully utilise and 
be aware that they are not reflecting as part of their professional artistry.   
4.3 Linear dynamic and a positive outcome  
More broadly, then, this points up how the assumption of a linear dynamic does not give 
room to or possibility for a messy process, or multifarious, invisible, none, or, negative 
(however defined) outcomes. Therefore, mining what constitutes a positive outcome in 
mainstream literature is relevant.  Already established is that its conceptualisation will 
reflect its Humanist and Protestant roots in the presumption of engagement enabling 
practitioners to realise their true, “core self” by ‘discovering who they really are’ 
(Brookfield, 2000:46) and ‘washing their practice’ from unwanted “stains” to be “more 
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authentic and integrated (Brookfield, 2000:46).  It is an assumption that reinforces a belief 
of “no limits […] on the capacity of the self to absorb feeling, on the mind to think and on 
the depths of reflection that are possible and needed” (Ferguson, 2018:417).  Indeed, for 
Foucault (1986) this is a critique that can be levelled against Humanism in its entirety.  
More recently, Brookfield (2000:46) describes the foundational assumption as one of 
“imperious certainty” and “triumphalism”. 
So, it is perhaps somewhat surprising to note in Schön’s (1983:59) original theory he writes 
that when outcomes from engagement in reflective practice are positive this is not “signs of 
success […] in action but [of] information relevant to” the knowledge and theory one 
already holds.  He could be suggesting that change in knowledge and theory does not have 
to equate to change in self or practice.  Or perhaps his contention is that a ‘sign of success’ 
does not have to be exhibited.  But either way this does not accord with his overall 
emphasis that reflective practice should lead to a positive change outcome in self and 
practice development, as well as the need to demonstrate that engagement in reflective 
practice which runs throughout his work as seen, for instance, in his showcasing of Petra 
and Quist (Schön, 1983; 1987). 
It could be that this confusion arises in light of Argyris & Schön’s (1974:17) work on 
theories-in-use introduced earlier, in particular their assertion that practitioners strive to 
ensure and maintain “constancy” such that they actively “avoid changing” (ibid) their 
theories-in-use and strive to ‘maintain biographical identity’ [emphasis added] rather than 
effect change, ‘modifying and refining’ their perception and recall “to maintain and protect 
the self” (ibid).  This could explain the inconsistency in Schön’s body of work; indeed 
Kinsella (2007a:398) picks out that Schön’s “failure to refer back to his earlier work with 
Argyris […] contributes to some of the conceptual confusions surrounding the theory of 
reflective practice”.  Even so a broader literature search shows this to be not only a matter 
of theoretical incongruity: individuals resisting change finds support elsewhere.  Social 
science communication theory explains that we actively seek out information in our 
environments and interactions that support theories and expectations we hold and 
subconsciously and unconsciously ignore those that do not (Mortensen, 1997), referred to 
elsewhere as ‘myside bias’ (Johnson-Laird, 2006).  So, if practitioners are invested in their 
professional identities and maintenance of a consistent internal and external account of 
themselves it ‘carves out’ (cf. Peters) questions about the purpose of engaging in reflective 
practice at all, let alone those related to the key tenet of a linear dynamic resulting in 
positive change.    
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4.4 The nature of change 
This explain why the percipients express that their reflection-on-action does not lead to 
apparent change.  However, another way to ‘carve’ this ‘out’ would be to explore the 
nature of change.  
According to Tennant (2000), change involves a reorientation of attitudes and/or values, 
and/or beliefs plus associated understanding, which requires impetus to engage as well as 
receptiveness to the possibilities of change.  So, to this view, perhaps percipient lack of 
change could be due to their lack of impetus and receptiveness and not problems with 
reflective practice. To unpack this further, an appreciation of the Concerns Based Adoption 
Model (CBAM) (e.g. Hord et al, 1987) from education theory, briefly understanding from 
the theory of planned behaviour from social psychology (Ajzen, 1985; 2011) proves fruitful. 
CBAM, “arguably the most robust and empirically grounded theoretical model for the 
implementation of educational innovations” (Anderson, 1997:331), elaborately models 
‘measurement, describing, and explaining the process of change” (ibid) as practitioners put 
new ideas and practices into use.   The model tracks engagement moving from oneself 
(confronting new information and feelings about the implications of the change), to task 
(responses and reactions to the consequences of the change for one’s practice) and impact 
(working with others to implement the change or make minor modifications to the 
innovation for it to work better and/or fit the specific context more effectively) (ibid).  The 
model also suggests how change can be facilitated.  The theory of planned behaviour from 
social psychology complements CBAM through a set of propositions that explain the way in 
which people react to situations.  Essentially it takes as its starting point CBAM’s emphasis 
on an individual’s initial attitude but develops further to consider: the role of social 
influence (the extent to which the individual feels pressured or supported to adopt the 
behaviour); normative beliefs (the extent to which the behaviour is adopted by significant 
others around them); and, how achievable they perceive the change to be (based on how 
much control they have and the extent to which it integrates into their current beliefs, 
norms and behaviours) (Ajzen 1985).   
Whilst both CBAM and the theory of planned behaviour are not without criticism (e.g. see 
Ajzen, 2011; Anderson, 1997) if considered in relation to reflective practice they illuminate 
the process of change.  We can see that whether someone changes cannot be a simple 
linear ‘I have reflected on it therefore change happens’ assumption that underpins 
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reflective practice.  Secondly, CBAM and the theory of planned behaviour show change to 
be socially situated in contrast to the private, individual activity of reflective practice.   
Whether considering maintenance of self, or the nature of change, jostling percipients lived 
experience of engaging in reflective practice with theory leads to appreciation of the 
complexity of change which suggests reflective practice as “a kind of self-understanding 
leading to some kind of enlightenment or learning” (Berman-Brown & McCartney, 1996:20) 
is terribly simplistic.  Adding to questions regarding what transforms, how much, and who 
decides in the context of The Trappings, we can now add questions about whether there 
has to be change, the nature of that change (including whether it needs to be positive), the 
extent of change, and what makes ‘change’ transformation – and how, in any case, this is 
dependent on social and normative influences in conjunction with interiority and initial 
orientation.   
Setting aside these ‘carved out’ (cf. Peters) questions, it could at least be argued that 
mainstream reflective practice literature directs attention to the deliberate and conscious 
deconstruction of the “meaning and application” (Davies, 2010:19) of specific elements of 
professional practice present in an action /intervention /interaction so that a practitioner 
can identify “alternative ways of framing the reality of his practice […] and entrain 
awareness of dilemmas” [sic] (Schön, 1983:310) for themselves.  Brookfield, (1995:2), for 
instance, directs students/practitioners to ‘hunt assumptions’.  However, the percipients 
lived experiences attest to it being complex.  Relating this to wider theory, we have seen 
that wise practice can include not reflecting, but also there is disagreement about whether 
reflective practice must involve questioning one’s personal and professional assumptions.  
For instance, Boyd & Fales (1983), Jarvis (1992), and Mezirow (2000) argue that it is not 
essential, and five years on from advocating ‘hunting’, Brookfield declares “there are no 
foundational defining assumptions waiting to be unearthed” [emphasis added] (2000:46).   
A final visit to the RPRG transcripts ‘carves out’ (cf. Peters) one more issue concerning the 
tenet of change and self-development being a linear dynamic with a positive outcome.  
Carol shares her experience of writing her diary and being preoccupied with  
98 Carol being entertaining, so telling the story, the thing, in an entertaining way 
[…] so engaging the person who will read it, your, you know, so how could 
I not be worried about how it comes across 
(18Oct2014)   
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The significance of this warrant’s attention in its own right so I return it later in this chapter, 
but note here how percipients – and all students/practitioners – do not engage in reflective 
practice in a vacuum; they are doing so as part of their higher education programme.  They 
are entirely aware of their reflective diaries as artefacts that evidence their engagement.  
Indeed, in her comprehensive review of the construction and assessment of reflective 
diaries/journals, Hargreaves (2004:200) identifies only three narratives that are given 
‘legitimacy’ by assessors so these become performed by students as evidence of change:  
‘valedictory’ (i.e. accounts constructed as ‘there was a crisis, I recognised the problem, I 
turned the situation around, and won the day’); ‘condemnatory’ (‘there was a crisis, poor 
decisions were made, the outcome was negative, no-one won, and I feel guilty, or angry’); 
and, ‘redemptive’ (‘I confronted a situation that exposed my belief system/behaviour as 
faulty, I have reflected on it, and am as a result redeemed’).  ‘Condemnatory’ is alternative 
to a positive outcome, but that’s all that can be said here!  More, it evidences impression 
management that performs prescribed expectations about change, i.e. they read the cues 
and understand what is required (Race, 2014).  As we have seen in their lived experience of 
engaging in reflective practice percipients are aware of performing – and performing 
change - to satisfy the audience that will be assessing them. 
In sum, the second element of the key tenet of reflective practice that self-development 
happens and leads to positive change in practice competence is problematic.  There are 
fundamental issues with reflective practice models used to steer that developmental 
dynamic; there is an absence of appreciating the wise significance of not reflecting; a 
narrow and limited conceptualisation of change alongside confusion with regards to the 
nature of change; and, finally, a lack of acknowledgement about the context in which the 
expectation of change sits and its impact on authenticity. 
4.5 Conscious recall of practice 
In any case, inherent to the reflective practice process of development is that 
students/practitioners have conscious recall of their practice; they need this to remember 
the event and isolate its variables to be able to hold them up for scrutiny.  In current 
understanding and practices it is unclear how reflective practice can work without this.  A 
return to theories-in-use is helpful in excavating this further.  As Barnett (1990:160) points 
out, “if you want to find out how professionals act, look not to their ‘espoused theories’”, 
the ones they can readily recall and speak about, but to their theories-in-use.  He continues,  
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professionals rarely act through any explicit theory or articulated 
principles governing professional practice, and much more on the basis 
of tacit principles and knowledge which are embedded in their 
professional behaviour [emphasis added] (ibid) 
Reflective practice, then, presupposes that: a practitioner is conscious of and can identify 
which components in their professional practice have salience in the event they are 
reflecting on; in which order (because a different order would have a different interplay); 
and that they are fully cognizant of resulting changes, already problematised.   Jason 
characterises reflective practice as a process that “sparks some memories” (6Dec2014, 
Jason:74) to produce “an account” of what he is “doing” (6Dec2014, Jason:87). 
Yet, Connected Practice: Professional Practice showed the interplay of practice elements in 
any moment to be complex, multi-layered and messy, and points up – along with theory on 
change - that they do not solely abide in the realm of the student/practitioner.  It can be 
considered that to be able to consciously recall salient elements of this as part of reflective 
practice a practitioner would need to know, identify and articulate the relevant aspects of 
skill they used and how they used them; plus know, identify and articulate what was 
‘present’ in the other/s; plus know, identify and articulate the mix of these that they 
responded and reacted to; plus know, identify and articulate the way in which they were 
influenced by the space and place they were in at the time; plus know, identify and 
articulate how the other/s were being impacted by space and place; plus know, identify and 
articulate how all, individually and together, understood the purpose of the interaction; 
and the mix of any of these at any one moment.  It is a complexity of possibilities that 
‘carves out’ (cf. Peters) an obvious question as to whether it is possible at all.  Therefore, 
this section briefly considers neuro-processing; and memory, including the impact of stress 
and high emotion, plus time in relation to delay between practice and its recall. If the 
ground this ‘carves out’ (cf. Peters) is unclear, then so is the underpinning assumption that 
one can recall the elements of professional practice sufficient to engage in reflective 
practice, not generally considered in mainstream literature.  Even Schön (1987a:25) 
acknowledges that descriptions of one’s practice “are always […] conjectures” or as Kinsella 
(2007a:400) puts it, “constructions”, partial and representative interpretations that 
‘attempt to impose stasis’ on “dynamic” practice (2007a:401).  Indeed, according to Schön 
(1983:49), 
Often we cannot say what it is that we know. When we try to describe it 
we find ourselves at a loss, or we produce descriptions that are 
obviously inappropriate. Our knowing is ordinarily tacit, implicit in our 
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patterns of action and in our feel for the stuff with which we are dealing. 
It seems right to say that our knowing is in our action. 
It would suggest reflection-in-action would be a more appropriate concentration, but that is 
not the focus of his or mainstream literature based on his work, other than to assume 
reflection-on-action will automatically and inherently positively develop ones ‘knowing-in-
action’.    
4.6 Neuro-processes 
Recent neuropsychological research brings a layer of consideration to Curating reflective 
practice with regards to conscious recall of professional practice.  Bargh (2017:3) discusses 
how “the conscious mind makes sense of our unconsciously generated behaviors after the 
fact, [thus] creating a positive, plausible narrative about what we are doing and why” 
[emphasis added].  Indeed, ‘creating a plausible narrative after the fact’ could be an 
apposite description of the percipient experiences of engaging in reflective practice.  Geoff 
says that writing a diary “all leads to a certain point, and you don’t really notice it at the 
time, you think you are doing it..”, that is, fully reflecting on practice, “but you are, in effect, 
like really you are writing the same thing over and over again” (30May2015, Geoff:132; 
30May2015, Debra:133), an experience shared by others as noted.  Not only this, Bargh 
(2017:280) asserts that “conscious experiences in one situation linger into the next 
situation without our realising it and become the unconscious influences in the subsequent 
setting” and these too “direct our conscious attention to things relevant to [them]” 
(2017:281).  It has relevance to ‘myside bias’ discussed earlier. 
To understand this further it is helpful to consider Kahneman’s (2011:13) “metaphor” of 
two different “systems” of thinking.  “System 1” is the mode of thinking that “operates 
automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of control” (2011:20), 
providing fast impressions and making immediate responses possible.  In contrast, “System 
2” thinking consists of “subjective experience of agency, choice and concentration”; it is the 
deliberate and “conscious reasoning self” (2011:21).  Thus, reflective practice is based on 
the assumption of System 2, that agency, choice and concentration are in a practitioner’s 
cognitive control, their linear and positive development being the overall focus here.  Yet 
Kahneman contends that “only a fraction of [the] capacity [of System 2] is engaged” 
[emphasis added] (2011:24) at any time.  Moreover, System 2 is only “mobilised” when 
System 1 does not have an answer, is surprised or challenged, or ‘to increase effort when 
an error is about to be made’ (2011:24-25).  On its own this could infer support for 
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Schönian reflective practice during surprising interactions in the ‘swampy lowlands’ of 
professional practice.  However, System 2 is much slower than System 1, System 1 is the 
mode of thinking we operate in most of the time, and System 1 provides the information on 
which System 2 depends but System 1 thinking operates via illusions and biases including 
the confirmation/‘myside’ bias and anchoring effects of earlier.  Here, then, we can 
understand that the ‘conscious reasoning self’ of a reflective practitioner is ‘operating 
automatically and quickly’ for most of the time and when they do deliberate it is based on 
illusion, bias and anchoring effects. 
 
4.7 Memory 
Secondly, then, is the issue anyway of whether students/practitioners can consciously recall 
their values, assumptions, influences and elements of practice.  As Dohn (2011:678) puts it, 
it is  
presupposed one can ‘get at’ the understanding and competence of the 
practitioner through the act of representation. [...] Tacit, embodied 
understanding and competence are presumed to preserve their nature 
through the process of representation and therefore not bound in any 
significant sense to situated embodied action as such. 
Clare questions whether “reflection can be in your head as well.  It doesn’t necessarily have 
to be written down” (6Oct2014, 9:23), challenging the typical association of reflective 
practice with reflection-on-action via writing a diary/journal.  Other forms are part of higher 
education programmes, however it is clear throughout the RPRGs the extent to which their 
higher education courses promoted and facilitated a reflective practice that relies on recall 
in written form.  For example, Jason, Sally and Sadie express how reflective practice and 
diary writing are “entwined” (21Nov2014, Jason:136) such that “that is what reflective 
practice is, a diary” (21Nov2014, Sally:141), with Sadie adding that “you don’t think of it 
that you’re reflecting if you’re not actually writing it down” (21Nov2014, Sadie:145).  
Setting aside for now the argument above regarding illusion, bias and confirmation, Herlihy 
et al (2012:662) review literature on autobiographical memory, “explicit memory of an 
event that occurred in a specific time and place in one’s personal past”, and the impact of 
passing time.  As the gap between event and its recall increases, memories become 
dominated by association and stereotypical emotions, rather than the particular and 
distinct as required by reflective practice, significant given emphasis in mainstream 
literature on reflective practice is geared to reflection on an incident, session, or period of 
professional practice predominantly via writing in diaries, but also discussion in groups, 
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and/or talking in supervision, all of which involve a gap after the event.  In that gap, as Sally 
describes  
14 Sally the problem for me and maybe for modern day life is the whole reflection 
thing because you’re so caught up, like you were saying earlier [referring 
to comments that other percipients had made], in juggling or in spinning 
plates or things you have to move on without reflecting. And you know so 
even having time to think about it let alone […] write up a diary or 
whatever 
(21Nov2014)   
Later in that RPRG Carol also talks about having little “time to really think and take things 
in” (21Nov2014, Carol:185) and Mary agrees, “it’s just like skirting on top of thoughts about 
it, you don’t really settle with it” (21Nov2014, Mary:186), and later says “life is one noise 
from the minute I open my eyes to the minute I shut my eyes” (21Nov2014, Mary:220).  
Being too busy, tired when they get home, and having more work to do once there 
including parenting are also common experiences for Rob, Becky, Duma and Mary 
(6Dec2014, Rob:117; 28Nov2013, Becky:44; 15Nov2013; 15Nov2013, Duma:152; 6Oct2014, 
Mary 12 & 29).  A consequence of the delay for Jason in diary writing is “what things are 
you going to choose. Generally the big things and you know it happened so long ago and a 
million things have happened since then so it becomes a story” (21Nov2014, Jason:119).  
Similarly, in the RPRG of 10th January 2015, Geoff is talking with Jason and they say: 
12 Geoff The thing I find when you’re on placement something will happen and you 
don’t have time to write it down, when you come back later to your reflective 
diary ‘coz so much happens through the day, you can’t remember, ‘who did 
that’, you may remember who did it and what happened but how it happened 
or why it happened …no… 
13 Jason …just the general gist of the story. 
14 Geoff …yes, you sort of lose a bit of it. 
Clare concurs, saying that reflective practice is “a lot to do with time” (6Oct2014, Clare:14). 
Indeed, in a different RPRG, Becky says  
153 Becky one of my biggest barriers was time, so I don’t bother, but what I really 
mean is that I don’t have the time or the inclination to go over everything 
in a way that you or you would understand, like I know what happened, I 
don’t want to go over it all again but I do want… 
(29Mar2014)  
and Jeanette interjects, completing her sentence, “…to make it meaningful…” (29Mar2014, 
Jeanette:154).  As a consequence for Becky (29Mar2014, Becky:155) and Jeanette reflective 
practice is “a chore, people see it as ‘oh I’ve been on placement, its eleven o’clock, why do I 
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have to reflect, I want to go to bed, and I’ve got to write’, so its real quick you know, a 
chore, job done” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:151).  In a different RPRG, Jason explains how he 
“scribbles something down” and  
70 Jason the next day I have a little look at what I scribbled before and if there’s 
something else I can think of, tweak it.  And I am gonna type it up so that 
then I maybe can tweak it some more.  But again, with that I wouldn’t say 
there’s much reflection there 
(6Dec2014),  
an experience in common with Geoff (30May2015, Geoff:35).  Rob describes that as 
“writing reflections on your reflections” and asks “does that work?” (30May2015, Rob:36), 
adding “surely once you start doing more with them it is different?” (30May2015, Rob:41) to 
which Geoff replies “Only you are now telling a story, telling specific parts, like an essay” 
(30May2015, Geoff:43).  So it is that Jeanette talks of being “totally diaried” (14Nov2013 
Jeanette:58), explaining “we change it in our minds before we even write about it” 
(28Nov2013, Jeanette:115), and you  
58 Jeanette forget about in the moment stuff…and so by the time you get home 
and you write about it you have forgotten about all of it and so it’s 
easier to go home and change it and it changes it so you write ‘I wasn’t 
all that bad actually’ 
(14Nov2013) 
In her next RPRG she talks again of writing a diary on practice and this being “a different 
process” because it is open to hindsight bias and “’Oh actually I wasn’t that bad really’” 
(28Nov2013, Jeanette:46).  Rob talks of trying to get into a habit of when to write his diary, 
but when he “make[s] anything routine like that [he’ll] get bored of it” (6Dec2014, Rob:187) 
and even though he has been told that it is a “good habit to get into [...] it just doesn’t 
always work” (6Dec2014, Rob:189, Rob:183, Rob:185).  Clare and Mary compare writing 
their diaries to complying with any other university assessed work (6Oct2014, Mary:57). 
In sum, with the activity of reflective practice relying on detailed recall of the components 
of practice and a gap between the event and its recall, there are significant issues at every 
stage and level.  More, Deffenbacher et al (2004, cited in Herlihy et al, 2012:664) 
distinguish between an ‘orienting response’, an unfettered consideration and expression of 
information, and a ‘defensive response’, the kind that is triggered by pressure which 
arouses “the urge to escape or avoid”.  Whilst it might be intended, and indeed hoped, that 
reflective practice stimulates the former, the pressure of cognitive effort to ‘get’ reflective 
practice, the emotional labour it entails, the nature of activities practitioners feel they 
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should be reflecting on/have been directed to, and, the desire to be perceived positively in 
order to pass their course discussed through the percipients and Curated with theory would 
suggest that a ‘defensive response’ would be more likely.  
As a result, we might question the point of the activity let alone the rhetoric that 
unproblematically extolls its purpose and value.   
One might contend that the problem is less to do with memory and more to do with the 
activity of keeping a reflective diary per se, however, in alternative reflective activities 
several other issues as well come into play.  Team debriefing meetings can follow 
immediately after a session but will still be at some distance from the specific practice 
event, and group and peer supervision will be less frequent so after what could be a month 
or more of sessions.  Therefore, all points concerning the impact of delay still apply - but 
now overlaid with group dynamics such as free-riding (Börjesson et al, 2005), social loafing 
(Rich et al, 2014) and social influence (Forsyth, 2012).  Likewise, individual supervision, if 
offered, is reliant on the skill of the supervisor and again typically takes place monthly at 
most, usually less frequently.  In either case, the presence of a gap between practice and 
reflection exists.  In fact, Carol, Mary and Clare talk about their supervisors not meeting 
with them for supervision (6Oct2014, 156-148), significant also because this was part of the 
requirements for the degree programme for professional qualification.  They talk of their 
supervisors being absent due to illness (6Oct2014, Mary:158), too busy due to workload 
(6Oct2014, Carol:161 & Carol:163 & Carol:172; Mary:170; Clare:162 & Clare:165), and of 
making plans to meet but these not coming to fruition (6Oct2014, Clare:165; Carol:163; 
Mary:166).  Clare talks of how she “feel[s] bad asking…you feel like you’re being a pain” 
(6Oct2014, Clare:169), and Mary agrees, “it’s difficult isn’t it” (6Oct2014, Mary:174) (and 
this all being something they had not discussed with their lecturers for fear of failing).  From 
their experience, then, alternatives or accompaniment to reflective journal writing are 
equally problematic.   
Here, then, and aside from issues already ‘carved out’ (cf. Peters) in this chapter, Curation 
regarding the key tenet to reflective practice Captured in chapter 2 that self-development 
happens and leads to positive change in practice competence ‘calls forth’ questions 
regarding this being a linear dynamic with a positive outcome, and that a 





5           Drawn out’ key tenet (iv): that individual practice development leads to change at 
an organisational level 
The fourth key tenet emphasises that whilst reflective practice involves (a now 
problematised) notion of self-development, if the endeavour was only about self it would 
be “a self-indulgent form of speculation that makes no difference to anything” (Brookfield, 
2000 cited in Cranton, 2006:45).  ‘Practice’ meaning service to others, the ultimate purpose 
being that service becomes more effective (Slade et al, 2019).  For Hilden & Tikkamäki 
(2013:78) reflective practice is the “fuel” of organisational change.  Yet how that happens is 
neglected by Schön in his theory (Taylor & White, 2000). 
It was a focus for Argyris & Schön (1978) however.  In contrast to “single-loop learning” 
whereby a practitioner receives information or ‘detects an error’ and takes instrumental 
‘corrective’ action but the organisation is ‘permitted’ “to carry on its present policies or 
achieve its present objectives” [emphasis added], “double-loop learning” is ‘correcting the 
error’ “in ways that involve the modification of an organization’s underlying norms, policies 
and objectives” (1978:2-3).  On this basis Senge (2013) developed his concept of 
“‘learningful’ conversations […] where people expose their own thinking effectively and 
make that thinking open to the influence of others” (2013:8), in ‘learning organisations’, 
“places where people are continually discovering how they create their reality. And how 
they can change it” (2013:12).  In fact, whilst Hilden & Tikkamäki (2013:77) signify reflective 
practice as fuel in organisational change, along with Taylor & White (2000) they advocate 
that “more emphasis needs to be placed on [it]”. 
Yet this is not evidenced in the percipients lived experiences of engaging in reflective 
practice.   Jeanette recounts being excited by the idea of reflective practice and going in to 
it “all guns blazing” but “was told by [her] supervisor that [she] really should have thought 
more first, and about the organisation” and so when it came to writing her reflective diary 
she “made something else up instead, like it wasn’t a total lie, it was something, but it 
wasn’t the thing, do you know what I mean” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:87) 
In a different  RPRG, Carol shares a similar experience, recalling when engaging in reflective 
practice in one particular organisation, “there’s no way I’d talk about, like I’m just hanging 
on to that, there’s no way I’m telling anyone but at the moment I’m lucky” (18Oct2014, 
Carol:34, Carol:32), the latter referring to her current place of employment, where, she 
explains, she can say “‘I think I’ve really fucked up today’” (18Oct2014, Carol:32).  Her 
statement is telling, however, that from her experience whether an organisation is 
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supportive of authentic engagement in reflective practice is a matter of ‘luck’ – and either 
way here she is not speaking of making a direct and explicit challenge to organisational 
practices, but to feeling able to acknowledge making a mistake.  For such reasons 
Ecclestone & Hayes (2009), Furedi (2004), and Bradbury et al (2010) write of reflective 
practice as limiting and restrictive, appropriated to maintain status quo in the context of 
neo-liberalism rather than initiate organisational change.  Geoff and Jason speak of coming 
to understand that their reflective practice has to “fit” (7Mar2015, Geoff:217) with the 
“protocols and the boundaries […] laws and different regulations” (7Mar2015, Jason:216 & 
Jason:218) of the organisation in which they work.  This could be perceived as them 
appreciating the significance of The Trappings as part of their professional practice, but in 
conjunction with their experiences already presented it is clear they mean censoring and 
manipulating their reflective accounts to ‘fit’.  In this vein, Brookfield (2000:46) points up as 
ludicrous the idea that any student/practitioner might be able to change The Trappings 
through a “single withering” reflective focus as if a “heat-seeking missiles locating and 
penetrating ideology”.  In fact, having asserted the importance of reflective practice to 
organisational change, Hilden & Tikkamäki (2013:91) conclude by stating it “remains to be 
seen” whether reflective practice can “be established as a safe platform in practical 
organizations for mulling over and gradually taking on board the changes it triggers”.   
Perhaps the percipient experiences of a lack of organisational change is due to them being 
‘novices’, their limited reflective practice fitting its characteristics described earlier.  Yet 
even if one accepted a view that the nature of engagement in reflective practice is 
determined by length of time in role, LaBoskey (1993) offers a more nuanced 
understanding of early career practitioners.  She finds a distinction between ‘alert novices’ 
and ‘common sense thinkers’, the contrast being in open-mindedness and questioning that 
all novices can have, but in either case their engagement in reflective practice and thus its 
likelihood of impacting on organisation change depends on depth and quality of the 
opportunity and support within the organisation per se, not length of experience – and we 
have already seen that support was a hit-and-miss affair for the percipients.   
It would appear, as in Schön’s theory, current conceptualisation and practices do not 
consider or attend to the process of how organisational change happens because of an 




6          ‘Drawn out’ key tenet (v): one needs to learn and develop reflective practice as a 
skill to engage in it. 
The final tenet of reflective practice Captured in chapter 2 is that it is a skill that can be 
learned and honed.  Indeed, this is a theme inherent to all four tenets explored so far.  It is 
also central to the “developmental epistemology” (Bleakley, 1999:315; Slade et al, 2019) 
underpinning reflective practice that is core to professional qualifying programmes.  Linked 
to its Deweyian and Humanistic roots, but also, and significantly the prioritising of reflection 
from that inheritance, reflective practice is (also) conceived and perceived as a natural 
dynamic involved with learning and metacognition that can be honed through specified 
methods in a disciplined manner in the context of education and professional practice.  In 
fact, writing more than two decades before Schön’s work on reflective practice, Hullfish & 
Smith (1961:35) outline the process of reflection and therefore the ways in which teachers 
can (and should) hone its development.  Describing reflection as “differ[ing] from the looser 
kinds of thinking primarily by virtue of being directed or controlled by a purpose – the 
solution of a problem” (1961:36) they set out the rationale and “procedures” for teachers 
so that, in their case, children develop the skill of “controlled use of sentiency, memory, 
and imagination in a balance that is appropriate to the particular purpose or problem at 
hand” (1961:36-37) so that they will become future citizens who can “control [their] 
thinking” (1961:47) and “subsequent experience” (1961:205).  Although discussing 
reflection and aimed towards children this has a striking resemblance to what Schön would 
refer to as reflective practice.  
Whilst there is implicit and explicit agreement in mainstream literature that reflective 
practice is a skill to be developed, its nature is debated.  To illustrate, first is the extent to 
which it is a natural capacity, or learned and linked to intelligence (e.g. Sternberg, 1986; 
Borkowski et al, 1987; Merriam, 2004).  If the latter it would suggest that some 
students/practitioners might be unable to develop the skill of reflective practice to the 
same level as others, throwing up issues concerning its assessment in higher education 
programmes if nothing else.  A second debate concerns the extent to which developing the 
skill of reflective practice is “slow and incremental” (Brookfield, 1995:240; LaBoskey, 1993; 
Dervent, 2015, Slade et al, 2019) as a practitioner gradually changes their “habitual ways of 
interpreting their practice, and learn[s] new ways of acting” (Brookfield, 1995:242); is 
“sudden and apocalyptic” (Brookfield, 1995:240) in the face of surprising or shocking 
experiences (Delamarter, 2015); or, dependent on the opportunity and quality of 
facilitation and supervision that challenges the individual to engage (Cousins, 2019).  For 
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Mezirow (2000:5) this is a spectrum, although adds to it “mindless assimilation”, a return to 
earlier discussion on the significance of purpose and impact.  A third debate concerns the 
extent of support for Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1986) assertion that reflective practice is a skill 
that novice practitioners necessarily must learn to become expert.  Benner (1984) argues 
that only experts can engage in professional practice in fluid and intuitive ways therefore 
deliberate development of reflective practice only required early on in one’s career, and it 
is to be recalled that Dewey’s (1910/1991) notion of ‘reflective thought’ that influenced 
Schön assumes developing reflection an imperative to maturation as part of education.  In 
contrast, as noted, a significant number of theories articulate reflective practice as a 
‘specialised tool’ for all.  
Despite this lack of agreement, albeit exposing shaky ground, the developmental 
epistemology is embedded in higher education programmes relatively unproblematically, 
reflective practice as a skill to learn and perfect.  Much attention in programmes and 
mainstream literature is given to how the skill should/could be facilitated and formally 
assessed.  For instance, the staged models of reflective practice identified earlier are 
written into pro forma, students, lecturers and supervisors follow the stages for guidance 
and direction, and models are “useful because they simplify.  They reduce complex and 
variable processes into a regular and standard pattern” (Greenaway, 2008:363).  It is a 
standardisation that determines how journals and reflective essays are written and the 
shape that dialogue in supervision should take, in other words, how reflective practice 
should be understood, how students/practitioners should engage, what criticality is, on 
what one should be critical, and how all this must be performed.  In this, the Schönian 
reflective practice of controlling practice, situations and self, in the context of 
developmental epistemology has parallels with a Kantian (1798/2006:54) perspective of an 
enlightened person who has the ‘propensity’ and ‘vocation’ to ‘cultivate, civilise and 
moralise’ themselves.  Kant writes of this requiring ‘courage’, or, in the words of his 
translator, to be “dare to be wise” (1798/2006:273).  A similar vein runs through the work 
of Hullfish & Smith and into that of Schön onwards, a spirit (or promise) that developing the 
skill of reflective practice involves, and will enable, ‘daring to be wise’.   
Yet, jostled with percipient experience of such guidance and instruction, there is little 
evidence of this.  Rather than enabling them to develop the skill of reflective practice and 
as result begin to ‘cultivate, civilise and moralise’ themselves, which of course assumes this 
as the desired outcome, and that they were not this already, and that reflective practice is 
the only way to develop these qualities, they tell a very different experience.  
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First, they are unsure if reflective practice is a skill.  Geoff refers to it in those terms 
(6Dec2014, Geoff:368), and for clarification, the European Centre for the Development of 
Vocational Training define ‘skill’ as “goal-directed, well-organised behaviour that is acquired 
through practice and performed with economy of effort”, differentiating this with 
‘competence’, a “prerequisite” for developing skill (Winterton et al, 2006:7).  This certainly 
has fit with those mainstream theories of reflective practice.  But Carol says it is something 
“You do automatically” (18Oct2014, Carol:6), a view that Debra, Rob and Jason share, when 
recalling their earlier conversation of reflective practice as an unconscious, common sense, 
innate, life skill.  Jeanette speaks of it as “a normal process” (28Nov2013, Jeanette:94) but 
then contrasts that with what she is asked to do in her higher education programme, 
marking out the two as different, although then adds that what happens through reflective 
practice activities at university is “you just become more aware of it” (28Nov2013, 
Jeanette:94).  So, perhaps this is the purpose of reflective practice in higher education 
programmes, to raise awareness of one’s already established ability to reflect – and indeed 
in a different RPRG, Sadie shares a similar experience, that she had “realised [...] that [she] 
was reflecting before but didn’t even know” it until at university (6Oct2014, Sadie:2).  
However, in a later RPRG she says “you don’t think of it that you’re reflecting if you’re not 
actually writing it down” (21Nov2014, Sadie:145). 
Setting aside their confusing of ‘reflection’ with ‘reflective practice’, it is useful to consider 
their experience by exploring how skill and competency are differentiated in theory.  
Defined above, writers distinguish between the innate (personal characteristics), with 
motivation, and, skill (e.g. Boon & van der Klink, 2002; Gangani et al, 2004), all three of 
which the percipients appear to experience as conflated.  Yet, this is not surprising given 
that reflective practice is conceptualised as a skill in their higher education programmes, 
this being entirely integrated in its requirements, and for which they must find motivation 
to persist in complying with the instructed developmental activities for the duration of their 
course.  To illustrate, McClure (2005:5) advises that “students need time to develop this 
skill” of reflective practice in higher education and sets about suggesting how to structure 
that time to make it happen.  Moreover, this is within a context in which the programme 
itself is time-limited, and during that time individuals must learn other necessary and 
essential aspects of being a higher education student and their subject discipline.  Dawn 
recalls the moment when she first heard about reflective practice:  
77 Dawn most people were switching off or going ‘holy shit, not only have I got to 
do placement and write essays but I’ve got to write a diary to reflect on 
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practice, a learning contract and then how to write these and then on top 
reflect on it after 
(14Nov2013),  
with the consequence that “reflective practice [is] this hoop for everybody to jump through” 
(14Nov2013, Dawn:84).  In a different RPRG Jeanette recounts reflective practice being 
introduced at the “scary” start of a degree programme.  She says when  
144 Jeanette like you’re learning how to write an essay, for the first time in your life, 
and you’re making new friends like it’s all scary… you’re told you gotta 
do this and that on top of all the essays to do then it’s just another 
academic piece to get done 
(29Mar2014).   
This can only exacerbate – and reinforce – the significance of provided guidance, instruction 
and pro forma on reflective practice and it being approached strategically and 
instrumentally.  So, for example, even whilst Johns (2004:19) warns against “the orderly 
step-by-step progression” of staged models, his proposed ‘structured reflection’ (2004; 
2009) through ‘six dialogical movements’ prompted through consecutive reflective cues 
framed as questions becomes just that, and, as established, numerous writers have 
dedicated research time to creating similar tools and models that have been used in that 
way.  
Moreover, and compounding this further, it has been established that reflective practice 
guidance, stage models, and instruction within professional education programmes become 
diagnostics through which to assess evidence that students/practitioners provide of their 
engagement via its products.  It is a matter taking on further complexity when recalling that 
engagement is compulsory, and performing correctly to the specified standards in specified 
ways is necessary to meet pre-determined Learning Outcomes to gain credits towards ones 
final Degree, as well as to meet the criteria for professional qualification.  The percipients 
express the way in which the combination of this militates against any potentially positive 
experience in and from developing the skill of reflective practice.  It shows up in four ways 
in the RPRGs:  
• reflective practice as currently understood and practiced is unfit for purpose;  
• reflective practice is performed with an audience in mind;  
• percipients are preoccupied with constructing and telling a story; and  
• predominantly, this story is made up.   




6.1 Reflective practice as currently understood and practiced is unfit for purpose.  
Jeanette talks of how the current “systems” around reflective practice are unfit for purpose.  
Her experience is that they  
130 Jeanette don’t really allow for mess even though that’s what we are about, we 
are about messy lives and messy people. It’s like it reminds me, in the 
first year someone said, I think it was [names lecturer], that it was all 
about doing diaries and she said that someone once had put a CD in, 
you know recordings, and then had said ‘but you’ve got to be really 
careful’ and so it’s like well I won’t be doing that then, better not do that 
then, do you know what I mean [laughter] so it’s kind of saying you can 
be creative but… you know, it goes horribly wrong so stick to the format 
(29Mar2014) 
So on the one hand they are told “reflection’s important” but on the other “there’s the 
template for it” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:147) and “It immediately loses its values, it becomes 
devalued in one sentence, a task to do” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:149), the “real quick you 
know, a chore, job done” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:151) noted above.  As a result, she 
describes reflective practice as ‘flimsy’ (28Nov2013, Jeanette:28) to which Becky agrees: 
“I’ll just write it’, you know, ‘whatever!’”.  She wonders how she might “keep it real” 
(29Mar2014, Becky:129), but the diary format she is guided to use is “not helping or fit for 
purpose” (29Mar2014, Becky:131).  Indeed, when reading her journal back to herself 
Jeanette doesn’t “remember going to that meeting, or that thing […], it’s meaningless 
literally” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:132).  In an earlier RPRG, she explains “you get so focussed 
on that piece of writing, the problem, the task, so the purpose of it becomes only that” 
(14Nov2013, Jeanette:89).  In sum, “because it’s not in the moment it becomes something 
else” (14Nov2013, Jeanette:91).   
6.2 Reflective practice is performed with an audience in mind  
Briefly referred to earlier but returned to here, the percipients also the key tenet of 
reflective practice being a skill to be developed through their experience of that task not 
taking place in a vacuum.  The perpetual shadow of writing to and for an audience means 
they perform their reflective journals in necessary ways that evidence requirements to 
pass, like Debra’s reference to her reflective diary as an exercise of proof to lecturers that 
she can “handle” (10Jan2015, Debra:78) herself in practice situations referred to earlier.  To 
expand, in her first RPRG and recalling that initially she responded positively to the idea of 
keeping a reflective diary, Jeanette speaks of very quickly becoming focussed on it as a 
product, or, in Geoff’s words, a “report” (7Mar2015, Geoff:176) and therefore  
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86 Jeanette actually forget[ing] the purpose of it, you just kind of write in the diary 
this is what I did, in the first person, this is what I did and this is why 
and you kind of get focussed on that piece of writing and you want to 
make it to look as lovely and neat and actually you hand it in and don’t 
really consider that’s your practice 
(14 Nov2013) 
Similarly, earlier in that RPRG she says “doing your reflective diary knowing its part of 
something that is being marked, you are doing it for a reason […] you don’t want to fail or 
you don’t want to get a 2:2” (14Nov2013, Jeanette:36).  In her next RPRG (28Nov2013), she 
mines this further, describing diaries as “part of the problem” because you “change them” 
(28Nov2013, 2:16) i.e. you “use a bigger word to make it look good, well better” 
(28Nov2013, Jeanette:18).  She speaks of this in terms of a “boundary ‘no I’m not going to 
put that in’, […]… I think that’s why a lot of us make a lot of stuff up” (29Mar2014, 
Jeanette:85), because “like you want to sort of […] do you best and […] your tutor be proud 
of you” (28Nov2013, Jeanette:28).  By her third RPRG she refers to this as the “audience” to 
her diary (29Mar2014, Jeanette:46) and how it is “against human nature to put down stuff 
that doesn’t make you look good” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:91).  So, she talks of her fear of 
getting her diary “wrong” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:89) and the amount of “pressure you put 
on yourself” (28Nov2013, Jeanette:68) to be good, and that she wanted to “do a good 
journal, so edit it, make it neater, tidier” (28Nov2013, Jeanette:108).  Indeed, the thought 
of not editing it when her supervisor suggested it to her was so difficult that she “cried over 
it. It was a really painful process” (28Nov2013, Jeanette:104).  She attempted to follow the 
suggestion but quickly resumed her crafted version to be assured of a good grade.  
Similarly, in Debra’s first RPRG, she expresses concern that writing accounts of practice 
means “it becomes official” (18Oct2014, Debra:7) and Geoff agrees, “How can you not be 
concerned about the audience, like you are doing it ‘coz they’ve asked you to” (18Oct2014, 
Geoff:108).  
Jeanette recalls in her second year  
134 Jeanette one, [names lecturer] was like, ‘very good you’ve gone into a lot of 
effort’, I used lots of different colours and highlighters, you know, but 
it’s just that, she was marking the effort, it doesn’t mean anything, like 
actually it doesn’t mean anything 
(29Mar2014), 
which Becky describes as “words with highlighters” (29Mar2014, Becky:136), and Jeanette 
continues, that:  
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136 Jeanette it’s not it, it’s fun, no not fun, it looks good, it was effort she was right, 
but, not it, you know I thought it was at the time, you know ‘I’ve got 
the emotion there because I’ve highlighted it pink’ [laughs] but looking 
back at it now it’s just words in pink 
(29Mar2014),  
a “process” that Becky sums up as having “gone through for nothing” (29Mar2014, 
Becky:137).  I ask whether there is still something of significance in their discovery of how a 
diary could just be ‘words in pink’, a question that Becky echoes back as “does it rob them 
from that process?” (29Mar2014, Becky:139).  But Jeanette thinks not; she says: 
140 Jeanette it would be very helpful to look at all the third year [final degree year] 
diaries and talk to them because I don’t think, like I really don’t think 
they get it, like I think that they think that a word in pink is what it is 
about.  They just, so they think that is the kind of thing to do, the 
majority don’t use it as experience, they do it to get the grades, or, if 
they don’t care about the grade then they just don’t do it at all, so 
what’s the point 
(29Mar2014) 
Becky concurs, “it’s pointless” (29Mar2014, Becky:141), leading Jeanette to ask the 
question, “So why are we bothering, if we know it’s pointless and they think it’s pointless?” 
(29Mar2014, Jeanette:142).   
To understand this, extending earlier discussion that engagement in reflective practice in 
university programmes must be considered in terms of its broader landscape of education 
pedagogy is necessary.  Here, it is argued, the nature of learning is ostensibly ‘knowledge 
telling’ (Sharples, 1999:22), characterised by the task of ‘learning to write’ (Allen et al, 
1989), such that “not only are [students] taught what to write, but also how to write it” 
(Jasper, 2011:59).  Consequently, even with a benign intention behind facilitation using 
models and pro forma to guide reflective practice, this wider landscape will influence the 
way that students approach it.  Indeed, percipient Joseph shares how: 
75 Joseph the actual process of diary keeping prohibited that exchange of truth 
and self and therefore that formula prevented self from ever 
developing… without me being able to share fears, anxieties, wants, 
needs, perception how can I ever then alter or reflect in a meaningful 
way, I can’t build and create anything other than self-censor 
(14Nov2013), 
a similar experience shared by Geoff (7Mar2015, Geoff:164).  Whilst Rob and Dasia reply 
that some kind of guidance is needed (7Mar2015, Rob:166 & Rob:168, Dasia:169), Geoff 
shares how currently this is much like guidance given to write essays because “it’s so it’s 
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easier to mark. If from that thing I’m supposed to achieve an occupational standard or I’m 
supposed to achieve this they’ve only got to read that bit and tick that bit” (7Mar2015, 
Geoff:170). 
The critique they draw out here, then, is that the practice of reflective practice is organised 
solely to favour higher education systems, with Rob, Geoff and Dasia (7Mar2015, 171-177) 
adding that compliance with guidance on how to develop reflective practice might create a 
“better story” but not enable what one wants to express, so it becomes a ‘tick box’ exercise, 
and therefore “reporting on” one’s practice rather than reflective practice.  In a different 
RPRG, and two year previously, Dawn speaks of people “at the top of the tree” deciding 
what “constitutes a pass”, meaning for her “there’s a good and a bad and I’m trying to be 
good”, and consequently in relation to her reflective practice, the “whole thing of a pass 
and fail creates lying”, giving the example if “you’re having a bad day” then you are going 
to “make things up” (14Nov2013, Dawn:41). 
6.3 Percipients are preoccupied with constructing and telling a story. 
Thus, rather than developing the skill of reflective practice, the focus of percipient 
experiences is of formulating their accounts in such a way that the intended audience will 
be able to understand them and judge them positively.  Their reflective recordings take on 
the quality of telling a story, with a distinct beginning, middle and end, that emphasises 
positive outcome/change which may not be the case, and together this does not match the 
messy, complex and rich reality of their actual professional practice.  In their diary accounts 
“you can tell yourself anything” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:18), they are merely “a version of us 
we want others to see” (28Nov2013, Jeanette:106).  Geoff says as soon as he begins to 
write he is “now telling a story, telling specific parts, like an essay, it becomes more 
unnatural, bringing in theory, it takes the magic of the reflection out” (30May2015, 
Geoff:43).  Later, he asks: 
173 Geoff is it a reflective diary or is it an essay? I get confused, which is it you want 
from me, they say where is the theory, integrate theory, whereas I want 
to reflect on that experience, isn’t that experience enough, right, or have I 
got to put in someone else’s experience to make it valid? 
(30May2015) 
Jeanette points out “if you’ve lost the moment it kind of makes you wonder what the ‘after’ 
is for” (14Nov2013, Jeanette:60).  So, rather than generating free-flowing, open critical 
reflection on messy, complex, rich professional practice, the diary with its models and pro 
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forma, becomes a hoop to jump through and stories to perform that, at best, as Sadie puts 
it, one ‘sorts thoughts out’, but this does not equate or lead to it being “different the next 
time” for self, situation, or professional practice (15Nov2013, Sadie:84). 
Obviously, this contrasts sharply with the theoretical claims of reflective practice as 
‘knowledge transforming’ (Sharples, 1999:22) and the essence of reflective writing and 
dialogue as ‘writing [or conversing] to learn’ (Allen et al, 1989).  In sum, the aim of 
reflective activities being that practitioners will develop the skill of reflective practice such 
that by ‘combining thinking and writing in a dialogue with themselves and others’, they will 
“develop understanding and create knowledge out of experience” (Jasper, 2011:60) has not 
been borne out in percipient experiences.  Their experiences show reflective practice to be 
a prescribed narrative to perform in a required manner, a chore that “after a little while 
gets boring, it’s like ‘oh shit, I’ve gotta write in my diary’ and you put any old thing in there” 
(6Dec2014, Rob:172).  Research with student teachers in Japan to explore the extent to 
which these experiences might be culturally or higher education/university specific 
revealed them to be very similar.  Japanese student teachers spoke about “not doing 
reflective practice” once they had graduated, in reality meaning not keeping a diary, which 
at the same time reveals the extent to which they too associate the one with the other 
(Trelfa & Tamai, 2014).  Moreover, and significantly, Nelson & Purkis (2004:205) highlight 
the enduring nature of bad and poor experiences of reflective practice, their research 
exposing how students will “[fall] back [to] the business of the education system” in their 
engagement in reflective practice once graduated and in work. 
We have also seen that these issues do not only apply to diary writing.  The “crucial” role of 
a supervisor in “being able to develop the capacity to reflect, self-analyse and contain 
[oneself] when interacting with service users” (Ferguson, 2018:418) is asserted in 
mainstream literature on reflective practice (e.g. Casement, 1985; Morrissey & Tribe 2001; 
Fook & Gardner, 2007; Gould & Baldwin, 2006; Johns, 2004; Rolfe et al, 2001; Jasper, 2011).  
It has been noted that Jeanette’s supervisor encouraged her not to censor and tidy her 
diary, and Geoff’s supervisor guided him to reflect on the way he writes about himself in his 
diary albeit this only told him about himself as a writer.  Clare also shares positive benefits 
when her supervisor acted as a gateway to learning opportunities in the placement 
organisation (6Oct20145, Clare:130).   
However, a mixed experience of organisationally supported supervision has been 
highlighted, and when positive other dynamics carry significantly more weight.  As Jeanette 
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says, the reflective journal has still “got to do what it going to do” (29Mar2014, 
Jeanette:79) so “of course I have to keep a structure and tell people what happened, 
someone’s going to read it” therefore she edits and censors to tell an appropriate story in 
the appropriate way (29Mar2014, Jeanette:81).  In Geoff’s words, it remains a “game to 
play” (30May205, Geoff:169), a similar experience shared by Sadie (15Nov2013, Sadie:44) 
and resonant with Debra’s account of reflective practice perpetually ‘singing the same tune’ 
(30May205, Debra:133).  
In sum, jostling mainstream theory with percipients experiences related to the key tenet of 
reflective practice as a skill to be developed shows up the impact of that epistemology.  
Carried out through  ‘vehicles of expression that practitioners themselves have not chosen’, 
in ways that create ‘instrumentalist, superficial and formulaic’ responses (Saltiel, 2010:135), 
has the effect, it appears, of confusion, ‘compliance and cynicism’ (West, 2010:66), borne 
out in accounts of practice that are exaggerated, diluted, or entirely made up (Hobbs, 2007; 
Toll et al, 2004; Erlandson, 2004; Powell & Gilbert, 2006).   
6.4 Predominantly the stories that percipients construct and tell about their 
professional practice are made up.   
The extent to which percipients make up their reflective accounts to best effect is a core 
experience shared by Jeanette, Becky, Dawn, Sadie, Jason, Debra and Geoff and, given the 
context above, can be considered wise if it means they increase their chance of passing 
their higher education course.  Becky talks about “embellishing [her diary] all over the 
place” (29Mar2014, Becky:61).  Jason talks of constructing and censoring his diary story by 
choosing “which bits I will say more about, which I won’t say about” (21Nov2014, 
Jason:121).  Geoff says that when he “write[s his] diary you know, I know what I’m going to 
write and where it’s going to go” (18Oct2014, Geoff:115).  In her third RPRG, Jeanette says 
that “a lot of the time, well we make our reflection” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:44).  Debra 
dreads writing about herself (30May2015, Debra:99) to which Rob says “Well no-one will 
know, you can say anything, you can make it all up” (30May2015, Rob:100).  In a different 
RPRG Sadie specifically talks of the shadow of judgement from a potential audience to 
which Debra says that she “think[s] about it all the time” which makes it a “horrible” 
experience (21Nov2014, Debra:91).  Sadie says she:  
89 Sadie think[s] about how [her diary and supervision] represent us”, likening it to 
“when someone comes round your house you kind of suddenly look round 
your house and go ‘oh god’ you know, like you want it to represent 
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something about you and it’s not going to be this you know [laughter]. 
Educated books on the shelves!” [laughter] 
(21Nov2014) 
Interestingly, in their focus on reflective writing, Platzer et al (1997:113-114) stress “a 
paucity of studies related to the use of diaries as a medium to promote reflection” 
[emphasis added] on professional practice.  They note Gerrish (1993), Burnard (1991) and 
Lyte & Thompson (1990) who highlight positive student experience but how even that 
research identifies student anxiety about committing personal reflections to paper, such 
that they “launder” their accounts (Wallace, 1995, cited in Platzer et al, 1997:114).  On the 
other hand, Morrison’s (1996) research into student journal keeping draws entirely positive 
conclusions, and Moon (1999:187) finds “enthusiasm and expression of value”, although 
only refers to two sources to substantiate this point and acknowledges the situation of “few 
evaluative studies”.  What is important, however, is, despite this, use of diaries is entirely 
commonplace in higher education programmes for facilitating reflection-on-practice: 
percipient experiences in this thesis builds a stronger case for the issues involved, these 
being linked to Identity-Of, the epistemological position of knowing the delineated pre-
existent discipline and practices or ‘sets of actions’ (Schatzki, 2001b:48), in this case, of 
reflective practice, and cleaving to’ them (Barnes, 2001:17).   
Paradoxically, then, we are led to see how the current practices of reflective practice as a 
skill stresses individual agency in their focus on professional engagement but assert this to 
be done through a “one size fits all” process that reinforces a “standardisation of people” 
(Russell, 1999, in Furedi, 2004:107).  Engagement becomes, in the words of percipient 
Jeanette, merely ‘words in pink’ that do not allow for, or encourage reflective practice in its 
roots of artistry.  It is an experience that has resonance with Furedi’s (2004) exposition of a 
wider therapeutic culture.  The developmental epistemology of reflective practice as a skill 
is “guided by a cultural narrative [through] the guidance of professionals” that 
‘compromises the ability of individuals to make choices’ and leads to a “diminished” sense 
of the power of self, a process and outcome (2004:107).  Further, and relatedly, this 
developmental one-size-fits-all approach pivots on a view of a homogenous body of 
practitioners that engage with reflective practice in a neurotypical way (Boundy, 2008; 
Runswick-Cole 2014).  ‘Neurotypical’ refers to a “preoccupation with” and presumption of a 
singular “experience of the world [as] either the only one, or the only correct one” (Muskie, 
2002:np), a description that has clear resonance with percipient experiences and the 
processes of neo-liberalism identified earlier.  Thus, we are led to the view that mainstream 
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literature and practice of reflective practice are “preoccupied with defining and maintaining 
the borderlands” (Runswick-Cole, 2014:1124) between those who effectively reflect and 
those who do not, rather than “recognition and acceptance of valuable [processing] 
difference” (Runswick-Cole 2014: 1120-1121).  Whilst original theory concerning the 
concept of neurodiversity stems from studies of autism, Baron-Cohen (2015:np) refers to it 
as a “revolutionary concept” that points up processing diversity in any context, here, then, 
relevant to the context of developing the skill of reflective practice.   
In sum, Curation that jostles theory with percipient experiences of engaging with reflective 
practice in relation to the tenet Captured of reflective practice being a skill that is learned 
and developed has surfaced significant issues.   
7 Curating reflective practice 
Capturing professional practice through scoping and interweaving social science and arts 
theories in chapter 2 led to a rich appreciation of reflective practice and identification of 
key tenets, which have been explored here by jostling and juxtaposing the rhetoric with 
percipients experiences of engaging in reflective practice from the RPRGs.  That Curation 
has created a critique of reflective practice.  This is not the first or only critique, and a range 
of those theories and debates have also been drawn in to the discussion.  However, in this 
thesis those ‘carved out’ (cf. Peters) questions are fashioned from the percipients.   
In summary, the fundamental issues Curated in this chapter are: 
- Confusion concerning how, if, and in what ways ‘reflective practice’ is different to 
‘reflection’; confusion in definitions of those terms, as well as ‘reflexivity’ and 
‘critical reflective practice’; confusion about whether reflective practice can or 
should be transformative – or indeed create change – and in any case, what these 
mean and involve, and how all this aligns within a context of the messy, rich, 
complexity of professional practice. 
 
- In relation to the practice of reflective practice, the ‘fight’ and ‘struggle’ of being 
constructed as suboptimal requiring growth is problematic and takes an emotional 
toll, one that has additional load when experienced as uninvited intrusion and 
confession, and when engagement is compulsory and assessed.  It takes on the 
form of confessing one’s wrongs, part of a wider ‘confessing society’ wherein the 
‘the private’ is a problem unless and until it is opened to public scrutiny albeit then 
judged to be a different kind of problem, in our case, whether it indicates suitable 




- Because of this, therefore not surprisingly, reflective activities are approached in 
particular ways, conforming to suppression of certain private emotions, and, 
performing public displays of a particular self that are channelled and directed 
toward evidencing linear and always positive change in self-development and 
practice competence, facilitated, expected, required and assessed through 
neurotypical staged models.  Yet even the literature of stages is confused and 
confusing and cannot overlay actual professional and reflective practice.  So, for 
example we have noted that non-reflection can be a wise choice and a reflective 
practice process need not be linear, indeed like the professional practice it comes 
from.   
 
- Current literature around reflective practice does not consider that practitioners 
will actively resist, change and process situations from neural-processing based on 
‘myside-bias’, illusion and anchoring effects. 
 
- Using CBAM with understanding from the theory of planned behaviour, the process 
of change has also been shown to be significantly more complex than ‘I have 
reflected on it therefore change happens’: whether there is change, the nature of 
that change and the extent of change including whether the outcome is positive, is 
dependent on social and normative influences in conjunction with interiority, and is 
significantly more complex than suggested in mainstream literature.   
 
- Whether that always has to involve awareness of personal and shared professional 
norms and values has been challenged, and whether it is possible to identify which 
components of professional practice have salience in the event they are reflecting 
on, and in which order (because a different order would have a different effect); or, 
have accurate memory recall; or, are fully cognizant of what has changed as a result 
of that reflection – have all been troubled. 
 
- The individual reflective practice of a student/practitioner leading to change within 
an organisation, pointed up as a neglected area in Schön’s original writing, has also 
been identified as problematic: the process is unclear, although the importance of 
the organisation in supporting and receiving reflective practice has been shown as 
essential, but this is not guaranteed – nor in the way and to the effect that 
mainstream literature sets out.    
 
- Finally, given the developmental epistemology stemming from its Humanist 
Protestant roots, ‘becoming civilised’ by learning the skill of reflective practice 
means that higher education programmes and underpinning scholarship give 
significant time and attention to the way in which it is to be facilitated by lecturers, 
how it is to be developed by those engaging in it, and ultimately how it should be 
formally assessed.  Here, competency, motivation and skill are conflated, reflective 
practice becomes another concept to learn amongst a vast array of concepts within 
a time-limed higher education programme, and the process of facilitating and 
evidencing one’s engagement becomes an experience of compliance via made-up 
accounts that are performed appropriately to pass their courses. 
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Thus, this research supports my earlier (different) research that reflective practice has 
become, or has always been, an exercise of interiority, self-surveillance, impression 
management and control, with the practice of reflective practice “the tool of choice” in this 
regard “by regulatory authorities” (Nelson & Purkis, 2004:205).  Practitioners explore and 
‘integrate their instrumental, expressive, affective and cognitive’ processes (Gould, 1996:3) 
with institutional arrangements that determine priorities and agendas, a process of 
articulating externally determined relevant information for utilitarian purposes (Barnett & 
Griffin, 1997).   
7.1 Engineering science not artistry 
It can be concluded from this Curation of reflective practice that reflective practice is (or 
has become) a domesticating process that inscribes and prescribes practitioners, Identity-
Of, rather than encouraging and enabling them as scribes of reflective practice or 
professional practice, Identity-As.  This sits in sharp contrast to its roots of professional 
artistry, the “fumbling act of discovery” (Hamilton, 2005:288) wherein practitioners are, as 
referred to earlier, “makers of artifacts” (Schön, 1987:42).  Fish (1998:42) goes further, 
articulating artistry as a “paradigm” that she describes as being about  
recognising and responding to, understanding and valuing, the artistry of 
professional practice […] the appreciation and connoisseurship of good 
practice, with a view to making it generally possible to enable people to 
‘make such appreciation their own’ (to experience that appreciation 
from the inside, rather than being dependent on the judgement of 
others). 
The Curated outcomes clearly do not reflect an artistry paradigm.  
In fact, the ‘input-output, additive and cumulative’ (Vlair, 2008:459) nature of what has 
emerged in Curation, with its attention to standardising input to ensure parity and equal 
possibility of output meaning diversity becomes a “noise that should be minimised through 
accountability mechanisms” (2008:448) can be seen to be more in-line with an ‘engineering 
science’ paradigm (Soler et al, 2014).  An engineering science paradigm is explained as: 
Plug and chug: procedural ways of solving problems and completing 
assignments that ~1. allow you to get by without wasting time thinking, 
~2. do not require you to really understand what you are doing, and ~3. 
protect your own limited understanding from being exposed. 
Cram and flush: a general approach to taking tests, completing 
assignments, and meeting deadlines that involves ~1. anticipating what 
the evaluators want, ~2. stuffing your mind with whatever fits the above 
requirement, and ~3. dumping this stuff out at the appropriate time and 
place (Bella, 2003:33).  
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It is striking to note the extent to which this matches the percipient experiences of their 
engagement in reflective practice, an engineering science rather than artistry paradigm 
with a focus on input, output and time.   
- Input 
Additive and cumulative output is driven by the nature and quality of the input, in our case, 
the instructional skills, guidance, and facilitation of reflective practice in higher education 
programmes.  The input and associated expectations are based on a limited and narrow 
notion of what it is to know and how one must and can evidence, indeed, perform this, one 
wherein cognition is sovereign and despite issues with what that entails.   
- Output 
This is followed by assessment of the nature and quality of the output - carried out by those 
who ‘led’ the input.  Judgements are made about whether practitioners have developed 
sufficiently, against explicit and implicit notions of appropriate process for development as 
well as what ‘sufficient’ involves.  To ensure this too has parity (otherwise how can 
equivalent sufficient development across individuals be judged), standardised 
measurements are used and, if all are to know what they need to produce and perform and 
then re-present this appropriately, focus must necessarily centre on its ‘administrable 
features’ (Vlair, 2008:448).   
Thus the focus of facilitators and students alike is dominated by expectations, 
requirements, pro forma, handbooks, checklists, SMART-ness (specific, measurable, 
achievable, relevant, timely/timeframe), and accessibility – delivered by facilitator-
assessors such that all student/practitioners are enabled to access the same information at 
the same time.  In this way it is assured that any lack of reflective practice is not the result 
of poor facilitator input, instruction and administration; responsibility for that must lie with 
individual student/practitioner laziness, lack of engagement and/or motivation, or their 
non-compliance.   
Failing to produce and perform as required carries high stakes – students/practitioners will 
not get their desired qualification so they learn to perform “legitimate narratives” 
(Hargreaves, 2004:200), and become competent in the skill of “being seen to be reflective” 
(Barnett, 1977, cited in Rowland, 2006:54) in the service of themselves, rather than in the 
scrutiny of their professional practice for the service of others.  Significant attention is given 
to more instruction (e.g. on how to approach and produce reflective journals) and more 
guidance (e.g. more guidelines concerning number, length and content of the recordings, or 
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more clearly specified Learning Outcomes, or better-defined assessment rubrics) in the 
spirit of being helpful.  For a typical facilitator of reflective practice this is difficult to argue 
against when framed as being best for the student: it is hard to argue against the 
hegemony of a good thing, and established understanding and practice of reflective 
practice is of it as inherently and inevitably a ‘good thing’, thereby increasing instruction, 
guidance and its detail can only be a ‘good thing’ too.  Divergence, whether student or 
facilitator-lecturer-assessor, becomes a cautious affair, if not avoided altogether, and, it is a 
wise student who knows where and how to seek out, interpret and perform the implicit 
and explicit cues presented to them about reflective practice to re-present it for favourable 
assessment. 
- Time 
For students/practitioners to learn all this and facilitator-lecturer-assessors to train them in 
it takes time; indeed, the deterministic significance of time to produce such effects are 
integral to an assumption of development and improvement.  It is again, therefore, little 
wonder that emphasis on time proliferates percipient experiences of reflective practice, the 
time to learn and understand what is required and how they must perform and produce, 
and then the time to do that performing and producing.  Moreover, in relation to current 
practices of reflective practice within higher education frameworks, they must all do these 
at the same time – so at specified times within a higher educational programme and 
specified times during their working week.  The produced goods, whether reflective 
journals, assignments involving reflection on practice, dialogue /supervision, or even 
behaviour in professional contexts, are assumed to be additive and cumulative in their 
development of the practice-producers, and additively and cumulatively create ‘good’ 
individual practitioners and ‘good’ practice.  Bleakley (2000:408) likens it to “techniques of 
personal growth and self-revelation equivalent to a fitness class”.   
8 Curating reflective practice: ‘Breaking-in’ 
Curating theory around the identified key tenets with percipients lived experiences reveals 
that mainstream understanding and practice of reflective practice does not encompass or 
support the complexity of professional practice, of knowing, of change, and of what 
changes.  Change is socially situated, messy, and the outcome multifarious, even invisible, 
and indeed, change may not always be the outcome – in fact the opposite, we orientate 
ourselves to constancy.   
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We can also understand that percipient preoccupation with what they need to do and how 
to produce and perform in the correct ways comes to shape and characterises their 
experience of and engagement in reflective practice, even though they are aware of this, 
and even when they can imagine it could be different.   
At best individuals might engage in reflective practice ‘in secret’ but this risks leaving 
professional practice ‘undiscussed’ (cf. Schön).  It also risks reflective practice in its service 
to self to be accused of being self-indulgent (Issit, 1999, in O’Reilly et al, 1999; Brookfield, 
2000).   
Bleakley (1999:318) highlights the irony of this developmental approach in its reduction of 
complexity to a “technical operation”.  Even when couched in critical and emancipatory 
terms he underscores their hollowness when such claims are ‘employed as if they were 
transparently an intrinsically worthwhile activity’ (Bleakley, 1999:320) without an 
interrogation of the process itself.   
In final analysis, Curation draws attention to how reflective practice has become 
appropriated by a neo-liberal agenda as a form of accountability.  A different route leads 
Brookfield (2000:46) to the same conclusion.  He writes  
Our narratives of critical reflection and self-disclosure are artifices – 
fictional creations in which we feature as the hero, but not to be 
confused with the chaotic fragmentation of daily experience.  
Political philosopher Henri Lefebvre’s (1992/2004) concept of ‘breaking-in’ is relevant here, 
part of a broader theory to be explored further later in this thesis, one that is, to-date, a 
little-known scholarship and little used concept (Elden, 2004).  Lefebvre (1992/2004) writes 
of ‘breaking-in’ or “dressage” in the context of enculturation.  He relates it to breaking-in 
horses, surprisingly fitting given the earlier analogy of The Trappings in chapter 2 and the 
Curated discussion above.  Breaking-in is when one “presents [people] with the same 
situation, prepares them to encounter the same state of things” in ‘ritualised, stereotyped 
rites’ (1992/2004:39).  It is an “automatism of repetitions” (1992/2004:40), “in the course 
of which interested parties can imagine themselves elsewhere: as being absent, not present 
in the presentation” [sic] (1992/2004:39).  Dressage through training “fills the place of the 
unforeseen” (1992/2004:40) with “phases”, a “linear series” with ‘a beginning and end’ that 
relies solely on “a general organisation of time” (1992/2004:39), and is ‘reinforced by 
identification with the chief, the sovereign, the models that have great power and 
influence’ (1992/2004:42).  ‘Breaking-in’ has an astonishing resonance with the percipient 
lived experiences of reflective practice that have been Captured and Curated. 
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Lefebvre explains that “in the course of their being broken-in animals work” [sic] 
(1992/2004:40): “under the imperious direction of the breeder or trainer, they produce 
their bodies […] their bodies modify themselves, are altered” (1992/2004:40).  Further, 
dressage “determines” rhythms, it “Is the training that counts: that imposes, that educates, 
that breaks-in” (1992/2004:41) – and in fact Lefebvre likens it to a “military model” 
(1992/2004:41), based on information that “stocks up on itself, trades itself, sells itself” 
(1992/2004:49).  His analysis has a striking similarity to Hannah Arendt’s notion of work and 
its contrast with action.  Arendt’s political philosophy leads her to observe that action can 
be “positively dangerous” (Canovan, 1992:132) in the face of neoliberal pressures for “a 
stable human order” (Canovan, 1992:133).  Containment and control operate through rule 
and ‘work’, work having predetermined outcomes and means, and where people are “the 
material to be dealt with” (Canovan, 1992:73) to be certain that they conform.  In her 
commentary on the rich contribution of Arendt’s philosophy, Kristeva (1999/2001:40) 
writes of how this ‘work’ feeds into “the cult of the ‘individual life’” that is at the core of 
Arendt’s critique – but now also core to reflective practice. 
A reflective practice that domesticates, that ‘breaks’ student/practitioners ‘in’ to the 
Identity-Of a ‘reflective practitioner’ through ‘work’ is far from its roots of professional 
artistry - and indeed far from the rhetoric of mainstream literature; and, Curation has 
illuminated an engineering paradigm instead and the experience of being ‘broken-in’, a slow 





Describing is the act and process of giving semblance (Langer, 1953) 
through a “logical expression of dynamic patterns and ideas” (Ryan, 
2012:210).  It aims to reconstruct, not in the sense of mapping 
something out but in communicating somebeing, that is, meaning as it 
was meant, in this case, as meant by the percipients. 
 
1 Introduction 
I began this thesis by identifying reflective practice as the anchor to my professional 
practice in its process of curiosity, inquiry, openness and scrutiny, therefore the importance 
of encouraging others to engage too because it will be positive for their professional 
practice and professions.  Yet so far this is a different experience to those of the 
percipients.  Chapter 2 establishes that social professionals are not “free agents” (Taylor et 
al, 2002:151), but also that this Identity-Of weaves with reflective practice such that they 
can be scribes of practice as well as inscribed.  However, lived experience of engaging in 
reflective practice from chapter 3 ‘carves out’ how that too concerns Identity-Of, the 
opposite of claims in mainstream rhetoric, that are contradictory, confusing, or not borne 
out.  Therefore, chapter 3 has advanced a “counter-stance” (Schostak & Schostak, 2008:15) 
to taken-for-granted understanding of reflective practice, but a particular kind of critique:  
It is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a 
matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of 
familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought, the practices 
that we accept rest (Foucault, 1988:154). 
It is Schostak & Schostak’s (2008:13) contention that this is where qualitative research 
typically ends, research applied to literature leading to conclusions as if instructions that 
“solve puzzles”.  But, ‘radical research’ requires more than this: a counter-stance is 
followed by “action”, an ‘engaged committed movement for change’ (2008:12).   
In sum, reflective practice can be argued to be a ‘system in ruins’ (Taylor et al, 2002:156) 
but left there would not lend to action.   
Whilst Taylor et al’s focus is higher education, their contention has relevance.  They guide 
that a label of ‘ruined system’ projects “pessimism” which impedes movement and erodes 
conceivability of change.  Yet “progressive change is possible, indeed necessary given both 
the fundamental contradictions in the system and its irrationality and immorality” 
[emphasis added] (2002:151).  Thus, applied to this thesis, they advocate viewing the 
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‘carved out’ (cf. Peters) Curation of chapter 3 as “a ‘battleground’, a site of conflicts” 
(2002:156) because unlike ‘ruins’ a ‘battleground’ offers mobility and imaginable 
alternative action.  Even so, considering the extent and nature of issues ‘carved out’(cf. 
Peters) in chapter 3, one might wonder why this thesis is progressing with reflective 
practice at all if doing so risks merely reinforce its domesticating acts, the slow and 
incremental violence of being ‘broken in’ that diverges so acutely from professional artistry 
and service to others.  After all, “a diminished and uncertain self can pose no questions and 
offer no challenge to anyone” (Ecclestone & Hayes, 2009:104).  Reaching a similar 
conclusion by different routes has led others to re-name and re-conceptualise reflective 
practice to, for example, “critical practice” (Fraser & Mathews, 2008), “practical wisdom” 
(Yunus Eryaman, 2007), and “critical pedagogy” (Ledwith, 2016).  Whilst certainly 
addressing confusion linked to emphasis from the word ‘reflective’, broader framing alone 
does not address the breadth and depth of issues that have been Captured and Curated.  
Indeed, here it has been understood that self and interior processing are involved in 
professional practice; it is the assumptions that go along with this and the means and ends 
to exploring that knowing in practice which are problematic.   
The emerging phenomenology (non-capitalised) allows for ‘analysis that dismantles what 
would otherwise not speak’ (Welton, 1987:xiii) but, further, critical phenomenology 
supports action ‘arising out of’ that (Canovan, 1992:102).  However, if I imposed that 
direction/action on to the research it would work against my principle that momentum 
should come from the percipients themselves.  However, the percipient experiences in the 
RPRGs offer their own ‘action’ that addresses and considers the issues Curated in chapter 3.  
This, then, is the focus of Describing.  
2 The process of ‘grasping’ percipients ‘action’. 
In phenomenology, commonality and differences in lived experience are “creative 
shorthands” and “helpful guides” (van Manen, 2016:312) in a “process of carefully spinning 
out a detailed phenomenological text” (2016:312).  Unlike general qualitative research, 
these are not identified “from the data” by the researcher but come to light through 
“grasping and formulating” the meaning of phenomena via “a complex and creative process 
of insightful invention, discovery and disclosure” (2016:320).  To this end, Describing 
“dwell[s]” in (2016:358) and “evoke[s]” (2016:367) percipient lived experiences where 
semblance between them exists.  To support and recognise difference, where an individual 
percipient shares their own experience (as opposed to semblance in common), ‘describing’ 
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(the word) is not capitalised.  The purpose is not to map experiences out, as in typical 
qualitative research, but to “grasp the naked now” (2016:369) by ensuring their voices and 
“meaning speaks and resonates” (2016:37) for itself, with as little commentary as possible.  
Chapter 3 closed with reflective practice as “a ‘battleground’, a site of conflicts” (Taylor et 
al, 2002:156), but, writing in the field of conflict resolution, Hicks (1988:81-82) points out 
that a creative and positive movement forward will be found when it is “firmly rooted in a 
vision of what might be”. 
3 A vision of what might be 
The percipients ‘action’ on ‘a vision of what might be’ that addresses and considers the 
issues Curated in chapter 3 begins with their positive experiences of engaging in reflective 
practice: recall earlier Geoff sharing how his reflective practice enabled him to “stop and 
think” about his intervention with two young men who had been fighting (10Jan2015, 
Geoff:44), Jeanette describing its significance with regards to thinking about herself and her 
values  (14Nov2013, Jeanette:14), and Sadie that reflective practice means she can be 
“more effective […] in the workplace” (15Nov2013, Sadie:100).   
This took me back to the transcripts to mine further their positive experiences of reflective 
practice. 
3.1 Management of feelings, emotions and reactions.  
Just holding in mind their higher education course requirement that they ought to engage 
in reflective practice gives Carol and Jason something tangible to cognitively coalesce 
around during practice sessions that otherwise feel overwhelming (29Nov2013, Carol:2; 
21Nov2014, Jason:75).  Differently, but perhaps linked, Duma talks about reflective practice 
being the way that he “protect[s himself” (15Nov2013, Duma:2).  When asked to say more, 
he explains “you think about it and see where you went wrong. What you could have done 
better. Or how you….could change your personality or your reaction should things like that 
happen again” (15Nov2013, Duma:6).  He describes himself as a “short-fused person”, 
sharing an example from his practice.  Employed in a new part-time role that gives him the 
opportunity to apply his university course to practice he recounts how he reacted ‘angrily’ 
(15Nov2013, Duma:62) when his colleagues did not do as he instructed.  He “start[ed] 
shaking and.…shaking my mind actually.… I got out of being professional a little bit” 
(15Nov2013, Duma:52) because he is used to working in a very different work context for 
“many years giving orders […] And orders should be taken and should be done” (15Nov2013, 
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Duma:66).  As he got angry, voices rose (15Nov2013, Duma:39), his colleagues began to 
“point the fingers” at him (15Nov2013, Duma:62) and another member of staff arrived and 
“calmed the thing” (15Nov2013, Duma:39).  Duma thought about “reporting” the staff who 
had not followed his orders (15Nov2013, Duma:39) but reflecting afterwards he thought 
about the implications for their families, how it could be “devastating” (15Nov2013, 
Duma:39).  For him, then, reflective practice is a “process” in which he has “the time to 
actually sit back and control the level of anger.  And when I control that level of anger then 
it helps me not to attack because I’ve always believed that attack is always the best 
defence” (15Nov2013, Duma:17).  It is a process of being “thoughtful” (15Nov2013, 
Duma:11) through which he is beginning to connect why he might have reacted so angrily, 
consider alternative actions he can take, and, in doing so, consider consequences of actions 
in his professional practice (15Nov2013, Duma:21).   
In a different RPRG, Dasia also talks about ‘calming down’ through reflective practice 
(18Oct2014, Dasia:42).  Dasia is studying a social science degree alongside being a mother 
to young children.  She recalls how she would react to situations at home, “‘why this 
happen to me’ I used to think, I used to get in a bad way” but by engaging in reflective 
practice “later” (18Oct2014, Dasia:40) she:  
42 Dasia will calm [her]self down, ‘no don’t stress up’, I, like, give myself advice, and 
I might find something but like when I am angry I can’t think but later 
when everything is back to normal I can start to think properly 
(18Oct2014) 
Geoff sums this up as reflective practice being “talk[ing] yourself down” (18Oct2014, 
Geoff:43), which resonates with him given that in the next RPRG he speaks of how he had 
been taught to manage his anger as part of group therapy earlier in his life (6Dec2014, 
Geoff:263).  To illustrate, he tells of a situation just before leaving his home, of being woken 
early by a neighbour’s delivery of building material.  He explains that in the past he would 
have been “hanging out the window” (6Dec2014, Geoff:259) getting angry but now he 
“kind of track[s] back what shaped that feeling and you process that” (6Dec2014, 
Geoff:259) likening this to reflective practice, at which point Jason interjects describing 
reflective practice as “feeling management.  It’s a feeling management” (6Dec2014, 
Jason:264).   
This reflective practice as distance from and management of one’s feelings, emotions and 
reactions is described by Dawn as:  
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28 Dawn adopt[ing] the witness position […] so that for everything involved in it you 
step back and have a look at what you do, having distance […] and then 
from there having a look at why did I react that way and unpack the 
reasons for my behaviour in that session and content 
(14Nov2013) 
by questioning “whether your own activities are appropriate” (14Nov2013, Dawn:28).   In a 
different RPRG Jason also adds to reflective practice as questioning, specifically, after an 
“uncomfortable” or “good situation”, “you sit down and are reflecting looking at the 
feelings it brought up, and the actions that you took, and why there’s negative and positive 
feelings about it” (18Oct2014, Jason:2).  Joseph shares similarly but in broader terms, 
reflective practice “sort of maps a journey and learning, and learnedness is how they best 
deal with that reflective practice” (14Nov2013, Joseph:2).  
Jeanette describes the purpose to all this: “improving us as practitioners”, to “be a better, 
you know, more improved practitioner” so “if you do something bad or you do something 
wrong then you kind of say look I did this but I did this to resolve it and actually you’ve 
learnt from that so…you’re going to be better in future” (14Nov2013, Jeanette:42), echoing 
Sadie’s description of reflective practice as a ‘professional responsibility’ referred to 
previously.  Along similar lines in a different RPRG Jason describes   
36 Jason a lot of lessons to be learned from [‘good and bad’ experiences in the 
workplace], for me reflective practice is how we can learn the most lessons 
we possibly can from those situations, I was like, well looking at it like it’s 
turning the negatives into positives … 
(18Oct2014). 
Joseph puts into words his experience of the value of reflective practice in a slightly 
different but related way: reflective practice means that he can “constantly […] reinvent the 
wheel, I constantly need to look at practice, […] it’s always a new piece of paper, which I 
love” (14Nov2013, Joseph:2).  Reflective practice “gives” him and his practice “that vitality 
back, […] new things that can be planned, new ways of expression, new ways of looking at 
experiences […] in order to pull new information out” (14Nov2013, Joseph:6).   
Thus the percipients are Describing the significant contribution from reflection-on-practice 
of distance: carried out after an intervention, action, situation, session, reflective practice 
enables practice management, overview, questioning, and development, and, as a result, 
facilitates practitioner vitality.  Their positive experiences are the rationale for progressing 
with reflective practice in this thesis. 
135 
 
However, the nature of that distance is unclear.  Above Duma, Dasia and Geoff speak of 
reflective practice-on and -in practice without differentiation, and when Dawn talks of 
‘everything you do’ it is unclear if she means at the time or later.  In a different RPRG Clare 
is less ambiguous.  She speaks of reflective practice whilst she is “doing” practice, so when 
she is “going ‘Oh, this isn’t working, I’ll try this way’” as well as afterwards by reflecting 
“‘well I’ve tried this way, but coz we’ve also tried that way’” (6Oct2014, Clare:3) so “I’m 
gonna go back and deal with that again and approach it differently” (6Oct2014, Clare:105).  
Having noted that Geoff blurs reflection on and in practice, later in that RPRG he speaks of 
the way that something can “put you in a certain mood that you don’t consciously know […] 
at the time, you just find your day goes that way because something put you there” and it is 
reflective practice that helps him to ‘track back’ (6Dec2014, Geoff:237) and identify the 
“shape” that mood is making in the moment (6Dec2014, Geoff:235).  Carol talks of 
“reflecting on other people’s practice” (6Oct2014, Carol:4) in the moment, by which she 
means making judgements and then adopting or rejecting those elements in her own 
practice (6Oct2014, Carol:7).   
What stands out here, then, is the percipients positive experiences of reflective practice 
related to the opportunity of distancing or ‘witnessing’ that it brings, but the nature of that 
is unclear.  It is also significant to recall that they - and mainstream literature - approach 
reflective practice as synonymous with writing, conflating reflection-on-action and 
reflection-in-action anyway.  For some students/practitioners, of course, writing will be 
useful.  In the RPRG of 15 November 2013 Sadie describes how it helps her “to sort 
thoughts out” and in that process “other questions come up” resulting in her having “more 
understanding of why I did what I did” (15Nov2013, Sadie:7).  Yet looking to the Curated 
experiences of all percipients this is not common.  Even having spoken about reflective 
practice positively, Carol says it is “writing it down” that she “struggle[s] with”, and 
reflective practice in her degree programme is all about that (18Oct2014, Carol:4).  She 
contrasts this with a time when she engaged in reflective practice differently: by “pick[ing] 
it right apart in my own head and then came to ‘well that probably was the best outcome I 
could have hoped for’, it wasn’t the ideal but it was the best I could have had” (18Oct2014, 
Carol:30) which does not happen when preoccupied with imposed diary protocols.  Joseph 
shares that his most powerful experience of reflective practice, when it gave him his 
‘vitality back’, was when talking in a group; this “enable[s] you to get reflection that you 
can’t get out of the diary” (14Nov2013, Joseph:10).  Geoff’s frustration with the limitations 
of journal writing were highlighted in chapter 3, an experience he contrasts with being 
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taught how to manage his anger in the moment (6Dec2014, Geoff:197; 6Dec2014, 
Geoff:207). 
So, there are two overarching elements to consider here.  First, it brings into sharper focus 
how their negative experiences of reflective practice are related to the current typical 
mainstream reflection-on-action process, their experience of being domesticated and its 
slow and incremental violence of being ‘broken in’.  Second, it is also clear that there is 
value to be had from reflective practice.  Together this provides lead and reason for 
proceeding with reflective practice in this thesis, plus these Descriptions so far signal 
possibilities for their ‘vision of what might be’ and its action: de-coupling the association of 
reflective practice with always and only writing; and, exploring in the moment, i.e. 
reflection-in-action.   
Acknowledging van Manen’s (2016:315) observation that expressed experiences are 
“already transformations”, if I remain as close to them as possible “the messages [they] 
bring to the surface from the depths of life’s oceans [will] have not entirely lost some of the 
natural quiver of their undisturbed existence” (2016:313).  Therefore, chapter 4 remains 
close to their voice with as little commentary as possible.  
4 Reflection-in-action 
Starting the RPRG of 10th January 2015, as usual I reflected back their previous discussion, 
that they had been sharing their experience of:  
6 JT reflecting in-the-moment being fast, and about scribbling it down, unlike 
reflecting after the event when you can take a long hard look or not so just get 
the job of it done, you just write about whatever it is you’ve got to write about 
in your diaries. A second thing was how what was important to you was the 
things you do in that moment, like dealing with anger, or with the many 
things going on all in the same time, but whatever they are they’re very quick, 
[…] a different kind of time experience 
(10Jan2015) 
Jason responds, “Yeah, you’re not, they’re very fast, you’re really conscious of everything, 
you just, well you just get on” (10Jan2015, Jason:7).   For Carol this is about “having a plan 
and sticking to it” (29Nov2013, Carol:88) but Sadie says it is not so linear, you can have “A 
path unless something else happens” although “having a path reduces panic” (29Nov2013, 
Sadie:90).  Looking across the RPRG transcripts to further explore ‘being conscious of 
everything in professional practice with or without a plan’ further, Carol and Mary describe 
how their “immediate reaction” is “structured” in to their practice.  By ‘structured’ it 
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appears they mean something like habit or reaction because they explain it as their “knee 
jerk” reactions in a moment.  At first Mary says she would not be able to change this 
(6Oct2014, Mary:117) because they are hardwired and thus fixed in the moments of her 
practice, but then recalls a colleague pointing out that she had changed the way she 
reacted to something, although does not know if this was due to having greater role 
responsibility thus greater “opportunity to express” herself or her reflective practice 
(6Oct2014, Mary:121, Mary:123, Mary:180).  In a different RPRG Carol speaks of her 
“instinctive practice”, so “instinct of what I should do in that situation” which is “I didn’t 
think at the time ‘I’m feeling vulnerable’ but there it was, I didn’t think, I didn’t put that into 
words in my head, I just felt it” (29Nov2013, Carol:36).  In a different RPRG Rob relates his 
to intuition and says it is “not like some amazing gift that you get given” (10Jan2015, 
Rob:155) and Jason agrees, describing it as a response that develops and changes in 
relation to “new experiences” (10Jan2015, Jason:156) to which Rob adds “when we 
challenge, when our thoughts and behaviours are being challenged” (10Jan2015, Rob:157), 
although Jason describes “if you’ve never experienced a certain situation before it may take 
you a lot longer to react to it because you’re thinking ‘what do I do’” (10Jan2015, 
Jason:124).  In his fourth RPRG Geoff also talks of responding from ‘instinct’, this time 
noting that it does not have to equate to desirable or effective action (10Jan2015, 
Geoff:104).  As he later says, “that’s the sort of crux of it, stuff that is originally instinct isn’t 
always all good for you, so it’s sort of trying to unlearn that and come back the other way” 
so “undoing some learned behaviours and learning new ones” (7Mar2015, Geoff:190).   
Being Described here, then, is a felt sense of a significant and prescient knowing in the 
contexts of professional practice structured in to their reactions and responses.  Asking 
about their experience of this, Carol speaks of how it “sort of coalesces very quickly, in a 
flash really. All of that coming together” (29Nov2013, Carol:46).  In a different RPRG Dasia 
and Rob describe it as: 
69 Dasia Like a quick peek? 
70 Rob Yeah a snap picture. 
71 Dasia A quick peek 
(4Apr2015) 
Rather than a flash, peek or snap, it is a process for Geoff that starts with a “niggling at the 
back of [his] mind” (10Jan2015, Geoff:178).  It ends with making a decision, an idiosyncratic 
unfolding that means other people would make “a completely different set of links” leading 
to a different action/intervention (29Nov2013, Sadie:42).  Because journal writing does not 
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help with any of this, Jason asks “How do we get more effective in the moment?” 
(10Jan2015, Jason:101) and Geoff agrees, journals do not help because “your reaction 
straight away, it’s instinctive” (10Jan2015, Geoff:102), it’s “what right in front of you” 
(10Jan2015, Geoff:120) in contrast to the retrospective activity of diaries, and they need 
and want something that helps with ‘in the moment’. 
So, in contrast to reflective practice as reflection-on-action and its associated journal/diary 
writing after an event/session, the percipients are Describing professional practice in terms 
of moments, and their immediate reactions and actions in those moments, articulated as a 
process, individually differentiated, and are wondering how they can become more 
effective in this.  To remind, reflection-in-action is a neglected area within Schönian 
(mainstream) understanding and practice of reflective practice but the percipient 
Descriptions are picking it out as necessary and important.   
Following van Manen’s (2016:312) “method” of “spinning out a detailed phenomenological 
text”, I went back to the transcripts with reflection-in-action in mind.  It led to a deeper 
Description of their lived experiences of it in context of their ‘vision’ and action ‘of what 
might be’. 
In the RPRG of 21st November 2014, Clare describes reflection-in-action as a counter-
balance to the “big scope” of “goals, targets that you try and achieve” in which she works 
(21Nov2014, Clare:46).  In contrast to “plate-spinning” (21Nov2014, Clare:48), reflection-in-
action is an experience of “Break[ing] it right down” in the moment (21Nov2014, Clare:46), 
without which she would be unable to give her clients “what they really need” (21Nov2014, 
Clare:46).  Asked to further describe the experience of ‘breaking it down’ she says  
47 Carol It’s a skill though isn’t it ‘coz we want to focus on one thing but we also 
need to keep our peripheral vision alive, both metaphorically and literally 
you know ‘coz there’s a whole lot of other stuff we can miss if we’re so in 
blinkers. So the real skill is sort of moving in, moving out 
(21Nov2014).   
Moving attention in and out, or ‘breaking practice down in the moment’ is “the significant 
time” because without this “things get missed out, [unclear words] when things happen 
that could be catastrophic” (21Nov2014, Carol:152).  Indeed, a year earlier she had 
described her experience of reflection-in-action as “trusting in your own instinct and your 
own aporias” (29Nov2013, Carol:58), that is, trusting the experience and process of “having 
no path” (29Nov2013, Carol:60).  Having spoken previously about having a path, here no 
path takes prominence.  In brief to explain her reference to aporia, Heidegger 
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(1945/2002:41) describes it as “A lack of resource […], a perplexity achieved by an 
encounter with the previously unthought, an uncertainty about where to go next driven by 
a desire to progress”, from its Greek etymology of poros, meaning path, passage, a way, 
and a-poros, meaning lacking a path, passage, way (Burbules, 2002).  Jason shares from his 
experience that having no path is not the same as chaos because essentially it works on the 
landscape discussed in chapter 2 as Being Prepared, Performance, and Qualities Of Me: his 
experience of reflection-in-action is all that he knows about a person, the connection he 
has built up with them, what they are saying in the moment, and the feeling that he has in 
that moment, all coming together, in a “snap”, “all that does happen while they’re actually 
there speaking to me” (10Jan2015, Jason:214).  This Describing of having no path but 
everything one knows about a person related to the interaction coming together in one 
moment, trusting that experience, which has the quality of a ‘flash’ and ‘quick peek’, is 
described by Jeanette as a ‘gelling together’(29Mar2014, Jeanette:8).  Like Mary, Debra 
tells of unconsciously repeating habits of action and wondering how and if she might be 
able to change them (6Dec2014, Debra:534, Debra 536), but Geoff replies, “a moment’s 
reflection can stop you doing them, breaking that cycle” (6Dec2014, Geoff:556).  I ask him 
to “tell me more about that moment” (6Dec2014, JT:560), and he describes it as 
“interrupting” (6Dec2014, Geoff:563), of “stopping and going ‘whoa’”(6Dec2014, 
Geoff:618),  Jason of conscious choice to “pay attention to it now” (6Dec2014, Jason:562), 
and that this requires “getting over a hurdle” of not paying attention (6Dec2014, 
Jason:568), which, to both Geoff and Jason, involves “making yourself” (6Dec2014, 
Geoff:570) ‘make that moment’ (6Dec2014, Jason:571).  
Thus the ‘sneak peek’ of reflection-in-action is making oneself make a moment of 
interruption to one’s unconscious action, a conscious paying attention to the now of all one 
knows, a feeling in a flash, all this gelling together.  
4.1 ‘Moments’ 
Exploring the nature of ‘that moment’ further, during a later RPRG Jason and Geoff put 
emphasis on “know[ing] everything you possibly can” (10Jan2015, Geoff:218, & Jason:216) 
about those they are working with so that they can respond (10Jan2015, Geoff:218), a 
process described by Debra as “your mind instantly draws […] on the bits of information you 
know about them, it fills them together” (10Jan2015, Debra:217).  Playing devil’s advocate I 
ask “So could anybody do that as long as they’ve learnt all that information?” (10Jan2015, 
JT:219).  Jason says no, what is needed is a ‘receptive mind’ in addition to “I’ll call it 
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patience” (10Jan2015, Jason:226) to which Geoff interjects with “empathy” (10Jan2015, 
Geoff:227).  ‘Empathy’, Debra, Jason, and Geoff Describe, is something that comes out of 
“life experience” (10Jan2015, Geoff:233, Jason:235) as well as being related to caring, the 
latter being a crucial lever because without it a practitioner simply “wouldn’t get it” 
(10Jan2015, Debra:230).  Invited to elaborate further, Debra describes it as the extent to 
which a practitioner has had the same experiences as their clients/users such that they can 
empathise (10Jan2015, Debra:236) and Geoff adds a finer distinction, the extent to which 
you can empathise even in situations when out of your “comfort zone” but “know how to 
deal with” it in contrast with those not “encountered” before wherein one reacts in “fear” 
(10Jan2015, Geoff:237) or shock” (10Jan2015, Debra:238).  The difference is connection 
with their clients/users.  During the times in which they must make a “snap decision” 
(10Jan2015, Jason:261), connection with those they work with (10Jan2015, Geoff:290) is a 
powerful shaping variable in their reflection-in-action. 
So, ‘that moment’ involves what they already know about the person they are engaging 
with, but also and significantly a receptive mind, which is about having empathy because of 
one’s own life experiences but also the connection one has with the person, and 
importantly all of this therefore relates to the connection they have with themselves. 
Further still, Rob describes it as “like an impulse reactions” [sic] (10Jan2015, Rob:240), 
which Jason refers to as ‘pre-judgement’ (10Jan2015, Jason:243), Debra “preconceptions” 
(10Jan2015, Debra:259), and Rob “snap social stereotype” (10Jan2015, Rob:262), to which 
Geoff adds that he “tr[ies] and fit[s] people into boxes” (10Jan2015, Geoff:262).  Jason 
elaborates that he too is not “neutral” so will make judgements about his clients based on 
appearance, for example (10Jan2015, Jason:248), which “can start the conversation 
negative” (10Jan2015, Jason:248), but that “the difference I can do now is let that go and 
actually talk to the person, those thoughts aren’t there when I start to talk to them whereas 
they would have been before…” (10Jan2015, Jason:256).  Rob describes this as 
“challeng[ing] that within [him]self” (10Jan2015, Rob:272) to which Jason reiterates, “you 
notice things fast and then you’ve got to let that go” (10Jan2015, Jason:277), and Geoff 
adds “you do, you put your own feelings, you have to put your own feelings to one side” 
(10Jan2015, Geoff:293).  They summarise this as being “integral to practice” (10Jan2015, 
Jason:291) and something that “not anyone could do” (10Jan2015, Geoff:295).  
Here, then, in ‘that moment’ what they (think they) know about the person they are 
interacting or intervening with is based on preconceptions, judgements, and stereotypes, as 
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well as feelings that surface on ‘impulse’, that they endeavour to ‘let go’ in the moment to 
be able to ‘actually’ talk to the person, and this is ‘integral’ to professional practice.   
Whilst this Describes the nature of ‘that moment’, their sharing also pivots around what 
signifies ’a moment’ in the fast and complex flow of professional practice.  To begin with 
Geoff speaks only in terms of journal writing and waiting for something to stand out to 
focus on but “most of its normal sort of, you know.  So it’s hard to pinpoint anything in the 
general hubbub of it all” (6Dec2014, Geoff:128), a view shared by Jason,  a reiteration of 
their experience of reflective practice as reflection-on-action, and that unless something is 
written down it is not a moment and gets lost (6Dec2014, Jason:121; Geoff:124).   
Here, then, the diary effect is that they do not see that they react, respond, and shape their 
practice all the time: ‘moments’ are just the tangible things that they write about 
afterwards, and writing is the product and the signifier of those moments. 
I remind them of an alternative activity introduced during their RPRG of the 21st November 
2014 because they had shared vivid experiences that had not involved writing.  It was a 
Sound Walk during which Jason, for example, had poignantly noted his feelings and 
thoughts in moments at the time, so I offer “maybe a different kind of noting not writing 
lots down is possible. What d’you think?” (6Dec2014, JT:122; JT:132).  Initially Debra and 
Geoff respond literally: immediately after the RPRG and its Sound Walk they had gone to 
the canteen to eat and had not thought about it further which might have been different 
had I set reflecting on the activity as ‘a piece of homework’ (6Dec2014, Geoff:151), falling 
back to reflection after an experience as being the only event possible and to responsibility 
for doing so existing with someone in authority telling them to do it.  With that in mind I 
prompt further Description by playing ‘devil’s advocate’: “Maybe we can only think after, so 
on-the-moment, on action, and we have to have a set day and time to do it. What do you 
think?” (6Dec2014, JT:196).  Geoff recalls that he now manages difficult moments all the 
time where previously he would have reacted angrily, that he “stand[s] back […] and 
approach[es] things differently” (6Dec2014, Geoff:197), although it was something he was 
“taught” (6Dec2014, Geoff:199, Geoff:201) to do in the “instant” (6Dec2014, Geoff:205).  
Jason notes sharp contrast with Geoff’s attempts to facilitate clients to reflect on their 
behaviour by writing in a diary which does not work (6Dec2014, Jason:227).   Asking Geoff 
what it was that he was taught to do is where he refers to reflecting-in-action as being 
“aware” of his mood and how it sets the tone for his interactions (6Dec2014, Geoff:235).  
To encourage deeper description, I ask Geoff “How are you aware?” (6Dec2014, JT:236).  
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He articulates a process whereby he notices what he is feeling, why he is feeling it, and 
“tracks” its impact on the moment (6Dec2014, Geoff:259), which for Jason is a moment of 
“stepping backwards” (6Dec2014, Jason:242) during a moment of practice. 
Therefore, catching a moment in an instant both involves and makes possible tracking back 
to identify the shape of feelings, the effect of that shape on the moment and therefore 
interaction, identifying what shaped it that way, and then ‘managing’ the shape differently.  
It is a moment of ‘stepping backward’, although initially this still revolves around 
dependence on others.  For example, adding to Geoff’s describing of being given strategies 
as part of anger management, he and Debra also share the value of having a superior 
practitioner observe them in practice and give “instant feedback” (6Dec2014, Debra:432), 
useful because they “may pick up on things that we’ve missed and so or just put to one 
side” (6Dec2014, Geoff:438).   
4.2 Moments and improvisation 
At this point Rob interjects: “basically what we’re talking about in terms of practice is 
teaching people how to improvise aren’t we” (6Dec2015, Rob:459).  He gives the analogy of 
comedians in an instant constructing an unplanned joke in response to audience 
comments, this being the result of “different connections in their head ping, pinging” 
(6Dec2014, Rob:465).  Rob says that to be able to do that requires “repetitive practice” 
(6Dec2014, Rob:469) which for Geoff is not “structure” (6Dec2014, Geoff:470).  By 
‘structure’ this time they mean externally imposed control because when asked to explain 
Geoff refers to strict school routines (6Dec2014, Geoff:470), Rob to “communist states” 
(6Dec2014, Rob:471), the felt experience of this being ‘boring’ (6Dec2014, Rob:473) and all 
this not “encourage[ing] improvisation” (6Dec2014, Rob:475).  In contrast they speak of ‘an 
improvisation approach’ (6Dec2014, Rob:472) which requires “lessons” on improvisation 
(6Dec2014, Rob:484) as well as lessons that model improvisation by being “improvised” 
(6Dec2014, Rob:479).  Then, Rob relates all of this to reflective practice: “we need 
instruction and guidance to be able to reflect, […] a lesson of guidance so [we] can 
improvise” (6Dec2014, Rob:492), and facilitators with “a structure in [their] approach to 
getting it across to us” but who do not know what will happen and how it will go 
(6Dec2014, Jason:519), in essence, having clarity of process but not content and outcomes 
so that students/practitioners would be “clear enough” to be able to improvise themselves 
(6Dec2014, Rob:531), so Being Prepared, enabling them to be able to be consciously 
flexible and responsive in the moment.   
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Thus, in relation to reflection-in-action in a moment of professional practice, having initially 
put their locus of control for this in others, here they are considering themselves as central 
to the process and signifying being able to improvise as an artful practice that requires 
Being Prepared, whilst also that it will be supported through input on improvisation as well 
as modelling by facilitators.  
To this Sadie adds her experience that “purpose”, “intention” and “deadlines” of context in 
any moment changes the “backdrop” for and impetus to her “action” in the moment 
(29Nov2013, Sadie:22), illustrating by contrasting her actions from “stick[ing] to a list” 
when shopping with the intention of “get[ting] around […] as quickly as possible” with the 
complexity and messiness of professional practice (29Nov2013, Sadie:18, Sadie:26).  Carol 
adds a further dimension: although in a specific moment in professional practice she might 
feel vulnerable, the longer she holds a job the more confident she feels in her purpose and 
intention, and this in turn helps her practice in the moment (29Nov2013, Carol:98).  She 
also talks about the employing organisation being significant too in terms of whether she 
feels “safe” in any moment dependent on whether it ‘adheres’ to relevant regulations and 
has a positive inspection record (29Nov2013, Carol:98).  Jason speaks of knowing the 
routines of an organisation but this not “helping you be a, an effective practitioner, […] just 
feel a bit more easy” (6Dec2014, Jason:623).  
Summing up, reflection-in-action is a neglected area within Schönian (mainstream) 
understanding and practice of reflective practice but the percipients pick it out as central.  
They Describe reflection-in-action as:  
• an artful practice, one that involves breaking practice down in a moment by moving 
one’s focus in and moving out, trusting in one’s own aporia, connection with those 
they are engaging with and with oneself, all in a snap, flash, coalescence, gelling 
together, in a moment.   
 
• In contrast to reflection-on-action, it is a moment of interruption, a paying 
attention to it now.  This moment does not make itself, like an identified critical 
incident, but a practitioner makes the moment, which requires a receptive mind, so 
patient empathy developed through considered life experience.   
 
• This is not always about being on familiar territory, and it will involve improvisation, 
as well as feeling prepared enough to be able to improvise.   
 
• The fast movement of all of this means that stereotype and prejudice kick in, but 
the moving in and moving out of awareness in conjunction with connection, means 
one lets this go in the moment.   
 
• Reflection-in-action involves identifying the shape of ones feeling in the moment 
and its impact in one’s practice, a tracking, a stepping backwards.   
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• One’s practice and reflection-in-action will be shaped by purpose and intention 
from context.   
 
• Reflection-in-action can be facilitated by given strategies and individual feedback 
after direct observation in professional practice; experiencing someone who 
themselves improvises and reflects-in-action; and from engaging in it oneself over 
the course of time.   
 
• Finally, reflection-in-action is supported by organisations that offer structured 
routines and facilitative environments. 
 
5 Problems with reflection-in-action 
The percipients are also clear from their lived experiences that reflection-in-action is not 
without difficulties.  
Sadie talks of the need for “balance” in order to “function”:  
56 Sadie you’ve got to get on with practice, you can’t be noticing every minute 
second event and going ‘do I need to attend to this, do I need to attend to 
that?’. You know, you’ve kind of just got to get on, so it’s quite a skill and 
an art isn’t it actually. You have to weave the way through dealing with 
and getting on, just getting on with whatever it is you’ve gotta do 
(29Nov2013) 
Similarly, a year later Carol is talking about the importance of making judgements in the 
moment as part of professional practice, and shares: 
45 Carol we do it all the time. And partly we have to, you know we can’t possibly go 
around naïve, particularly if it’s completely new to us, you know we have to 
go around judging also. If you think about it if you look out the window 
there’s so much stimulation, there’s so much going on that we have to 
decide what we’re going to focus on and tune in but equally we’re missing 
things so much including ourselves. We’re so busy sort of tuning into one 
thing and another out there and basically making judgements and making 
decisions that there’s so much else that we miss 
(21Nov2014) 
Jeanette also talks of “go[ing] about things and you don’t notice” (28Nov2013, Jeanette:26), 
Sadie of “being distracted” as well as not “pick[ing] up on that clue or cue” (29Nov2013, 
Sadie:26).   
So, in essence Carol, Sadie and Jeanette are Describing how they are to know what to 
notice or pay attention to, what they might miss, the extent to which it involves a pause, 
and how long a pause is needed given that they need balance to get on with whatever it is 
they are doing at that time. 
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Further still, in a different RPRG Geoff, Mary and Becky caution that authentic engagement 
in reflection-in-action could generate adverse, even abrogating experiences: it could be 
“confusing and overwhelming” (28Nov2013, Becky:140); trigger significant change which 
“could change other things” that have unintended or unexpected “knock-on” effects 
(4Apr2015, Geoff:59); be a process in which one ‘hears [ones] own noise louder’, difficult if 
one “doesn’t like [its] sound” (21Nov2014, Mary:228); and misunderstood or executed 
incorrectly reflection-in-action could tip into being ‘detached’, ‘phasing out’ in the moment 
rather than engaged (10Jan2015, Debra:210, Geoff:211).  
Indeed, and in contrast to Carol’s experience of trusting the no path of aporia, in the fast 
and messy moment of practice in which she does not immediately know what she is going 
to do Sadie experiences “that sort of not knowing” (29Nov2013, Sadie:64) as a “sense, the 
sense” (29Nov2013, Sadie:80) of “a black hole, a pit” (29Nov2013, Sadie:62), of “going into 
[…] numbness” (29Nov2013, Sadie:64), a “complete, I really, I really don’t know what to do, 
I can’t find a way out” (29Nov2013: Sadie:66), “a paralysis of the mind” (29Nov2013, 
Sadie:68), “a panic paralysis” (29Nov2013, Sadie:70), of “being drowned in the head” 
(29Nov2013, Sadie:82), and once there, she adds a “layer” of judgement, of “I’m rubbish, 
because I’ve gone wrong, I’m thinking, you know, oh god, I’m here again, can’t think what 
to do next and all I want is the hole to open under me (29Nov2013, Sadie:72).   
Attention to reflection-in-action therefore brings awareness to the experience of not 
knowing.  It is clear for some this is about trust and connection, but it cannot be assumed to 
be the case.  Even so, Sadie feels that finding a way to work with her ‘pit’ would be essential 
to her professional practice: she can “get away with it […] socially” but not professionally 
(29Nov2013, Sadie:76).  Carol wonders whether some aporias are “normative cognitive” 
and others “are possibly produced by some experience in the past” (29Nov2013, Carol:78).  
It is not entirely clear what she means here but perhaps paths/no paths that are created by 
societal norms and those that come from one’s own personal history. 
6 Glance 
With their caution noted, reflection-in-action was still obviously important to the 
percipients.  During the RPRG of 10th January 2015, I remind them that they had spoken 
about it as being more than learning information about a person or “some techniques and 
applying them” (10Jan2015, JT:321). 
146 
 
Jason says this is because it “wouldn’t be enough” (10Jan2015, Jason:322).  From his 
experience what else is needed is “something in you that […] deal[s] with the, you know, 
and how you react to it” (10Jan2015, Jason:322).  I invite him to say more about “something 
in you” (10Jan2015, JT:323) and he describes embracing “self-development” (10Jan2015, 
Jason:324) and Geoff adds the “desire to develop” (10Jan2015, Geoff:331).  In describing 
what stimulates this, Geoff speaks of a significant event or period that ‘changes your 
outlook’ (10Jan2015, Geoff:333) or having an “inbuilt” positive world-view (10Jan2015, 
Geoff:347).  For Jason it is a “change” that “clicks in” (10Jan2015, Jason:361), and Debra of 
“that thing that changes you, fitting you” (10Jan2015, Jason:365).  Specifically, Jason talks 
of a ‘click’ as a moment in reflection-in-action, and in that ‘click’ of a moment the 
situation/person he has been working with has “altered” and so has he (10Jan2015, 
Jason:363).  So here, then, reflection-in-action is Described as not being about applying tips 
and techniques but wrapped into a desire to develop, a desire that can be in-built, created 
by a pivotal experience, a change that fits, or something that just ‘clicks’, but clearly not 
something that is externally imposed and expected.   
I reflect back this Describing as ‘the process of what informs us in the moment’ (10Jan2015, 
JT:366) and to this Rob responds by introducing an idea that he has had - and in doing this 
he uses the word ‘glance’.  Checking through the transcripts I used the word ‘glance’ two 
RPRGs previously and Jason had responded at that time using the same word, but Rob had 
not been present.  Perhaps Jason and Rob had talked together outside of the RPRGs, Rob 
catching up with what he has missed, or perhaps the word at this point Describes Rob’s 
understanding of the percipients experiences of reflection-in-action.  Either way, it is a term 
that would go on to take ‘threshold’ significance and therefore I Describe its emergence in 
full.   
Referring to the previous RPRG Rob says  
367 Rob I was just thinking, I think again when we sat, had a glorious day sat in the 
sun, it’s like the reflection, we don’t have like a pause button on life to 
actually go ‘oh that was interesting, why are we doing this’. So it was like 
what can we do to actually think ‘hold on, stop and have a think’. And I 
was then on the idea of like freezing time and I thought just have a really 
horrible looking watch and when you see it you think of the time and stop 
and think, or glance, right. So I sort of thought well I can’t buy everybody a 
watch so ‘oops that’s no good’, so my idea was this bright thing, you’ll look 




Rob had brought to the RPRG brightly coloured silicone wristbands that he had 
commissioned with “Reflect, learn, action” (10Jan2015, Rob:371) printed into them.  He 
explains his idea and its application to reflection-in-action, referring to examples from 
practice that percipients had shared earlier and in previous RPRGs:  
371 Rob Reflect, learn, action [unclear words]. You just pay attention to everything 
that’s going on in that moment. So the minute you play with it, or look at it 
so you’re not waiting for two boys to start fighting or some young kid 
to…[interrupted] 
 
376 Rob …It’s about you know not waiting for the two boys to fall out or the guy 
telling you all this weird stuff, it’s actually in the moment when you play with 
it I think right then you glance, like ‘what, how am I feeling at the moment, 
what am I thinking, what’s going on’. So those are the things you kind of 
quickly take a glance at. So rather than waiting, so I might be having a 
conversation with you about ‘did you have a nice weekend’, could be 
anything …[interrupted] 
 
378 Rob … it’s in that moment so you go ‘oh yeah, what was I thinking and feeling 
then’. It’s rather than wait for some big dramatic some event to happen, just 
to start informing what is it that we pay attention to. In some ways like you 
said when there’s something big and dramatic it’s easier almost to go ‘well I 
paid attention to that, I have this relationship and I know they’re in touch 
with Social Services and I know their house got burned down’ but actually 
most of what we do is fast, fast, fast. 
 (10Jan2015) 
Discussion follows: 
379 Geoff Where’s my head the rest of the time when I’m just there. 
380 JT Exactly. 
381 Geoff It’s a good point. 
382 JT So its [Rob’s] way of saying you know ‘where’s your head and body now?’. 
383 Rob So it’s not, I was trying to work out how to record, how I feel, how I can 
smell things where I am, what it is, they’re a multitude in that moment. 
You know I can’t record everything else, I was thinking ‘how do you just 
grab hold of this moment’. But it is, it’s almost like say the ‘time-pause 
button’ as I was saying when you go ‘woah this is where everything is’. 
But that’s almost a long, that’s not your gaze that’s a glance, yeah. 
384 JT That’s a, a glance, right? 
385 Rob … a ‘hey this is where everything is’ because it’s more of a slow moment 
than a react now, which is what we’ve been saying, it is a react now, it’s not 
a, you know, ‘this is where we all are and it’s nice or not working out right’. 
But this is your own reflections of it, the, like, snap ones. Whereas I went off 




Glance, then, is both ‘the moment’ and how one works with and processes the moment.  At 
the same time, the word conveys and he Describes its qualities of speed, flash and 
coalescence from earlier, attention to feeling thinking emotion in a moment.  Jason goes on 
to contrast things that “stick in your memory” (10Jan2015, Jason:388) such as when you 
enjoy something, “you remember it because you were enjoying it” (10Jan2015, Jason:390), 
with all other aspects involved at the same time that are not remembered, and therefore, 
as Rob puts it, get “completely lost” (10Jan2015, Rob:392).  So there is a difference 
between merely remembering something (the something you enjoyed) or not, with 
“reflectively learn[ing]” (10Jan2015, Rob:389) in a moment, and what makes the difference 
between the two is “watching” (10Jan2015, Jason:408) or Glance.  I sum up and reflect 
back:  
410 JT Yeah. So [Rob’s]’s bands then, so just rather than wait for these big critical 
moments it’s the moment you play with [the wrist band] or you find yourself 
looking at them that you just pay attention to […] to where’s your head, your 
body and your feelings and what are you processing in that moment. So, 
kind of, in that that moment just kind of glance, watch, pay attention, is that 
right? So Jason’s ‘watch’, yeah? And go ‘oh yeah that’s what’s happening’, 
rather than wait for the big incidents… 
(10Jan2015). 
Discussion follows: 
413 Geoff […] But yeah it is interesting to think about that, ‘coz I spend quite a lot of the 
session generally you know over like three hours or whatever you know just 
standing back and watching and I don’t really think I’ve thought about what 
I’m watching. 
414 JT Yeah, yeah it will be interesting just to see… 
415 Debra …But it’s just like, it’s like when you’re watching the [clients/users] you know 
when they’re coming in in the morning and sometimes [they] are all right 
sometimes they’ll be really happy and others [unclear words] they’ll be really 
quiet sort of thing, you end up watching them during the day to see how their 
mood changes and things like that.  So I suppose you could see that as a 
reflection as well. 
416 Geoff Yeah. Although the bands are different Rob? 
417 Jason I think what he’s said is it’s not reflecting on an incident … 
418 Rob … [unclear word] it’s reflecting on the … 
419 Geoff …what you’re picking up on them. 




Here, then, they are differentiating between watching without glance, a mindless general 
seeing, and watching with glance, and how glance is not reflecting on practice but reflecting 
in a moment. 
7 Gaze 
In the subsequent RPRG Geoff speaks first: “So I suppose the main thing is we’re looking at 
the difference between sitting down weeks later or days later and writing, or, reflecting in 
the moment” (7Mar2015, Geoff:1), to which I reply that “something jumped out at me 
when looking at the transcript from last time, [Rob] used ‘gaze, and ‘glance’ to describe 
those” (7Mar2015, JT:2).  In his idea of silicone wrist bands to draw attention to and 
facilitate glances in the moment, Rob had contrasted it with gaze to underscore what he 
meant, that is to contrast glance with the long unpacking of practice after an event that is 
typical of mainstream understanding and practices of reflective practice.   
Whilst this chapter is founded on Describing by dwelling in the percipients experience, a 
brief detour is needed to offer a frame at this point.  According to Kelly’s Personal Construct 
Theory (1977:10), a construct is “a reference axis devised by man for establishing a 
personal orientation toward the various events he encounters” [sic] for “psychological 
guidance” whilst making sense of experiences.  Each construct comprises two contrasting 
poles, what it is and is not, with the meaning of the construct derived from both at the 
same time even if only one is given expression.  At this point in the RPRG, then, I was 
highlighting the percipients notion of Gaze as the dichotomous aspect to Glance 
(capitalised from here on in the thesis to distinguish them as concepts) and in doing so 
underscoring the role the percipients had given them as “insight cultivators” (van Manen, 
2016:324), that is, “distinctions that help us explore or deepen our understanding of a 
certain experience, a phenomena” (2016:327).  To recall from chapter 1, insight cultivators 
are a feature of phenomenological research that  
Help us to interpret our lived experiences, recall experiences that seem 
to exemplify these insight cultivators, and stimulate further creative 
insights and understanding with respect to our phenomena under 
investigation (2016:324). 
They facilitate “’grasp[ing]’ things and ‘know[ing]’ the things that the concept names” 
(2016:324), and the percipients embracing and embedding of Glance and Gaze shows the 
extent to which this was the case, indeed such that they became “threshold concepts” 
(Meyer & Land, 2003), i.e. concepts that enable crossing the threshold of “troublesome 
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knowledge” (Perkins, 1999:9), knowledge that is otherwise counter-intuitive, alien, 
conceptually difficult, incoherent, ritualised, inert, tacit.  ‘Threshold concepts’ are therefore  
akin to a portal, opening up a new and previously inaccessible way of 
thinking about something. It represents a transformed way of 
understanding, or interpreting, or viewing something without which the 
learner cannot progress (Meyer & Land, 2003:1). 
Whilst critical phenomenological research inevitably requires the researcher to name the 
broad phenomena to be explored, the finely grained content of lived experience and action 
forward comes from the research: from the outset I named reflective practice as the focus 
and the possibility of alternative practices related to reflection-in-action as the inquiry; the 
insight cultivators of Glance and Gaze and their action taking on life as threshold concepts 
came from the percipients in the RPRGs. 
8 Glance and Gaze 
Dasia had been missing from the RPRG of 10 January 2015 when Rob had given out 
wristbands, so in the following RPRG she asks what the percipients are talking about.  I 
reply, clumsily, still clarifying their concepts for myself:  
6 JT Ok, so before Christmas when we sat in the sun and it was so nice, there 
was something that came through, the difference between reflecting on 
practice after the event, really pulling it apart and really inquiring into it.  
And, we’ve been slowly over the weeks wondering how much that is 
relevant to or helps you make decisions in the moment and what happens 
in the moment. And then after [Rob] brought bands in for everyone that 
had ‘reflect, think, action’ on and said every time you looked at it, played 
with it, that you noticed what you were thinking and feeling, so not waiting 
for a big dramatic event, and said this was Glance, you Glance at 
something really very quickly and you make sense of it, and Gaze, when 




7 Dasia So Glance is straightaway? 
8 Geoff Right there and then, yeah. 
9 Rob Gaze is that thing of afterwards you might think ‘oh I’d have done that 
differently if I’d had time’, is ‘Gaze’, you know. 
10 JT So, Gaze is when you start really pulling something apart? 
11 Geoff Yeah.  ‘Coz actually practice is mostly about Glancing and getting on with it. 




Going further Rob says it is possible to “perfect the skill of Gazing’” (7Mar2015, Rob:16) to 
which Geoff says this is why he joined the research project in the first place because he 
“wasn’t very good at that” (7Mar2015, Geoff:17).  I ask “So does perfecting the skill of 
‘Gazing’ impact on the decisions you make in the moment when you’re talking to young 
people, or making decisions?” (7Mar2015, JT:18), and Geoff replies 
19 Geoff I don’t think, no I think they’re more sort of two separate things, yeah 
because I think now when I’m Gazing I’m bringing in experiences since it 
happened or whatever I’m thinking then, or stuff we’ve, other things that 
have come to me.  So this is why I’ve left and I’ve done my diaries, I scribble 
every time I get home and then slowly building it on the computer and 
maybe going back two or three times to some bits because you can just 
layer it up. Yeah. So I would say it’s quite separate, yeah 
(7Mar2015) 
Therefore, Glance is Described as having the quality of a click, a pause, an interruption, a 
freezing of time in the moment, a slow moment, a ‘hey this is where everything is, where’s 
your head, body and feelings that you are processing in that moment’.  It is a quick Glance, 
watch, pay attention, that is fleeting but an extremely significant aware experience.  In 
contrast, Gaze is the process of attending to an event, that may be big and dramatic, the 
event being the trigger, and sitting down afterwards to think or write, pulling some thing/s 
about it apart, wondering if you could/should have acted differently, and revisiting that 
thinking and/or writing to layer it up.  Indeed, in the final RPRG Geoff talks more about that 
layering up.  Writing in his diary is where “in hindsight [we] tell ourselves the same things 
even if we think we aren’t” (30May2015, Geoff:136).  However, I remind him that in an 
earlier RPRG he had spoken of how his university tutor and fieldwork supervisor had 
encouraged him to “see how you wrote your diary and what that said about you” 
(30May2015, JT:137), so perhaps layering had potential?  To this Geoff describes “one kind 
of Gaze or another” (30May2015, Geoff:138), that is, Gaze of reflection-on-action by pulling 
things apart in the diary (where practitioners tell themselves the same things), but also 
reflection on that reflection-on-practice, “the Gaze of hindsight on your reporting” 
(30May2015, Geoff:141).  To this he clarifies “yes it could help you Glance, bloody hell, did 
you hear that! [laughs] but it’s got to be something different, not diary diary diary, not that, 
it just doesn’t, does it [laughs]” (30May2015, Geoff:141).  
Thus, he is differentiating between ritualised and domesticated reflection-on-action that is 
reporting one’s practice, with subsequent deliberate purposeful Gazing on that reporting.  
Referring to this as ‘hindsight Gaze’ this could help with professional practice if it isn’t 
through the activity of journal writing – or, at least, journal writing as he currently 
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experiences it, involving domestication, the slow incremental violence of being ‘broken in’ 
to adhere to Identity-Of reflective practice in its established domesticating practices.  His 
point is that ‘hindsight Gaze’ could serve a purpose in identifying one’s adoption of those 
domesticating discourses and in this way Gaze could offer critical space, a response to his 
need for reflection-on-action to be ‘something different’. 
9 An exposition of Glance 
In this way, together Glance and Gaze offer a reimagining of reflective practice, a radical 
return to its roots of professional artistry, given that artistry as defined earlier is knowing 
and being, so when, how, and the skills, imagination and qualities to “go beyond” (Fish, 
1998:56) the established taken-for-granted understanding of reflective practice to ensure it 
fundamentally concerns service to others.  Glance and Gaze offer a “dis-solv[ing of] the 
puzzle” (Schostak & Schostak, 2008:13) of reflective practice, a “conceptual gateway” to “a 
transformed way of understanding, or interpreting, or viewing” (Meyer & Land, 2006:3) it.  
With that in mind, I returned to the RPRG transcripts again, this time asking “what does this 
sentence say about the experience” of the phenomena” (van Manen, 2016:320) of Gaze 
and Glance.  It is an activity that needs to be – and was – carried out in the spirit of 
“wonder”, a key “methodological feature of phenomenological inquiry” described by van 
Manen as “that moment […] when our [attention] has been drawn by the [attention] of 
something that stares back at us” (2016:360).  Describing Glance and Gaze as it ‘stares back 
at me’ in the transcripts gives further illumination to these percipient threshold concepts. 
After the Sound Walk in the RPRG of 21st November 2014, Carol talks about memories from 
childhood “flooding” her (21Nov2014, Carol:185), triggered by certain sounds, and Mary 
interjects, describing that experience as fully “facing something” in contrast to more typical 
“skirting on top of thoughts about it” and not “really settl[ing] with it” (21Nov2014, 
Mary:186).  Jason takes up that theme, describing “pay[ing] attention to the sounds” 
(21Nov2014, Jason:205), in his case the “sound” and “rhythm” of footsteps, wind, leaves, 
birds, water (21Nov2014, Jason:205, Jason:213, Jason:215) whilst also being “aware of 
everyone” at the same time as “doing my own thing” (21Nov2014, Jason:215), an 
experience shared by Carol, Debra, and Mary, Mary describing it as ‘waves coming in’ 
(21Nov2014, 8:218).   




279 Clare there’s so much that is just background and it’s just there and it’s 
happening all the time, that triggers.  It’s only when it’s out of place that 
you suddenly go ‘oh what’s that about’. And it really is just like that, and 
there’s so much that you have to put to the background and you just have 
to get rid of, but you still have to be listening to it, and listening out for 
what’s not normal, what’s not right, what’s not in the right place 
(21Nov2014). 
Here, then, are moments of attention created by that which surprises as well as by 
‘listening out’, that is, ‘listening but not having a conversation with it in your head’ 
(21Nov2014, Mary:284, Mary:286), which for Carol is ‘getting in the moment’ (21Nov2014, 
Carol:292).   Like Mary, Debra contrasts this to thinking that “washes all the time”, “things” 
that “you don’t really think about […], not properly” (21Nov2014, Debra:298) and Jason 
adds that as a consequence different students/practitioners experiencing the same will not 
pay attention to it – or Glance - in the same way (21Nov2014, Jason:280).  To this can be 
included Jason’s observation related to the process stemming from wearing his wristband.  
He says “I’m very aware that I’m wearing it and I’ve happily worn it every day. But it’s 
making that connection with when you’re aware of it to go ‘what am I Glancing’ at’, yeah” 
(4Apr2015, Jason:115).  Geoff responds by joking “I might reflect on the sleeves are too long 
and that [laughter]” (4Apr2015, Geoff:116).  I reply, and conversation follows: 
117 JT And actually that’s the thing though, it could be anything. It’s not about … 
118 Geoff …I suppose it is small things isn’t it, yeah. 
119 JT So that’s [Rob’s] point ‘coz we’re very good at ‘Gazing’ at the big significant 
stuff, but actually for the most part our life is made up of ‘Glances’, right? 
120 Jason And that’s the thing, you know we’re not, there isn’t big things going on that 
we’re ‘Gazing’ at in practice it is the trillion Glances but we have to make them 
into big things 
121 Geoff Yeah, you can perhaps work out why you sometimes end up where you do, you 
know if you could see the little things and take those steps. 
122 Rob Yeah, it’s those connections  
123 Geoff Yeah. 
(4Apr2015). 
Further to Jason’s comment that the nature of Glances will differ between individuals, 
Dasia is curious about the extent to which the way one engages in Glance is to do with 
“personality”, so whether a student/practitioner is able to “deal with spontaneous things or 
sudden things” (7Mar2015, Dasia:21).  Hence, she wonders if “some people” are more 
prone to Glance rather than Gaze, asking  
41 Dasia Can the difference between these two be the person himself [sic], like some 
people pay attention to lots of details or very quick to spot things and very 
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adaptable, flexible, they can quickly respond. And some people are like 
they are learning style if you can say or their individual style, personal 
styles affect 
(7Mar2015). 
So, pulling together percipient experiences to Describe so far, Glance is a fleeting watching 
moment, that coalesces very quickly in a flash or a gelling together, is linked to a receptive 
mind, and can involve bringing forward a niggling at the back of one’s mind.  It is an 
immediate process that is both a skill and an art and involves noticing, interrupting, 
attending, tuning in, moving attention/tuning in and out, tracking, trusting the 
experience/process of having no path, working with sensing, by capturing, getting at it, 
clicking, a thing that changes you in that moment in context of experiencing that otherwise 
‘washes’ over you.  It is a felt sense of the feeling, the rhythms, sounds, rather than the 
‘whole thing’/the story of the event that led to that feeling, but in that way as result one 
gets a sense of the whole.  It is, as Jeanette puts it, “multifaceted, like your reflection, 
instead of” the “false” “contradiction” of “trying to get something multifaceted into a table, 
like a grid, like they say ‘this is how you write your diary and your portfolio, this is what you 
have to do’ and so you do it” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:127).   
Whilst Jason describes that the made moment of a Glance differing between individuals, 
Dasia that individuals might approach it differently, the percipients Describe Glancing at 
any time, the power of “picking out rather than just seeing the whole thing, reflection in the 
moment like” (21Nov2014, Sadie:26), a view echoed by Carol:  
47 Carol It’s a skill though isn’t ‘coz we want to focus on one thing but we also need 
to keep our peripheral vision alive, both metaphorically and literally you 
know ‘coz there’s a whole lot of other stuff we can miss if we’re so in 
blinkers. So the real skill is sort of moving in, moving out 
(21Nov2014).   
Later in that RPRG I refer to her word ‘focus’ to reiterate her experience at a point in which 
Describing had drifted, although ‘focusing’ becomes something I return to later in this 
thesis.  For now, though, Jason says the power of Glance is its fleeting focus, the “there and 
then […] in the moment” (6Dec2014, Jason:66). 
10 How to engage with the Glance of reflection-in-action 
When Describing how to engage with Glance, Sally shares the need to ‘re-educate ourselves 
to slow, slow down’ (21Nov2014, 16:114) which links to Mary’s earlier description that they 
need to learn how to “just let it be there but come back here” to oneself (29Nov2013, 
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Mary:287).  Carol distinguishes between getting back to oneself as part of the process of 
Glance (reflection-in-action) and being swamped by “self-consciousness” (21Nov2014, 
Carol:292), the difficulties of reflection-in-action Described above, whilst ‘getting back to 
oneself’ resonates with her experience on the Sound Walk which, like Jason, she described 
in terms of a “rhythm”, “like a mindfulness meditation kind of thing” (21Nov2014, 
Carol:214).  Mary agrees contrasting this with her usual “life” of “one noise from the 
moment I open my eyes to the minute I shut my eyes” (21Nov2014, Mary:220) and 
competing pulls on how she ought to spend her time (21Nov2014, Mary:222), and Carol 
describes a Sound Walk moment when she was “both in [the moment] and enjoying it and 
then just sort of breathing” (21Nov2014, Carol:292), which for Jason was the experience of 
“just be[ing]” (21Nov2014, Jason:291).  Clare thus describes it as “more than a Sound Walk, 
it was ‘all your senses’ walk” (21Nov2014, Clare:247) whilst emphasising that what made it 
significant was doing this with others because it meant that the activity remained 
purposeful (21Nov2014, Clare:266).  In a later RPRG and talking about the facilitation of 
reflection-in-action, Geoff talks about a book with “practices in it [that] help you” to deal 
with ‘tension and stress’ (4Apr2015, Geoff:61).  Asking them to consider if those 
experiences have application to professional practice, Geoff speaks of “taking the time, 
knowing you need to take the time to just analyse”  (4Apr2015, Geoff:65) which he names 
“mindfulness” (4Apr2015, Geoff:61, Geoff:65); Sadie of “giving yourself time to get that gut 
feeling of how you’re feeling stops you making assumptions” (21Nov2014, Sadie:310); and 
Carol of memories being triggered that were 
311 Carol very much in the back of my mind at the moment but I’ve not brought 
them forward to think about.  But that’s giving me time to sort of do the 
whole lot, whereas normally you’d be so busy you’d just be ploughing on 
(21Nov2014). 
More, Dasia speaks of “memory in the body” (7Mar2015, Dasia:235).  Conversation follows:  
238 Jason Memory in the body? 
239 Dasia Memory in the body, OK, you know our experiences are stored in lots of 
ways not just in our heads 
240 Rob …and you can never let anything go ‘coz something may bring it to the fore. 
It’s just about trying to … 
241 Jason …manage it somehow… 
242 Geoff … slot it further down so it appears less I suppose if it’s a negative thing, we 




Here, then, they are Describing engaging with the Glance of reflection-in-action as involving 
slowing down, switching out outside influences; and listening without having a 
conversation with it in one’s head, so being both in an experience that is embodied, but not 
swamped by it, of focusing on breath and all the senses, which they relate to ‘mindfulness’, 
‘gut feeling’ and ‘memory in the body’.  Thus, in further illumination of the threshold 
concept of Glance they are adding flesh to it, literally.  
However, initially they Describe how to reflect-in-action through the domesticating 
established frame of typical practices of reflective practice.  For example, in her second 
RPRG Jeanette talks of reflection-in-action in terms of writing a diary albeit doing so during 
the practice itself, but it is “not practical to carry a diary around with you” (28Nov2013, 
Jeanette:6).  Geoff shares similarly (6Dec2014, Geoff:120) but this means the experience 
“get[s] lost very quickly” (6Dec2014, Geoff:124), shared also by Jason: “How do you do that 
because if I don’t write it down at the time I forget” (6Dec2014, Jason:121).  Yet Geoff says 
if he writes and “start[s] to think about all these things” during interacting with a client he 
would no longer be “listening properly” (10Jan2015, Geoff:200), a “phasing out” 
(10Jan2015, Geoff:202) that he compares to becoming distracted during a lecture 
(10Jan2015, Geoff:206).  Debra says “Yeah, which is the downside isn’t it of reflecting in the 
moment” (10Jan2015, Debra:203), to which Jason and Rob agree (10Jan2015, Jason:204, 
Rob:205).   
Here, then, whilst Glance enables a reimagining of possibility for the percipients, their 
experiences also point to confusion about how to engage with it, reinforcing reflective 
practice as synonymous with reflection-on-action and writing even when explicitly 
discussing reflection-in-action.   
However, getting to that place opened a door to wider Describing, Jeanette asking “How 
can we do it differently, how can we do reflection-in-the-moment?” (28Nov 2013, 
Jeanette:74), with Becky adding “it’s such a complex thing” (28Nov2013, Becky:76).  
Answers come from the percipients, practical ideas and strategies for Glance.  
10.1 Noticing the now 
Rob speaks of the importance of “learn[ing] technique to notice the now” (30May2015, 
Rob:33), which Geoff amends to “having the skill to notice the now” (30May2015, 
Geoff:34).  In the RPRG of 18 October 2014, Jason says “If we could improve our focus in the 
act [of practice] that should help me, well us, to deal with the moment or better…” 
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(18Oct2014, Jason:55) and Debra interrupts with “…and not how to learn about writing 
about it, tell a story about it, like how is that helping” (18Oct2014:56).  Dasia’s earlier query 
about the extent to which ability to Glance is related to an individual’s personality leads 
into dialogue about whether Glance is innate or a skill that can be learned, but in any case 
they conclude its facilitation would “give [them] the experience, the knowledge and the 
experience” such that professional practice in the moment would be less likely to be 
“personal reaction without thinking, unconscious reactions (7Mar2015, Dasia:20).  In other 
words, with the “knowledge and background” of Glance/reflection-in-action encouraged 
through its facilitation a practitioner will inquire “deeper”, building their “conscious 
reaction. He know what he’s doing, why he is reacting in that way to this situation” [sic] 
(7Mar2015, Dasia:23).  So whilst Describing differences in how individuals “process the 
Glance” (7Mar2015, Geoff:42) they also need “a tool-kit or making people aware or 
teaching people for Glance” (7Mar2015, Geoff:207) which will “enable” them to identify 
approaches for Glance of reflection-in-action (6Dec2014, Jason:94), which, in turn, means 
they will grow in Glance.  
10.2 Tool-kit for Glance: reflective scraps 
So far, then, this ‘tool-kit’ requires ways to notice the now, i.e. ways to make moments of 
fleeting interruption (linked to mindfulness), in ways that respect individual difference, and 
discussion around what happens in those moments (linked to memory in the body).   
In the RPRG of 21 November 2014, Sadie, Carol, Mary, Jason and Debra are talking about 
their experiences of activities I had introduced to the RPRGs and how they have applied 
that to their professional practice.  Building on the ‘skill of moving in and moving out’, Carol 
describes it as the ability “to focus on one thing but we also need to keep our peripheral 
vision alive, both metaphorically and literally” (21Nov2014, Carol:47) because her attention 
can be easily drawn to a particular significant experience thus ‘blinkering’ (21Nov2014, 
Carol:47) everything else.  At the same time, attempts to ‘focus in’ can be hindered by 
distractions, whether from others, or context (space and place), personal associations, and 
their own senses (21Nov2014, Clare:247), as well as from “really giving yourself a hard 
time, self-critical all the time…” (21Nov2014, Jason:346) which can “play on your mind” 
(Mary:350) long after the original interaction (21Nov2014, Debra:355, Clare:357).  All this 
blocks them from noticing the now in the moment (21Nov2014, Carol:353).   




Jason suggests  
371 Jason you could just put it on a post-it note and shove it in a book and then at 
some point have a look at all the words and see ‘well what does that say’ 
you know. If they’re all ‘crap’, ‘useless’ ‘rubbish’, well where does all those 
come from, what do they get, give birth to? You know what is that all 
about?” 
(21Nov2014) 
I offer that they could try that out but in the following RPRG, Jason, Debra and Geoff share 
that they had approached it much like a diary, so after an event and this means in the 
meantime “life gets in” the way (6Dec2014, Geoff:156).  Geoff also adds that he had not 
tried it out because I had not insisted that he does so (6Dec2014, Geoff:151), leading to 
discussion about agency and responsibility, essentially, who the “habit” (Jason:70, Rob:178, 
Rob:189) of reflective practice is for, whether lecturer (or researcher) or themselves.  
However, I take their idea of writing single words - as well as their discussion of agency and 
responsibility - into my teaching and tell the percipients in the last RPRG about how that 
had gone.  Dasia had not been present so I recap their idea by referring to it as ‘keeping 
reflective scraps’ rather than a diary or journal (30May, JT:42), which Debra qualifies as 
“one or two words” (30May2015, Debra:48) “in the moment” (30May2015, Debra:48) and I 
concur, “Exactly, a scrap” (30May2015, JT:49).  I explain that “anything they do with [those] 
after is something else, it might be important or helpful but it is something else” 
(30May2015, JT:42), encompassing Geoff’s ‘hindsight Gaze’, which Rob describes as 
“…building something up, building it up…” (30May2015, Rob:143).  In that way Geoff says 
“you could get that feeling in the moment and then later add another thought about that 
feeling…” (30May2015, Geoff:147).  Because of the ‘quality and nature’ of that process he 
362 Jason So, like just watching all of that somehow. [unclear words] write it down, just 
words or whatever and then just put it away, a quick Glance and put it away 
and look at it later and go ‘oh that’s right’.  
363 Carol And then you get rid of it from being on your mind? 
364 JT So, you are saying that instead of getting caught into all of that you could 
capture it, catch yourself in the act, in the act of something really playing on 
your mind, write a word, write, there it is … 
365 Carol …better than thinking about it all the time. You just write a word, it doesn’t 
have to be like reams of it just like, so like ‘useless’ and that’s it done. And 
then just forget about it, ‘that’s it, done’, you’ve dealt with it, no need to think 
about it. I’m starting to do that a little bit, but it’s everything you’ve done, the 
translation, it’s, you’ve got to think about it as a process – it’s  gone from 
here, out of here, let’s close the book, just fast, like a quick look at it, let it go 
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describes this as an entirely different experience to typical diary writing where he is “telling 
a story, telling specific parts, like an essay, it becomes more unnatural, bringing in theory, it 
takes the magic of the reflection out” (30May2015, Geoff:43).  To illustrate, Debra describes 
her experience of a young woman she works with that “winds me up, she grinds on 
me…[…]… there’s just something about her that grates me” (30May2015, Debra:52).  I ask 
“So how do you use your diary with this?” (30May2015, JT:53), and conversation follows: 
54 Debra Well I just explain what happened, like that 
55 JT How would it be if you wrote a scrap about ‘grating’, its quality and nature 
right in the moment 
56 Geoff Trying to get that, so ‘grating’, not describing the whole thing, that’s the 
thing isn’t it? 
57 Rob Yeah, can you notice that 
(30May2015) 
Here, then, coming out of the percipient lived experiences are ideas that work as an 
alternative to diary writing that I named ‘reflective scraps’.  It works with reflection-in-
action, capturing Glances in the moment, and can be part of reflection-on-practice through 
‘hindsight Gaze’.  It is a process that allows for ‘noticing’ all ‘that’ is in a moment in practice. 
10.3 Tool-kit for Glance: alternative reflective scraps 
In relation to not being able to use a diary in the moment Jeanette talks of “captur[ing] her 
practice with some sort of voice” (28Nov2013, Jeanette:4) as this would enable her to be 
“voicing exactly the moment” (28Nov2013, Jeanette:8).  For instance, she says if she “could 
speak, take a photo […] at the time, you can get it” and then look at the photo or listen to 
the recording afterwards,  
151 Jeanette even if not in the moment coz it’s not appropriate, you could get it […] very 
quickly, afterwards, as soon as you can, you know, you can find places and 
times, and that would make it all more meaningful 
(29Mar2014).   
It contrasts sharply with her ‘words in pink’ experience of reflective practice earlier in this 
thesis.  She experiments by using a digital recorder and lapel microphone in practice but 
the organisation was “quite wary of it” so she carried it out “just after” instead but when 
listening back it still felt that “something gets lost in translation […], something gets lost” 
(29Mar2014, Jeanette:2).  I asked for her “sense of what gets lost” (29Mar2014, 
Jeanette:3), and she explains “being there you’ve got that sense but as soon as you are 
talking about it” afterwards it is different, accompanying that with an example of talking 
“about body language” not being the same as “that sense” of the actual experience 
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(29Mar2014, Jeanette:4).  She also tried taking a photo in combination with the digital 
recorder.  She describes a moment “when talking to [a client which] was just exasperating” 
and used her phone camera to take a picture of her own face as well as immediately record 
her felt experience of ‘exasperating’, and put together “that got it”.  Trying that 
combination again later she says “it didn’t matter if there was 10 minutes of words”, it was 
the image in the moment that “felt more real, kinda more real, closer to that moment…it’s 
like that moment it was how I felt so if I look at my face and the words behind it together 
that kind of gave me that real sense” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:6).  She explains this is because 
“I could have taken a picture” of the people she had been interacting with “but that wasn’t 
it, the sense, it was me, you know, the sense was with me, within me, they were the focus 
for it but that was me, so the whole feeling (29Mar2014, Jeanette:8).  To underscore that 
experience she contrasts it with keeping a reflective diary: reflection-in-action is “not a 
story”, you can’t “tell yourself anything, it’s like a real moment” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:18); 
she can’t “down play it” or “make it look better than it was” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:18), and 
she doesn’t have to “dredge” through “layers” in order to “get to any reflection” 
(29Mar2014, Jeanette:22).  Instead “well to be honest it was like that was there that and 
there that was” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:18), “with the picture and the words you are right 
there” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:22), a more “relaxed way for reflecting” (29Mar2014, 
Jeanette:18) but then says  
58 Jeanette …but like in a story you can give more away, you can unpick, take you 
places where a picture couldn’t, more out of my control, like with the 
camera I knew what face to pull and someone else can look at it and say 
‘well you do look a bit angry’ and I can say ‘well no I wasn’t’ but with a 
story well that could be taken in all sorts of places 
(29Mar2014). 
I was not clear here whether she was saying writing on practice can be ‘taken’ by her as its 
author in a range of surprising (positive) ways, or whether others reading it could interpret 
it in whatever way they choose, this being out of her control - so I ask her “which is the 
diary like, the camera or the story?” (29Mar2014, JT:59).  She replies “I know how to write 
[a diary], you know, I know how to do it good” so even when her supervisor suggested that 
she “leave it messy”, i.e. uncensored and unedited, she only did it once.  Although she could 
“see the benefit” (28Nov2013, Jeanette:144), that leaving her diary messy would be “a 
transformatory process” (28Nov2013, Jeanette:114), she did not repeat it because she 
prides herself on “get[ing] good grades” for which she needs to be “in control, can control 
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it, at the end of it” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:60), using the example “when I am writing I can 
get the word right” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:64).   
Thus, it would appear when writing a diary she can control the direction of its story 
whereas digitally capturing her felt sense in a moment through recording words and an 
image is more dynamic.  In fact, she refers to being able to “talk the hind legs off a donkey” 
compared to digitally recording words in the moment being “trying to be real” (29Mar2014, 
Jeanette:64).  When “trying to be real, to get to the realness in those recordings [she] 
stumble[s] a lot” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:64), whereas in her diary she will use a different 
word even though it is not “the right word, it’s not what I meant but its job done” 
(29Mar2014, Jeanette:66).  Later she adds  
103 Jeanette if you’re thinking back on an event you can go ‘yeah I can remember 
that’ but when it’s on a voice recorder you’ve got your actual voice and 
you pick up your tension, and where you are stuttering and with the 
picture too you’ve got the emotions so it’s real, like so it’s real it’s as 
real as I think I can get it then that’s really helped, like it’s really helped 
me in my third year, so in that sense for me it’s working, do you know 
what I mean, it’s a more immediate process, I would not say it’s an 
easier process, because I’m putting my soul out there, but its more 
immediate… if you can understand it as a positive thing then it makes 
the process easier too as well 
(29Mar2014). 
10.4 Capturing moments of practice 
Therefore a ‘reflective scrap’ can be a single word scribbled down fast or a photo and/or 
digital recording.  Perhaps choice links to the percipients point that different people will 
meaningfully engage with reflection-in-action/Glance in different ways.  As Geoff puts it, 
“not everyone is ever going to be able to process the Glance” in the same way “because it’s 
just not the way their mind processes information” (7Mar2015, Geoff:42).  To illustrate 
Becky says that she would find digitally recording her reflections in a moment to capture 
her practice “a real struggle” (29Mar2014, Becky:61), “embarrassing” (29Mar2014, 
Becky:105) and therefore it “may not go anywhere” (29Mar2014, Becky:61).  Yet she posits 
61 Becky it probably would be in some ways more truthful rather than writing it down 
and embellishing it all over the place, but there’s something about my brain 
and writing, whereas talking ties my brain in a knot 
(29Mar2014). 
She wonders if she is “assuming that I’m not going to be able to do it, so it might be good to 
try” (29Mar2014, Becky:64) which in turn “might give me confidence to speak more, or just 
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experiment with expressing myself” (29Mar2014, Becky:107); and Geoff’s experience of 
becoming aware of reflection in the moment was that it is a long slow process, that he had 
to deliberately “stick with it” for “four or five years” but eventually it “becomes your 
instinct” (10Jan2015, Geoff:109).  
Whether reflective scraps are written, vocal or visual, the importance is in the “experience 
of trying to capture the moment” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:100) because this “puts the soul 
back” into reflective practice (29Mar2014, Jeanette:10).  I ask if her own experiments with 
capturing the moment “get[s] to the soul” (29Mar2014, JT:98) and she replies “maybe it 
doesn’t matter if it’s not the actual moment but it gets you to think about the moment 
more, like that’s the point anyway isn’t it” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:100) and Becky agrees, 
“reflective practice is not the thing, the practice is, so if it gets us to think about our practice 
more then its working” (29Mar2014, Becky:101).  As Rob puts it 
40 Rob If we’re going to make anything any different we’ve got to do it in the 
moment, we can’t you know afford to steam off and then put things down 
in a diary, blah blah, you know, we can’t do that all the time. We’ve got to 
get it in the moment. So they’re still, yeah, they’re important but different.  
You’re talking about reacting, so seeing that moment of reaction 
(7Mar2015) 
11 Glance, Gaze…. and Leaving Go 
During their Describing of Glance and Gaze a further ‘insight cultivator’ emerges.  Whilst 
referring to the ‘quick look and let it go’ (21Nov2014, Carol:365) of reflective scraps, the 
‘letting it go’ element gathers momentum, taking on life of its own.  
To begin with, as part of his experiences of reflection-in-action Geoff speaks of how 
important it is that he “get[s] absorbed in” other things (4Apr2015, Geoff:31), so 
“unconsciously… looking for things to get absorbed in” (4Apr2015, Geoff:138), shared by 
Rob: 
34 Rob When I do jewellery bits or ‘coz I’m short-sighted anyone gives me the little 
screw that falls out your glasses or the little pin on your watch, I love doing 
that. 
35 JT Yeah, yeah. 
36 Rob Just doing something different with my head. 
37 Geoff Yeah. 
38 Rob And you have to sit down and concentrate on it and not go quickly ‘that’s the 
end of that’. It’s just like that’s what I’m zoned in on that. 
39 JT So it is all you are doing, yeah? 
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40 Rob And I think years ago it might have been I’ll sit down and do a jigsaw, which I 
haven’t done for a little while now. But it’s the kind of thing, it’s not reflecting, 
it is just zoning in on nothing and just flushing everything through 
(4Apr2015). 
‘Letting it go’, as initially termed, therefore can be associated with doing something 
different ‘in one’s head, by zoning in on it but also engaging the body, an embodied act that 
serves to flush everything through.  Rob refers to this as his “therapy” (4Apr2015, Rob:32), 
a term that Dasia later adopts when referring to baking:  
136 Dasia For me I find it quite therapeutic. Because the cake ‘coz it isolate me and 
makes me concentrate on one thing and forget all negative things 
around me. And when I finished I look at the negative in another way 
because I take a step away or I separate myself. And I look at in fresh 
perspective 
(4Apr2015). 
At that point in the RPRG I highlight what they have been saying and in doing so underscore 
‘letting it go’ as a new ‘insight cultivator’:  
139 JT […] You’re digging something completely new here. It’s like something 
about the ‘not moment’.  You were talking about Gaze after the event 
when you’re really pulling something about and you’re talking about 
Glance in the moment, but, do you see, you are also talking about 
something about ‘not the moment’. Do you see what I mean? You are 
saying that this too is important when, I think you said flushing earlier, 




140 Jason That’s post  -  you’re talking about post-moment of action? 
141 JT Well more you were talking about ‘not moment’? 
142 Jason Ah okay. 
143 JT You are baking a cake, you’re doing your thing, you are doing a jigsaw, or I 
go for a run, but it’s not a moment ‘cause we’re letting everything, what did 
you call it? It feels like you’ve washed through, flushed through.. 
144 Rob …Oh it’s my therapy. 
145 JT Yes, you called it that and you described it as flushed through or 
something... 
146 Geoff ..Flushed, yes, flushed. 
147 Rob I generally call it my therapy. So it’s like everything sort of flushes, is flushed 
through, yeah I will really concentrate but everything kind of you know I sort 
of get to the end and that was my connection.  It’s like it doesn’t matter 
what terrible thing has happened because now I’m looking at it differently. 
So there’s when we Glance and also when we Gaze at it really hard and then 
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we all go ‘oh yeah’, and there are things when we’re doing something that’s 
completely different, distracts us but it’s really important… 
148 Jason ..Subconscious kind of distillation. 
149 JT OK! So this is a thing… 
150 Rob …That’s what I, when I’m making, doing something else it’s then, and you 
think of something else and then you get to the other end and you go ‘well it 
couldn’t have been important ‘coz I’ve forgotten’ [laughs]. But it was 
important at the point, you know. 
(4Apr2015).  
Discussion becomes general so at that point I bring it back by summing up where it had got 
to: 
161 JT So, the Gaze, Glance and the ‘flushing it through’ or the … 
162 Rob You need a ‘g’ word then don’t you? 
163 JT … yeah that’s it, we do we need a ‘g’ word [laughs] 
164 Rob …‘Flush’, no…. 
165 JT …Oh that would be great I see can a model coming on! [laughter]… 
166 Rob …Synonyms for ‘flush’… [laughter] 
167 Geoff Yeah. 
(4Apr2015) 
To facilitate deeper Description, I remind they have talked about “flushing through, but also 
automatic pilot” and ask “Are they the same, or different, or linked?” (4Apr2015, JT:188).  
Geoff feels that this would be a “very personal experience” (4Apr2015, Geoff:189) to which 
Jason adds “So sometimes it could be flushing through and sometimes automatic pilot. It 
depends on what happens after..” (4Apr2015, Jason:192) and Geoff interjects “… or if what 
you were doing before is personally important” (4Apr2015, Geoff:193) but then confuses it 
with being distracted whilst trying to concentrate on something (4Apr2015, Geoff:151), a 
process that Rob refers to as a ‘brain jump’ (4Apr2015, Rob:154) although offering that he 
keeps a notebook to “park” such thoughts so he is able to resume focus (4Apr2015, 
Rob:158).  But in the next and final RPRG Rob returns to ‘letting it go’ in its meaning of ‘not 
the moment’ and says that he had been thinking about what to call it.  He explains it is “not 
‘letting go’ because that sounds like you are doing it deliberately and we were saying about 
not doing it deliberately” (30May2015, Rob:5), a “stand[ing] back away from stuff and 
hav[ing] a brain wash, a mind wash, just clear it…” (30May2015, Rob:7).  Debra had not 
been present at the previous two RPRGs and is confused, interrupting Rob with “….I’ll do 
anything to not reflect on things….(30May2015, Debra:8)… “like a task avoidance kind of 
thing” (30May2015, Debra:10), to which, and significantly, Geoff responds “…no, that’s 
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reflective practice, avoiding reflective practice” (30May2015, Geoff:11).  Geoff, Rob and 
Dasia then Describe the new emerging ‘insight cultivator’ further: 
12 Geoff …it’s kind of doing the dishes, and cogs just go ‘click’, and suddenly… 
13 Dasia …so it’s not doing something to distract or put off something… 
14 Rob …its like having a brain wash… 
15 Geoff …doing something completely different, not consciously to do that thing 
necessarily, and something entirely different 
16 Rob …and something clicks, so not working on something but something 
works… 
(30May2015) 
At this point I offer  
17 JT …and maybe just ‘leaving go’, so taking time out, whether or not 
something clicks, you were saying that it was important in its own right, 
or your ‘brain wash’ [Rob].  So, the three things, Glance, Gaze, and 
Leaving Go? Or Brain Wash?” 
(30May2015). 
Rob replies, speaking of “hitting that point when your mind wanders away from those 
thoughts and you’re able to relax…so the mind wandering away” (30May2015, Rob:18). 
Debra checks “…so start to think about something else and suddenly it makes more sense, 
that’s it?” (30May2015, Debra:21).  In answer Rob describes the process as: 
23 Rob […] the other things that you might be doing might have a tiny splinter of 
an aspect that might relate to what it was, so not deliberately, or maybe 
it is, but that’s not why you are doing it, but suddenly you are thinking 
how does that relate to it, so you find yourself at a certain place and you 
start to think ‘how come I ended up here’ and then you go ‘ah yes 
because it’s a focal point’ and ‘focal point’ is relevant to the thing you 
had gone away from, so, you know, it might just spin things […] 
(30May2015). 
Dasia sums this up as it enabling “coming at things with fresh mind” (30May2015, Dasia:29), 
speaking of getting “blocked” so “it needs time, your brain saying it needs time to organise 
things and when you do that it’s like its ready” (30May2015, Dasia:29).  Rob replies,  
30 Rob Mr Muscle brain cleaner! [laughter] 
31 Dasia A fresh brain, you can see things clearer 
(30May2015) 
Thus the ‘insight cultivator’ of Leaving Go is not engaging in the Gaze and Glance of 
reflection-on or -in action; it is involvement in a tangibly different activity or no activity such 
that the mind wanders, an alternative absorption that flushes or washes thoughts and 
feelings through, and as a result a student/practitioner might return freshly at something in 
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their practice that they was previously blocked: by not working on something a block is 
cleared and/or seeing is clearer.  This is not via deliberately setting about a different task, 
nor is it about merely getting distracted from ones focus, but the significance of realising, 
naming and valuing Leaving Go.  In the meantime, I had explored their Describing of Leaving 
Go to see if it connected with anything established in mainstream literature on reflective 
practice.  I share (clumsily!) how this had produced nothing, although  
32 JT literature on creativity, so there’s stuff to do with performance theory and a 
creative act, the creative act of putting things down to give space for those, 
you said it, cogs to go click, and the things we do as practitioners are 
creative acts aren’t they, always creating in the moment 
(30May2015). 
This was the final scheduled RPRG, therefore Leaving Go had been given life by the 
percipients as a third dimension to Glance and Gaze but there was no time for further 
exploration in the primary research period during which it may – or may not – have grown 
through their Descriptions of their lived experiences of reflective practice and become a 
third ‘threshold concept’.   
12 ‘Journey-man-woman’ reflective practitioners  
Being the final RPRG we reviewed the research process.  In that context Rob mentions that 
on his “father’s birth certificate it says his father was a ‘journeyman boot maker’” 
(30May2015, Rob:235).  Not knowing that phrase I ask if it means he was a “travelling 
salesman making or mending boots?” (30May2015, JT:236).  Geoff explains “No, I’m a 
journeyman [names trade], it’s like in history it meant you had completed your full 
apprentice, you had made that journey” (30May2015, Geoff:237).  Conversation follows: 
239 Rob …so that make us journeymen reflectors then [laughter] 
240 Debra ….and women! [laughter] 
241 Geoff Yes, that’s it, journey men and women reflectors 
242 JT Lovely, journey men and women reflectors right to the end [laughter] […] 
(30May2015). 
Even so, and poignantly with regards to their experiences of reflective practice, Geoff 
worries that by referring to themselves as ‘Journey-men-and-women-reflectors’ they would 
be staking a claim in its engagement, which could come across as arrogant (30May2015, 
Geoff:117), and Rob worries about it inferring expertise (30May2015, Rob:114).  To this I 
respond that the journey “is about knowing yourself, not saying expert, or not expert, but 
just knowing, and being able to know yourself (30May2015, JT:118), to which Rob agrees, 
167 
 
saying “In order to know we need to name” (30May2015, Rob:119) and Geoff concurs 
adding “if you know what it is you do, all the little, the very little things that you do, then 
you can know” (30May2015, Geoff:124). 
Thus, finally I returned to the transcripts to consider facilitating the journey of Gaze, Glance 
and Leaving Go from the percipients expressed experiences. 
12.1 Facilitating the journey: percipients expressed experiences   
The percipients are clear that they want something that enhances their reflection-in-action 
– or, as I Describe it, to grow their Glances – to support them in their ‘journey’.  Along with 
a tool-kit for this they want some kind of ‘input’ that is also modelled in action.  They want 
to know how to notice, pay attention, interrupt, in the moment of practice without 
becoming distracted or blinkered, but they also do not want to become paralysed by the 
intensity of that action in the moment.  The Trappings of one’s job as well as the imposed 
routines of accepted practices of reflective practice, i.e. reflection-on-action, provides 
familiarity and safety, but the percipients want support to engage with the “tiny” and 
“fleeting” rather than only the “quite significant” (29Nov2013, Sadie:86) and indeed, whilst 
acknowledging The Trappings, they want to be able to approach practice ‘fresh’, to create 
it.  Their contention is that current understanding and practices of reflective practice do not 
facilitate this.  The slow incremental ‘breaking in’ to adopt and adhere to accepted practises 
means that the ‘soul’ of reflective practice, its possibilities as well as that of potential 
professional practice, get ‘lost’ in ‘translation’. 
They are clear that enhancing their ability to Glance will take time because it is a ‘complex 
thing’ and they recognise that it requires them to ‘make themselves make that moment’, a 
“real slow process to start with” (7Mar2015, Geoff:32) that is ‘hard to pick up’ (4Apr2015, 
Geoff:9), but “once you get the handle on it, it actually changes your approach to everything 
if you want it to. So it is about that quicker reflection” (4Apr2015, Geoff:6).  Jason agrees, 
“like learning a technique, it’s difficult at the beginning but when it becomes part of your 
life, part of your, you use it in every single aspect of your life” (4Apr2015, Jason:10).  As 
Geoff puts it, “it becomes a natural thing, most of the time” (7Mar2015, Geoff:34).   
Sadie says that the more facilitators of reflective practice “talk to people” about aporia and 
“about how they are gonna work with that, the more it might help them in these moments” 
(29Nov2013, Sadie:86).  The percipients have also spoken of facilitators needing to be 
aware of potential ‘knock-on effects’ of reflection-in-action; of individual personalities, 
168 
 
preferences and life experiences; and the risk of it becoming tuning out and ‘detached’ 
rather than tuning and connected.  In sum the facilitation of Glance would need to be 
thoughtful, skilled and prepared for a range of different start points and processes.  This is 
important because, as Jeanette and Becky describe, it will be about ‘unpicking who you are’ 
(29Mar2014, Jeanette:117), of your “inner self coming out” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:115), 
such that I propose I would need to “pre-warn people” and “provide a safety net or some 
tasks to engage in that provides a platform to stand on” (29Mar2014, JT:118) from which 
they can build.  Jeanette concurs adding this would be important because unlike current 
mainstream and typical practices of reflective practice, Glance is like “opening yourself up 
raw” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:119).  Indeed, the percipients are clear: facilitating Glance, as 
well as Leaving Go and a re-imagined Gaze will require clear and supportive ‘instruction, 
guidance and lessons’ (6Dec2014, Rob:492) but, importantly, these must not take the 
shape, imposition and power of ‘breaking in’ and Identify-Of, so not a process of input 
where they passively learn and perform technique.  Whilst it needs to “fit” (7Mar2015, 
Geoff:217) with the “protocols and the boundaries…. laws and different regulations” 
(7Mar2015, Jason:216 & Jason:218) of the organisation in which they are working, it 
requires individual student/practitioner motivation through a process that supports and 
promotes them to “feel ready for change” (4Apr2015, Geoff:21) and “commit to do it, 
dedicated to do it” (4Apr2015, Rob:30), even when, or perhaps especially because it won’t 
“work every time, of course it doesn’t […] you might, you know, still miss things” (4Apr2015, 
Geoff:13). 
Exploring this further, in the RPRG of 29 March 2014 and playing devil’s advocate, I point 
out that their valuing and signifying of Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go had come from their 
poor experiences of current practices of reflective practice so would facilitating it 
differently from the outset of their higher education programmes “be taking that process of 
experience and development away?” (29Mar2014, JT:138), a question summed up by Becky 
as “does it rob them (i.e. future students) from that process?” (29Mar2014, 3:139).  In 
response, Jeanette and Becky, are very clear: if they had started from where they are now 
in their understanding of reflective practice (in light of the RPRGs) they would be “putting 
so much into it at some many different levels” (29Mar2014, Becky:143).  To provoke further 
Description I ask:  
145 JT […] I was thinking when you were describing the first year, like new friends 
and learning how to write an essay, so much going on, should we even ask 
people, first years, to be reflecting, reflective practice, have they got 
enough going on, and then maybe they wouldn’t approach it as just 
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another of the many things they have to learn to do, to do, do you see 
what I mean? What do you think? 
(29Mar2014) 
In answer Jeanette replies that reflective practice “should” be included from the beginning 
of a higher education programme so that students:  
147 Jeanette [understand] it’s just different but equally important right at the start, 
coz it’s not separate is it, I think the opposite, make it be equally 
significant, it can’t be stressed enough, reflection’s important, but not in 
the way, like ‘reflection’s important, there’s the template for it’  
(29Mar2014) 
So, rather than “devalu[ing] it” by making it be a “task to do” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:149), a 
“chore, job done” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:151) inevitably approached through the mindset of 
just another “deadline” (29Mar2014, Becky:155), the facilitation of Glance, Leaving Go, and 
a different kind of Gaze would “make [reflective practice] all more meaningful” 
(29Mar2014, Jeanette:151, Jeanette:154).  Jason and Geoff’s response takes a broader 
frame, of how it’s about “how to teach them emotional intelligence, how to get them to sort 
of think about how their emotions affect what they do and that sort of thing” (7Mar2015, 
Jason:194) by “step[ping] back” and “think[ing] a bit deeper” (4Apr2015, Jason:81; 
Geoff:74).  More generally in this regard Jason, Geoff, Rob and Dasia speak of needing a 
‘simplified way to direct’ people (4Apr2015, Geoff:21) and “distil” all that has emerged 
through their RPRGs “into one” (4Apr2015, Rob:58) through clear and coherent approaches 
based on experiential discovery as “early” as possible (4Apr2015, Geoff:27) which ‘gives 
them the base’ (4Apr2015, Rob:24), to be ‘built up, improved or reinforced’ (4Apr2015, 
Geoff:27) throughout the higher education programme. 
12.2 Facilitating the journey: connected and interwoven Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go 
In the RPRG of 7 March 2015 Geoff, Rob, and Dasia stress that this needs to be more 
imaginative and creative than current facilitation practices, which I sum up as “how to 
enable people to be more conscious in the Gaze as well as Glances” (7Mar2015, JT:29).  To 
illustrate, in contrast to the controlled, prescribed, assessed and judged process of current 
reflective practice, Dawn speaks of “truly creative artists, musicians, actors, creative 
people” (14Nov2013, Dawn:69) who are “in the moment, and its mojo isn’t it” (14Nov2013, 
Dawn:69) which is “energy and passions and alertness, being on the ball, right there” 
(14Nov2013, Dawn:71).  Jeanette also speaks about creativity.  Unlike “normal reflection” 
where “you write something anything and you’re told how to write it, things, like you’re 
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learning to write an essay” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:144), she talks of “the importance of the 
creative mind” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:144).  Creativity enables them to see “how past 
experience shapes […] beliefs” (7Mar2015, Jason:221), at “how that affects the decisions 
you’re making in the moment” (7Mar2015, Jason:225 & Jason:233), therefore a creative, 
imaginative Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go bringing energy, passion and alertness to its 
processes.  The percipients have also emphasised how ‘hindsight Gaze’ would be about 
explicitly identifying domesticating discourses in their written accounts, paying attention to 
where they have adopted and adhered to them.   
Therefore, in contrast to literature that explores reflection-on-action and reflection-in-
action as separate, or related but does not explore or theorise that relationship, the 
percipients Describe Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go as connected and interwoven.  In the 
final RPRG I refer to how I have been acting on their two threshold concepts and one insight 
cultivator: “I’ve started a course, it’s a form of therapy but I’m doing it to see how it might 
work as a form of practice, but it’s about noticing feelings before we tell stories about 
them”.  I pick up on an illustration shared by Debra about a client ‘grating’ on her, saying: 
“before you’ve gone ‘oh my goodness she’s really grating on me’ you are noticing before it’s 
become that thing, ‘grating’, in case you can do something differently with it” (30May2015, 
JT:58).  Debra replies:  
59 Debra So that would help because otherwise it is grating, grating is a fact, and 
that’s how I treat her, you know, it’s really hard, because I’m constantly 
waiting for her to do something that’s, you know how you just don’t like 
people, there’s just a clash… 
(30May2015) 
The course I was referring to was on Focusing, a phenomenological philosophy and practice 
created by Eugene Gendlin, which, as will be seen, becomes significant in chapter 5’s 
Narrating of their Describing. 
12.3 Facilitating the journey: the research process after-thought 
To further consider the facilitation of the journey of Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go I looked 
to percipients expressed experiences of the research process to see if and what that might 
highlight as relevant to illuminating the radical ‘journeying’ of reflective practice. 
The percipients speak of the significance of its group dialogue and facilitation, specifically 
how this had been the ground from which their insight cultivators and threshold concepts 
had emerged.  They compare it to their experience of reflective practice facilitation in their 
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higher education programmes, speaking of how that was based on the very different 
process of typical mainstream practices of reflective practice/reflection-on-action, with a 
very different impact.  As reminded earlier, being phenomenological research the broad 
phenomenon was named by me as researcher, i.e. it was not any phenomena but this one, 
thus from the outset focus was overtly and explicitly an exploration of whether there are 
alternatives to typical mainstream practices of reflective practice.  The assertion of 
percipients and therefore this thesis, is not that they introduced reflection-in-action where 
it wasn’t before, but their dialogue in a group, their sharing of lived experiences related to 
the nature and qualities of reflection-on-action and reflection-in-action, their queries, 
confusions, and what it needed to or could be, all led to their ‘insight cultivators’ of Glance, 
Gaze and Leaving Go, and their Describing of Gaze and Glance led to those becoming 
‘threshold concepts’.   
The significance of being in a group for “get[ting] reflection that you can’t get out of diary” 
was expressed by Joseph in the very first RPRG (14Nov2013, Jospeph:10) and reaffirmed by 
Clare in relation to the Sound Walk.  In a later RPRG Becky also talks about the importance 
of “dialogue, bringing it all up to the surface, going into an understanding”, and Jeanette 
agrees adding this was the reason she opted to take part in the research project in the first 
place (29Mar2014, Jeanette:121).  Becky concurs saying that the group is them ‘doing 
critical consciousness’ (29Mar2014:123).   
In the final RPRG Geoff says his reason for joining was to “understand about reflective 
practice and do it differently” (30May2015, Geoff:210.  In answer to whether it had “been 
helpful for that” (30May2015, JT:211) he responds “O yes, like I did it a college before I 
came here, and here as well, but this, this has transformed it” (30May2015, Geoff:212).  
This, then, involves me, the facilitator of the RPRG dialogues, so I looked to the 13 
transcripts with that in mind.  Across them I can see myself as a ‘journey-woman-reflector’ 
too.  It is apparent I was learning how to ask questions that supported exploration of the 
phenomena whilst maintaining equanimity and equity, without ignoring or pretending that 
I did not have power, privilege and advantage.  I note where I may not have got that 
balance right.  For instance, before the RPRG of the 29th March 2014 I had introduced the 
idea of writing an account of practice as creative non-fiction, inviting percipients to come 
prepared with a try-out (sending guidance and a copy of one of my own beforehand to 
assist).  Jeanette came to the RPRG having elected not to do it and explained her reticence, 
but by the end decided she would give it a go.  Although I repeated it “might not be the 
thing that works for you” (29Mar2014, JT:62 & JT:162), given that the other percipients 
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were doing it, in conjunction with me initiating it and following it up, I now wonder about 
her experience of that.  Indeed, in response to her offer to try the activity I say that doing 
so “would be very helpful to me” (29Mar2014, JT:163).  Having been to every other RPRG, 
after this one Jeanette did not return.  She contacted me to let me know she was 
withdrawing to focus on her dissertation but looking back at all the transcripts another 
interpretation is my power as lecturer/researcher putting a student/participant under 
pressure, more so when considered in relation to her expressed experience throughout of 
wanting to do what is required by those in authority to ‘do well’ and be perceived and 
judged in such terms.  Whatever the reason, applied to considering the facilitation of Gaze, 
Glance and Leaving Go it points up the power of facilitators - and groups – in relation to 
influence and compliance. 
Extending that observation, prompted by the notion of journey this time in relation to what 
comes next as a result of the percipients Descriptions, I am mindful of Meyer & Land’s 
warning that questions should always be asked about whose threshold concepts are being 
applied and how.  Whilst Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go are those of the percipients, Meyer 
& Land caution against threshold concepts being used in ways that produce a “‘totalising’ or 
colonizing view”, by becoming “a measure” that “exert[s] a ‘normalizing’ function” (Meyer 
& Land, 2003:10) – essentially taking the form of a new incremental violence of being 
‘broken in’.  Indeed, perhaps, this could be posited as what happened to Schön’s original 
threshold concept of reflective practice in the first place: rather than being what 
practitioners do as part of their artistry of professional engagement, reflection-on-action 
with its neglected and under-theorised neighbour of reflection-in-action has become a 
function that practitioners must develop by learning how to do it, and this necessitates 
what it is that they have to do and how they have to do it, this all becoming ever more 
determined, imposed and controlled, a normalising function that is then measured to judge 
competence.  In relation to facilitating the journey of reflective practice, by this argument 
Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go have vibrancy but should not be applied and utilised in ways 
that colonise subjective experience. 
Finally, I am also clear from looking to the transcripts that initially organising ‘open’ group 
membership was not an effective facilitative process in the journey of reflective practice.  In 
the (academic) year of 2013-2014, out of the total of eight RPRGs six involved new people 
joining, inevitably meaning those six returned to a Start, with introductions, explanation, 
and not being able to fully extend or build on what had been discussed and described 
before.  It was of course relevant – it was still research – and brought insight into the 
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experience of reflective practice as currently practiced.  However, percipients also began 
leaving (Jeanette, Becky, Joseph, Dawn, Sadie, Carol, Mary, Clare), sometimes due to their 
time at the university coming to an end (Jeanette, Becky) but also, I felt that the group 
experience was not doing something they needed – it needed – to do.  There is no way of 
knowing if they would have stayed longer had it been a ‘closed’ group – and in fact Sadie, 
Carol, Mary and Clare left even with the change to a closed group – but it is noticeable that 
once I ‘closed’ the group to newcomers in 2014 through to the end of the primary research, 
a total of seven RPRGs, there was a change in depth and nature of exchange.  Changes in 
membership still happened, Sally could not make the first meeting - and then she – and 
indeed Jack - only came once.  But Jason, Debra, Geoff, Rob, and Dasia also started at this 
time and whilst missing occasionally for other commitments or illness they continued until 
30 May 2015.  It could be of course that this combination of percipients created a different 
dynamic, and/or that I had become more confident and rounded in my role.  However, 
when considered in conjunction with their Describing of the significance of group dialogue 
then closed membership must have relevance.  Geoff, for example, speaks of how named 
experiences could be embedded in “tak[ing] it forward and remembering it and acting on 
it” (6Dec2014, Geoff:600).  So whilst closing the group might disadvantage membership 
inclusivity, those present could take their experiences and ideas forward, to remember and 
act on them, to embed them.  In sum, it made possible the journey that the percipient 
assert is involved – indeed required – for a radically new reflective practice and for me to 
facilitate it as a meaningful experience: not having to return to a Start each RPRG meant we 
could together journey in a more connected way.   
13 Describing Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go 
- The dominating, even sole emphasis on reflection-on-action in mainstream 
literature and practice of reflective practice, is Described by the percipients lived 
experience in terms of a slow incremental violence of being ‘broken in’ to its 
requirements and expectations.  Instead, they signify and value reflection-in-action, 
Describing this in terms of play, creativity, imagination and aporia.  Reflection-in-
action was Described as a feeling sense of significant and prescient knowing in the 
moment, a coalescence, a gelling together in a flash through a process of 
‘metaphorical and literal peripheral vision’, a noticing, capturing, interrupting, of a 
focused breaking practice down in the moment by moving in and moving out whilst 
also trusting the experience of that process, not knowing its outcome in the 
moment of that moment, of having no path.  It requires from a student/practitioner 
connection with self, a receptive mind, and connection with others, involving 
letting go of preconceptions, stereotypes, judgements in the moment, tracking the 
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shape of their feelings and the effect of that on their interaction, identifying what 
shaped it in that way and then ‘managing’ the shape differently.   
 
- Their Describing of Glance became a ‘new portal’ (cf. Meyer & Land) that enables 
reflection-in-practice, this being absent from mainstream theory and practice.  
Glance is a vehicle through which to deepen understanding of the experience and 
qualities of reflection-in-action.  Glance has the quality of a click brought on 
through a pause, interruption; it is a freezing of time in the moment, a slow 
moment, a ‘hey this is where everything is, where’s your head, body and feelings 
that you are processing in that moment’.  It is a quick Glance, watch, pay attention, 
which brings attention fleetingly to embodied knowing.  It is ‘that thing that 
changes you’, so ‘that moment, that feeling’ from moving ones focus in and then 
out.  Glance is a skill and an art involving noticing, interrupting, attending, tuning in, 
tracking, trusting the experience/process of having no path, working with ‘sense, 
the sense’, capturing, ‘getting at’ the whole of a moment.  Glance is embodied and 
involves memory in the body.  It is Described through improvisation, mindfulness 
and embodied knowing. 
 
- The percipients do not reject reflection-on-action altogether.  They Describe a value 
for some and/or at some times from reflection-on-action.  Further, through 
Describing Glance the threshold concept of Gaze emerges, a vehicle through which 
to deepen understanding of the experience and qualities of reflection-on-action.  
Their Describing of Gaze catalyses a more imaginative, creative and dynamic 
reflection-on-practice that re-imagines and repositions it away from being a slow, 
incremental violence of being ‘broken in’.  Gaze is the process of selecting an 
event/interaction after its happening, that may be big, dramatic or small, but either 
way the event is the trigger and Gaze is staring at it, to pull some thing/s about it 
apart and in detail, wondering if you could/should have acted differently, breaking 
what existed as a complex dynamic whole into small fixed and static pieces for 
analysis, and, typically, writing that down and ‘layering it up’ by ‘bringing in’ 
experiences and thoughts ‘that have occurred’ to the Gazer since the selected 
event, to better ‘report’ and therefore perform themselves in familiar, acceptable 
and expected ways as required to those in authority.  However, the percipients also 
Describe instances where Gaze could be ‘good’, that is, if re-imagined and re-
positioned as ‘hindsight Gaze’ where a practitioner writes an account of their 
practice as one activity, fronting up that this could be fiction, but then as a second 
activity deliberately returns to it to identify within it their adoption of 
domesticating discourses, an avenue of reflection on oneself as a reflective writer 
from which one may learn ‘something different’.   
 
- In the last two RPRGs a final insight cultivator emerges, research time running out 
to explore whether it too would become a threshold concept.  They spoke of 
Leaving Go, involvement in a tangibly different activity to the one they were 
engaged in.  They Describe this in terms of mind wandering, absorption that flushes 
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through and washes or freshens the brain/mind.  Leaving Go is not deliberately 
setting about engaging in something different for this to occur, or merely getting 
distracted, but they know it has happened because by not working on something 
something works, clicks, a block is cleared, seeing is clearer. 
  
- They Describe Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go in terms of their distinctive qualities 
but also at the same time as connected and interwoven and that there would be 
differences in the way that individuals engage in all of them.  
 
- Finally, the percipients Describe what they want or need from facilitation of Gaze, 
Glance, and Leaving Go, framing this as a ‘journey’, but importantly their emphasis 
here is on the experience as ‘journey-men-women’.  So, although a ‘tool-kit’ and 
‘modelling’ will be important for all, alongside cautions about what to pre-empt 
and look out for they also highlight individual difference both in the nature of that 
journey and engagement in Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go.  
 
Together, Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go, offer a radical reclaiming and reimagining of 
reflective practice.  This is important.  Although I am Describing in this chapter, so making 
connections between the RPRGs and individual experiences, and in the chapter to follow 
will Narrate this through connection with theory, I know that Carol’s lived experience of 
‘flash’ and ‘coalescence’, Dasia’s ‘quick peek, and Jeanette’s ‘gelling together’, for example, 
will have different felt sense physicality, tones, qualities and associations, as well as 
different dichotomous poles (cf. Kelly) that construe what these are not.  With more time 
(indeed such as the time a university degree programme brings, albeit time-limited), as well 
as noting connections between experiences as is the case in this research inquiry, a radical 
reflective practice that is reclaiming its roots would be able to encourage students to 







Narrating in this work is neither an “exercise of imagination” (Peters & 
Besley 2012:119) nor the telling of a story (Cobley, 2014) but a process 
that connects, frames, and gives expression to that which has been 
Described.  It “draws” the Descriptions of chapter 4 into “a plot, 
emplotting” them (Peters & Besley 2012:119) through connection with 
theory.  Thus Narrating involves “responsiveness” (2012:119) to what 
has been Described, therefore “mutual recognition” (2012:119) from the 
reader and those implicated in the Narrating that it does indeed honour 
what has been Described.  Narrating is a deeply moral undertaking. 
1 Introduction   
Having Captured theory related to professional practice in order to advance a rich 
appreciation of reflective practice (chapter 2), chapter 3 Curated its mainstream literature 
with percipients lived experience of engagement, making possible a depth and breadth of 
insight into the appropriation of reflective practice, and asserting it to be a ‘battleground’, a 
site of conflicts’ (cf. Taylor et al).  Chapter 4, Describing, ‘evoked and dwelled’ (cf. van 
Manen) in the percipient experiences from the RPRG transcripts, this offering insight into 
the reclamation of reflective practice: it brought out their ‘vision of what might be’ (cf. 
Hicks).  Now, the focus is Narrating.  Narrating connects and frames by ‘drawing into a plot, 
emplotting’ (cf. Peters & Besley) what was Described by identifying connections with theory 
and the research aims and sub-aims: it Narrates what their lived experiences connect to.   
 
More precisely, this chapter concerns whether and how their Describing connects to a 
radical reflective practice, all the while ensuring that it “tell[s the percipients] experience as 
lived through” (van Manen, 2016:315).  As Polkingthorne (2007:476) explains, “Readers 
should be able to follow the presented evidence and argument enough to make their own 
judgment as to the relative validity of the claim’”.  Therefore, validity stems from the 
integrity of the Narrating.   
 
Framed by critical phenomenology it also needs to have “catalytic” value (Lather, 1986:67).  
From this perspective it could be that the phenomenological themes and insights only have 
relevance to the 16 percipients and still be valid – although, just on this van Manen’s 
(2016:355-6) scrutiny criteria presented in chapter 1 ensure broader relevance and 
trustworthiness, to which Narrating plays an important part.  However, it also needs to be a 
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‘catalyst’ for action, which for this thesis is the purpose of developing facilitation of 
reflective practice in higher education programmes.   
Therefore, Narrating as worked in this thesis is a deeply respectful and moral endeavour.   
Summarising the concluding section of chapter 4, the percipients Describing of reflective 
practice took the form of: 
• Signifying and valuing reflection-in-action, Describing play, creativity, imagination 
and aporia; 
 
• Articulation of Glance (reflection-in-action), Described through improvisation, 
mindfulness, and, embodied knowing; and the need for a re-imagined Gaze 
(reflection-on-action); 
 
• Introduction of Leaving Go; and, 
 
• The facilitation of the ‘journey’ of Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go. 
The Narrating of this chapter will therefore be structured around each of these in turn, but 
will end by applying that discussion to revisiting the purpose of reflective practice and its 
radical roots.  Thus, attention now turns to reflection-in-action to explore if and how the 
percipients Describing connects to theory, by first returning to Schön, and then beyond. 
2 Reflection-in-action 
Instead of the slow and incremental violence of being ‘broken in’ to the current mainstream 
practices of reflective practice and its emphasis on reflection-on-practice, the percipients 
Describing gives prominence to reflection-in-action.  They speak of the former not 
supporting or addressing their practice in the “hot action” (Eraut, 1994:53) of professional 
contexts, the word ‘action’ having particular significance as will be seen.  Indeed, the 
significance of Professional Practice: Connected Practice shows the extent to which 
mainstream reflective practice is not fit for the complex and multi-layered nature of 
professional practice, so whilst, of course, as Schön asserts, some aspects of practice can be 
met through the ‘high ground’ of technique, guidelines, and procedures it is in the ‘swampy 
lowlands’ where issues and decisions are messy and confusing with no possible ‘blueprints 
and formulae’ to guide where a practitioner relies on ‘in-the-moment’ practice artistry.  In 
fact reflection-in-action is “core” (Finlay, 2008:3), the “artful practice” of professionals 
(Schön, 1983:19) characterised as the ‘art of implementation and improvisation’ (Schön, 
1987a:13).   
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Significantly, rather than the artistry of their professional practice being required in the 
occasional (or even frequent) confusing ‘swampy lowland’ situation as articulated by Schön,  
the percipients Describe making complex decisions and taking action in contexts that are 
inherently fluid, confusing and messy all the time, exemplifying professional practice as 
complex action within a “stream-of-consciousness flow” (Lyle, 2002:212).  In their 
expression of this reflection-in-action is Described as a feeling sense of significant and 
prescient knowing in the moment, a coalescence, a gelling together in a flash through a 
process involving ‘metaphorical and literal peripheral vision’, noticing, capturing, 
interrupting, breaking practice down in the moment by moving focus in and out whilst also 
trusting the experience of that process, not knowing its outcome in the moment of that 
moment, of having no path.  It requires from a practitioner connection with self, a receptive 
mind, and connection with others, which involves letting go of preconceptions, stereotypes, 
judgements in the moment, or tracking the shape and effect of them on the interaction, 
identifying what shaped it in that way and then ‘managing’ the shape differently.   
‘Moment’ is pertinent – and moments do not happen to the percipients but they make 
them, fleeting junctures in which they ‘pay attention to it now’.  But also, by ‘moment’ the 
percipients are acknowledging times in their professional practice of not moments.  ‘Not 
moments’ has been understood in different ways.  Discussion Curated in chapter 3 
established how not reflecting is healthy and appropriate in some practice circumstances.  
The percipients also Describe how they do not always create moments and would like to 
become more ‘effective’ in doing so, as well as more effective in their moments.  They also 
Describe ‘not moments’ in the terms of Leaving Go, but this will be the focus of later 
Narration.  
Narrating this reflection-in-action finds connection with research elsewhere.   
Rather than reliance on application of theory alone, Benner (1984) refers to professional 
practice of nurses in the terms of how they engage promptly, creatively and holistically.  
Fook et al (1997) found that practitioners in a range of social professions highly evaluate 
peers who can adapt in complex situations, work with a range of variables and interests, 
and respond rapidly with imaginative and resourceful interventions.  Fish (1998:123) writes 
of this as artistry, ‘mysterious and ineffable’ based on “the kind of knowledge that is 
endemic in doing” (1998:93), whilst less amorphous, O’Sullivan (2005:222) refers to 
‘reflective judgment’, “the ability to base sound judgements on deep understandings in 
conditions of uncertainty”.  Nelson’s (2013b:60) “liquid knowledge” referred to in chapter 2 
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as part of Being Prepared in the heuristic tool Professional Practice: Connected Practice is 
an elegant epitome of all this.   
Yet it is ironic to recall how reflection-in-action is the least theorised element of Schön’s 
work, a fact that has perpetuated in mainstream literature on and in reflective practice.  
Attempts to address this have for the most part been “incoherent logically and irrelevant 
practically” (Newman, 1999:154), and “elaboration of the psychological realities” it involves 
have been missing (Munby & Russell 1989:74, cited in Eraut, 1994:147).  Consequently, 
where reflection-in-action is considered, we have seen that it is perceived and approached 
as inferior to reflection-on-action.  To illustrate, Zeichner & Liston (1996:45-6) identify five 
levels of reflection.  The first, “rapid reflection”, is where practitioners “reflect immediately 
and automatically while they are acting”, the second, “repair”, is similar but with a “quick 
pause for thought”.  It is not until the final levels of four and five that attention is 
“systematic and sharply focussed” but attained through reflection after the event.  
Moreover, all levels only involve (and therefore require) cognition and reasoning as the 
form of knowing.  Similarly, Mezirow (1991) distinguishes between ‘reflective action’, a very 
brief break in practice to question what is wrong (this being its sole emphasis), whilst 
‘critical reflection’, framed as the superior practice, involves the retrospective questioning 
of underpinning assumptions and beliefs involved in the action taken.   
Could it be that the percipients have got it wrong, that their reflection-in-action is nothing 
more than their sudden realisation of background cognitive processing involved in routine 
and automatic reactions, and in any case would never compare in significance nor 
usefulness to deliberate, disciplined post-practice analysis?  Perhaps they are seduced by 
their own poorly conceived colloquial notions of ‘instinct’, this being a word they used 
several times when describing reflection-in-action, seemingly confusing displays of speedy 
reactions with tacitly wise responses.  And if this is the case for them, why not in general?  
This may explain why reflection-in-action does not feature in a Schönian-inspired reflective 
practice. 
The questions suggest the relationship between reflection-on-action and reflection-in 
action needs articulation.  In Narrating this, my attention returned to the integral 
assumption of mainstream conceptualisation of reflective practice discussed earlier in this 
thesis, that through reflection-on-practice ones in-the-moment engagement will inherently 
and inevitably improve.  Drawn out as problematic in that Curation, now in the context of 
Narrating it can be seen to stem from Schön.  He writes that “reflection on knowing-in-
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action goes together with reflection on the stuff at hand” [emphasis added] (1983:50), 
framing this within a “constructionist view”: ‘practitioners construct situations of their 
practice’ that are “rooted” in their “practice worlds” (1987a:36).   For Benner (1984) this is 
how nurses become able to understand situations rapidly and holistically, although, and 
importantly, she argues this to be cumulative, based on years learning The Trappings (in the 
terms of this thesis) of the profession, adopting and adhering to its practices including 
reflective practice such that one exhibits Identity-Of nursing - or any social profession - 
through the slow, incremental process of being ‘broken in’.  In fact this is why Schön 
(1987a:36) accentuates the role of the “practicum”, the period of time during which 
students/practitioners are “initiated into the traditions of a community of practitioners and 
the practice world they inhabit”, where one 
learns their conventions, constraints, languages and appreciative 
systems, their repertoire of exemplars, systemic knowledge, and 
patterns of knowing-in-action (1987a:36-7). 
It is this cumulative repetition of reflection-on-practice that is assumed to positively affect 
reflection-in-practice.  As argued by Dreyfus (2001) (building on Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986) in 
his seven stages of competence, it is not until the fifth stage of ‘expertise’ that an individual 
can competently engage with surprises and act appropriately without having to deliberately 
reflect-on-practice.  Indeed, as seen, it is Schön’s (1983) contention that novice 
practitioners lack the ability to know-in-action; they merely apply rules and procedures 
unthinkingly and need to develop reflection-on-action if they are to become expert – even 
competent - professionals.  He describes this as a “ladder of reflection” (Schön, 1987a:114): 
by “climbing up the ladder, one makes what has happened at the rung below an object of 
reflection”, the implication being that at the ‘lowest’ rung there is no reflection-on-action 
therefore without this one is merely reacting automatically.  Dreyfus (2001:48) goes beyond 
‘expertise’ with ‘practical wisdom’ as his seventh and final stage of competence, only 
attained once an individual has been “an apprentice to [their] parents and teachers” for a 
significant length of time (2001:120).  Thus, reflection-in-action is the outcome of a 
disciplined, incremental and successful approach to reflection-on-action over time, again 
reinforcing reflection-in-action as the inferior of the two, although Usher et al (1997:170) 
go further, contending reflection-in-action to be “little more than accommodative and loses 
its critical edge”.   
A re-examination of Schön’s canonical texts of the 1980’s at the point in which he asserts 
the significance of reflection-in-action is therefore germane.  There he defines it as “central 
to the art through which practitioners sometimes cope with the troublesome divergent 
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situations of practice” (Schön, 1983:62), but immediately confounds it with reflection-on-
action: he writes of “action-present”, the “zone of time in which action can still make a 
difference”, offering this to be minutes which would equate with ‘in-action’, but then 
proceeds to add ‘days, weeks, even months’, the timeframe of reflection-on-action.  He 
follows this with what he pronounces to be an illustration of a practitioner reflecting-in-
practice: 
He may reflect on the tacit norms and appreciations which underlie a 
judgement, or on the strategies and theories implicit in a pattern of 
behaviour. He may reflect on the feeling for a situation which has led 
him to adopt a particular course of action, on the way in which he has 
framed the problem he is trying to solve, or on the role he has 
constructed for himself within a larger institutional context [sic] (ibid). 
This is patently reflection-on-action.  Another illustration that Schön refers to earlier in the 
same text is of a baseball pitcher “finding the groove” of practice in their game.  First 
declaring he “do[es] not wholly understand what” ‘finding the groove’ means, he offers 
that they “are talking about a particular kind of reflection”, a line of analysis that sounds 
promising.  But, he then lists the possibilities of ‘that kind of reflection’, summing that up as 
“reflection on their patterns of action, on the situations in which they are performing, and 
on the know-how implicit in their performance” [emphasis added] (1983:55).  Later he 
returns again to baseball pitchers, this time contending that “even if” reflection-in-action is 
“feasible” [emphasis added], so inferring it may not be, it could be “dangerous” (1983:277): 
reflection-in-action can “interfere with the smooth flow of action”, the player becoming 
“paralyse[d]” when what was ‘unconscious is brought to consciousness’ (ibid). Schön’s own 
confusion of reflection-on and reflection-in practice is strikingly similar to the Curating and 
Describing, and following Schön, the confusion and perceived inferiority of reflection-in-
action that follows in mainstream reflective practice theory is hardly surprising.  In fact, key 
writers such as van Manen (1990), Court (1988) and Atherton (2010) go on to assert 
reflection-in-action as a misnomer, and Moon (1999:97) reviews (some) relevant literature 
and concludes “there is no empirical evidence [for] the existence of a form of reflection 
that occurs within action”, a condemnation that Eraut (1994:148) lies entirely at the feet of 
Schön and his lack of “evidence that reflection-in-action is occurring”. 
Accordingly, it appears that the percipients are over-estimating the significance of their 
reflection-in-action.  It would also appear that reflection-in-action is not qualitatively 
different to reflection-on-action, and the inferior process.  In fact, in view of Schön’s theory 
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it is not even clear that reflection-in-action is a form of reflective practice sufficiently 
distinct to warrant having its own label.  So it appears that the percipients should be 
directed to turn their attention to reflection-on-action alone. 
However, it must be remembered that this is abductive critical phenomenological research, 
framed to “create new narratives about the phenomenon” (Tavory & Timmermans, 2014:5) 
through the percipients “conscious experience and subjectivity” (Varela & Shear, 1999:3).  
The puzzle (cf. Schostak & Schostak) of reflective practice is not to be solved through 
comparison and contrast with literature but, and importantly, through the percipients first-
person lived experiences.  Of course, in empirical terms the percipients numbering 16 could 
be held at issue if “belief in the truth of a generalisation is proportional to the number of 
instances that have been observed” (Blaikie, 2007:60) but matters pertaining to validity, 
relevance and trustworthiness were addressed earlier.  It could also be levelled that group-
think shared experience of the value of a distinctly different reflective practice in terms of 
reflection-in-action merely says something about the particular group, and to that extent 
myself as researcher/facilitator.  Whilst specifically discussed in the Epilogue, van Manen 
(2016:348) explains in abductive phenomenological research it is not the ‘experiential 
accounts or anecdotes that validate its quality’ but whether 
the phenomenological interpretations of the underlying meaning 
structures of [those accounts] are valid and executed in a scholarly 
manner, and whether the phenomenological themes and insights 
emerging from [them] are appropriate and original. 
If judged positively on those terms, applied to this thesis as the extent to which percipients 
Described lived experiences connect with each other and with theory, and the clarity of 
meaning of those connections, then the research has broader relevance.  Therefore, 
because the percipients’ experiences appraise reflection-in-action as markedly different to 
and distinct from their experience of reflection-on-action and positive for professional 
practice, this must lead the direction of Narrating to follow, taking me to a broader 
exploration of Schön’s work beyond his most typically and frequently cited sources (The 
Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think In Action, 1983, and, Educating The 
Reflective Practitioner, 1987). 
From sight of his body of work (via Newman & van der Waarde, 2018) Schön’s early focus 
was technology, industry, innovation and change, in his PhD completed in 1954.  Titled 
Rationality In Practical Decision-Making, he explored circumstances in which 
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the inquirer is presented with a situation that troubles him, calls a halt 
to action, seems to require certain transformations: the problematic 
situation [sic] (Schön, 1954:4).   
Early evidence of Schön’s Pragmatism is evident in his description of those “troubling” 
times – or “exceptions” of practice: he writes that practitioners do not draw on “practical 
criticism”, i.e. comparison of their practice with the “givens” of their profession (1954:2), 
but engage in ‘practical decision-making’, the “series of operations performed by an 
inquirer and directed toward the resolution of that situation as their goal” (ibid).  This he 
calls “rationality”, that is “conformity to those procedural principles which tend to resolve 
problematic situations” (1954:3).  In that work, then, Schön is articulating two differing 
forms of engagement but both describe practitioner deliberation on the action they have 
taken albeit with contrasting levels of agency.   
Yet 17 years later in Beyond The Stable State (1971) Schön asserts the significance of 
“existential knowledge” in a landscape that is otherwise ‘dominated’ by “the 
rational/experimental model of knowing” (1971:232).  In his application of this to 
professional practice, the last chapter of that text, he declares the absolute significance of 
what he refers to as “case history”: he writes “where we cannot establish controls we form 
judgements about ‘what has happened’ or ‘what has led to these effects’” (ibid) by 
deliberating on the situation afterward, which has clear association with what he was later 
to term ‘reflection-on-action’.  But the illustrations he provides for this are not of ‘case 
history’ reflection-on-action dissection after an event.  He writes of a teacher being aware 
of his [sic] students “growing commitment” in the learning “venture” having initially been 
‘distrusting and disinterested’, an awareness the result of “receiv[ing] a thousand little 
indications” in practice moments; and, of a “consultant to the board of a neighbourhood 
corporation” becoming aware of the members’ emerging “confidence” in him [sic] from 
noticing its “unfolding” as it unfolds (ibid).  The process involved is the practitioners 
‘watching one thing grow out of another’ (1971:233), ‘synthesising’ their ‘experience with 
theory’ (1971: 235) whilst “in the situation” [emphasis added] (1971: 236), combined with 
their skill in “confront[ing] multiple, conflicting perspectives on the situation […] in the 
interpersonal here-and-now” [emphasis added] (1971: 236).  He refers to such a 
practitioner as a ‘learning agent’, someone who is “willing and able to use [themselves] as 
an informational instrument within the learning situation”, who ‘listens rather than asserts’, 
and can abide with “anxieties” and “suspend commitment to the last possible moment […] 
while it is in process” [emphasis added] (ibid).  So having introduced ‘existential knowledge’ 
but going no further, then exacerbating that lack of substantiation by returning to his 
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favoured reflection-on-action, the illustrations offer clear association with what became 
‘reflection-in-action’.   
Given the difference between his thesis of 1954 and publication of 1971 I tracked the 
evolution of Schön’s ‘learning agent’, finding that in 1963, Displacement Of Concepts, he 
explicates how a practitioner’s existing and established concepts make possible engaging 
with “received” situations but become “displaced” when they no longer work (1963:30-31) 
so instead of “static” transposition of understanding that risks inappropriate intervention, 
new concepts ‘dynamically’ (1963:41) “emerge into view” (1963:59).  It suggests a process 
that is ‘mysterious’ and ‘reductive’ (1963:59) but in actuality involves “preconscious 
sensing" and “feeling-clues” (1963:69) in the “programme for exploring the new situation” 
(1963:59).  ‘Preconscious sensing’ and ‘feeling clues’ have striking resonance with the 
percipients lived experiences of reflection-in-action.  Critical reviews of Schön’s work at the 
time challenged his proposition of this being a sufficient and adequate explanation of that 
process (e.g. Buchdahl, 1966), but in any case, it has been established that Schön did not 
take up those ideas or extend them in his writing on reflective practice and reflection-in-
action in 1983 and 1987.   
However, my research objective is to radically reclaim reflective practice by returning it 
back to or expound its roots, so this being its early lineage means it must be considered 
whilst Narrating connection with the percipients Describing of chapter 4.  Moreover, 
despite his confused articulation of reflection-in-action in the 1980s Schön picks up his 
earlier ideas in 2001.  In The Crisis Of Professional Knowledge And The Pursuit Of An 
Epistemology Of Practice he ascribes reflection-in-action as “a kind of knowing […] inherent 
in intelligent action” (2001:194) explained to be “react[ing] to the unexpected by a kind of 
on-the-spot inquiry” (2001:196) via a fast “stop-and-think” process that is “close to 
conscious awareness” (2001:198), or “smoothly embedded in performance” with “no stop-
and-think, no conscious attention to the process” (2001:198).  In either case, reflection-in-
action is a “kind of production” out of “making” (2001:199), a description that manifestly 
builds on his 1987 notion of practitioners as ‘makers of artifacts’.  Here, then, professional 
practice can be understood as created, expressive, creative, and subjective, reflection-in-
action as valid and valuable in its own right.  Again, Schön provides illustrations, and, whilst 
these are repeated from earlier works, brought together it is striking to note his articulation 
of professional practice as embodied, from tight-rope walking to jazz playing, and building a 
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gate to sports coaching.  Referring to their professional practice through the metaphor of 
‘tool’, he writes that  
to be skilful in the use of a tool is to learn to appreciate, as it were, 
directly, the qualities of the materials that we apprehend through the 
tacit sensations of the tool in our hand (2001:195).   
Thus, he is casting reflection-in-action as visceral, a sensate embodied felt experience, a 
conceptualisation that strongly resonates with reflection-in-action Described by the 
percipients.  This connects with (some) other writers on reflective practice and professional 
practice too.  Beckett (2000), and Beckett & Hager (2000), state the case for recognition of 
‘the whole person’ in professional practice and learning, and Johnson (2007:91) reminds 
that “all our meaning, all our creativity, all our knowledge is grounded in our bodily 
engagement with our environment and intrinsically shaped by it”.   
Here, then, practice decisions and interpretation of meaning may well involve or can be 
organised in the mind, but there is a process of experience inherent to and shaping this that 
is realised through the medium of the embodied practitioner.  The percipients Described 
experiences of chapter 4 clearly evidence and elucidate this.  The lesser known work of 
Schön that connects to their Descriptions does not prove their experiences in the same way 
that earlier discussion did not disprove it, however the process of Narrating connects, 
frames and gives expression to that which they Describe, i.e. Narrating is essential to 
Describing in order to complete ‘grasping the naked now’ of their lived experiences of 
reflective practice expressed during the RPRGs by ‘rescuing it from just now’ (cf. van 
Manen) through rooting it in theory.  In consequence, it is relevant to critically speculate on 
the confusion and change in Schön’s writing.  It could be considered that his focus on 
providing a new ‘epistemology of practice’ is at crux here.  Epistemology being “how human 
beings come to have knowledge of the world around them” (Blaikie, 2007:18), presupposes 
first ‘a world’, and second one’s ‘knowledge of’ it, so no matter how ‘a new epistemology’ is 
articulated it will inherently involve a gap between a situation and how one makes sense of 
it.  Accordingly, a Schönian 1980s-inspired theory of reflective practice rooted in 
epistemology would not significantly differ from any other established approach to problem 
solving in professional practice contexts.  In fact, in The New Scholarship Requires a New 
Epistemology (1995b) Schön himself points up the clash of working in institutional contexts 
dominated by “theories of knowledge […] built into [their] structures and practices” 
(1995b:np) with practice characterised as “experience, trial and error, intuition or muddling 
through”.  However, in that work his exposition of reflection-in-action involved in the latter 
concerns “restructur[ing] his understanding of the situation” [sic] by reflecting on “the 
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problem he has been trying to solve, his picture of what is going on, or the strategy of 
action he has been employing” [sic]  and “invent[ing] a new strategy of action” that “he 
tries out […] running an on-the spot experiment whose results he interprets, in turn as a 
‘solution’” [sic] (ibid).  Whilst it would have been interesting to hear more about his notion 
of ‘running on the spot experimenting’, his focus remains on “reflecting on reflection-in-
action” [emphasis added] (ibid).   
Yet, in The Reflective Practitioner Schön writes that it might be possible to develop 
understanding of “reflection-in-action [as] rigorous in its own right”, referring to “the art of 
practice in uncertainty and uniqueness” as potentially holding the key (1983:69).  Implicit in 
this, then, is emphasis on reflection-in-action process not problem solving, and the nature 
of social reality rather than knowing, in other words, ontology rather than epistemology, 
but tied as he is by his epistemological endeavour this does not follow through.  One can 
also consider that his epistemological tie will be compounded by his Pragmatism.  Although 
Pragmatism recognises knowledge as something that changes over time, it takes the view 
that the best way to construct it will depend on what kind of knowledge is required, 
therefore overarching attention on outcome (Denscombe, 2010).   
Thus, although Schön is expressly attempting a new theory concerning practitioner 
processes, by default its emphasis will be on product, on what needs to be done to reach 
certain solutions; and, although his ‘new epistemology’ (Schön, 1983; 1992; 1995a) strives 
to articulate a process of reflection-in-action, his theory is based in outcome achievement.  
Nevertheless, following the percipients lead in their Describing of reflection-in-action as 
visceral, sensate, embodied fleeting felt experience, an argument can be made for a radical 
re-examination of reflective practice to return it to its roots by picking up and developing 
his pre-83 and post 2001 convictions.  Indeed, in The Crisis Of Professional Knowledge And 
The Pursuit Of An Epistemology Of Practice (2001) Schön marks out as troublesome the 
linear association of reflective practice with putting ones practice into words and the 
cognitive processes this involves, essentially an invitation to theorise it otherwise.   
To do so calls for a full and deep Narration of the Described percipients reflection-in-action.  
The first aspects of this to surface in chapter 4 were play, creativity and imagination, so 





2.1 Play, creativity and imagination 
The percipients Describing of play, creativity and imagination throws into sharp relief the 
slow incremental violence of being ‘broken in’ to current practices and understanding of 
reflective practice.  Its Narration could offer passage to a more visceral, sensate embodied 
felt experience of practice. 
In the exposition of Professional Practice: Connected Practice, play, defined as possibilities 
created in the moment without a predicted or intended goal (cf. Bell; Bateson & Martin; 
Gordon), and playfulness, a mood, mind and embodied state (cf. Bateson & Martin), were 
expressed as core to Performance and central to the ‘artistry of imaginative, inventive and 
creative practices’ (Key, 2013:186).  ‘Performance’ itself was conceptualised as ‘provisional, 
in-process, existing and changing over time […] marking identities, bending and remaking 
time, adorning and reshaping the body, telling stories’ (Schechner, 1998:361), with 
emphasis given to kinesis, “breaking and remaking […] movement, motion, fluidity, 
fluctuation, all those restless energies that transgress boundaries and trouble closure” 
(Conquergood, 1995:138 cited in Bell, 2008:13).  In fact, like Key, Clark’s (1995:576) 
contention is the “discipline” of practice is ‘creativity and imagination’ [emphasis added].   
Firstly, it was the percipients’ ‘playful play’ (cf. Bateson & Martin) with creative engagement 
that brought life to a radical reflective practice: play and creativity gave space, even 
permission, to disrupt the traditional epistemology and practices of reflective practice.  
Percipients played with reflective practice, experiencing that in different ways, but it 
created shared methods, distinctive activities and playful engagement as a general 
approach.  In this way, lightness and playful “spirit [was] a catalyst for inventiveness, 
attentiveness and openness in thinking and practice” (Warren, 2013:2630) enabling rich 
dialogue about the ‘in common’ regardless of and separate to outcome, so about the 
experience of process rather than the product of current configurations of reflective 
practice.   They/we played with ways to capture individual and shared ‘all-about-ness’ of 
experiences, by  
• recreating the felt sense of embodied experiences in modelling clay;  
• experimenting with digital recordings and photographs, and collecting abstract 
doodles, as ‘scraps’ in the fleeting moments of practices;  
 
• collecting artefacts that symbolised and signified feelings in the moment; and  
• participating in activities, including Sound Walks, contemplation of given and found 




The purpose was to cut away from preoccupation with traditional and typical forms of 
domestication and domesticated activities plus the associated impact and driver of 
‘audience’, and to do this with others, a playful collective and collaborative endeavour 
within dialogue, this being very different to the typical isolated and isolating mainstream 
practices such as diary keeping.  James & Brookfield (2014:xiii) write of the power of playful 
activities being to “jolt ourselves, and students, out of our normal and routine ways of 
understanding and practicing”.  It contrasts sharply with Captured and Curated current 
practices and understanding of reflective practice, which, to use percipients words, has ‘lost 
its soul’, this being “buried beneath a raft” of technical-rational practices (McIntosh, 
2013:5) in The Trappings higher education and professional practice.   
Secondly, in Describing their playful experiences of reflection-in-action the percipients use 
the word Glance, and contrast this with the Gaze of typical practices of reflective practice.  
So, where the Gaze of reflection-on-action pins down and fossilises knowledge, the fleeting 
quality and interruption of Glance is playful and invites creative and imaginative 
engagement.  Schön’s reflective practice was not meant as skills that practitioners should 
develop – which impels assessment as to whether and how much they have developed 
when embedded in higher education programmes.  It concerned what practitioners do as 
part of their professional artistry, and what the percipients Describe they do is engage in 
the fast flowing, messiness of professional practice.  They contrast the nature and quality of 
this with ‘having a plan or a list’, the former being the aporic complexity and messiness of 
professional practice, the latter likened to professional practice as if ‘shopping’, the 
following of pro forma and instruction of how to engage in current practices of reflective 
practice.  Introduced through Heidegger in chapter 4, Burbules (2002:172) refers to Plato’s 
aporia, the moment when a ‘misconception has been exposed, stripped away’ such that ‘a 
clean terrain now exists for the reconstruction of knowledge’.  If something is known it is 
epistemic, the aporic moment dissolved; therefore aporia is ontological.  Thus, play, 
creativity and imagination lend to aporic engagement.  The percipients lived experiences of 
reflection-in-action concern being, not knowing; and whilst mainstream theory and 
understanding of reflective practice extolls being it does so through the slow and 
incremental violence of ‘breaking’ practitioners ‘in’ to practices that they must adopt and 
adhere, a rhetoric of being but a reality of knowing.  Before an in-depth Narration of Glance 




The fundamental action of the RPRG process was of the percipients being “active”, defined 
by McIntosh (2013:6) as 
not being fed information [but] actively exploring a subject; 
deconstructing and re-constructing it as they dialogue and reflect upon 
these dialogues as professionals and professionals in the making. 
The intersection of social science and the arts was instrumental in this, its liminoid space 
oiling opportunity to ‘create, co-create, and pause’ (McIntosh, 2013:6), to engage in the 
powerful interruption and disruption of traditional epistemology and practices.  It provided 
‘new possibilities to stitch, weave and knot narratives and transformations in a creative 
way” (Lee McCartney, 2015:141), giving space to McWilliam’s (2009) “meddling” and Puwar 
& Sharma’s (2012:44) “becoming otherwise” through “unexpected combinations”.  Indeed, 
Biesta & Anders Säfström’s (2011:540) Manifesto For Education argues that “what makes 
education educational” is “freedom”, not containment and control.  ‘Freedom’ might infer 
anything goes dependent on whims of fancy and fantasy, which was not the case in the 
RPRGs and neither, as New Internationalism points up, is it for The Trappings of 
professional practice - nor those of higher education frameworks.  Faced with any path 
dependent on whim could also result in experiencing impasse and paralysis not action 
(Burbules, 2002), and percipient Sadie’s ‘black pit’ jumps to mind here.  But, by ‘freedom’ 
Biesta & Anders Säfström mean adopting one’s own “authority”, in our terms, as creator, so 
“adopting […] an orientation towards freedom” (2011:540) that is “found in the tension 
between ‘what is’ and ‘what is not’” (2011:541), therefore not in compliance with being 
domesticated and ‘broken in’ to Identify-Of, reflective practices that impose what is and 
what isn’t.  It is orientation to the spaces between, of dancing the line of no choice and 
endless choices, a process that enables something other or more than cognition alone, one 
that invites and includes messy, rich, complex experience.  It is a dynamic that  
concerns the way in which ‘what is’ is interrupted by an element that is 
radically new rather than a repetition of what already exists. This 
interruption – which can be called ‘dissensus’ – is the place where 
subjectivity ‘comes into the world’ (Biesta & Anders Säfström, 
2011:541), 
‘interruption’ being a word the percipients themselves used when Describing Glance.  
In sum, then, the nature of ‘playful play’ that facilitated and supported this interruption 
was the percipients individual and collective authority as embodied creators, their authority 
to dance the lines of ‘what is and what isn’t, and this without fear of judgement, in the 
liminoid space of social science and arts, this, then, being relevant to a radical reflective 
practice.   
190 
 
However, it begs the question where this fits in employer demands for “technically 
proficient workers” (McIntosh, 2013:3), i.e. the relevance of a social science/arts 
opportunity and a subjective individual and collective lived experience that encourages 
play, creativity and imagination in professional practice within a New Institutionalist 
analysis suffused as it is by The Trappings.  Student employability is a “contentious concept” 
(Harvey, 2003:3), but even in that debate is agreement of employers needing graduates 
who can “‘get up to speed’ quickly” (2003:6), and, significant to our purposes, according to 
Harvey (2003) and Emery (1997) this does not involve being able to engage in play, 
creativity and imagination.  These are not identified within the employer-determined 
graduate skills gap nor (typically) recognised as a necessary element in preparing for work 
during higher education because as McIntosh (2013:3) contends, higher education is as 
much “embedded in the consumerist economy […] as any other industry in the public or 
private sector”.  Therefore,   
At university, it is all too easy for a learner’s spirit of enquiry, playful 
experimentation and curiosity to be stifled by a misplaced perception 
that ‘student engagement’ and ‘student satisfaction’ will only be 
achieved if courses are delivered in certain unplayful ways (Lucas, 
2019:vii). 
Here, then, the “traditional educational paradigm” (Emery, 1997:232) of adult learning has 
shown a “remarkable ability” to resist change, even in the face of challenge from research 
(1997:230).  It is a 200+ year-old epistemology that views subjective experiences of 
individuals as “treacherous, unstable material from which knowledge must be processed” 
(1997:233-234) and shared perceptions as only valid when defined as such by those with 
appropriate authority, so, individuals recognised as accomplished in “the accumulation of 
tried and true associations” as a result of “intellectual processes of abstraction and logical 
inference” (1997:234).  This is not to argue that all in higher education reinforce such a 
paradigm, and indeed resistance/difference comes from authors already mentioned in that 
regard in this thesis.  However, it is salient to note the extent to which Emery’s point both 
articulates and emulates the percipients Descriptions of mainstream reflective practice in 
higher education programmes, their ‘treacherous unstable’ experiences needing to be 
trawled for knowledge to process, this being determined by externally defined methods as 
well as the particular knowledge outcomes, these defined by those in ‘authority’.  To use 
the words of Emery, it is a process that ensures “garbage does not enter the system” 
(1997:234), i.e. "fitful, random individual experiences” (1997:235) are not valued because 
“the path to knowledge is the memorization of established associations and the knowledge 
of the rules of classification and the logic of implication”.   
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A final aspect to consider is that unlike play, creativity and imagination, this imposed ‘path 
to knowledge’ is time dependent: i.e. 
The right time for teaching B is when A has been learnt. C can be taught 
only when B has been learnt. The disciplined student accepts that the 
appropriate time for studying is that laid down by the curriculum, which 
in turn is presumed to be dictated by the nature of the socially 
accumulated body of knowledge (ibid). 
Successful progress is measured through staged tests of that memory for which literacy is 
sovereign given its ability to “pin down” learning and ‘report’ it to those in authority 
(1997:236).  Again, it is striking to ‘hear’ the percipients lived experiences in Emery’s quote, 
their preoccupation with time as a theme in the RPRGs.  In sum, “all must be taught to 
distrust their personal experience as a guide to knowledge” (ibid) and trust those who gate-
keep what, when, and how learning can happen and the boundaries of success in that 
endeavour.  The aim of this epistemology can thus be appreciated as ‘production’ of “the 
critical, disciplined and literate mind” (ibid), so cognitive functioning that successfully 
performs compliance with, and adherence to, these requirements.  More recently Simmer-
Brown (2011:107) has written about the power of this “third-person” focus in engendering 
critical thinking.  Less brutal in argument she observes how it works to “assur[e] fairness, 
respect, personal privacy and objectively determined standards of academic excellence as 
the benchmarks in higher education” but to the marked loss of, and detriment to, “first-
person” understanding of one’s own experiences.   
Resonance with percipient experiences of current practices of reflective practice is striking - 
and what stands out in this Narrating is the absence, indeed mistrust, of play, creativity and 
imagination.  Where, then is Narrating that connects to the percipients valuing of playful 
play, creativity and imagination in relation to reflection-in-action?  
Play, creativity and imagination find accord with an alternative employability paradigm and 
discourse, one of practitioners as responsive, innovative learners, life-long (rather than 
time-dependent) and autonomous (rather than authority dependent) (Störmer et al, 2014; 
Barnett, 2008), all of which involve key skills and qualities associated with first-hand 
experience of, and confidence in, playful play (Bateson & Martin, 2013; McIntosh, 2013; 
James & Brookfield, 2014).  For James, play is not “the marginalised stuff you do when all 
the grown-up business has been attended to” (2019a:13-14).  She argues “we need to play 
[…] because play makes us better at the complex, challenging, horizon-stretching work” 
(2019a:14), indeed befitting Schön’s own notion of a ‘learner agent’.  In such a paradigm, 
practitioners are understood as already and always “quite efficient learners” who ‘learn on 
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their own terms rather than in response to what they might be told’, a paradigm cast in 
heutagogy (Hase & Kenyon, 2003:1).   
The tension between the two perspectives aside, they are referred to as ‘mode 1’, 
“conventional academic propositional knowledge” (Barnett, 2009:431) and ‘mode 2’ 
‘creative, imaginative knowledge production and use in situ’ (Barnett, 2004:251), or as 
above, ‘third person’ and ‘first person’ respectively (cf. Simmer-Brown).  Like Simmer-
Brown, Barnett asserts dominance of the former in higher education.  Consequently, he 
asks 
By what pedagogical processes might a student – whose initial state of 
understanding might be rudimentary or even opinionated – be brought 
into a state of forming well-founded claims about the world? (2004:251). 
However, he argues that adopting a singular focus based solely on “driving up mode 2 
knowledge as especially important” is ‘unduly simplistic’ (2009:431).  His emphasis is on 
“the process of coming to know” (2009:433) [emphasis added], so, “neither knowledge or 
skills but being” [emphasis added] (2004:259) and the “formation of [that] authentic being” 
(ibid) through specific learning “dispositions” and their “manifestations” in expression of 
individually flavoured “qualities” (2009:433).  In that always-process-of-being, creativity 
and imagination are critical (Barnett, 2013). 
Yet, finally in this aspect of Narrating it must be remembered that the aim of this research 
is to have catalytic validity (cf. Lather) in the facilitation of reflective practice in higher 
education programmes, but a playful, creative approach to reflective and professional 
practice as a process of being within a heutagogical paradigm does not sit easily within 
higher education’s constituent of assessment (Moore, 2004).  In our terms, it is once more 
preoccupation with, and dominance of, epistemology over and to the loss of ontology 
(Dall’Alba, 2009; Barnett, 2008; Moore, 2004).  However, the percipients Described their 
experiences of the freezing impact of assessment on reflective practice.  With the focus of 
mainstream understanding and practice of reflective practice being self and practice control 
and development, what should be produced becomes more easily assessable when it is 
based solely in the critical thinking of reflection-on-action, or, in Barnett and Simmer-Brown 
terms, when Mode 1/third-person and Mode 2/first-person inquiry and expression are 
conflated as if one and the same.  It is a fact not lost on the percipients when they share 
how it makes reflective practice much easier for their lecturers to mark, and in this way 
reflective practice is reduced to/has become a set of expectations about the way one is to 
think/be seen to think about ones practice, controlled by those in authority, a performed 
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‘development’ that is time dependent and pinned down in ways that enable its reporting 
for judgement of success.  It is not concerned with the facilitation and support of play, 
creativity and imagination that was so critical to percipients individual and collective 
authority as embodied creators, to facilitation of their authority to dance the lines of ‘what 
is and what isn’t’ without fear of judgement.   
More specific Narrating of how play, creativity and imagination can be included and 
facilitated as part of reflective practice will not be needed in this thesis given that the work 
of those referred to identify activities which could be considered for their fit in higher 
education and indeed I introduced my own to the RPRGs which can be repeated.  So 
instead, focus will turn to the percipients Describing of reflection-in-action illuminated 
through Glance, the second theme arising from chapter 4. 
3 Glance (reflection-in-action) 
As tracked in chapter 4, the emergence of Glance as a “handle” (Gendlin, 1962:32) to the 
felt sense of reflection-in-action speaks from within it and creates a shift in understanding 
as a result, a ‘threshold concept’ that enabled a reimagining of reflective practice.   
Glance is a concept that names and conveys the brief interruption in practice, the fleeting 
paying attention to a moment; Glance is both ‘the moment’ and how one works with and 
processes that moment.  Glance is taking in all one’s senses at that moment, letting the 
experience wash over whilst noticing at the same time.  It has the quality of a click brought 
on through that pause, interruption; freezing of time in the moment, a slow moment, a ‘hey 
this is where everything is’, your head, body and feelings in that moment.  It is quick, watch, 
pay attention, that brings attention fleetingly to embodied knowing.  It is ‘that thing that 
changes you’, so ‘that moment, that feeling’ via moving ones focus in and then out.  Glance 
is therefore the skill and art of attending, tuning in, tracking, trusting the 
experience/process of having no path, working with sense, capturing, ‘getting at’ the whole 
of a moment.  It is embodied and involves memory in the body.   
In Narrating Glance it is fascinating to note the strong connection of this with Casey’s 
(2007) phenomenology and philosophy of The World At A Glance.  Initially I came across his 
publication by title alone but he describes glance (not capitalised to distinguish it from that 
of the percipients) as something that 
happens by actions of leaping from the zone of the familiar to the very 
edges of the unfamiliar, all the time while taking in the intermediate 
stretches, and then leaping back again (2007:xii).   
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Further, it can be considered as a “theory of moments”, i.e. “significant times when existing 
orthodoxies are open to challenge, when things have the potential to be overturned or 
radically altered” (Elden, 2004:x), Glance likened in concept and process to a “blink of an 
eye […] a gateway where past and future collide” (ibid).  Glance resonates with North 
Whitehead’s ‘withness of the body’ of chapter 1, his portrayal of the body as a chain of 
“transmission” of experiences “inherited” (1929/1978:312) and “enacted” (1929/1978:237) 
with “vector character”, this meaning ‘emotion, purpose, valuation and causation’ through 
a “concrescence of prehensions” (1929/1978:35), a ‘growing’ into something ‘concrete’, 
enabling ‘grasp’ (1929/1978:166).  The ‘withness of the body’ is, in his words from chapter 
1, the “becoming of experience” (ibid).  Thus, it is clear, the percipient concept and practice 
of Glance is about a different kind of engagement in reflective practice, one that is fit for 
purpose in relation to the fast, dynamic “entangled relationalities” (Barad, 2010:264) of 
professional practice in chapter 2.   
In Narrating Glance, connection can also be found in Greene’s (1978:165) articulation of 
engagement in ‘learning landscapes’ that take the form of  
an active attention […] to life in its multiple phases, not the kind of 
passive attention in which one sits and stares – not the kind of focalised 
attention that permits one only to see the track ahead of one.   
It is about messy, rich, experience emerging from and within the ‘entangled’ complexity of 
professional practice, a fleeting Glance in flow rather than a retrospective singular isolated 
act.  Glance is noticing “threads of past, present and future” (Lee McCartney, 2015:141) as 
embodied in the percipients ‘head, body and feelings’, thus in the “context of a body 
sustained over time” (2015:139) as coalesced in a moment.  Thus, Glances “create multiple 
entry points for stories of self and multiple renderings of [ones] experiences” (2015:143).  
So, with professional practice as repetition of the familiar and improvisation, Glance is 
essential in its moment of space and the opportunity to be “altered by these spaces” (Lee 
McCartney, 2015:143). 
In sum, Glance is a “moment of eccentricity” in its position as “outside” the traditional and 
typical “realm of what counts as learning” (Sierk 2014:140).  Where currently the discourse 
and climate of higher education emphasises Mode 1/third person fixing, predicting and 
evidencing, or “getting a grip” (Willis, 1999:98), reflective practice has come to work “as a 
kind of sheepdog” (1999:99) to that end.  It too concerns ‘analysis, categorising, 
generalising and disseminating between things or the grouping of things’ (ibid) in the 
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production of accounts of practice made of “dull moments that tend to blur together” 
(Sierk, 2014:140).  Conversely, in Glance  
The mind does not ‘seize upon’ the object to analyse and subdue it but 
attempts to behold it, to allow its reality, its beauty and its texture to 
become more and more present (Willis, 1999:99). 
Glance is ‘returning anew’, “to go back or come back again […] in a new and different form” 
(Sierk, 2014:146).  As seen from the percipients it is about “intuitive/contemplation” (Willis, 
1999:99), or, in Sierk’s (2014:140) terms, “the beauty of soulful moments”.  Casey begins 
his book (introduced above) with a call to “regain” glance in Global North paradigms and 
epistemologies that favour gaze [sic], and consider it as ‘unworthy of investigation in its 
own right’ so ‘dismiss it as inconsequential’ (2007:xii).  Indeed, Glance in our terms is 
essential,  
A scopic scout stationed at the outposts of human perceptual 
experience. It discovers whole colonies of the to-be-seen world: places 
where sight has never before been – or if it has, it now sees differently 
[…] leading it out of more staid and settled ways of looking (ibid). 
Thus in its “second of solace, a liberating leap” (Casey, 2007:xiii) Glance is a “flickering, 
ungovernable mobility [that] strikes at the very roots of rationalism” (Bryson, 1983:121).  
Indeed, Sierk (2014:145) would consider teaching and learning that does not involve Glance 
as “inauthentic and contrived”.  Here, then, Glance is “an agent of change in the midst of 
the stasis induced by established modes of seeing [and knowing] that favour gaze” (Casey, 
2007:xiv).  Casey’s work explores the phenomenology of glance in everyday life, Bryson, the 
semiotics of paintings, Sierk, the soulful moments in classroom teaching, and for the 
percipients Glance takes on life as a ‘threshold concept’ that Describes their experiences of 
reflection-in-action of reflective practice.  The connection between all these strikingly 
construe its significance and qualities. 
4 Reflection-on-action: Gaze 
Gaze is the concept through which percipients name and convey reflection-on-action, 
thereby the typical mainstream practices of reflective practices in higher education 
programmes.  Initially named as a dichotomous pole to better exemplify Glance, Gaze also 
took on life as a threshold concept.  Gaze is the process of selecting an event/interaction 
after its happening, and can be big, dramatic or small, but in any case the event is the 
trigger and Gaze is staring at it afterwards, pulling some thing/s about it apart and in detail, 
wondering if you could/should have acted differently, breaking what existed as a complex 
dynamic whole into small fixed and static pieces for analysis, and, typically, writing that 
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down and ‘bringing in’ experiences and thoughts ‘that have occurred’ to the Gazer since the 
selected event to better ‘report’ it and perform themselves in familiar, acceptable and 
expected ways.  The percipients lived experience of Gaze is therefore of being ‘broken in’ to 
its externally defined theory and practice (that is confused and contradictory), under the 
perpetual shadow of judgement from authority, thus crafting, editing, censoring, 
exaggerating, lying, embellishing, planning, rehearsing, even entirely ‘hamming’ up Gazed 
accounts of practice.   
Gaze is clearly experientially different to Glance.  It is also clearly different in relation to 
outcome, one that was Described by the percipients as not (sufficiently) supporting or 
facilitating present and future professional practice, potentially not even relating to it at all 
(particularly when its accounts are entirely made up).  This said, the percipients also 
Describe instances where Gaze could be ‘good’, that is, if it was re-imagined and re-
positioned, ‘hindsight Gaze’ where a practitioner writes an account of their practice as one 
activity, fronting up that this could be fiction, but then as a second activity deliberately 
returning to it to identify their adoption of domesticating discourses, an avenue of 
reflection on oneself as a reflective writer from which one may learn ‘something different’.  
But as it stands the percipients Describing is dominated by their current experiences of 
‘bad’ Gaze based on mainstream reflective practice, where students/practitioners tell 
themselves the same things, sing the same tune, even when they do not think that they 
are.  The percipients emphasise how Gaze contrasts with fast, fleeting Glances that make 
up their actual professional practice.  Indeed, it is for this reason that the percipients speak 
of having nothing to write about, other participants of giving reflective practice up, a clear 
indication of the extent to which professional artistry, professional practice, and reflective 
practice are disconnected. 
In Narrating Gaze again the liminoid space between the arts and social science proves 
fruitful.   In his book Vision and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze, Bryson (1983:94) refers to 
the colloquial meaning of gaze as “prolonged, contemplative, yet regarding the field of 
vision with a certain aloofness and disengagement, across a tranquil interval”.  His assertion 
“the gaze [is] victorious over the glance” (1983:95) foreshadows the same argument made 
by Casey some 20 years later.  For Bryson, gaze creates ‘fissures’: the viewer fixes on one 
something at a time as if “confronting a new scene, one which has broken free of its 
sequence” which is ‘viewed in isolation” (1983:98).  So, in our terms, Gaze (capitalised) 
encourages and facilitates a “particular narrative segment, a segment that less and less 
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implies the original circle from which it is taken” (ibid) and therefore less and less the rich 
complex multidimensional professional practice elucidated in Connected Practice: 
Professional Practice.  Gaze concerns “distancing and disengagement” (Craig, 2012:27), 
which, for reflective practice produces depleted, flat, reduced outcomes and cynical, 
inauthentic, doubtful and frustrated, engagement.  Narrating Gaze by identifying and 
exploring its connections in social science and arts literature has a surprising fit with the 
percipient Descriptions of their lived experiences of established, mainstream practices and 
understanding of reflective practice.  
Continuing this Narrating prompts reference to Foucault.  He tracks 17th century publicly 
displayed punishment of some individuals with the aim to frighten all into a ‘good way of 
life’ via introjection of surveillance, applied to contemporary analysis of a compliant 
citizenship who go about their everyday life in the shadow of a controlling, judging, invisible 
audience which he likens to the enclosing function of a “dungeon” (1975/1977:200).  His 
contention is that we are both victims of surveillance and introject its control to enact it on 
ourselves and others, Narrating that lends appreciation of Gaze as enclosure via 
introjection of control that forces performance to be curated such that the narrow accounts 
of professional practice display required behaviours and meet certain expectations.  
Narrating Gaze also finds accord with feminist theory in its critique of male objectification 
and voyeurism.  Here Gaze: 
demands a story, depends on making something happen, forcing a 
change in another person, a battle of will and strength, victory/defeat, 
all occurring in a linear time with a beginning and an end (Mulvey, 
1992:29).   
It is a description that has striking resonance with percipients experiences of objectifying 
their practice as if voyeurs to it as they perform ‘reflective practice’ in the accepted 
mainstream narratives, an aloofness from messy experience, and demand of a tidy story, 
accounted for and objectified into constituent parts, through a lens of needing to do (not 
be) be better/different/else.  From both a Foucauldian and feminist analysis, activities 
associated with Gaze close possibilities and align focus through to what, and how, to 
reflect.   
4.1 Gaze with Arendt 
Thinking with Arendt offers a frame for all this, not in terms of her full focus on 
totalitarianism but the practices of politics on the human condition.  Her assertion is that 
focus on ‘individual behaviour and individuality’ (Arendt, 1958:41) has come to dominate 
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Global North society, and, like Foucault, argues it creates a “conformable body politic” 
(1958:49).  It is a view that resonates with the percipients Describing: maintenance of a 
‘conformable body politic’ is dependent on student/practitioners “remaining restricted” 
[emphasis added] (1958:49).  More specifically, in our terms, Arendt argues that “reflective 
judgement descends from the particular to the universal […] without any overall rules” 
(Arendt, 1971: 69), which means (and makes) “the quest for meaning is meaningless” 
(1971:59).  But travelled out as if there are rules means any conclusions a practitioner 
reaches from engagement in reflective practice can only be merely “laws from and to itself” 
pronounced in diaries-as-artefacts in the form of “there we are, no questions asked” 
(1971:59).  Further, “since it is always the same person whose mind thinks, wills and judges, 
the autonomous nature of these activities [creates] great difficulties” (1971:70), an 
observation that further accentuates the effect of isolated, individual diarying of reflection-
on-action.  As a result, extending argument of chapter 3 that anything more meaningful 
would be kept secret (cf. Issit in O’Reilly et al), Arendt attests that as a result any semblance 
of ‘action’ becomes banished to “the sphere of the intimate and the private”.  
Consequently, any professional practice and organisation problems become individualised, 
a student/practitioner’s own faulty “general humanistic development” (1958:49), requiring 
their personal change rather than change in “the world they move in” (1958:49).  Each 
person as a “newcomer” (in terms of natality) “possesses the capacity of […] acting” 
[emphasis added] (1958:9) in the potential of ‘radical unpredictability’ (Canovan, 1992:132) 
and expression of uniqueness and distinctiveness (Arendt, 1958:176), but, in our terms, in a 
context of being ‘broken in’ and its need for stability such capacity and action is “positively 
dangerous” (Canovan, 1992:132).   
Narrating through Arendt lends insight into the appropriation of reflective practice.  After 
all, Schön’s (2001:186) starting point was professional artistry, which he emphasises is “not 
reducible to the exercise of describable routines” [emphasis added], even though, for all 
the reasons and in all the ways identified, it has become exactly that, her argument 
illuminating process and impact.  As Clark (1999:5) observes, the brain, i.e. “the physical 
medium of cognition”, has become inextricably linked to being, and therefore development 
and control of being dominates and becomes focused on “computational/information-
processing” alone (1999:6).  Consequently we become “prone to the illusion that we 
constantly command a rich inner representation” (1999:9) of everything around us when 
actually, as Curated, our perceptual framework is restrictive, narrow and flawed.  Therefore 
“we must abandon the image of ourselves as essentially disembodied reasoning engines” 
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(1999:14), a view that chimes with Arendt, and instead “develop analytic and explanatory 
strategies that better reflect and accommodate [our] dense interanimation” (1999:15). 
4.2 Reimagining Gaze 
However, as Described, the percipients point up that Gaze can be re-imagined and re-
positioned as positive for practice: reflecting via ‘the relative tranquillity of a post mortem’ 
can have advantages.  Plus, it would be unnecessarily dogmatic to dismiss reflection-on-
practice altogether, because to do so would involve insisting on adoption of a particular 
(albeit different) kind of reflective practice, a ‘breaking in’ already illuminated as 
problematic.  The percipients Describe ‘good’ ‘hindsight Gaze’, and it has been argued that  
Gaze has a part to play in professional practice if it is understood for what it is, in its 
limitations, narrowness and partiality, which by itself contributes to the reclaiming and 
reimagining of reflective practice. 
Continuing that line of argument, it follows that where theory, practice, facilitators and 
organisations/professions mean reflection-on-action it should be referred to as such, a 
clarity of expectation and intention otherwise hidden by the generic label of reflective 
practice.  In accordance with the percipients ‘good hindsight Gaze’ it also follows that 
reflection-on-action will benefit from its purpose being emphasised as development of 
critical thinking in adult learning with professional practice as stimulus.  Explained in 
chapter 1, critical thinking concerns an individual ‘converting’ (Dewey, 1993/2008:125) 
their fast, dynamic, rich, complex, multi-layered, multi-dimensional and ‘entangled’ (cf. 
Barad) experience into control by moving it into the “the best thinking [s/he is] capable of 
in any set of circumstances” (Paul & Elder, 2001:xii), an analysis with striking attunement to 
the Captured, Curated and Described reflection-on-action in this thesis. 
Narrating this more transparent and clearly defined reflection-on-action, Paul & Elder’s 
iconic work proves essential.  They differentiate between “high quality thinking” that “does 
the job set for it”, whilst that which “lacks a purpose […] is aimless”.  ‘Aimless thinking’ 
might stumble by “chance” on something that is of “value to the thinker. But more often it 
will simply wander into an endless stream of unanalyzed associations from one's 
unanalyzed past” [sic] (Paul & Elder, 2006a:34).  The authors refer to this as “shoddy” (Paul 
& Elder, 2006b:4), “bad thinking” (Elder & Paul, 2013:34) that is “left to itself”, therefore 
“biased, distorted, partial, uninformed or down-right prejudiced” (Paul & Elder, 2006b:4) 
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being based as it is in “personal agendas, interests, and values. People typically see things 
as they want to and twist reality to fit preconceived ideas” (Elder & Paul, 2013:34).    
In contrast, ‘high quality’, or critical thinking, is “sound” (Paul & Elder, 2001:xii) “excellent 
thinking” (Elder & Paul, 2013:4), the “disciplined art of ensuring that you use the best 
thinking you are capable of in any set of circumstances” (Paul & Elder, 2001:xii).  It is guided 
through ‘learning to write’ strategies set out by the authors and is assessable via its 
specified standards: 
standards for thought; standards that guide us to consistently excellent 
thinking; and standards we can count on to keep our thinking on track, 
to help us mirror in our minds what is happening in reality, to reveal the 
truth in situations, and to enable us to determine how best to live our 
lives (Elder & Paul, 2013:34). 
Their notion of critical thinking (and its aimless alternative) has a striking similarity to 
mainstream theory and rhetoric regarding reflective practice/reflection-on-action as 
Started, Captured and Curated in this thesis.  More crucially, their work contributes to its 
re-imagination.  To illustrate, their ‘standards’ of critical thinking comprise intellect (clarity, 
accuracy, precision, relevance, depth, breadth, logic, significance, fairness), and reasoning 
(questioning issues/problems, implications, consequences, points of view/frame of 
reference, assumptions, inferences).  “Explicitly mastering” these standards (Elder & Paul, 
2013:35) enables “commanding the quality of one's life and, more generally, to creating 
societies that genuinely value critical thinking” (2013:34), all of which being entirely in-
keeping with the requirements of reflection-on-action and indeed, graduateness defined in 
the Preface.  It would therefore be relevant - in fact significantly appropriate, useful and 
ethical - for reflection-on-action to explicitly and expressly refer to and assess critical 
thinking, leaving reflection-in-action to be a celebration of Glance.  In addition, the 
percipients ‘good hindsight Gaze’ involves deliberately and purposefully returning to 
written accounts of practice to identify the ways in which they have adopted and adhered 
to domesticating discourses. 
This reimagined reflection-on-action contributes to a reclamation of reflective practice as 
“multileveled awareness, multifold openness and appreciative curiosity” (Ebehart & Atkins, 





5 Glance (reflection-in-action), Described through improvisation, mindfulness, and, 
embodied knowing 
The Gaze of (un-reclaimed) mainstream reflection-on-action has been characterised 
through a technical-rational ‘plug and chug, cram and flush’ (cf. Bella) engineering science 
paradigm, yet it must be considered that meeting externally determined standards by 
producing favourable evidence has a place in higher education.  After all, as Race (2014:80) 
remarks, not all learning can or needs to be “deep”.  It also has a place in professional 
education in the social professions as articulated by The Trappings.  But it is not obvious 
how this would facilitate this re-imagined Gaze and the new Glance of reflective practice.  
Not only does ‘plug, chug, cram, flush’ not match the percipients experience of play, 
creativity and imagination that is part of reflection-in-action, it does not fit the nature of 
Glance Described in terms of ‘improvisation’, ‘mindfulness’ and ‘embodied knowing’.  
Therefore, having Narrated the reimagining of Gaze, attention now returns to Glance to 
explore these elements.   
5.1 Improvisation 
Improvisation was scoped in the discipline of professional practice via the heuristic tool 
Connected Practice: Professional Practice.  Indeed, it was noted that Schechner (2013) links 
improvisation to play, connection to earlier Narration of play as part of reflection-in-action.  
Lobman & Lundquist (2007:2) also link play and improvisation in their contention that 
“while people often live their lives as if there is a script, the fact is [they] are also capable of 
breaking from the expected”, a view that has resonance with the percipient Description 
(and now Narration) of Glance.   
It also connects with theory related to kinesic performance of professional practice (cf. 
Conquergood).  In chapter 2 it was noted that improvised practice does not just happen: it 
requires a practitioner to ‘carve out space for it, to produce it’ (Peters, 2005:305), in itself 
Narration that accords with percipient Descriptions of needing to create ‘moments’.  It also 
has resonance with their request for ‘instruction, guidance and lessons’ that will support 
them in the art of ‘creating on the fly’ (cf. Smith) that is central to their Glance of reflective 
practice and therefore their professional practice.  Lobman & Lundquist (2007:3) explicitly 
draw on the arts for their facilitative activities, and this in context of the “ensemble”, that 
is, through collaborative, creative work in groups, so not the individual isolated focus 
typical of mainstream reflective practice, and through experiential immersion, not 
deliberation after an event.  Here, then, by following the percipient lead, reflective practice 
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would do well to engage in – and can explore – the creative improvisation of professional 
practice by facilitating the deliberate and conscious facilitation of improvisation.  Indeed, 
Harris (2014:659) reminds that Schön refers to improvisation in professional settings, 
relating this to Schön’s expertise as a jazz clarinettist.  Exploring this, in his 2001 work Schön 
specifically uses jazz music improvisation as an example of and metaphor for professional 
artistry, describing it as an “invention” (2001:199) that it is “organised [collectively] around 
an underlying structure, a shared schema of meter, melody and harmony that gives the 
piece a predictable order”.  This is interwoven with ‘musical figures and variation’ of 
individual ‘players’, that are ‘combined and recombined’ as they “[feel] the direction in 
which the music is developing, out of their interwoven contributions, […] make new sense 
out of it and adjust their performance to the sense they make” (ibid).  Harris, a musician as 
well as lecturer, taught and assessed improvisation in jazz playing in higher education music 
colleges, more recently applying that to teach and assess improvisation in higher education 
social professional education.  Therefore, in my Narrating there is no need to articulate how 
deliberate and conscious improvisation can be part of the facilitation of Glance.  The ideas 
and activities of Harris, Lobman & Lundquist, and Peters (for example) can do that work.   
5.2           Mindfulness  
Alongside improvisation, the percipients Describe Glance as thoughtful, slowing down, 
switching out outside influences and listening but without having a conversation with that 
in one’s head, therefore of being both in an experience and out of it, and focusing on 
breath and all the senses.  They talk specifically of ‘mindfulness’.  Connecting to relevant 
theory as part of Narrating, mindfulness is defined as  
the self-regulation of attention so that it is maintained on immediate 
experience, thereby allowing for increased recognition of mental events 
in the present moment [and] adopting a particular orientation toward 
one’s experiences in the present moment, an orientation that is 
characterised by curiosity, openness, and acceptance’ (Bishop et al, 
2004:232). 
Similarity with the percipients Glance is clear. 
Langer (1989:14) contrasts mindfulness with “mindlessness” [sic], the latter being ‘rigid’ 
reliance (1989:23) on categories, distinctions, and “acting from a single perspective” 
(1989:28), in other words, minds that read signs and then “shut like a clam and do not let in 
new signals” (1989:29).  It has resonance with the thoughtless and clichéd repetition of 
behaviours Curated in chapter 3.  Indeed, Langer explains how “fixed mindsets” (1989:33) 
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are generated from education processes dominated by an “orientation” of “outcome” 
rather than “process” (1989:45).  Thus “mindful awareness” (Smalley & Winston, 2010:1) is 
“a first-person, or subjective, methodology” [sic] (2010:3) that concerns being “‘aware of 
awareness’” (2010:1) by “cultivat[ing] abilities beyond the verbal and conceptual to include 
matters of heart, character, creativity, self-knowledge, concertation, opens and mental 
flexibility” (Lief, cited in Poitras, 2005:6), so, “an awareness or attention to present 
experience” (Smalley & Winston, 2010:3).  Bishop et al, Langer, Smalley & Winston, and 
Poitras are representative of a growing literature that supports, promotes and guides 
reflection through commitment to meditation and a compassionate approach to oneself 
and others.  Wider research evidences the positive impact of mindfulness on professional 
well-being and practice through, for example, attitude (Krasner et al, 2009), connection to 
clients/users (Hutcherson et al, 2008); self-care/reduced stress levels (Irving et al, 2009); 
and, regulation of emotions and strengthening of memory (Roberts-Wolfe et al, 2012).  
Such work accounts for the “exponential growth” of mindfulness practice in professional 
practice in the Global North (Hyland, 2017:334).   
Nevertheless, the precise meaning behind the percipients reference to ‘mindfulness’ is 
unclear; indeed, I have used the word myself in this thesis to refer to being cognizant of 
something, and it could well be that they mean the same.  In fact, conceptualisation of 
‘mindfulness’ is a moot point.  Sherrell & Simmer-Brown (2017) adopt Welwood’s (2002) 
term ‘spiritual bypassing’ to question the extent to which, if at all, it is acceptable, indeed 
ethical, to disconnect mindfulness from its Buddhist roots.  Broken off by and subsumed 
into Global North epistemology of control, the interconnectedness and interdependence of 
mindfulness becomes ‘refashioned’ (Purser, 2015:23) into promotion of individualisation, 
and appropriated as a “therapeutic form of self-help and self-care” (2015:33).  This applied 
to professional contexts becomes a vehicle through which 
Workers can labor longer hours without needing breaks; employees are 
more productive; students will have fewer behavioural issues. Emotions 
will be cooler and more manageable, and classrooms and workplaces 
will be more harmonious and manageable [sic] (Sherrell & Simmer-
Brown, 2017:76), 
an argument that reinforces critique from percipient experiences of current practices and 
understanding of reflective practice.  Like mainstream reflective practice, this version of 
mindfulness resides in assumptions that individuals have “full control and agency for their 
own emotional reactivity” and “thoughts”, that they can “decenter from the contents of 
their experience”, and, therefore that they are “fully responsible” for their own 
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betterment.  As a result, any “misery”, “suffering” and poor professional practice is 
“entirely self-made”, the result of an individual’s own lack of “motivation” and “willpower” 
(Purser, 2015:35), so mindfulness provides the way to “self-regulation, self-management, 
self-acceptance, and self-control” (ibid), resonant with earlier argument regarding reflective 
practice.  It sits within a wider debate, with, for example, Kabat-Zinn (2017), widely 
acclaimed as establishing mindfulness practice in the Global North, assuring that it “has 
always been anchored” in its original roots (2017:1126) and is “prima facie a positive […] 
and tremendous opportunity” (2017:1126), whilst others, such as Purser (2015), caution 
against such muddled and muddied claims.  The detail to that debate being too broad for 
this thesis, it is enough to note Sherrell & Simmer-Brown’s call for critical attention to any 
suggestion that adopting mindfulness might, in our case, be an easy answer to the puzzle of 
reflective practice.  For instance, they highlight how the Global North “mindfulness 
movement” (Sherrell & Simmer-Brown, 2017:80) obviates “marginalization, exclusion, 
separateness, and aggression” as “merely a function of […] perceptions” (2017:81), whilst 
reinforcing a ‘very limited bandwith’ of acceptable practice in terms of “be[ing] in one’s 
body, and to have voice” (2017:83).  Essentially, it is the White-washing of rich, 
multifaceted and multi-formed cultural traditions and practices.    
However, a growing number of writers sit mindfulness in a broader frame of contemplative 
pedagogy, a “form of inquiry and imaginative thinking [that] complement[s] critical 
thinking” (Bush, 2010:162), here, then, Gaze and contemplative practices that foster Mode 
2/first person “investigations” (Owen-Smith, 2018:24).  For Barzbeat & Bush (2014:viii-ix) 
contemplative pedagogy is the same endeavour “that is at the heart of all great scholarship: 
profound attentiveness to the phenomena that one is trying to understand” [emphasis 
added], i.e. that students/practitioners should “feel deeply and experience themselves 
within their education” (2014:3).  Rodgers (2002:851) discusses this in terms of presence, 
applying it to discussion and practice of reflective practice, drawing on Dewey to develop 
“six phases” through which to facilitate presence in university programmes for being and 
becoming teachers.  Subsequently, Rodgers & Raider-Roth (2006:267) beautifully craft this 
into enabling professionals to bring their “whole self to full attention so as to perceive what 
is happening in the moment”.   
By this Narrating of mindfulness I am not suggesting that the percipients were aware of 
these matters in their use of the word but this is the point.  Although they spoke of 
‘mindfulness’ and their Describing of it has potential association with mindfulness practise, 
it is not clear if they were conceptualising it in relation to its roots, history and purpose, or 
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as being more conscious in and of their thoughtlessness.  In similar terms, then, caution is 
required to ward against simplistic and uncritical adoption of ‘mindfulness’ as if this alone 
will provide direction for (even answer to) a re-imagined reflective practice.  Indeed, how 
mindfulness and its broader base of contemplative pedagogy is differentiated or related to 
reflective practice is typically unclear, although for Morgan (2014) the key difference is in 
the cognitive bias of mainstream emphasis on reflection-on-action.  In any case, Ergas 
(2013:4) states “we have not yet developed a rigorous conceptualisation of contemplative 
practice as pedagogy”, in our case, in its adoption in higher education to support reflective 
practice.  Even so, a broader frame of contemplative pedagogy, its scholarly underpinning, 
and its facilitation of a wider breadth of practices if in conjunction with critical awareness of 
diversity and developed through research in its possibilities and potential, appears to offer 
a promising contribution to theorising and practice of Glance - and Gaze.  The recent 
growth of interest in and literature on contemplative pedagogy lends to that task, therefore 
further extension in this regard is not developed in this thesis. 
5.3 Embodied knowing 
Having Narrated the percipients Description of improvisation and mindfulness of Glance, 
attention now turns to embodied knowing, which builds on discussion above.  Reference to 
‘mind’, ‘cognition’ and ‘thinking’ has appeared in numerous places through this thesis, 
indeed often interchangeably and without definition, a reality that typifies discussion of 
reflective practice when used there too.  For example, dominance of understanding 
concerning and practices to control the way one thinks, so reflective practice as a “state of 
mind” (Vaughn, 1990:ix) through the management of Gaze to sustain and produce this 
“proper” position (Hochschild, 2012:9) has been a strong feature in the percipients 
Descriptions.  Even play was referred to as “special a state of mind” [emphasis added] 
(Martin, 1991:35).  In terms of Glance and reflection-in-action, the percipients Describe 
‘receptiveness of mind’, expressed as ‘lightness’ and ‘patient being’ although they speak 
interchangeably about ‘mind’ and ‘head’, these being different to their ‘body, feelings, and 
soul’.  A full Narration of theory connected to all this is too broad for the scope of this 
thesis, but it is useful to call on Arendt and her differentiation of ‘thought’ with ‘cognition’, 
and Ergas for his elucidation of ‘mind’ to develop understanding.   
Briefly, for Arendt thought “has neither an end nor an aim outside of itself, and it does not 
even produce results” (1958:170), a definition that has a notable resonance with that of 
‘reflection’ in chapter 3.  She defines cognition as the  
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process by which we acquire and store up knowledge, […] always 
pursu[ing] a definite aim which can be set by practical considerations as 
well as ‘idle curiosity’, but once reached the cognitive process has come 
to an end (ibid),  
which has a striking correlation with discussion of reflection-on-action.  Ergas (2013:6-7) 
explains mind from yogic scholarship: “lower mind”, ‘related to perception’ that “gathers 
sense data, thinks and decides […] at a rather crude level”; “higher mind”, ‘intellect, reason, 
and allows insight, reflection and discrimination’; and, finally, “I-maker”, which 
“personalizes the experiences of the previous two components”.  Combining the three, 
‘mind’ encompasses the “restless flux” of “thoughts and sensations” [emphasis added] 
(2013:7).  In this context, the dominance of cognition through the ‘plug and chug’ (cf. Bella) 
technical rational approach to reflective practice is ironic.  Rather than “artful practice” of 
practitioners (Schön, 1983:19), reflective practice has been shown as a practice where it is 
presupposed one can ‘get at’ the understanding and competence of the 
practitioner through the act of representation. [...] Tacit, embodied 
understanding and competence are presumed to preserve their nature 
through the process of representation and therefore not bound in any 
significant sense to situated embodied action as such (Dohn, 2011:678). 
Change as a result of reflective practice is also assumed to be cognitive – change in the way 
one thinks about one’s practice and the assumption that this will impact on what one thinks 
when in practice.  The elevation of “cognitive, rational knowing above other forms of 
comprehension” (Brookfield, 2000: 43) (such as improvisation, mindfulness, and embodied 
knowing) have been argued as steeped in the Humanistic roots of reflective practice and 
the established therapeutic and constructivist perspective in education – and Global North 
societies - with cognition as sovereign. 
Yet the percipients Describe ‘memory stored in the body’, and felt senses captured by facial 
gestures.  They speak of the knowingness of feelings without naming them; of being 
‘flooded’, of ‘waves coming in’ and being ‘washed by’ ‘memories’; of ‘sounds and rhythms’ 
of space and place; and of embodied experiences of ‘fear’ and ‘shock’.  They draw on 
bodied metaphor, such as ‘blinkered’ in contrast to ‘keeping one’s peripheral vision alive’ to 
contrast Gaze with Glance, and ‘chewing over’ negative practice.  They Describe ‘the shape 
moods make’, of ‘getting outside of self-consciousness to get in the moment’, of 
‘breathing’, ‘noise’, ‘gut feeling’, and, ‘just being’.  Rather than domination of mind and its 
cognitive processes as the singular form of knowing and a practice that is about control, 
their knowing is embodied and bodied and the practice they Describe is about recognising 
and dwelling in not controlling this, in a moment.  Indeed, diverging from mainstream 
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reflective practice, Cowart (2005) asserts that all practice is realised through the body, 
echoing Heidegger’s (1961/1979:99) central thesis  
We do not ‘have’ a body; rather we ‘are’ bodily’. Feeling, as feeling 
oneself to be, belongs to the essence of such Being.   
Here, then, body and mind are a “tight coupling” (Cosmelli & Thompson, 2010:367) in 
contrast to the Captured, Curated and now Narrated percipient lived experiences of 
mainstream reflective practice with its preoccupation of cognition, struggling to cognitively 
grasp what is required, engaging in cognitive (flawed) processes about their professional 
practice, and then carefully constructing the re-presentation of that in diaries through 
further deliberation.  The percipients knowing through reflection-in-action paradoxically 
matches Dewey’s (1916/2011:78) concept of ‘reflective thought’ on which Schön developed 
his thesis, ‘reflective thought’ being an embodied process, in contrast to the “evil results 
which have flowed from [the] dualism of mind and body”, where the ‘wellspring of bodily 
activity’ is constructed as an “intruder”.  Here, then, separating mind and body “destroys 
the vital meaning of an experience” (1916/2011:84), yet in what was to become reflective 
practice, this is exactly what has happened.  Bodily feelings are not entirely absent: Atkins & 
Murphy (1993), for example, propose three stages to a reflective cycle, the first being 
awareness of uncomfortable feelings or thoughts, and in Schön’s (1983) original writing he 
asserts that reflection is (only) triggered by one’s surprise or realisation of breakdown in 
routine practice.  More generally, O’Neill (2009) refers to the sensing of bodied disquiet as 
a signal that something needs attention through the term ‘uncanny’ moments, which, for 
our purposes, can be understood as travelling a particular path of professional practice, 
familiar due to education, length of experience, The Trappings, and planning, but suddenly 
being thrown off, an experience of surprise, discomfort, unease, and of not knowing what 
to do.  It is an uncanny or aporic moment, a surprise during events.  Atkins & Murphy’s 
(1993) second stage is ‘critical analysis’ of such uncanny moment against known 
knowledge, and their final phase is ‘development of a new perspective’ by combining “self-
awareness, critical analysis, synthesis and evaluation” (Finlay, 2008:4).  In this, then, 
although alluding or specifically referring to feelings, the typical focus of the practice of 
reflective practice is of these being instructive of something untoward, with practitioners 
moving quickly from them via and to cognitive functions to master the situation.  For the 
percipients, however, knowing is embodied and bodied, that they might feel and not name, 
and their experience of professional practice is messy, and this all the time, rather than 
occasional surprising situations or breakdowns.  O’Neill (2009:216) extends her analysis of 
uncanny to consider the ‘canniness of bodily knowing’ [emphasis added].  In our terms, in 
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contrast to Schönian-inspired reflective practice centring on surprise and cognition, 
O’Neill’s contention is that the body is canny all the time.  Drawing on proprioception, she 
observes 
the unconscious, effectively effaced, perception of whole and partial 
bodily orientation and movement derived from inner bodily sensations 
[…] highly modulated with tactile, vestibular, visual and aural sensations 
(2009:220). 
Indeed, Vaquez Bronfman (2005:13) bemoans the weight of literature on professional 
practice that typically ‘only considers the small part of professional activity’ [emphasis 
added] that concerns cognition.  For similar reasons, Kinsella (2007a:408) advocates 
rejection of a Descartian duality, instead to regard the body and mind as “intertwined”.  
Here, then, thought, knowledge and action cannot be understood without their 
embodiment (Burkitt, 1999).   
In Narrating the percipients experience, then, clarity concerning Descartes argument 
becomes salient.  Indeed, the extent to which Global North epistemology and ontology has 
evolved on the basis of duality is well-established, typically reduced in reference to 
‘mind/body split’ with the body essentially absent.  In Discourse On The Method 
(1637/1975:15) Descartes is clear that ‘mind’ is indeed both the starting point and guiding 
principle.  To illustrate, he asserts “never” to “comprise nothing more in my judgement 
than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly”, this being his ‘method of 
doubt’.  The division between body and mind is proposed through ‘six meditations’: he 
writes that he was initially “undecided” but by the sixth he had “proved” it 
(1642/1954:130).  This alone could reinforce popular understanding of his philosophy.  
However, in that final piece he writes “my body, by a special title really did belong to me 
[…] I could never separate myself entirely from it” (1642/1954:112) but given his ‘method 
of doubt’ he urges one must “not rashly accept all the apparent data of sensation”, whilst 
on the other hand neither rashly “call them all into question” (1642/1954:114).  
Consequently, he argues that he ‘has a body closely bound up with’ himself but also a 
“clear and distinct idea of [himself] as a conscious and not an extended being, and a body 
which is an extended and not a conscious being” (1642/1954:114-5).  Because he can 
consider his body as a number of parts he conceptualises it as “divisible”, but when he 
‘considers the mind’ he “can distinguish no parts within myself” (1642/1954:121).  
Therefore, his contention is that ‘sense-perceptions’ are purely for “indicating to the mind 
what is good or bad” (1642/1954:119) and “mind is not directly affected by all parts of the 
body; but only by the brain” (1642/1954:121), the prioritising of cognitive brain functioning 
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over the body.  So finally he declares the body and its sensations to be present but 
different, working as a “machine” that serves the mind within which they are ‘more often 
true than delusive’, and that “memory […] connects the present to the past, and my 
understanding (1642/1954:124).  The body is made  
in such a way that, even if there were no mind in it, it would still carry 
out all the operations that, as things are, do not depend on the 
command of the will, nor therefore on the mind (1642/1954:120).   
As a result, he is led to the belief that thinking is something that cannot rationally be 
doubted, hence describing “I am, I exist” (1642/1954:67), ‘information from the body is 
negligible’, and ‘bodies are only really perceived by intellect’ (1642/1954:75).   Strictly 
speaking, then, rather than the commonly referenced body/mind ‘split’ or ‘divide’, 
Descartes’ philosophy is that body and mind are fundamentally different “substances”, in 
relationship with each other, but dualistic, the body being servant to the latter (ibid).  But 
the percipients do not Describe being in relationship with body as an inferior partner, a 
Descartian and Schönian notion of body as a source of information on the way to cognitive 
mastery; they Describe their experience of bodily knowing as important in its own right.  
This is more in accord with the Phenomenological philosophy of Merleau-Ponty 
(1945/2002:94) in his appreciation of “the body [as] the vehicle of being in the world”, 
where the “inside and outside are inseparable” (1945/2002:474) such that “my existence as 
subjectivity is merely one with my existence as a body […] inseparable from this body and 
this world” (1945/2002:475).   
From this Narrating, we can now appreciate how professional practice has become reduced 
to prioritising the technical rational perspective of Gaze, where only knowledge that can be 
‘pinned down’ (cf. Emery), objectively analysed, and measured against externally ‘valid’ 
knowledge is the kind of knowing to be trusted and valued (Barnett, 2008; Saleebey, 1989; 
Gowdy, 1994; Kinsella, 2007b).  Further, it underscores the role of ‘experts’ (cf. Emery) in 
authority because in such a context practitioners are dependent on them to provide and 
direct towards packages of appropriate knowledge against which they should interpret 
their practice, the same experts that judge the outcome and, in the case of professional 
education, assess against its production of acceptable forms.  Reflective practice in such 
terms becomes constructions of identity and practice that are partial and limited, thus, “are 
not, by themselves, enough” (Saltiel, 2010:141) – but pretend to be.  Like Descartes body 




Thus, a broader Narrating to develop theoretical connections to phenomenology, the canny 
body and aporia proves useful to understanding Glance.  Macintyre & Buck (2008:324) 
write of professional practices, in their case, teaching, as “bodily participatory 
engagement”; and in their discussion of acting Oida & Marshall (1997:14) describe the 
importance of practitioners ‘learning the geography of their body’ through “active 
awareness”.  Estola & Elbaz-Luwish (2003:704) highlight two integrated elements: teachers’ 
awareness of their own physical bodies as it is the first aspect that students pay attention 
to; and, the toll of “physical labour” of their practice on their bodies.  They discuss these in 
terms of “bodily presence”, so the “physical fact” of being there, and also, powerfully, their 
awareness of “body positions”.  In a different social profession Pack (2009:49) also 
highlights the essential and integral understanding that practitioners (counsellors) have of 
their ‘bodies as a site of knowing’ to inform their practice.  Further still, Dekeyser & Leijssen 
(2005) offer a more nuanced analysis, distinguishing between ‘body orientated responses’, 
where a practitioner is aware of their bodily knowing and explicitly refers to and uses it in 
their practice; and, ‘body-based responses’, where they respond it subconsciously.  Shaw 
(2004) provides evidence of three different themes of bodily knowing in professional 
practice: ‘body empathy’ or resonance with clients/users; ‘body as receiver’, so awareness 
of being bodily affected by the interaction; and ‘body management’, that is, dealing with 
their own physical body and that of the client.  In sum, analysis here refines understanding 
the ‘body as a tool of the language of practice’ (Estola & Elbaz-Luwish, 2003:714)). 
Narrating further, Pack (2009) discusses the process whereby students/practitioners are 
aware of their bodily knowing, writing of “attuning” (2009:46) “with the experience of their 
own bodies” (2009:49).  ‘Attuning’ acts as “a guide connecting them with […] unspoken 
content” (ibid) received through somatic transference and countertransference (Ross, 
2000) (emotional identification and transfer/contagion when working with clients/users), 
and supports them in ‘transcending disassociation’ (Pack, 2009:49) and “vicarious 
traumatisation” (2009:48).  Specifically, Sodhi & Cohen (2012) write of 
students/practitioners being supported to become “more effective” (2012:131) in all this by 
learning to “tune in” (2012:120); and ‘tuning in’ was a phrase used by the percipients 
themselves.  They Describe it in terms of paying attention to and engaging with their 
bodied responses, to understanding and trusting this as a valid source of knowledge and in 
contrast to the absence of “noncognitive ways of knowing” (Barnacle, 2009:32) in typical 
social professional education.  Their lived experiences match Barnacle’s (ibid) assertion for 
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the “life of the gut” and therefore for “re-thinking the central role that reason has 
traditionally been accorded in accounts of learning and understanding”. 
Whilst Schön aimed to provide a ‘new epistemology of practice’ through reflective practice 
that “rejected linear thinking as the primary mode for professional problem solving and 
knowledge building” [emphasis added] (Papell & Skolnik, 1992:20), this research has shown 
that in theorisation, conceptualisation and application it has become precisely that.  
Indeed, ‘epistemology’ has been shown to be instrumental here, now understood as 
compounded in the Global North, the dominant epistemology prioritising cognition, where 
embodied and bodied knowing become invisible, unvalued and denied.   
Yet it has also been identified from a more complete reading of Schön’s work that he began 
to cast reflection-in-action as a “critically important” (1983:69) visceral, sensate embodied 
felt experience, such that by 1992 he is expanding his 1983 concept of “action-present” to a 
“conversation with the situation” that “need not employ the medium of words” 
(1992b:125).  He writes of this as “the time to look, the patience to hear what the material 
has to say to you, the openness to let it come to you” (1992b:126).   
First, then, we can see that the development and application of Schön’s ideas in 
mainstream literature, based as they are in his 1980’s work and not his whole body of 
writing, evidences that they have been “selectively plundered in such a way that the 
original vibrancy and open possibilities have been charged with a stereotyped cycle of 
reflection” (Sweet, 2010:187).  Further, even in respect of this, reflection-in-action was 
clearly not something he fully worked through, made complicated by his own confusing of 
reflection-on with reflection-in action, a situation that he acknowledges himself 
(1992b:123).  Accordingly, and perhaps as a result, embodied knowing as part of reflective 
practice has continued to be significantly misunderstood, underdeveloped and/or absent 
altogether.  Here, then, Glance of reflection-in-action reclaims and redefines its 
significance. 
6 Leaving Go 
Having Narrated Gaze and Glance, focus now turns to the third theme Described in chapter 
4. The percipients Described not engaging in Gaze and Glance or reflection -on and -in 
action. They spoke of Leaving Go, involvement in a tangibly different activity to the one 
they were engaged in.  They Describe this in terms of mind wandering, absorption that 
flushes through and washes or freshens the brain/mind.  Leaving Go is not deliberately 
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setting about engaging in something different for this to occur, or merely getting distracted, 
but they know it has happened because by not working on something something works, 
clicks, a block is cleared, seeing is clearer.  The percipients name and value Leaving Go as 
important in its own right.   
Narrating Leaving Go, it is interesting to note similarities with ‘mind-wandering’, defined 
and discussed in neuroscience.  Reviewing its literature, Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna 
(2013:3-4) note that it first features in early 1960’s research when its benefits were 
identified, i.e. “consolidate[ion of] recent […] experiences into long term memory”; ‘mental 
time travel’ enabling connection of ‘past, present and future’ thus a renewal of ‘self-
identity and sense of continuity’; and ‘prospection’, the ‘simulation of plausible outcomes’ 
to actual and possible future events, “an adaptive process that helps us select the optimal 
course of action”.  Baird et al (2012) turn their focus to the nature of the mind-wandering 
task, referring to research that shows an increase in the benefits when the task is 
‘undemanding’ rather than ‘no task at all’ (2012:1117).  They use the term ‘incubation’ as 
‘paradigm and concept’ to describe mind-wandering (ibid), which took me to an older 
source8 but nonetheless relevant to following percipient lead.  In 1926 Wallas wrote on The 
Art of Thought as part of creative problem solving.  Framed by recognising the complexity 
of consciousness, combined with discussing the extent of personal agency and control, he 
explains that the art of thought “is an attempt to improve by conscious effort [this] already 
existing form of human behaviour” (1926:24).  Drawing on philosophical, psychological and 
introspective studies of the time, he compares day-dreaming, distraction and automatic 
thinking to the “achievement of thought” (1926:37).  Day-dreaming is “the interrelation of 
verbal and visual imagery with rising and falling consciousness (192632-32); distraction, 
“when a fully-conscious train of thought is broken in upon a call for our attention to 
another subject” (1926:33); and automatic thinking is explained through etymology of the 
word ‘click’ (1926:29) (therefore different in meaning to that ascribed by the percipients 
use of ‘click’).  In contrast, ‘achievement of thought’ involves immersion in the problem 
followed by the defining feature of “incubation”, “an interval free from conscious thought 
on the particular problem concerned” (1926:42).  Because of incubation “illumination” 
happens, “the appearance of the ‘happy idea’” (1926:38) which can then be ‘verified’, i.e. 
“both the validity of the idea [is] tested and the idea itself [is] reduced to exact form” 
(1926:38).  ‘Incubation’ has resonance with the percipients lived experiences of Leaving Go: 
 
8 With thanks to Dr. Judith McCullouch 
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Wallas describes it as “voluntary abstention” through “conscious mental work on other 
problems” (1926:41) and the percipients spoke of detailed and focused work such as ‘fixing 
spectacles’ and ‘doing jigsaws’; Wallas writes of “relaxation from all conscious mental 
work” (1926:41-42) and the percipients talk of ‘baking’ and ‘listening to music’ in the same 
vein.  In other words, Wallas is describing a process that “restore[s] freshness to the mind” 
(1926:46) that precedes a “‘flash’ of success” (1926:47), a period on the “fringe of 
consciousness” (1926:47) or “intimation” (1926:48), a “state of rising consciousness” 
(1926:48) that a person may or may not be aware of, but will typically describe in terms of 
feeling something emerging (1926:48-49).  He argues that through greater awareness of 
incubation, so “we can attempt to hold on to such a train on the chance that it might 
succeed” (1926:50).  It is interesting to see that some 40 years later in his iconic final work 
before he died, Bachelard (1960/1969b) wrote of “reverie”, “a flight from the real” where 
“consciousness relaxes and wanders and consequently becomes clouded” (1960/1969:5) on 
the way to “an opening to a beautiful world, to beautiful worlds”, a state of “I a non-I which 
belongs to the I” (1960/1969:13); and thirty years on again, Csikszentmihalyi (1996) writes 
about creativity signifying ‘preparation, incubation, the ‘aha’ moment, evaluation and 
elaboration’, and how that process can involve many ‘iterations, loops and insights’, with 
the insight appearing slowly, perhaps years, through a series of many small “disconnected 
flashes”, or maybe a “thunderous aha”, or combinations of both (1996:81).  Creativity as a 
generative, transformative process is taken up by Robinson (2011) in his important work on 
creativity and education, in fact echoing Wallas’ conclusion that “training in the art [of 
thinking] should be part of [education]” (1926:169) for a “life of creative thought” 
(1926:172).   
Leaving Go can thus be understood as crucial in reflective practice alongside Gaze and 
Glance, and to support the creativity of Glance, as well as be important in its own right.  
However, like earlier Narration of mindfulness, it is vital to note Smallwood & Andrews-
Hanna’s (2013) caution against naïve application of mind-wandering, in our terms, Leaving 
Go.  They highlight how content underlying an individual’s mind-wandering plus the nature 
of mind-wandering itself can significantly alter the experience, and how it could be 
indication of “performance disruptions, cognitive problems, risk taking or low motivation” 
(2013:2).  This, then, is important to consider in facilitation of Leaving Go. 
In sum, Leaving Go is not something I have come across in literature on reflective practice 
and yet Narrating from the percipients lead shows it to compliment and be the foil for the 
deliberate activity of reflection-on-practice, and the partner to Glance of reflection-in-
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action.  Therefore Leaving Go is significant and to be facilitated in equal terms as Gaze and 
Glance within professional practice education.  Consequently, I began to visualise and 
conceptualise Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go together as a rhythm, building on the 
percipients own use of the word as well as on the rhythmic nature of their Descriptions of 
bodily and embodied knowing, the rhythm of moving in (reflection-in-action), out 
(reflection-on-action) and away (Leaving Go).   
7 Facilitating the ‘journey’ of Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go. 
Having Narrated Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go, attention turns to their facilitation as a 
‘journey’, the fourth theme emerging in chapter 4. 
Schön (1987a:13) writes of professional artistry as  
a kind of knowing, though different in crucial aspects from our standard 
model of professional knowledge.  It is not inherently mysterious; it is 
rigorous in its own terms; and we can learn a great deal about it – within 
what limits, we should treat as an open question. 
His suggestion is that this should happen “by carefully studying the performance of 
unusually competent performers” (ibid), perpetuating an epistemological assumption that 
length of experience equates to extent of competence, a view that was challenged in 
chapter 2.  Whilst no doubt it brings confidence, and confidence features in the percipients 
Describing, as well as that gained though time and promotion, they are also clear that Gaze, 
Glance, and Leaving Go are essential at all levels of experience.  Indeed, they expressly 
state that facilitation and engagement should begin at the start of their professional 
education.  In any case, setting aside the thorny matter of how ‘unusually competent’ 
practitioners are defined and identified, Schön does not elucidate the process by which 
one’s own reflection-in-action develops by studying such practice.  In The Reflective 
Practitioner Schön also writes of factors that ‘foster or impede’ reflection-in-action 
(1983:321), such as ‘fixed stereotypical categories’ and feelings of ‘shame, vulnerability and 
fear of failure’ (Schön, 1983:321), but he does not articulate ways to positively work with 
these or how to facilitate to lessen their likelihood.  However, the percipients are clear: 
rather than instruction and guidance of current practices of reflective practice in its slow 
violence of  breaking-in to and through its practices, they want support and facilitation to 
dwell in Identity-As (in contrast to Identity-Of) and reflection-in-action, a playful, creative, 
contemplative approach based in imagination, improvisation and embodied knowing.  As a 
way to explore this, then it is recalled that chapter 4 noted the research process from which 
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Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go emerged must be significant in facilitating the journey, 
therefore the focus of Narrating that follows. 
7.1 Dialogue and approach 
In chapter 4 I offered that the research process being based in dialogue must be significant, 
and indeed, the percipients Describe this as giving vitality to their reflective practice which 
it had been missing.  Dialogue is different to conversation or discussion.  Whilst all concern 
individuals sharing their own “horizon of understanding” (Gadamer, 1979:143), in 
conversation and discussion this involves “problem-solving” (Goulet, 2005:ix) via expression 
or imposition of a “particular vantage point” (ibid), but dialogue is “the totality of human 
experience” (ibid), the purpose of which is “explicitly critical and aimed at action”.  Those 
taking part “reject their role as mere ‘objects’ in nature and social history and undertake 
instead to become ‘subjects’ of their own destiny” (2005:viii).  But being a process of 
‘ruptures, disturbances and fusion’ (Gadamer, 1979:273) it necessarily must be 
underpinned by values of ‘concern, trust, respect, appreciation, affection and hope’ 
(Burbules, 1993) if it is to “discover or re-establish a genuine and creative collective 
consciousness” (Smith, 2001:np).  As such, the role and nature of facilitation becomes 
significant, requiring careful and sensitive regard, a point underscored by the percipients 
themselves.  However, because values are not always immediately/obviously visible, a 
claim to dialogue could be made when in fact it is absent.  For example, in her iconic 
challenge to critical pedagogy, feminist writer Ellsworth (1989:298) picks out its practices of 
dialogue, empowerment and voice as potential “vehicles of repression” [emphasis added], 
that is, they can “perpetuate relations of domination” (1989:298) in their action as “code 
words” that ‘hide political agendas’ (1989:300) in the (well-meaning, or otherwise) 
practices of educators/facilitators and the space, place and systems of education 
(1989:298).  Indeed, it is Gur-Ze’ev’s (1998:463) contention that simply an uniformed 
notion of “hope” held by professionals for their clients can be patriarchal, elitist, and 
ethnocentric, in Ellsworth’s (1989:300-301) words, a “violence” practiced through the 
“dogma of illusion of hegemonic versions of what is best for another” and well-intentioned 
but uncritical “practices” (1989:303).   
Thus, calling a group conversation or discussion dialogue doesn’t make it be so; and 
absence of “meaningful analysis” (1989:306) of relations, roles, power, individual and 
shared purposes, and actual (political) interests risks silencing and repressing.  It draws to 
mind a realisation I came to during the RPRGs.  I became aware that I was becoming 
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increasingly irritated with one of the percipients whose comments seemed (to me) to take 
random trajectories.  Ostensibly, then, I was perceiving her as other to what I 
wanted/hoped from her in her participation in the research process.  It was not until an 
accumulative activity of noticing my irritation in the moment that I began to realise there 
was an association in her interjections that she was making and understood, I just needed 
to ask her to articulate it.  With that small effort on my behalf I was able to comprehend 
her direction of flow – she, of course, knew it already.  Reading the transcripts, before that 
eventual Glance of noticing (and my rather guilty realisation) I can see that my responses 
must have ‘closed’ her (comments, participation, self) down.  Wellington & Austin (1996) 
identify five valid different and non-hierarchical orientations to reflective practice, and 
encourage practitioners and their facilitators to identify and value their own primary mode 
of engagement, although, patently, that I knew their theory did not mean I embedded it.  
Dialogue, then, like reflection-in-action, is as much an ongoing commitment as it is a 
political action.  Indeed, it is Arendt’s contention that action and speech ‘actively reveals’ 
“unique personal identities” (1958:179) not self-knowledge.  Therefore, dialogue has the 
power to ‘rescue a reflective group exercise from narcissism or psychologism’ (Goulet, 
2005:ix).   
To sum up here, in the facilitation of the journey of Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go, the 
process of reflection-in-action, to what purpose, or, to what “initiative” in Arendt’s words 
(1958:185), what ethical moorings, and for this to be in the “interspace” or “inter-est” 
(1958:182) of dialogue, are all key in creating the difference between “authentic” individual 
and collective engagement, with pointless cyclical internal or external talk and “self-
display” (Arendt, 1971:36) of mainstream reflective practice. 
A positive impact on dialogue in the RPRGs came from critical phenomenology in view of its 
“clearly defined methodological form of reflection” (Luft, 2019:xxxvi) so this must also have 
relevance to facilitating the journey of Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go in its potential to bring 
“renewal with more rigor than is [otherwise] possible” (ibid).  It is a method that is widely 
acknowledged as an  
an artful, assimilative experience for those who take it seriously and 
incorporate its premises, methods, orientations and perspectives – 
bodily, affectively, cognitively, and assumptively (Psathas, 2009:xi), 
a description with a striking similarity to the percipients own expression of what is required.   
The power of critical phenomenology method lies in its “challeng[e] to let phenomena 
reveal themselves” (Bentz & Rehorick, 2009:4).  Thus, rather than imposing “a lens of 
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understanding”, its offers “a mirror” so that those engaging can “clear [their] focus” and 
‘see themselves in a new way’ (ibid).  The relevance of this to facilitation of reflective 
practice can only be significant.  As discussed earlier in relation to the RPRGs, critical 
phenomenology as the method of inquiry catalysed during 2014, so half way through the 
research period meaning that the benefits of Petitmengin’s (2006) elucidation of its style of 
interviewing that informed my facilitation was not there at the Start.  In future facilitation 
of a redefined and re-imagined reflective practice it would follow that foregrounding its 
approach from the Start for the emergence and exploration of subjective experience as part 
of the journey of Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go would be helpful.  In fact, Petitmengin uses 
it in her higher education teaching (so not only her phenomenological research) to enable 
students “to gain consciousness of their own cognitive processes, and to make them 
explicit, so that they can then use this technique in their professional practice” (2006:231), 
endorsement of its approach within this context. 
Having Narrated the significance of dialogue with a critical phenomenological approach to 
overall facilitation, focus now turns to the particular, that is, the percipients Describing of 
facilitating a reclaimed redefined reflection-on-action through Gaze, reflection-in-action 
through Glance, and Leaving Go. 
7.2 Facilitating Gaze 
Starting with reflection-on-action, percipients are explicit in their need for it to be more 
imaginatively and creatively conceptualised and facilitated.  Of course writing on and 
talking about ones professional practice after an event for some students/practitioners has 
the potential to be a “fundamental [way] in which we express ourselves and learn from 
others” (Barzbeat & Bush, 2014:135) but it is clear from the percipients Captured and 
Curated lived experiences that this cannot be the case, or at best will be unlikely, in the way 
that practice of reflection-on-action is currently configured.  Gaze tells of a slow 
incremental violence of being ‘broken in’ that contradicts the value and intent of self-
expression.  As argued, in a context of ‘knowledge telling’ (cf. Sharples) and writing/talk as 
reporting via ‘pinning practice down’ (cf. Emery), a student’s focus will inevitably and 
necessarily land on their need to learn what and how to write/talk (cf. Allen et al), 
therefore focus on service of themselves rather than the artistry of professional practice for 
the service of others.  In parallel the facilitator’s focus will be on the information required 
to support that endeavour as well as how to assess performance of ‘appropriate 
development’.   
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Of course, individuals might engage in reflective practice outside of this, indeed akin to a 
recommendation made by Kember et al (2001) in their assertion that reflective activities 
such as diary writing should be private with practitioners choosing what they share from 
them to be used for assessment purposes.  But, this risks leaving professional practice 
‘undiscussed’ (cf. Schön) and maintains reflective practice as an isolated, individual activity, 
with all the resulting issues that have been identified.   
And of course, it must be acknowledged that even within current reflection-on-action as 
Described and Narrated, some percipients learned some things some times.   
Going further than Kember et al, Stewart & Richardson (2000) argue for reflective activities 
not being assessed at all, and certainly their freezing effect Described by the percipients 
along with the shadow of audience and its impact on engagement could lend to this 
conclusion.  But, not only does a concern with assessing reflective practice leave 
unaddressed the depth and breadth of issues explicated in this thesis, assessment as part of 
education and qualification is not per se problematic.  What is at issue is the way its 
“central purpose” is understood, i.e. the way it features within broader ‘pedagogical 
approaches and goals’ (Moore, 2004:35).  Moreover, and as highlighted through The 
Trappings, a recommendation for facilitation of reflective practice cannot sit entirely 
“outside or untouch[ed] by the larger social conversations, situations, ideologies and 
purposes within which it is situated” (2004:36): because it is part of professional education 
it will need to be involved with assessment.  In accord with Moore, there is no reason that 
conception, theories, facilitation and facilitators of reflective practice cannot “contribute to 
[a] range of purposes” [sic] (ibid) that includes assessment in higher education frameworks, 
an important point I return to later, but surely doing so can be better than the current best 
of some student/practitioners learning some things, some times, hardly an illustrious 
exposition of professional artistry!    
To start with, a radically (as defined in chapter 1) different - indeed appropriate, useful and 
ethical - reflective practice has been Narrated in terms of naming and conceptualising it as 
reflection-on-action when this is what is expected and intended.  In contrast to hiding 
intention and purpose behind the generic term ‘reflective practice’, transparency is radical, 
and facilitating and assessing reflection-on-action through the established standards and 
principles of critical thinking is also radical.  This is because at root reflection-on-action is a 
“secondary reflection practice with [specific] evaluative criteria” (Dohn, 2011:673) whereby 
individuals ‘master’ their thoughts and take command of themselves, their practice and 
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their practice situations by presenting some version and elements of past experience “in 
front of” themselves (Gendlin, 1997:4), “control]led], contain[ed] or capture[d]” (1997:3) 
through Gaze.  Gaze reveals reflection-on-action to be an empirical epistemology of 
experience as “finished givens” that can be ‘simply observed, represented’ (1997:6), and 
analysed to reveal ‘the truth in situations’ (ibid) as if there is one.  Even though the criteria 
for this are imposed externally it necessarily becomes a “self-referential [process] of 
practice representation” (Dohn, 2011:673) because individuals base their accounts on 
flawed cognitive processes and shape, amend, and make-up the details to meet 
requirements.  Therefore, a radical facilitation of reflection-on-action is to explicitly, 
transparently and more usefully frame, understand and facilitate it in terms of Gaze, the 
‘systematic cultivation’ (Paul & Elder, 2006b:4) and assessment of a practitioner’s critical 
thinking about their practice through the clearly worked-through standards.  In doing so it 
would openly and tangibly reflect the technical-rational paradigm of reflection-on-
action/Gaze and enable higher education practices to maintain a focus on learning 
outcomes and their evidencing (McIntosh, 2013).  
Yet, the percipients also express the need for more imaginative and creative facilitation of 
Gaze.  For instance, they offer that Gaze could be enhanced through ‘reflective scraps’, 
instead of whole accounts, that they deliberately return to and ‘layer up, Gazing again to 
identify how they have adopted domesticating discourses in the ways that they write about 
their practice.  It also occurred to me that connection with theory through Narrating could 
assist further in exploration of a reimagined, creative Gaze  
Kristeva’s Tales of Love (1987) proved significant in this regard.  Love being a deeply 
subjective and private theme, it struck me that public exposure could leave an author 
vulnerable such that they elect to lie, ham up, edit, embellish, make it all up, or not write 
about it at all, paralleling percipients experiences of reflection-on-action.  Yet, Kristeva 
enters into the task despite ‘finding it difficult’ (1987:1).  Of course, she will have crafted 
her writing: she, like reflective practitioners engaged with reflection-on-practice, are 
writing for a purpose and in the shadow of an audience.  Even so this does not prevent her 
from writing and doing so with authenticity.  A case in point is in the chapter Stabat Mater, 
title from a 13th Century hymn and Haydn composition translated as “grief of a mother for 
the pain of her child” (van der Velden & van Osnabrugge, 2015).  Here Kristeva writes on 
woman as mother whilst interweaving it with personal sensate, visceral, embodied ‘flashes’ 
(1987:234) of her own subjective experiences and felt senses from pregnancy, birth, the 
physicality of an infant, and her embodied responses as mother.  Whilst writing in one 
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column about the relationship between Mary and Jesus, in the adjoining column she 
records her responses to her own crying baby.  It is a deeply personal and subjective 
reflection, but as I read it I can feel her-my response to the crying of her-my newborn, and 
even if I had not had a baby of my own I would still be able to feel from within her writing.  
In places in Kristeva’s writing, on and about take precedent, no personal reflection at all, in 
other places the two run alongside, illuminating, even entwining making it difficult to 
discern whether the focus is Mary, Kristeva – or indeed, me.  I feel it in my gut.  Thus, whilst 
exploring content on “the most refined symbolic construct [of] femininity, [that of] 
Maternality” [sic] (1987:234), Kristeva’s writing deeply connects with her self and my self: I 
am invited in to the process, and she-I-we feel connections in personal sensate, visceral, 
embodied “flashes” whilst reading and learning about theology.   
It is a powerful piece of reflective writing.  If the Gaze of reflection-on-action of professional 
practice was like this it could also be powerful – and a radical difference to the Curated and 
Described percipient experiences of depleted, flat, reduced constructions of ‘meaningless’ 
and ‘pointless’ reflective diaries.  It would of course still be a representation of their 
practice.  As noted by Dohn above, this is inherent to the task and there are “essential 
changes in the epistemological relation between practitioner, actions, and events” 
(2011:675).  In fact, during the RPRGs we experimented with deliberately writing accounts 
of practice in third-person as ‘fictions’.  But/and Narrating via Kristeva offers insight into the 
potential power of first-person accounts in relation to a re-imagined Gaze. 
Gaze has a purpose, and can be creatively re-imagined, but it is limited and partial.  Indeed, 
from similar conclusions about reflective practice Dohn (2011:680) argues that “alternative 
ways of acting that challenge and change the practice logic from within the practices” [sic] 
are needed, but these “have not been developed yet”.  Gaze is positioned as outside and on 
professional practice, but we have seen here that it can be radical, helping to return 
reflective practice to its roots of artistry. 
7.3 Facilitating Glance 
Glance offers a different conceptualisation and practice from within professional practices: 
it meets a different purpose, responding to Dohn’s, and, more importantly, the percipients 
call for such innovation. 
The nature of Glance is already Narrated, and along with this the percipients also highlight 
need for ‘awareness of’ and a ‘tool-kit’ for ‘teaching people for Glance’.  This must not be 
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based on input, passively learning and complying with expectations and requirements, but 
involve recognising, honouring, and dwelling in one’s embodied and bodied knowing, a 
process that should start as early as possible in higher education programmes and then be 
embedded throughout.  They express how it will take time, and as with discussion above 
regarding ‘journey, this is not to do with dependence on length of experience in practice – 
or extent of knowledge of The Trappings – but time to grow appreciation of and confidence 
in one’s own ‘canniness’ (cf. O’Neill).  I have argued that career experience can imbue 
practitioners with confidence when engaging in practice in-the-moment, yet, nevertheless, 
a very new practitioner bringing limited time-length experience to the role can still be – 
indeed, according to percipients and established Narration, will be - aware of and respond 
from their senses and feelings, their bodily knowing all the time (Gowdy, 1994) and 
facilitation can give them confidence in and validation of that bodily and embodied 
knowing.   
In Narration of this, then, and echoing Heidegger’s theory outlined in chapter 4, Burbules 
(2002:179) description of aporia as ‘epistemic emptiness’ appears germane here.  In sharp 
contrast to epistemic knowing that characterises current understanding and practice of 
reflective practice, epistemic emptiness is: 
at that moment, one knows nothing, and does not know what to think 
or say or do next […] there is no path in sight [or] there are too many 
paths to choose from [or] one cannot recognise a path is already there 
[or]the path is apparent but one cannot or will not follow it (ibid). 
This will be experienced by all practitioners regardless of career length.  Derrida (1993) 
refers to it as “doubt”, suggesting differing kinds: ‘aporia of suspension’ (when action 
cannot be mechanically applied); ‘ghost of undecidability’ (perplexity when faced with 
different choices); and ‘aporia of urgency’ (doubt created by having to make decisions in 
the moment, right there and then).  By focusing on the ‘uncanny’ worked with in retrospect 
through epistemic knowing, Gaze/reflection-on-action misses the complex nature of 
professional practice Captured in chapter 2, here understood as moments of uncertainty, 
risk, doubt as well as ones canniness all the time.  Burbules (2002:174) uses the metaphor 
of “labyrinth” to describe this although ironically a labyrinth has a single path to follow.  
Maze, on the other hand, might be more appropriate with its numerous possibilities, some 
of which lead to dead ends and double-backs, although even then a typical maze still has a 
single ‘correct’ path amongst the choices leading to the desired outcome and Schön’s 
original argument was of no blue-print or formula in the messiness of professional practice.  
Therefore, Narrating provides theoretical underpinning to why the percipients Descriptions 
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emphasise the no-path of epistemic emptiness, whilst, significantly, also theorising Glance 
in its opportunity and grounds on which to discuss and trust doubt, to become mindful of 
epistemic emptiness, and connect to the notion of embodied action through felt sense in a 
moment.  Glance is the moment when “one recognises something as something; one 
recognises the unfamiliar so that it becomes familiar” (Burbules, 2002:177).  The 
percipients offer that the ‘tool kit’ of Glance they are looking for should necessarily 
introduce the notion of aporia.  Derrida’s nuanced conceptualisation would bring depth to 
this, and a focus on aporia would open space for understanding and insight into felt sense 
during uncanny and canny Glances, the felt sense and associations that bridge Glance to 
action during the aporic moment. 
Moreover, and importantly, this recognising, honouring, and dwelling in one’s embodied 
and bodied knowing of Glance requires its own specialist lexis and shared understanding.  
Without this practitioners will be unable or less able to recognise, identify, acknowledge 
and articulate their embodied and bodied knowing.  Similarly, without methods that 
privilege bodily knowing that are at least comparable to the models and pro forma that 
favour visible as well as cognitive reflection-on-practice, it will remain invisible.  The nature 
of these methods also require attention recalling Arendt’s point that speech and action are 
key.  Finally, without theory to underpin all this practice focus will move into the 
theoretically weightier cognitive realm as soon as possible, if not start and end there in 
entirety.  Embodied and bodied knowing is, nonetheless, complex, or, as Sweet (2010:187) 
puts it, it is “something of a tease”.  Traditionally acknowledgement of bodies as part of 
professional practice has been met with apprehension (Macintyre & Buck, 2008) hence why 
the “power” of bodily knowing “to form and inform self and others continues to be 
marginalized, perhaps feared” (Probyn, 1991:108): it is “the fear of the near” (ibid).  
Acknowledging body is bucking the trend so will be met with resistance from facilitators 
and students/practitioners.   
7.4 Naming and articulating embodied and bodied practice. 
Furthermore, to do so is not straightforward.  In contrast to ‘pinning down’ and ‘reporting 
on’ practice to account for one’s decisions and action after the event, practice that is 
embodied and in a moment “is changing, volatile and often contradictory, [...] we do not 
have a single static story to tell about ourselves” (Estola & Elbaz-Luwish, 2003:703).  
Reflection-on-practice and its cognitively based epistemic knowing tells an easier, 
contained and tidy story, even if partially or indeed entirely made up.  Even the way that 
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bodies are “understood and made meaningful is a cultural question” (Estola & Elbaz-
Luwish, 2003:714).  Foucault’s (1975/1977; 1976/1978) influential work discussed earlier 
points up the controlling power of discourses about bodies, the way that its surveillance 
creates “social bodies and realities” (Henderson, 2007:236), i.e. “power incites, instils and 
produces effects in the body” (2007:226), an “inscription” that “occurs” as soon as “the 
body enters culture” (2007:231).  This is also a theme within feminist literature.  For 
instance, Schweik (2010) explores oppressive and repressive notions of ‘normal bodies’ 
applied to women, and hooks (2000) commandingly conveys the intersection of feminist 
theory and Black women’s experience in the complexity of bodies and bodily knowing.  In 
fact, May Schott (2001:322) develops a feminist critique against using the body as “source 
of truth” since to do so risks ‘essentialism and biologism’ that traps women” [emphasis 
added] (2001:326).  In other words, her argument is that the body as reference point can 
belittle and romanticize complex experiences and discourses, or be so subjective to be too 
inward-looking, all criticisms that could be made of reflection-in-action itself, illuminating 
Arendt’s contention regarding the risk of individualist, isolated, self-indulgent practices. 
Glance is a powerful potential to a reclaimed and redefined reflective practice, but what is 
clear from this Narrating is the risk of it reinforcing surveillance on body and becoming a 
‘commitment to internalism’ (Mossel, 2005:149), in other words, a return to a domestic 
and domesticated self.  Yet with that warning in mind, it is in-keeping with the percipient 
lead to continue and consider bodily knowing, a view that finds accord with Saleebey 
(1989:560) in his argument that “it is the denial of the body, of sensation, of sensory 
experience that is the key condition allowing political and social oppressions” [emphasis 
added].  Freire’s (1996) contention that it is the technical rational model, in our case, 
mainstream reflective practice, that reinforces authority and perpetuates oppression.  
Indeed, it is Field Belenky et al’s (1986) assertion that when bodily knowing is denied or 
blocked the content of that knowing becomes disembodied and disconnected.  As Gendlin 
(1984:144) puts it, in such a context it is the   
intricate texture of ‘inwardness’ that does not fit. And what it fails to fit 
is the ‘external reality’ made of seemingly smoother patterns that make 
no room for the complexity.   
The issue, then, is how to facilitate an embodied and bodied reflection-in-action so that it 
becomes a trusted and valid source for practice and involves socio-political awareness, and 
to do so in ways that are nuanced and informed.  Glance is personal and individual but such 
facilitation would ensure its context, purpose and action reclaim it as authentic from its 
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cover of domestication and domesticated practices and would offer a radical perspective 
that contrast with a centrally controlled reflective practice 
It has been argued that that this involves identifying, naming and valuing the “constituent 
parts” of bodily knowing (Powell, 2008:93-94), so “listen[ing]” to bodies as both “cultural 
constructions and real flesh and blood” (Estola & Elbaz-Luwish, 2003:714), but also 
importantly, engaging with the processes of that elicitation, so with how the parts and the 
processes “are mixed and ‘mated’ in specific situations” (Powell, 2008:94).  It could be that 
the complexity in this explains why reflective practice has become dominated by a cognitive 
based reflection-on-action – but, either way, a bodied and embodied reflection-in-action 
remains “the real challenge” (Vasquez Bronfman, 2005:16), one that this doctoral research 
addresses.  It is interesting to note that rather than “teachers” of reflection-in-action, the 
current state of affairs, in 2001 Schön writes that reflection-in-action requires “coaches”: 
coaches will demonstrate their capacity for professional artistry and reflection-in-action 
and at the same time “help” students/practitioners in their development of it.  This has fit 
with the percipients call for facilitation, support, and modelling and whilst Schön continues 
with the point that  
the development of forms of professional education conducive to 
reflection-in-action requires reflection on the artistry of coaching 
(Schön, 2001:204)  
he does not elucidate further, thus in our terms, the processes of elicitation of Glance of 
reflection-in-action is yet to be identified in this thesis.   
7.5 Facilitating Leaving Go 
Attention must also be given to facilitating Leaving Go in its place of equal significance to 
Gaze and Glance within professional practice education.   
The importance of practitioners not engaging in reflective practice at all times in 
professional contexts was discussed in the Curation of chapter 3.  It was posited that 
practitioners need to know about circumstances in which deliberately not reflecting would 
be a healthy strategy and appreciate how to do so in ways that do not involve a “thorough-
going closure down of the self [but] a temporary suspension and defence of that self” 
(Ferguson, 2018:423).  This would be an important inclusion in facilitation of Gaze and 
Glance. 
But Leaving Go is different to this whilst also vital.  Leaving Go is not about ‘not engaging in 
reflective practice’ but deliberate engagement in a different task, a process of incubation 
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prior to illumination.  Without language, methods and facilitation of Leaving Go, 
practitioners will be unaware of its significance and therefore will not consciously engage in 
the deliberate mind-wandering that waters the ground of creative and innovative practice.  
To this end, Baird et al (2012:1120) suggest, for example, that its facilitation should include 
reinforcing engagement in “simple external tasks (i.e. tasks not related to the primary 
task)”, explaining that this works because it “increases unconscious associative processing” 
through a period in which “executive and default [neural] networks [can] interact” 
(2012:1121).  Further, the deliberate action of Leaving Go could also be considered as a 
core element of self-care, essential when working in the social professions (McGarrigle & 
Walsh, 2011). 
8         Facilitating Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go – and the need to focus further on Glance. 
Thus, taking the lead from percipient lived experiences shows a radical approach to the 
practice of reflective practice involves creative, enlivening Gaze of reflection-on-action, the 
introduction of Leaving Go, and understanding and appreciating Glance of bodily knowing 
and the way this informs practice in-the-moment, a summation that connects with Satina & 
Hultgren’s (2001:531) declaration for the need to “bring the body in from the educational 
margins” through a ‘pedagogy of embodiment’.    
Yet, to remind, the first sub aim of this research is ‘To explore, discuss and propose 
innovative and creative ways to consider, work with, and facilitate reflective practices in 
radically different ways within higher education programmes as a meaningful and political 
personal, individual and collective engagement’ [emphasis added].  Gaze and Leaving Go 
have been discussed, but whilst the rich meaning, significance and value of Glance has been 
established, now understood as involving bodily knowing as well as playful creativity, 
improvisation and imagination, broadly informed by contemplative pedagogy, how to 
engage with the processes of that elicitation from inside the practice, indeed, how to listen 
to the body still remains an important question. 
Narrating with this in mind, Macintyre & Buck (2008:318) write of ‘catching self in the act’, 
explaining this to involve ‘fostering inner attention’ (2008:322) by ‘seeking’ and ‘seeing’ 
within the “concrete realities” of the “context the practitioner is working in (which involves 
receptivity as opposed to labelling and categorising)” (2008:319), a process that requires 
‘falling into trust with the body as the medium for sense-making’ (2008:316).  There are 
lovely resonances here with the percipients Describing of Glance, but alone this could risk 
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the cautioned naïve, romanticised, biologism, and being “too inward”, so “‘too’ 
complicated, oversensitive, too emotional, too demanding, too dependent, and so on” 
(Gendlin, 1984:145) discussed above.  It is also essential to heed Kinsella’s (2007a:109) 
warning that an embodied reflection-in-action could become “a new master discourse”, 
reinforcement of my earlier argument that it risks becoming something that 
students/practitioners must be ‘broken in’ to.  But the potential of Glance is in its 
theorisation and practice of reflection-in-action.  Therefore these are all lines worth 
dancing: to not do so would sustain reflective practice as “partial and perverse”, 
perpetuating understanding and practice as “only occupying one side of the dualities it has 
constructed” (Harstock, 1983:171).  Here, then, Glance “revers[es] the proper valuation of 
human activity” (ibid).  To-date where attempts exist in mainstream literature to focus on 
reflection-in-action they typically get snagged on the fact of a gap between experience and 
making sense of that experience, thus lost in a trail of debate as to whether that makes it 
reflection-on-practice, obscuring any possibility and potential theorising reflection-in-action 
might bring.  Differentiation offered between Gaze and Glance helps here but Narrating 
further the facilitation of an embodied, bodied Glance and its contribution to a radical re-
imagining of reflective practice is required.    
8.1 Facilitating embodied, bodied Glance 
Dohn’s (2011:680) stated contention is that “alternative ways of acting that challenge and 
change the practice logic” need to come “from within the practices” [sic] but these are yet 
to be developed.  It is to this that Glance speaks.  In Narrating here, Mossel’s Action, Control 
and Sensations of Acting (2005) proves a useful starting place.  He attests the value of 
turning attention to the ‘real-time’ sensations of acting.  Not only is it “faster […] because it 
need not wait for an error to occur” (2005:142), or in our terms, need not wait for an 
uncanny event or feeling, it signifies our canniness all the time.  Moreover, it does not 
concern judgement and control, whether externally imposed or individually introjected, 
and neither is it solipsistic.  Mossel distinguishes between ‘activity’ and ‘action’.  ‘Activity’ is 
where focus is on outcome, and “intended results […] are controlled” (2005:142), so, for us, 
activity relates to Gaze.  ‘Action’ comprises “sensation” and “process”, sensation being 
“either a part or an effect of the process” such that the sensations of action “provide us 
with real-time information” (2005:135).  It is a definition that resonates with Arendt’s 
‘action’ Captured in chapter 2.  Thus, “in awareness of acting we find the agent at work” 
227 
 
(Mossel, 2005:136), and it is “sensations [that] provide us with information about our body, 
the world, and the relationship between our body and the world” (2005:140).  
This conceptualisation connects the nature of Glance with bodily knowing, and dances the 
lines of: inward and outward; self-connection with the politics of self; and, body and 
practice and context.  An elucidation of ‘agent’ is useful in this.  Rather than agency in its 
implication of control and prediction, Mossel locates significance in “awareness of the 
process” (2005:154), agent is “experienced and the experience forms part of it” (2005:143) 
by which he is valuing that which “consists in interaction between body and mind” 
(2005:146).  Arendt goes further.  She too writes on fostering action, but for her this also 
concerns voice.  In what can be considered a response to concerns of becoming ‘too 
inward’, Glance must necessarily involve ‘speech’, so giving shape and voice to, as well as 
ownership of, its ‘revelatory character, subject and comprehensibility’ (Arendt, 1958:178).  
Without this we are “performing robots” (1958:178), an analogy that takes us back to the 
percipients experience of current understanding and practice of reflective practice.  In 
contrast to preoccupation with “‘what’ somebody is – his qualities, gifts, talents, and 
shortcomings, which he may display or hide” [sic] (1958:179), speech ‘actively reveals’ 
one’s personal identity, a “disclosure of ‘who’” (ibid), so, and resonant with Mossel’s more 
recent work, illuminating the “agent in the act” (1958:180).  Without this, action “is 
meaningless” (1958:181).   
Thus, expressed Glance is deeply political.  
Mossel’s offer to this Narrating, then, is not only in considering sensation as significant in 
‘embodying’ practitioners as ‘agents’ (2005:148), but in reinforcing the argument that 
absence of that recognition positions students/practitioners as “passive” (ibid) and Arendt 
adds action, voice and dialogue.  In our terms, it is a critical connection in understanding 
the process of domesticating and being ‘broken in’ to Identify-Of ‘reflective practitioner’, as 
well as the impact of positioning bodily knowing as a by-product or mere signal on the way 
to more important cognitive work.  Mossel’s work begins to address the process of ‘tuning 
in’ expressed by the percipients Descriptions, echoed above by Sodhi & Cohen (2012), but 
termed “attuning” by Mossel (2005:146).  However, these authors do not follow on to 
discuss how it might be facilitated and in such ways to avoid drift into an individual, 
solipsistic, inward-facing perspective.  
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In Narrating that element, the canon of Eugene Gendlin proved significant, initially 
identified during the latter stages of the research period as Described in chapter 4.  Gendlin 
is a Phenomenologist who developed ways of thinking about and working with lived 
experiences, but specifically bodily felt sense and its implicit nature in knowing through 
Focusing.   
Rather than being snagged on the gap between experience and making sense of that 
experience Gendlin begins from the position that we need a way of conceptualising, 
understanding, and practice of ‘entering and speaking from’ the gap [emphasis added] 
(1997:3).  Secondly, he proposes this is fundamentally “more than” [sic] ‘controlling or 
containing’ the gap as if merely “excess” (ibid) to be cognitively tidied away.  Consequently, 
he writes of the gap and of entering and speaking from it as being 
more than [the] conceptual patterns (distinctions, differences, 
comparisons, similarities, generalities, schemes, figures, categories, 
cognitions, cultural and social forms [sic] (ibid)  
that happen as soon as we speak about – or, in our terms, on - experiences.  Along similar 
lines, Roth (2012:6) writes of “experience” being “more than can be put into words” 
because experience comprises the “entire span” of “the immediate and the embodied”.  
However, in his description of experience Gendlin goes further.  He expresses it as “that 
partly unformed stream of feeling we have every moment […] to which you can every 
moment attend inwardly if you wish” (1962:3), a “raw, present, ongoing functioning (in us)” 
[sic] (1962:11).  More than Roth’s characterisation of experience as difficult to verbalise 
which anyway jars with Arendt’s emphasis on speech and voicing, Gendlin’s explanation is 
subtle and nuanced.  He offers that experience cannot be ‘exhaustively examined’ (1997:4) 
because “it is never completely in view”: experience is “dispersed in our situations; we are 
in it, and there is always more of it in us (with, under, and behind us, and out there…)” [sic], 
whether or not we ‘name or divide it’ (1962:11).  Therefore, within the terms of this thesis, 
experiencing and then making sense of that experience in the moment cannot be 
represented through typical mainstream understanding and practices of reflective practice 
as if that experience is “given in already-formed units which cognition could simply observe, 
represent, or approximate” (1997:6).   
That said, Gendlin is also anxious not to give the impression that the gap between 
experience and making sense of it is a “vague no-man’s land” (1962:3) about which 
students/practitioners can “say whatever [they] wish” (1997:7), accounting for or 
interpreting it in whatever way they please.   
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In those two points, then, Gendlin’s work points up the limitation and partiality of 
reflection-on-action/Gaze as Curated, Described and Narrated, whilst also reinforcing a 
platform for the process of Glance. 
A consequence of his assertion that the gap is important but should not be ‘vague’ means 
that it makes difficult his task of writing about it in order to develop his theory.  Therefore, 
he sets about referring to it as “ ‘…..’ ” (1997:7).  In elucidation – and with powerful 
resonance to the percipients notion of Glance – he writes  
We can let a ‘…..’ come in any spot where we pause, and we can think 
from it, even if we don’t write it (1997:7).   
In different texts he puts words to ‘…..’ that are also significant to theorising Glance.  He 
refers to ‘…..’ as “thinking at the edge” (2004:1), and, “thinking from an intricacy, a spider 
web” (1996:np).  Poignantly, he asserts that ‘…..’/thinking at the edge/thinking from an 
intricacy is “very exact and precise” (1997:16) although at the same time qualifies this is not 
the same as arguing doing so is inherently clear, in our case, to a student/practitioner.   
Resonance between Gendlin’s exposition of the gap between the experience and making 
sense of that experience with the percipients Describing of Glance that has been Narrated 
in this chapter is striking.  Importantly in this regard, Gendlin next turns his attention to the 
process of ‘entering and speaking from’ ‘…..’ (1997:16), in our terms, his response to the 
matter of how to enter and speak from Glance.   
He begins this by explaining the process as going “into a murky sort of down or in, or 
allow[ing] some sort of coming from it” [sic] (1997:16), which he argues is consonant with 
all “life and situations” but also, importantly for our argument, as being more “intricate” 
than the cognitive activity of identifying “historical determinants” (1962:xvii), in our terms, 
identified retrospectively to fill the gap.  Through this analysis and applying his non-dualistic 
gentle challenge to the more typical understanding of reflective practice, he does not go on 
to advocate dismissal of the conceptual and cognitive, but offers that we should “think with 
both ‘…..’ [and] ‘zigzag’” (ibid) between the experiential and the conceptual to let the 
former “make new sense and modify our concepts, rather than being confined in them or 
ending in mere contradictions” (ibid).  Here, then, in our terms, meaning would not be 
domesticated or domesticating, Trapped to known, abstracted “dead objects of study” 
(1962:2) in a narrow, limited and limiting direction.  Here meaning “is not only about things 
and it is not only a certain logical structure, but it also involves felt experiencing” [sic] 
(1962:1).  In critical pedagogical and feminist terms, the personal is political.   
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Gendlin’s notion of ‘zigzag’ brought back to me that I had begun to visualise and 
conceptualise Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go as a rhythm, building on the rhythmic nature of 
the percipients communication of their bodily and embodied knowing, so, the rhythm of 
moving in (reflection-in-action), out (reflection-on-action) and away (Leaving Go).  It was 
reminiscent of ‘zigzag’.  Using emotions as an example, current practices of reflective 
practice approach them as if objects to identify, account for, and escape from in cognitive 
mastery and control of practice, but Gendlin’s proposition is that they can be ‘entered in 
and spoken from’ as felt experiences in the moment, and then one can reflect on those 
concepts later in an approach of curiosity about what they tell that person – as opposed to 
the other way round.  It is a perspective that finds confluence with neuroscientist Damasio 
(2000:50-51) where he distinguishes between ‘primary, universal’, ‘secondary, social’ and 
‘background’ emotions.  He articulates them as ‘body states’, the body being the “theatre” 
for emotions, whilst at the same time noting that their “expression and meaning [is] given 
by learning and culture”.  Thus, a finer grained reflective practice is a rhythm between the 
felt sense of an emotion in the moment and its “stereotypicity” (ibid), and, indeed, 
Damasio’s neuroscience lends insight to Gendlin’s (1962:3) subsequent articulation of  
prelogical, ‘preconceptual’ experience as it functions together with 
logical symbols, [without] substituting one for the other [sic]   
that are located ‘within this body’ [emphasis added] (1962:13).  It leads Gendlin to contend  
if we do not have the felt meaning of the concept, we haven’t got the 
concept at all – only a verbal noise” (1962:5-6),   
a statement that could have been directly written with the percipients Descriptions of Gaze 
and advocating for Glance in mind. 
Yet, still, in the context of this section of Narrating, accessing, and therefore facilitating, the 
process of Glance still needs attention.  Gendlin’s process of “Focusing” (1978:10) is 
significant here.  Focusing is the term he gives to his method for the way one ‘makes 
contact with felt sense’, i.e. the “felt dimension of experience that is prelogical” which is 
important “in what we think, what we perceive, and how we behave” (Gendlin, 1962:1).  It 
has a striking resonance with Arendt’s (1958:39) articulation of the self comprising ‘inner 
sensations that present themselves to us’. 
Before going further, this could be interpreted as taking argument back to asserting a 
process that represents practice rather than practice itself (cf. Dohn) and indeed this is an 
argument that parallels Munévar’s (2014:np) criticism of Gendlin ‘conflating self with sense 
of self’.  If Gendlin’s theory ultimately takes us full circle back to the critique of reflection-
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on-action/Gaze/typical understanding of reflective practice, then it is of no help to 
Narration of Glance - but perhaps it finally reveals Glance not to be a radical reclaiming and 
redefining of reflective practice that expounds it as crucial to the roots of professional 
artistry? 
In his writing Gendlin is clear, concepts emerging from the felt sense “cannot fully 
represent it” [emphasis added] (1962:33), but the process is an action (cf. Mossel; Arendt) 
that help us to “grasp this preconceptual way experiencing behaves” (Gendlin, 1962:34).  It 
is, therefore and in fact, an elucidation of Mossel’s “attuning” that mirrored the percipients 
Description of, and need for help in ‘tuning in’ that has been missing so far from Narration.  
It lends insight into how one might ‘attune to the sensations of acting’ (cf. Mossel), and 
even there Mossel highlights that “Much of what happens when we act does not reach 
consciousness” (2005:148) and can be “non-deliberate” (2005:153).  The latter, then, 
weaves in earlier Narrating regarding not-reflecting as well as Leaving Go, but, still and 
importantly, reinforces the assertion that “our agency is found in the sensation of acting” 
[emphasis added] (ibid). 
Focusing has relevance to Glance.  Briefly, it involves attuning to the sensations of acting, or 
experience, the felt sense, from which emerge ‘handles’, i.e. the qualities of the felt sense 
described through a word, image or phrase that speaks from within it, creating a received 
shift in understanding as a result.  Focusing is therefore ‘process rather than content’ 
(Gendlin, 1962:32-33).  More specifically, Gendlin explains the process as comprising “six 
movements” that he fully articulates and in which practitioners can be supported (in 
Schön’s words, ‘coached’) to engage.  The ‘movements’ are:  
• ‘clearing the space’;  
• experiencing the ‘felt sense’;  
• an emergent ‘handle’ that speaks from that felt sense;  
• checking-in, back and forth, to ensure the ‘handle’ ‘resonates’;  
• followed by ‘asking’ for meaning; and, finally,  
• ‘receiving’ (1978:43-64).   
It has a clear utility to Sodhi & Cohen’s call for practitioners to ‘tune in’ (2012:120) whilst 
noting that even if aware of somatic reactions and responses social professionals have 
“difficulty linking these sensations to specific knowledge” (2012:113).  From that research 
they state  
They were unable to articulate what was actual bodily knowledge and 
what was cognitive knowledge.  Participants recognized and valued their 
bodies as sources of knowledge but it was also difficult for them to 
isolate body-specific knowledge (ibid).   
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Therefore, Gendlin’s Focusing provides a process for naming, but importantly with regards 
to dialogue, for sharing that knowledge as well. 
It must be noted that Glance through Focusing still involves a selection of moment and the 
percipients themselves spoke of the importance of making moments.  So, a question arises 
whether Focusing needs to happen all the time – and if so how, particularly when applied 
to the context of professional practice, otherwise how would a student/practitioner know 
when to Focus/select the moment?  Thinking with Mossel is useful here.  He highlights that 
“awareness is a precious and limited resource” (2005:154), therefore, in our terms, a 
student/practitioner does not have to be aware of every sensation, or all the time, indeed 
“some activities are so rapid that feedback to the brain’s central processor is impossible” 
(2005:156).  Thus, the issue is more one of “what she can become aware of” [sic] 
(2005:156), not how much and when.  He continues, explaining that activity (for us, 
Gaze/reflection-on-activity) and action (Glance/reflection-in-action) “are not separated by 
an abyss” (2005:158), so we need only to ‘attune attention’ to a “small part” of the 
sensation of acting such that “it is this part that makes my behaviour an action” (2005:159).  
In that way “subintentional movements become actions the moment we notice them” 
(2005:163).  Helpfully he also asserts anyway “Awareness is not an all-or-nothing affair”, we 
can be “fully aware, peripherally aware or totally unaware” (2005:166) but if totally 
unaware, i.e. not engaging in Glace at all, “then we do not act” (2005:166).   
Thus, Glance is not about Glancing all the time, or spending facilitation /guidance/ 
instruction struggling with identifying which moments to focus on (as happens with current 
practice of reflection-on-practice), but is a process for engaging that grows what it is that 
practitioners can be aware of, for more of the time albeit still fleeting in nature, and in 
doing so signifies bodied and embodied knowing in the moment.  This resonates with 
Willis’s (1999:99) intuitive/contemplative reflection introduced earlier.  He writes 
Even here consciousness is still active, but the act of thinking is different: 
it is an act of reception which holds the thinking mind back from closure 
and returns again and again to behold the object, allowing words and 
images to emerge from the contemplative engagement (ibid). 
For Damasio (2000:173), importantly, this will not be a “single track and a single sequence” 
as suggested by the common metaphor of “‘stream of consciousness’”, one that I drew on 
myself from literature as part of chapter 2.  As Mossel suggests, Glance is multiple and 
generates “more than one narrative” (Damasio, 2000:176), consonant with a messy, rich 
professional practice as Captured in chapter 3. 
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Focusing has most commonly been integrated into psychotherapy, but a literature search 
shows that more recently it has been drawn in to the disciplines of geography (Banfield, 
2016), medical education (Alexander et al, 2015), creative writing (Perl, 2004), and Human 
Computer Interaction design (Núñez-Pacheco & Loke, 2018).  It might also be considered 
that Focusing has ground in common with contemplative pedagogy “as a practice [so] 
turning our attention inward to explore our first-person experiences – our own embodied 
mind” [sic] (Ergas, 2017:14), however, there are differences in practice, principles and 
theories concerning whether mindful practices should be about that or instead work to 
create a gap between oneself and experience in order to distance oneself from it to 
function more effectively (Traversa, 2017).  In contrast, Focussing is about deepening “in 
and with” the gap [sic] (Schoeller & Dunaetz, 2018:123), to abide and dwell in the felt 
experience of a moment and see that emerging as part of a shift.   
In sum, Focusing beautifully conveys the nature of Glance and contributes to its 
theorisation and facilitation: it offers a specialist lexis and shared understanding such that 
students/practitioners would be enabled to recognise, identify, acknowledge and articulate 
Glance, engage in theory and methods that privilege Glance in ways that match those of 
Gaze, and value it as significant in its own right.  In Narrating, I find one instance of 
connecting Focusing with reflective practice.  In Reframing the Concept of Reflection: 
Consciousness, Experiential Learning, and Reflective Learning Practices, Jordi (2011) also 
begins from a position of critiquing the constructivist and cognitive basis for current notions 
of reflection.  He then proceeds to present his case to ‘rescue and rehabilitate it’ (2011:182) 
through Focusing, “the purpose of [which] is to ‘dip’ into [ones] subjective space in order to 
formulate and make explicit [the] implicit and vague felt-sense of experience” (2011:192).  
He concludes his paper by stating  
if we can conceptually engage with the complex intricacy of experiential 
learning with precision, then we can develop reflective practices that 
seek to facilitate an integration of the range of implicit and cognitive 
elements of our conscious experiencing. By identifying and engaging 
with elements that are characteristic of the integrative and meaning-
making journey of experiential learning, I propose that we can develop a 
more expansive concept and practice of reflection (2011:195). 
However, whilst he uses the term ‘reflective practices’ in his conclusion, the focus of his 
paper is, as expressed in its title, reflection, which means that he would appear to be 
referring to activities that support this more expansive notion of processing in contrast to 
reflective practice as understood in this thesis.  His work is also theoretical, so not led by 
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primary research and lived experiences of reflective practice.  In this sense, then, this thesis 
significantly builds on whilst also complements Jordi’s work.   
9 Narrating reflection-in-action/Glance as part of a radical reflective practice 
Reflective practice is explicitly about practice, and therefore needs to and must be “thicker” 
(Gendlin, 1997:9) than Gaze/reflection-on-practice/critical thinking alone.  What makes it 
‘thicker’ is Glance/reflection-in-action and yet, even as important as it was to Schön in his 
original theory, it is and has remained to be the least theorised element of reflective 
practice: weight of attention in literature and practice of reflective practice is on reflection-
on-action.  This thesis has reimagined and repositioned reflection-on-action as Gaze, and 
theorised and proposed practice of reflection-in-action through Glance.  In final analysis of 
the significance of Gendlin’s work to reclaiming and redefining reflective practice, his 
overarching contention is that we are “lost” if we either lose “touch with our own 
personally important experiencing”, or, if it becomes “too clouded, narrowed”, and yet 
society 
allows so little pause and gives so little specifying response and 
interpersonal communion to our experiencing (Gendlin, 1962:15-16)  
‘Society’ has been unpicked in this thesis in terms of The Trappings, New Internationalism 
and neo-liberalism applied to its impact on the practices of reflective practice.  In this 
regard, then, Glance is further underscored as a political act. 
9.1 Purpose: the nature of ‘practice as service to others’ 
Having radically reclaimed and redefined the practices of reflective practice by following 
critical phenomenological inquiry into the percipients lived experiences of reflective 
practice, for this to be fully actualised in the terms of the research aims and sub-aims, 
application to the purpose of reflective practice must be involved, a point inferred above.   
It has been argued through this thesis that the current practices of reflective practice have 
become service for self, despite literature claims and intentions to the opposite, and 
despite ‘practice’ itself meaning ‘service to others’ (cf. Argyris & Schön).  It has been argued 
that reflective practice has become appropriated such that it mirrors, feeds, and has 
become shaped by the Capitalist market principle of socially required outcomes, a process 
that necessitates individualised nurture, surveillance and control and reflects an 
engineering not artistry paradigm.  To fully return reflective practice to its roots, then, its 
radical theory and practice must (re)locate it to professional artistry as service for others.  
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Without this even a radical theory risks becoming (seen, understood as, appropriated by, or 
misinterpreted as) engagement in self-development with therapeutic undertones and for 
solipsistic purposes.  
However, there is an interesting tension here when recalling the roots of reflective practice 
were Humanist, Protestant and Pragmatic, a focus indeed on self and situation 
improvement, development and mastery.  One could assume, therefore, that a ‘return to 
roots’ must accommodate this.  But we have seen how this relates to Schön the person – 
and of course Schön-the-person is in his theory, just as I am in this thesis - but Schön based 
his theory on “cases of professional practice” that he ‘selected’ from “actual practice and 
some records of professional education” to ‘exemplify’ the points he wanted to make 
(Schön, 1983:74).  Thus, his very different approach and inductive base to his research is 
about articulating the concepts, constructs and assumptions that he already held, which 
means he is more deeply sewn into its claims and conclusions.  The premise of my research, 
from the outset and throughout, was expressly not to ‘colonise’ (cf. Erdmans) the inquiry 
and its methods nor its subsequent Narrating, achieved by following and honouring the 
percipients, this approach and its writing being the research (cf. van Manen).  Of course, to 
reiterate, I am in this – I am not neutral, and I bring into it my own experience, including my 
valuing of reflective practice declared at the ‘gateway’ to the thesis and set out in chapter 
1.  But in fact the deliberate positioning of percipients in methods as well as in all that 
emerged from that process revealed the extent to which the Humanist, Protestant, 
Pragmatism of a Schönian-inspired reflective practice confuses and confounds established 
understandings and practices of reflective practice.  A radical reclaiming and redefining of 
reflective practice, then, must work reimagine it as professional artistry for others, which 
was the original intention in Schön’s work but not given life.  Indeed, more than not given 
life, reflection-in-action was not given flesh, literally and metaphorically in relation to 
embodied and bodied theorisation and practice.  Where Schön began to re-cast reflection-
in-action as visceral and sensate, Glance takes it further, Narrated to show where and how 
it connects to theory.  Yet it could be considered that Narrating Glance through Focusing 
could still be an individualist, solipsistic, even self-indulgent, ‘commitment to internalism’ 
(cf. Mossel) that counters the premise of reflective practice as service to others not service 
to self.  Indeed, Gendlin refers to such critique levelled against his work (Gendlin, 1984).  
Similarly, Arendt warns against the pointlessness of endless internal dialogue with oneself, 
a solitary act that at best produces nothing (Papadimos, 2009).  Finally, and overlapping 
with these points, Glance can be accused of alienating away from critical awareness of 
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social structures, the one positive element that can be said of current practices of reflective 
practice/reflection-on-action (Fook et al, 2006; Fook, 2016) given that the distance of Gaze 
on practice events (potentially) provides opportunity to deliberately unpack actions and 
take critical socio-political stock. 
Thinking with May Schott’s (2001:327) ‘feminist materialism’, here, however, returns us to 
the importance of  
seeking to be ‘attuned’ to the authority of one’s own experience [at 
the same time as] being aware of the limits of one’s locatedness, of 
falsely generalising from one’s own perspective [emphasis added], 
 
within a context of “concrete historical analysis”, the platform from which to consider that 
experience (albeit whilst bearing in mind her caution referred to above).  Indeed, Damasio 
(2000:145) reminds that ‘ownership and agency are related to a body and requiring a body’ 
and without this they are “meaningless”.   
Moreover, thinking with Arendt, it can be argued that reflective practice has become tied 
down only to ‘work’ as she defines it (and discussed in the Capturing of chapter 2) because 
of its emphasis on fixed, solid, durable artefacts that create stability, through which 
students/practitioners “retrieve their sameness, that is, their identity”, an ‘objectivity out 
of the subjectivity of men’ [sic] (Arendt, 1958:137).  As Kohlen (2015:162) puts it, in her 
application of Arendtian argument to healthcare practice,  
the whole production process [of work] is orientated towards a goal, 
and those who participate have to adjust to the programme, that is to 
say they have to function within the programme. 
Indeed, Gendlin’s response to his critics is relevant here too. He explains that awareness of 
the “more complex texture of experienced reality” leads to the creation of social structures, 
“new liveable patterns” that give opportunity and space for change, a movement that 
involves ‘resilience, energy’ and action (Gendlin 1984:146).  Inherent to such “form-
making” is “structural understanding” (1984:147), in other words, “the structural political 
and economic detail must be seen, else form-making will be superficial” [emphasis added] 
(ibid).  Thus, engaging with the intricate texture of one’s experience challenges “a social 
system in which form-making itself becomes routine” (ibid).  In sum, he declares that 
"‘inwardness’ is social, and constitutes the very rejection of social forms” and is at the 
foundation of political argument (1984:148).  So,  
If we reject the (very common) thinking which unknowingly splits 
individual and social, we quickly see the social and political character of 
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the so-called ‘inward’ liberation; it liberates from narrowly ‘external’ 
social forms.  (1984:150). 
As Arendt argues “it is a mistake to take freedom to be primarily an inner, contemplative or 
private phenomenon” (cited in Yar, 2006:7).  It is for this reason that reflective practice in 
Professional Practice: Connected Practice is depicted as cutting out and away from The 
Trappings. 
This said, Gendlin also qualifies this does not mean that “Focusing steps necessarily free us 
from oppressive social forms” – he continues “They do; but we can not say that they always 
do so in every respect, that every oppressive form will change” (1984:154).  Using his 
argument to apply to Glance, then, Glance is, of course, a ‘translation’ (1984:157), but it is 
what we are aware of that is crucial, of the political into the personal, to see how we 
embody it – and to “crash the party” (1984:157); Glance means that we can.  The 
percipients ‘good hindsight Gaze’ adds to this process.  Betz Hull (2002:36) cites an Arendt 
speech from 1972, that  
The common and the ordinary must remain our primary concern, the 
daily food of our thought – if only because it is from them that the 
uncommon and the extraordinary emerge.   
10 Narrating Glance, Gaze and Leaving Go 
Narrating Glance, Gaze and Leaving Go finds connection with Schön’s original view of the 
artful and “active construction of and conversation with the situations of practice” (Kinsella, 
2007b:110).  Yet, as argued, whilst stating the critical importance of professional artistry 
and reflection-in-action within it, he stops there.  Kinsella (2007a:408) highlights an 
“‘embodied’ mode of reflection as distinct from the ‘intentional’ mode” in his work, and 
concludes that, although weight of attention has been taken up with the latter, i.e. 
“education that appeals to cognitive understanding and knowing-that” [sic], it “must 
incorporate” [emphasis added] bodied and embodied knowing “into its conceptions” 
(2007b:408).  Theorisation and practice of Glance does just that, and combined with a 
reimagined Gaze/reflection-on-action, and Leaving Go, reflective practice is reclaimed and 
redefined. 
As stressed above and important to restate here, my aim is not to replace one dogma with 
another, with “a new master discourse” (Kinsella, 2007a:109), but, reclaiming and re-
defining Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go, reinvigorates and reimagines the entire artistry of 
reflective practice.  Theorisation of Glance specifically addresses that which was previously 
‘logically incoherent and practically irrelevant’ (cf. Newman), signifies reflection-in-action, 
238 
 
and offers direction for practical engagement, as well as ‘elaborates the psychological 
realities’ (cf. Munby & Russell) involved. Identified and articulated in this way gives Glance 
‘catalytic validity’ (cf. Lather) so it can be facilitated in higher education programmes (and 







Having theorised, and articulated the facilitation of, a reclaimed and reimagined radical 
reflective practice and identified the intention to not replace mainstream reflective practice 
as if this is a ‘new master discourse’ (cf. Kinsella), I was still struck by how this could be 
achieved when applied to higher education programmes.  How could the value of this 
radical  reflective practice through the vehicles of Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go be 
recognised at the same time as not ‘colonising’ (cf. Meyer & Land), containing and 
controlling messy, subjective experience? 
It occurred to me that this mirrored my opening dilemma of wanting a form of research 
inquiry that would support engagement in messy, rich experience.  Setting out I recognised 
it to be an ambitious project, but as Law & Urry (2003:7 cited in Haggis, 2008:164) contend, 
qualitative research methodologies can reflect a lack of imagination and courage such that 
much that is complex ‘escapes’ – and the same can be said of mainstream reflective 
practice.  It had been right to take that approach because it gave life to a ‘strong’ theory (cf. 
Sutton & Staw) that emerged from, within, and engaged with complexity, temporality and 
embodiment, entangled with contexts of professional practice.  In sum, by not 
domesticating and taming entangled intersections of multiple trajectories of ‘opportunity, 
risk, and dead-ends’ (cf. Burbules), the research inquiry did not reinforce or mirror the 
discourse of traditional mainstream conceptualisations and practices of reflective practice, 
therefore, the research methods, its process, and that which emerged were intertwined 
and authentic.   
Thus, it followed that detailing this activity could lend to resolving the dilemma of 
facilitating the radical reflective practice in higher education without losing its rich vibrancy. 
2.           The ‘imaginary’ 
First, I note resonance with Deleuze’s (1990:66) conceptualisation of the imaginary, the 
space between opposing forces where emphasis is on the “circuit of exchanges” between 
them and that which ‘crystallises’ as a result.  In my case the ‘opposing forces’ were of 
social science and the arts already discussed, but also the dilemma above, of how to 
facilitate the reclaimed, reimagined reflective practice without imposing on messy 
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subjectivity.  I surprisingly discovered this endeavour had resonance with Arendt’s desire to 
not “freeze into a static construction what is actually a dynamic and unfinished process” 
(Canovan, 1992:6) and ‘sacrifice’ “spontaneity, plurality – everything that is genuinely 
human” (1992:11).  In other words, Arendt - and I - ‘set off to think - without a bannister to 
hold on to’ (1992:6).  In this, however, the potential risk is process and outcomes that are 
haphazard and confused, a critique levelled against Arendt’s writing (Canovan, 1992), 
indeed the same caution put to my research (at ‘upgrade’), i.e. rather than rich seams from 
messy complexity it might simply become a mess.  In fact, it is a tension that can be said of 
lived experience, and professional practice, on both reflective practice is based, inherently 
messy tensions of: intention and disarray; the expected, unexpected, and confusion; the 
explicit and implicit; and, the interplay of fixed, stable, and ‘ever changing shards’ (cf. van 
Manen), of which we may or may not be conscious.  Current practices of reflective practice 
assume a process of (supposed) mastery over and on this, of containing and control.  
Developing an approach that would honour the messy, complex dynamic befitting the 
messiness and richness of professional practice would be appropriate to a radical reflective 
practice.  To this extent it can be argued that the research inquiry is already of value 
because it ‘disrupted conventional methodological practices’ in its action of a “positive 
intervention into [traditional] hegemonic disciplinary means” (Ellingson, 2009:3).  Yet still, 
how could I ensure/enable Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go do not fall into being something 
that students would be ‘broken’ in to and impose a hierarchy of reflection-in-action over 
reflection-on-action.   
3 The rhythm of reflective practice 
It occurred to me that one thread of Narrating not yet woven in to the thesis was my 
response to the percipients Descriptions of Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go as a rhythm, 
noted in several places in chapter 4 and 5, in response to the rhythmic nature of their 
references and words in Describing their lived experiences of reflective practice, alongside 
the rhythm of moving in (reflection-in-action), out (reflection-on-action) and away (Leaving 
Go).  For instance: 
- It is a rhythm of different paces: the prolonged slowness of Gaze, the fast fleeting 
Glance, and the fast or slow of Leaving Go.  
 
- It is a rhythm of different qualities: the delayed, enclosure and surveillance of Gaze, 
the here-and-now presence of Glance, and the being elsewhere of Leaving Go.   
 
- It is a rhythm of different felt senses: of being flooded, waves coming in, being 
washed by memories and sounds, and rhythms of space and place, of sharper 
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hotter embodied experiences of fear and shock, and cooler focus of jigsaws and 
cooking.   
Having expedited reflection-on-action as a “particular narrative segment, a segment that 
less and less reflect the original circle from which it is taken” (Bryson, 1983:98), it struck me 
that in common between Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go is that they are all ‘narrative 
segments’ that together more closely imply the whole.  In contrast to typical attempts that 
consider reflection-in-action but become snagged on the extent to which there is a gap 
between experience and meaning-making and debates about the nature of that gap, and 
this to the extent that for some reflection-in-action is a misnomer, this thesis offers that the 
Gaze of reflection-on-action, the Glance of reflection-in-action, and Leaving Go, interweave.  
Together they are reflective practice, and reflective practitioners dance the rhythms of each 
and all together. 
In the same text that brought me to the notion of ‘breaking in’, Lefebvre writes of ‘rhythm’   
as a ‘mode and tool of analysis’ to “examine and re-examine a range of topics” (Elden, 
2004:xii), as well as the activity of ‘rhythmanalysis’.  Lefebvre’s rhythm and rhythmanalysis, 
‘a little known and used scholarship and concept’ (Elden, 2004:xiv), is now taken forward in 
this thesis.   
Lefebvre (1992/2004:64) explains rhythm to be  
neither a substance, nor a matter, nor a thing. Nor is it a simple relation 
between two or more elements, for example subject and object, or the 
relative and the absolute […] It has these […] aspects, but does not 
reduce itself to them.   
It is about energy, an ‘unfolding, increasing by diversifying’ (1992/2004:65) that is “founded 
on the experience and knowledge (connaissance) of the body”, so, ‘consciousness and 
knowledge’ (1992/2004:67).  Indeed, in rhythmanalysis the “body is the first point” of 
‘contact and analysis’ (Elden, 2004:xii).   
Thus rhythm and rhythmanalysis has direct relevance to the redefined and reclaimed 
reflective practice: 
- Rhythm is interdependent: Lefebvre writes of it being “slow or lively only in relation 
to other rhythms” (1992/2004:10), which has direct interrelation to the rhythm of 
Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go. 
 
- Rhythm is “natural, spontaneous, with no law other than its unfurling” 
(1992/2004:8), but this does not mean it is haphazard or chaotic: Lefebvre explains 
that it “always implies a measure” [emphasis added] (1992/20048), ‘measure’ 
meaning “harmony”, the “simultaneously quantitative and qualitative” (ibid) 
242 
 
‘reuniting’ of that which ‘marks and distinguishes with aspects and elements that 
link them together’ (1992/2004:9).  This ‘reuniting’ is reminiscent of the percipients 
call to ‘make moments’ as well as the need for uniting Glances and Gaze, i.e. 
uniting fleeting and embodied knowing with “the monotony of actions and of 
movements, imposed structures” (1992/2004:8) of the Trappings of New 
Institutionalism.   
Thus, the rhythm of Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go concerns  
repetition and difference; mechanical and organic; discovery and 
creation; cyclical and linear; continuous and discontinuous; quantitative 
and qualitative… [sic] (1992/2004:9); 
and a redefined and reclaimed reflective practice is this “synthesis” (1992/2004:12) through 
Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go.  It is this that “animates” (1992/2004:30). 
Therefore I am led to contend that a radical theory of reflective practice articulates the 
rhythm of Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go even whilst understanding this to be a “difficult 
task and situation: to perceive distinct rhythms distinctly, without disrupting them, without 
dislocating” (1992/2004:19).  So it is that Lefebvre describes that “rhythmanalyst[s] will not 
be obliged to jump from the inside to the outside” but to “listen to them as a whole” 
(1992/2004:20), as ‘bundles or garlands or bouquets’ of ‘different but in tune’ rhythms 
(ibid).  It is a description that fits Gendlin’s Focusing for Glance, with a reimagined approach 
to Gaze, and the deliberate activity of Leaving Go.   
Relevant to Glance alone, Lefebvre writes of “grasping’, “when the body makes a sign” 
(1992/2004:64), through the practice of calling on “all [ones] senses”, (1992/2004:21) 
rather than “privileging any one of [them]” (ibid).  This is a practice of ‘thinking with [ones] 
body’, “not in the abstract, but in lived temporality” (ibid) and the “unforeseen”, and is ‘the 
magic at the heart of the everyday’ (1992/2004:40).  In sum, a practitioner “garbs 
[themselves] in the tissue of the lived, the everyday” (ibid), ‘arriving’ “at the concrete 
through experience” (ibid).  Thus, the contribution of theorising reflection-in-action through 
Glance in a radical reflective practice is that it ‘garbs’ the student/practitioner in the tissue 
of the lived and the everyday in their professional practice, by calling on all one’s senses, 
tuning in to what was previously ‘unforeseen’ as well as to what is already known.  And, we 
can understand and facilitate (or coach) this through appreciation of it as a ‘journey’, via 
dialogue and the method of critical phenomenology and Focusing, that supports 
articulation of bodied and embodied knowing, whilst also bearing in mind the warnings 
cautioned in chapter 5.  In conjunction with Gaze and Leaving Go, this reclaimed and 
redefined reflective practice contrasts sharply with the experience of mainstream reflective 
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practice characterised as ‘singing the same tunes’ over and over as percipients “contain 
[them]selves by concealing the diversity of [their] rhythms” (1992/2004:10).   
Thus, in the words of Lefebvre, the rhythmanalysis of Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go 
integrates what is present with presence, ‘presence’ being “here (and not up there or over 
there)” (1992/2004:47) “in a dramatic becoming, in an ensemble full of meaning, 
transforming them no longer into diverse things, but into presences” [emphasis added] 
(1992/2004:23).  It is a radical reflective practice that concerns ‘going deeper, digging 
beneath the surface, listening attentively instead of simply looking’ at the “surface, 
spectacle” (1992/2004:31).   
- The rhythm of Glance, Gaze, and Leaving Go still “demands attention and a certain 
time” (1992/2004:32) of course, but in contrast to the Described, Narrated 
attention and time of Gaze/reflection-on-action requiring a leading to and Identity-
Of, alone it “bring[s] to it a multiplicity of (sensorial and significant) meanings” 
(ibid) resonant with Identity-As. 
 
- The rhythm of Glance, Gaze, and Leaving Go still involves memory, “to grasp this 
present otherwise than in an instantaneous moment, to restore it in its moments” 
(1992/2004:36).  But it does so “in the movement of diverse rhythms” (ibid) 
without getting snagged on that as an issue, instead seeing the matter to be one of 
interweaving and growing what student/practitioners are aware of (cf. Mossel), and 
this for a different purpose, i.e. “not to isolate [but] in order to live it in all its 
diversity” (Lefebvre, 1992/2004:47).   
 
- There is still a product, as such – but in the rhythm of Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go 
this is a “simulacrum” (ibid), a semblance, not a fixed artefact. 
4 Facilitating the rhythm of reflective practice 
Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go as a rhythm bears a beautiful synergy with a reimagined and 
redefined reflective practice.  Using Lefebvre’s words, it ‘deregulates’, i.e. “throws out of 
order and disrupts”, and in doing so “produce[s] a lacuna, a hole in time, to be filled in by 
an invention, a creation” (1992/2004:44), one that honours improvisation, creativity and 
curiosity.  In fact, the application of this to professional practice is further illuminated in 
Lefebvre words that “Interventions […] should be made through rhythms, without brutality” 
[emphasis added] (1992/2004:67), in itself reinforcing the significance of this radical 
reflective practice.  
Even so, bearing in mind the ‘catalytic validity’ (cf. Lather) of this thesis in view of its title, 
aims and sub-aims, it still feels somewhat nebulous to imagine introducing this radical 
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reflective practice to students/practitioners, social professions, and higher education as a 
‘rhythm’ when recalled that to be truly catalytic in its radical formulation it needs to work 
within their necessary frameworks. 
Whilst explaining that a ‘rhythmanalyst will not be obliged to jump from the inside to the 
outside’, Lefebvre extends from that point to more fully describe the process, helpful when 
applied to facilitating reflective practice as a rhythm.  He writes of ‘grasping and analysing 
rhythms’, that is, “it is necessary to get outside them, but not completely […], a certain 
exteriority enables the analytic intellect to function” (1992/2004:27).  Here, then, the 
rhythm of reflective practice can be explained as a more nuanced dancing the line of 
exteriority and interiority, in our case, underscoring the need for an explicit focus on critical 
thinking when related to Gaze and its assessment, and the significane of theorisation and 
practice of Glance/reflection-in-action.  As Lefebvre emphasises, “to grasp a rhythm it is 
necessary to have been grasped by it; one must let oneself go, give oneself over, abandon 
oneself to its duration” [sic], therefore “in order to grasp this fleeting object…it is therefore 
necessary to situate oneself simultaneously inside and outside” [sic] (1992/2004:27).  The 
Describing and Narrating of this thesis has offered that this involves play, creativity, 
imagination, improvisation and embodied knowing, facilitated through a frame of 
contemplative pedagogy, dialogue, and questioning relevant to phenomenological inquiry 
that prioritises subjectivity.  Indeed, Lefebvre writes of the significance of dialogue as part 
of rythmanalysis, “intense moments of communication” compared to “banal and 
superficial” ‘floods’ of conversation (1992/2004:49).  He posits that “restoring the value of 
dialogue […] does not oblige us to devalue the informational: […] its social and historical 
reality” (ibid), but rhythm is “more” (1992/2004:64).  In this way this thesis progresses 
reflective practice. 
4.1              Mittere 
Yet, even still, in final utility of this in its facilitation I wondered how one could retain the 
complexity of rhythm whilst ensuring that it could be conveyed to students/practitioners in 
its richness; and, how its facilitation incorporated into a redefined and reclaimed reflective 
practice set within higher education could hold the space for the rich messiness of 
experience without tidying or imposing on it.   
It was a line of inquiry that took me to explore the root of the word ‘mess’.   
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‘Mess’ stems from the Latin verb mittere [mee-tear-rey] meaning ‘to send, to let go’ 
although in late Latin it evolved ‘to put, to put in place’ and by 1400’s to specifically refer to 
the nature of what was being ‘put in place’ to ensure equal attention.  However, from there 
it mutates into referring to the state prior to being ‘in place’, i.e. jumble, concoction, as well 
as mixed mass of food, such that by the 1800’s ‘mess’ meant untidy and disordered, 
referring to both a state/place that is untidy/disordered and to the production of untidiness 
and disorderliness (O’Conner & Kellerman, 2014 ).  But, significantly originally mittere was 
not about being disorganised, chaotic, jumbled; mittere is letting go.   
Bearing that in mind, it follows that to let go one first needs to have a sense of what it is 
that one is to let go of, in conjunction with courage to step into the unknown, so, into a 
liminoid space after one has let go and before one emplaces.  The process of mittere is 
complex. 
Further, we can also appreciate that in that liminoid space ‘letting go’ is not about anything 
happens, nor, conversely, is it about imposing methods that bridge the space.  Mittere 
needs an approach that can “deal with ‘the fleeting’, ‘the distributed’, ‘the multiple’ and 
‘the complex’” (Haggis, 2008:161), that, in Gendlin’s terms, speaks from it.  It is a dilemma 
that can be appreciated through a lens of Complexity Theory in its distinction between 
‘messy complexity’ and ‘ordered complexity’ (Bachman, 2008).  Ordered complexity holds 
the promise of richness but is snagged on a neo-positivist ontology and epistemology.  
Messy complexity recognises and works with ambiguity; it is a process described by 
Bachman (2008:22) as being at the “edge of chaos” with “nascent and pregnant 
possibilities” whilst all the time “reeling in and organising” the information to find its 
“unique essence […] so its true nature can be addressed” (2008:21).  This has striking 
resonance with the spirit of my research endeavour, and, significantly, the spirit of the 
radical reflective practice of Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go that has emerged from it.  
Therefore, Mittere, now capitalised as a thesis concept, has fit and relevance. 
The originality of this doctoral work lies in its reclaiming of reflective practice, and now the 
research approach as well can be understood through the frame of Mittere, ‘frame’ being 
defined as a loose structure that gives space for methods to arise whilst providing the 
process for this to happen (Stiles, 2003) 
Yet, this still required clarification if it was to contribute to a ‘strong’ theory of Mittere, 
therefore, I re-visited the transcripts with it in mind, hence its key elements are embedded 
in and integral to the percipients’ voices and the spirit of the research endeavour.  These 
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are: Starting, Capturing, Curating, Describing, Narrating, and in recognition of their framing 
significance I drew them into the thesis frame as chapter headings, each with a brief 
explanation in italics.  These are explained in full here. 
- Starting 
Reflective practice starts somewhere, and indeed, with a nod to the early Phenomenology 
of Heidegger and Sartre, it has been established that it is always-starting, always-becoming.  
However, germane to any particular period of reflective practice, there is a Start 
somewhere.  So it is that Trimingham (2002:57) writes of the “arbitrary starting point of 
entry”, in our terms, to professional practice awareness, to which we bring our “own level 
of understanding and knowledge” such that “no two people would start at the same point”.  
Starting can start anywhere and be in the moment and on a moment; Starting might also be 
about not reflecting, and it can be Leaving Go.  Starting is not about creating a tidy story 
with a beginning, middle and end – that is to say, it might be, for some at some times, but it 
does not have to be – and indeed to be encouraged not be – but it is to acknowledge a 
Start. 
- Capturing  
Once Started one must Capture, and to ‘Capture’ one first must notice: Capturing is reliant 
on noticing.  Noticing is active attention and marked consciousness, an awareness to be 
honed.  Indeed “every act [of practice] depends on noticing: […] what you do not notice, 
you cannot act upon; you cannot choose to act if you do not notice” (Mason 2002:7).  De 
Waal’s (2011:13) discussion of moments of “reverence and respect” is relevant here.  And 
one Captures what is noticed.  Capturing can be the Glances of reflection-on-action, this 
thesis having proposed improvisation, creative, playful and imaginative forms of practice 
informed by contemplative pedagogy, and not the story-telling, reporting on and 
accounting for one’s practice of currently established methods of reflective practice.  
Examples from the thesis include: single words or phrases; doodle, drawing, or clay models; 
photographs taken in the moment; an artefact collected at the time that holds the moment 
in its form; and, recording on a mobile device of a noise or words expressed to sum up the 
experience.  Capturing can also be of traditional Gaze, although as a radical movement 
going forward this has been guided towards the principles and standards of critical thinking, 
but can also be facilitated through creativity and play, and through using written accounts 
to identify domesticated discourse adoption.   
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Moreover, Capturing can be by Glance, this thesis having theorised reflection-in-action and 
articulated its nature, qualities and practice, one that is enabled by Gendlin’s Focusing, the 
gentle surfacing of handles of felt sense.  The ‘movements’ of Focusing: modelling and 
facilitating improvisation; developing a language for and awareness of embodied and 
bodied knowing; facilitating awareness and practice of not reflecting: and, the creative 
‘incubation’ of Leaving Go, are all involved here.  Thus, Capturing invites comparison with 
presence when it is defined as  
the self-regulation of attention so that it is maintained on immediate 
experience, thereby allowing for increased recognition of mental events 
in the present moment [and] adopting a particular orientation toward 
one’s experiences in the present moment, an orientation that is 
characterised by curiosity, openness, and acceptance (Bishop et al, 
2004:232).    
Importantly, however, whilst in some quarters such approaches in the form of 
‘mindfulness’ have become something of a bandwagon, jumped on by a range of 
professions wherein the purpose is to ensure that students/practitioners ‘seek relief from 
the soul-crushing conditions’ (Ghodsee, 2016:np) of their contexts and practice through 
focus on inner self and compliance (Martin, 1991), the purpose of an orientation to mindful 
presence in Capturing is action (cf. Arendt; Mossel).  Although action and inward attention 
do not have to be mutually exclusive (Berila, 2016), according to Stanley (2012), and the 
percipients, they often are.  The radical reflective practice through Capturing brings them 
together. 
Captured Glances and Gazes are all handles to a felt sense experienced in and on moment, 
specifically referred to as ‘scraps’ to emphasise that they cannot be conceptualised as a 
whole, complete, replete.  Here then, Capturing is about being present to and sensitive in 
the moment and grows the points of conscious awareness of what a student/practitioner 
can be aware of, an awareness that is embodied and bodied, the canniness of the body all 
the time (cf. O’Neill), an ‘inner readiness’, the ‘raising of awareness of now’ (Jakube et al, 
2016:76), on one’s own, and together shared in dialogue. 
- Curating 
After a period, on one’s own and with others one looks back over the stored ‘scraps’ of 
Glances and Gazes to see what they have in common between them as well as what is 
different, distinct and surprises.  It is a process of Curation, ‘bringing elements into 
proximity with each other, making junctions, opening new routes’ (Ulrich Obrist, 2015:1) 
through fresh perceptions, connections, and insights which are ‘put forward for 
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exploration’ (Bohm & Peat, 1991:27), a process broadened through dialogue with others.  
This is not for its own sake: it is held in context of professional practice engagement.  In 
other words, Curation should not become the driving force and end-point, because this 
would risk a return to performativity, the (re)production of what one thinks one ought to 
Curate as is the case in current practice of reflective practice.   The process of Curation 
needs to be fully grounded in Gazes and Glances with emphasis on curiosity and openness, 
not cultivating and telling stories, a process that includes space and time for Leaving Go, 
and ‘layering up’, i.e. returning to that which has been Curated with new Gazes, Glance, 
and Leaving Go. 
- Describing 
The ideas, implications and possibilities from that Curating then unfold through a process of 
creative and divergent thinking and feeling in which new possibilities are given space to 
coalesce and crystallise via their own discovery paths.  These are ‘composed or put 
together’ (Bohm & Peat, 1991:27) through Description, that is, Describing coalescences to 
convey the way the ideas, implications and possibilities of the Captured and Curated 
Glances and Gazes can be understood (Andersen, 1991).  Importantly, the significant 
motivation here is curiosity and surprise, so unlike current practices of reflective practice 
the student/practitioner does not know in advance the direction and outcomes of those 
discovery paths. 
Whilst an obvious approach to this Describing would be words, Wittgenstein 
(1953/2009:36) raises caution. Through an analogy of fibre and thread he explains ‘the 
strength of the thread resides not in the fact that one fibre runs through its whole length 
but within the overlapping of many fibres’ (ibid).  Describing, then, requires finding symbols 
that satisfactorily express the Curated Glances and Gazes, a thoughtful choice of words, but 
it could equally involve other forms of thoughtful expression such as drawing, doodling, 3D 
modelling, collage, installation, etc., in our terms, their activity being simulacrums to the 
‘all-about-ness’ of the Curated Gazes and Glances. 
Thus, the simulacrums of discovery paths of Describing do not story-tell but ‘dwell in 
process as a method of inquiry’ (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005:959), remaining ‘deeply 
intertwined’ (2005:962) with the person’s Glances and Gazes.  In doing so Describing 
‘produces different knowledge and produces knowledge differently’ [emphasis added] (St. 
Pierre, 1997:175).  Old and familiar stories do not get ‘rewritten or repeated’ to ‘re-describe 
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the world and ourselves’, and it sustains the possibility of ‘be-do-live something different’ 
(St. Pierre, 2014:5), by: 
- retaining the principles of playfulness and surprise: attention is given to the chosen 
form of expression such that they do not draw on familiar narratives, cliché and 
‘old, worn-out metaphors’ because to do so would result in ‘ideas and imagination’ 
becoming ‘inflexible’ and ‘unstretched’ (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2008:973); 
 
- not being concerned with creating something that conveys the ‘all about-ness’ of 
the Captured Gazes and Glances in a way that is ‘right’, or complete, or about 
solutions, answers, fixity or stability: emphasis is on the ‘discovery of new 
possibilities for exploration, not right or wrong’ (Bird, 2006:5); 
 
- and, importantly, it is not an isolated activity: dialogue and community builds the 
bandwith of exploration, courage and appreciation, and is facilitated to include 
Leaving Go. 
 
- Narrating  
Finally is Narrating, where what was Described is considered in its own right by asking what 
it tells about the practice/phenomena that has been Captured and Described.  Here new 
Narratives are created whilst retaining freshness.  Emphasis is on exploring ‘in one’s own 
voice, its meaning in the present’ (Pinar, 1975:12) through connection with theory and 
community of practice, so with what it connects to and with, in the spirit of openness to 
‘the unexpected turn’ (Dewey, 1934/1980:139), i.e. that which the Gazer/Glancer did not 
‘foresee’.  Thus, in contrast to the ‘plug and chug, cram and flush‘ engagement, process and 
outcome of typical approaches of reflective practice, focus is sustained on ‘what is not yet 
present’ (Pinar, 1975:9) through creation of ‘new possibilities that are stitched, weaved and 
knotted’ by Narratives that offer creative and innovative ways forward (Lee McCartney, 
2015:141).  Thus, new Narratives are created and told about practice that are not 
rehearsed and have not been limited and constructed by the finite and fixed methods of 
traditional reflective practice. 
5 Mittere 
Mittere, of Starting, Capturing, Curating, Describing and Narrating, is not to be understood 
or approached as categories to comply with but a frame, a loose structure that gives space 
(cf. Stiles) to ‘circuits of exchanges’ (cf. Deleuze).  To further appreciate this an analogy of 
suspension is useful: a suspension – in our case, Mittere – is a form utilised to bring forth 
something of significance, a vehicle that works as an ‘investigative workshop’ (Dosse, 1999 
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cited in Lather, 2006:47).  Thus, Mittere is not the thing itself; Mittere is true to its name, it 
is about letting go and stepping into the unknown, creatively and innovatively, a vehicle 
that supports emplacement of oneself in one’s individual and shared professional practice.   
Therefore, Mittere is not a return to “the sphere of the intimate and private” (Arendt, 
1958:48), a “there we are, no questions asked” (Arendt, 1971:59) process previously 
critiqued in relation to current practices of reflective practice.  Mittere emerges within 
dialogue, a community of practice (Barnett, 2008), and is a movement: of perpetual moving 
in (to oneself) and moving out (to dialogue and action).   
The end point or outcome of Mittere is not a fixed product, artefact, or the only way of 
understanding something.  It should be considered and shared confidently in light of its 
authentic process but also perceived and appreciated as a fragment of something ongoing 
albeit satiated at that point. Thus, rather than the typical approaches of reflective practice 
where stories are told in one’s reflective diary, supervision, or to a line manager, this new 
approach to reflective practice requires that its Narrating is shared with the community of 
practice for resonance and comment, in turn creating space for new Gazes and Glances, 
contributing to a rich learning landscape (cf. Greene) and organisation (cf. Senge). 
As noted, Mittere requires courage.  Whilst it celebrates messy and is not a mess, telling 
familiar stories in expected ways is safe territory, whilst the messiness of professional 
practice (and research) can take one along all kinds of avenues where the temptation is to 
impose and/or engage with methods that are habitual, taming and domesticating, indeed 
the current reflective practice state of affairs.  During the research process we all, 
percipients, supervisory team, and myself, found ourselves dancing along, falling off, and 
getting back on lines (as such) as we endeavoured to trust the journey, to trust Mittere, 
‘journey-man-women’ of a radical reflective practice, indeed mirroring the experience of 
engaging in professional practice itself and on which reflective practice is applied.  In this, , 
the radical reflective practice as anchor to and steer for professional practice is reinforced 
by Mittere: Mittere provides a frame, and discipline (cf. Clark) for the rhythm of Gaze, 
Glance, and Leaving Go, which “prevent[s] it from spiralling out of control” (Trimingham, 
2002:56) whilst at the same time enabling authentic engagement.   
Here, then, 
- Mittere frames an approach to a radical reflective practice as rhythm, enabling the 




- Mittere prioritises creativity and playfulness, a creative, lightness of engagement in 
the moment, creating rich, new Narratives that facilitate fresh and potentially 
innovative discovery.  It refuses the watchful eye and scrutiny of audience and its 
freezing impact on process and outcome.   
 
- Mittere holds the rhythm of a reimagined Gaze and theorised Glance as well as a 
notion of Leaving Go, together a radical practice. 
 
- Acting freshly through Mittere offers ‘freedom, meaning, worth-whileness and self-
esteem’ (Mason, 2002:8) via divergent thinking (Goff & Torrance, 2002) and a 
discovery orientation (Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi, 1976) key to ‘innovative mind’ 
(Claxton, 2000), ‘imaginization’ (Morgan, 1993), and the creation of new Narratives, 
all of which are valued by learning organisations (ibid).   
 
In sum, Mittere returns reflective practice to its roots of professional artistry and Identity-As, in 
juxtaposition to the hoop jumping of traditional reflective practice and its advancement of an 
external locus of motivation and engagement of Identity-Of.  Mittere holds experience in  
interstitial spaces with no beginning or endings, but as always becoming, 
as being open to transformations, where rhizomes create 
interconnected networks and multiple entry points (Lee McCartney, 
2015:142). 
 
6 Mittere – and currere?  
Having articulated Mittere it struck me that it was similar in sound to, as well as possibly 
similar to the process of, currere, such that I wondered, at the end, if I had arrived at the 
door of something already there.  This, of course, is not a problem, my research reinforcing 
the concept of currere, but the more significant question was whether Mittere is needed: 
perhaps currere was already sufficient.  I had not previously encountered currere; in fact, it 
was at a conference where I was presenting engagement in the theoretical underpinning of 
Mittere that I was introduced to it.   
‘Currere’, in its Latin meaning ‘to run’ as a current that runs or flows, was adopted by Pinar 
to encapsulate his autobiographical method of inquiring into lived experience of 
curriculum, ‘curriculum’ also stemming from the Latin ‘currere’.  Thus, his currere is a 
“postmodern philosophical approach to education that acknowledges personal and 
temporal dimensions of the learner” (Sierk, 2014:135).  Its method is referred to as “a 
dynamic entity, constantly changing as it continues to develop” (2014:137) although Pinar 
himself described it as a step-by-step procedure (1975) which by 2004, he refers to as 
“moments” (2004:xiii).  That said, a quick review of the way in which it has been typically 
used shows that it is applied as steps, these being: remembering the past (regressive), 
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followed by imagining the future (progressive), then analysing and synthesizing emergent 
themes (analytical), and, finally, identifying meaning (synthetical) (Pinar, 1975; 2019). 
In general, then, currere has tones that appear similar to Mittere, and like Mittere it is 
approached as “not fixed, it is motion and it is lived” (Lee McCartney, 2015:138).  Similarly, 
and echoing earlier discussion, Sierk (2014:140) writes that “To the untrained eye […] 
currere […] may be seen as chaotic or disorganized” but in fact is a mirroring of the 
responsiveness and spontaneity of curriculum practice.   
There are also resonances with Mittere in the detail of Pinar’s ‘steps’/’moments’.  
Regression (step 1) involves a deliberate “return to past to capture it as it was and as it 
hovers over the present […], one is on the past while in the present” (Pinar, 1975:6), which 
has parallels with Glance.  In the past where research and discussion of reflection-in-action 
have been stalled by debate on the gap between experience and making sense of 
experience (therefore whether all reflective practice is reflection-on-practice), in step 1 of 
currere Pinar (1975:7) argues that the “present is veiled, the past is manifest and 
apparent”.  In our terms, then, Glance will always be about what just happened – it is 
always ‘the past manifest and apparent’ but it is not telling stories about it, and not 
interpreting means it is Narrated freshly because as Pinar (1975:8) puts it, “interpretation 
will interrupt your presence in the past”.  In this sense, then, Glance is a snapshot – and 
Pinar (1975:9) talks about “coalescence to form a photograph”, as it were, and ‘studying 
the detail’, likened to “holding […] the picture and one’s responses to it” (ibid).   
This is followed by ‘progression’, a second look at the ‘photograph’ in Pinar’s terms.  He 
writes of this as “looking at what is not yet present” (ibid).  For both currere - and Mittere - 
it requires what Pinar refers to as “free association”, that is, ‘avoiding rational, critical’ mind 
(1975:10).  He advises to do this for “as long as it is comfortable” whilst “not forc[ing] the 
process”, which means, as Sierk (2014:137) puts it, “leaving loose ends”.   
Currere’s third step/moment is ‘analytical’.  Here one marks “what one [has] drawn” (Pinar, 
1975:11).  To this end, Pinar writes of “bracketing what is, what was, what can be”, and as a 
result one is “loosened from it, potentially more free of it, hence more free to choose the 
present and future” (ibid).  Like Narrating in Mittere, the purpose is to offer “clearer light” 
on the present, that should surprise and ‘take on new meaning’ (ibid).   
Finally, Pinar instructs this should ‘all be put aside’ (1975:12) to then articulate “In your 
own voice […] the meaning in the present” (ibid).  Here one is “mak[ing] it all of a whole” 
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(1975:13).  It is the last step/moment, ‘synthetical’, “where pieces are made whole” (Lee 
McCartney, 2015:142), or, in Pinar & Grumet’s (1976:61) terms, “where I am placed 
together” and “new structures evolve in the process of naming old ones” (1976:115) 
In this, then, currere would appear to have resonance with Mittere. 
However, currere also has a noticeable likeness to established models of reflective practice, 
i.e. ‘what happened, where would you like to be/how would you like it to be’, free 
association around this, and then pulling in analysis and meaning.  To the same critique of 
mainstream reflective practice, then, it risks being, as indeed has been argued of currere, all 
about “self-display” (Apple, 1999:227) and ‘racialized and gendered indulgence’ (Smith, 
2013:6).  So, and despite attempts by some to do otherwise, currere spins, in our terms, on 
‘singing the same tunes to oneself’ over again, and service to self rather than others (Smith, 
2013).  It is, also, obviously about curriculum, its strength lying in being a different way of 
thinking about curriculum theory and development, but obviously not, therefore, 
professional practice in the social professions, which clearly would go some way to explain 
its limitations in focus on service.  Finally, and relatedly, currere is an autobiographical 
tracking and exploration of one’s orientation to curriculum – it not about rich messiness 
that emerges within and from the ‘hot action’ of practice.  Mittere is all this, and recognises 
what would be considered as irrelevant to currere, the significance of ‘other’ and dialogue 
being central to its frame.   
Mittere has emerged from this doctoral research, and is embedded in it.  Unlike currere, it 
is a frame for the messy rich complex nature of professional practice and it is a frame for 
reflective practice that is radically reimagined and redefined as comprising the rhythm of 
Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go.  Mittere is different to currere, but can be considered as a 
relation in ways that have been identified. 
7 A reclaimed and redefined reflective practice 
This thesis has radically reclaimed and redefined the practices of reflective practice from 
neo-liberal appropriation that formulates it as a reified, cognitively dominated, panoptical 
form of therapeutic analysis and professional assessment, a narrowing process that 
imposes habitualised and repetitive routines (via models and pro forma) on to what 
otherwise could be innovatory practices.   
Its contribution lies in its critical exploration of what is taken-for-granted in mainstream 
understanding and practices of reflective practice.  Using percipient threshold concepts and 
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insight cultivators, a radical reflective practice is theorised through Gaze (reflection-on-
action), Glance (reflection-in-action) and Leaving Go (moving away). 
Reflection-in-action, that Schön and subsequently Schönian inspired reflective practice 
confuses and conflates with reflection-on-action, if it features at all, is given life and flesh.  
Glance takes forward Schön’s introduction of reflection-in-action as visceral, a sensate 
embodied felt experience, and progresses it through theory and practice.   
Moreover, in contrast to the slow incremental violence of being ‘broken in’ (Lefebvre) to 
current understanding and practice of reflective practice, and a dichotomised reflection-in-
action or reflection-on-action, this thesis contends that reflective practice should be 
understood as a ‘rhythm’ (Lefebvre) of moving in - Glance/reflection-in-action, and moving 
out - Gaze/reflection-on-action, and away - Leaving Go.   
The thesis also has ‘catalytic validity’ (cf. Lather), identifying the implications and facilitation 
of this radical reflective practice, both in relation to Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go, but also 
in a frame that models and sustains them as a rhythm. 
Finally, this thesis offers that the process of inquiry by which this emerged is also central to 
a radical reflective practice, Mittere in its roots of mess and letting go, the name given to 




EPILOGUE: STARTING OUT AGAIN 
Setting out the Starting landscape of this thesis (chapters Starting Out, Starting On and 
Starting) and the principles of its research (chapter 1), I introduced my interest in reflective 
practice and personal journey from it being a ‘natural fact’ to regarding it critically; and, 
explicated key terms, such as ‘experience’ and the ‘self’ who is experiencing it.  In-keeping 
with the declared aims and sub-aims, set within an understanding of ‘radical research’, the 
research was articulated as Practice-Led inquiry (rather than methodology), in the Faculty 
of Arts, an interpretive and critical phenomenological endeavour with methods that would 
emerge through deliberate siting of percipients as central, the desire being for its process 
to match those of professional practice.  It also set out the process of research and thesis 
writing in terms of spirals (cf. Trimingham), informed by van Manen’s ‘phenomenology of 
practice’, specifically drawing on his process of ‘seeing meaning’ as well as ‘scrutiny 
criteria’, applied to the context of RPRGs. 
It was proposed that only by fully scoping the discipline of professional practice through 
Capturing can one come to a rich, deep appreciation of the professional artistry involved 
and therefore fully appreciate the essential role and nature of reflective practice within it.  
Here, informal interviews, re-visiting my MA dissertation, and critical reflection led to 
Professional Practice: Connected Practice, offered for its heuristic value in enriching 
discussion through deep consideration of its elements.  Practitioners weave The Trappings 
with Connected Practice, Being Prepared, Performance, and Qualities Of Me in their daily, 
indeed moment-by-moment decisions, actions, thoughts, feelings, of what it is to be that 
particular profession and professional, in that particular situation of clients/users and other 
practitioners, and context of space and place.  Individually and collectively, practitioners are 
prescribed and inscribed, working in and with agreed notions of professional, user/client, 
procedure and policy, a landscape where these territories are contested and discourses 
clash.  The Trappings is about a rigidity and fixing of practice and professional selves, of 
adopting and adhering to the relevant Identity-Of.  In that process, and with reflective 
practice at the core of Professional Practice: Connected Practice, it was shown that in their 
Identity-As a professional in that profession, practitioners also scribe their practice, 
reflective practice cutting through The Trappings.  It is an analysis that leads to a rich 
appreciation of and for reflective practice and through that elucidation core tenets of 
reflective practice emerged: that the practice of reflective practice is widely accepted as 
clear and understood; that it involves the development of emotional, affective, self-
awareness; that self-development happens and leads to positive change in their practice 
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competence; that individual development leads to change at an organisational level; and, 
that one needs to learn and develop reflective practice as a skill in order to be able to 
engage in it.   
Having ‘drawn out’ (cf. Schostak & Schostak) reflective practice in this way, and, as a result, 
Captured those vital tenets, chapter 3 focused on them in turn, elaborating the ways they 
are discussed in literature but, importantly, bringing that ‘into proximity’ (cf. Ulrich Obrist) 
with percipients experiences of engaging in current understanding and practices of 
reflective practice.  This jostling together or ‘meddling’ (cf. McWilliam) made possible 
‘unexpected combinations’ (cf. Puwar & Sharma) that surfaced questions about reflective 
practice.  It was offered that reflective practice has become, or has always been, an 
exercise of interiority, self-surveillance, impression management and control.  Students/ 
practitioners explore and ‘integrate their instrumental, expressive, affective and cognitive’ 
processes (Gould, 1996:3) within arrangements that determine priorities and agendas, a 
process of articulating externally determined relevant information for utilitarian purposes: 
they learn to perform and evidence legitimate narratives, and become competent in the 
skill of “being seen to be reflective” (Barnett, 1977, cited in Rowland, 2006:54) in service of 
themselves rather than in scrutiny of their professional practice for the service of others.  
Thus it was argued that reflective practice is based on a limited and narrow notion of what 
it is to know and how one must and can evidence, indeed, perform this, wherein cognition 
is sovereign, a process more in-keeping with an ‘engineering science’ paradigm (cf. Soler et 
al) based on input and output, characterised as ‘plug and chug, cram and flush’ (cf. Bella) 
rather than professional artistry.  It was offered that at best individuals might engage in 
reflective practice as was intended in secret, but either way professional practice remains 
‘undiscussed’ (cf. Schön) and reflective practice to be accused of being self-indulgent (Issit, 
1999, in O’Reilly et al, 1999; Brookfield, 2000).  The lived experience of this as expressed by 
the percipients is of a slow incremental violence likened to Lefebvre’s (1992/2004) concept 
of ‘breaking-in’, whereby “under the imperious direction of the breeder or trainer, 
[students/practitioners] produce their bodies […] their bodies modify themselves, are 
altered” (1992/2004:40).   
Here, then, we can see that current mainstream understanding and practice of reflective 
practice does not encompass or support the complexity of professional practice, of 
knowing, of change, and of what changes.  Change is socially situated, messy, and the 
outcome multifarious, often invisible, indeed, change may not always be the outcome – in 
fact the opposite, we orientate ourselves to constancy.  A reflective practice that 
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domesticates, that ‘breaks’ practitioners ‘in’ to Identity-Of reflective and professional 
practitioners and perform both as required is far from the professional artistry roots and 
rhetoric of mainstream theories.   
Contrary to research being applied to a literature review leading to conclusions as if 
instructions to ‘solve puzzles’, ‘radical research’ requires ‘active, engaged committed 
movement for change’ through “action” (cf. Schostak & Schostak).  As befitting to critical 
phenomenology, chapter 4 Described experience and meaning ‘as it presents itself’ (cf. 
Canovan) by ‘evoking’ and ‘dwelling’ (cf. van Manen) in the percipients lived experiences of 
an alternative ‘vision of what might be’ (cf. Hicks).  The percipients emphasis was on 
reflection-in-action, which they Described in terms of their threshold concept Glance.  
Glance is trusting the experience/process of having no path.  It is about working at the 
edges of the familiar (cf. Casey).  It is about ‘active attention’ (cf. Greene), working with 
‘sense, the sense’, the ‘fleeting’, ‘capturing’, ‘getting at’ the whole of a moment, from 
‘multiple entry points’ (cf. Lee McCartney) and ‘returning anew’ (cf. Sierk).  Glance is 
embodied and involves memory in the body; it is about improvisation and a wider frame of 
contemplative pedagogy. 
They also re-imagined a creative and dynamic reflection-on-action, their threshold concept 
of Gaze.  Gaze is the process of selecting an event/interaction after its happening, that may 
be big, dramatic or small, but either way the event is the trigger – and then staring at it, to 
pull some thing/s about it apart and in detail, breaking what existed as a complex dynamic 
whole into small fixed and static pieces for analysis, and, typically, writing that down in 
order to perform self in familiar, acceptable and expected ways in order to ‘report’ as 
required to those in authority, construction of a ‘conformable body politic’ (cf. Arendt).  
This thesis argues that where reflective practice means reflection-on-action it should be 
stated as this but Gaze also offers that it can be reimagined to be more playful, imaginative, 
creative in its facilitation and appropriately aligned to the principles and standards of 
critical thinking.   
The percipients also offered the insight cultivator of Leaving Go as important to reflective 
practice as Gaze and Glance, the deliberate activity of not engaging in reflective practice 
through mind-wandering tasks as a process of incubation and then illumination, but also 
self-care (cf. McGarrigle & Walsh). 
They surfaced difficulties with Glance and, from their experience, what they wanted in its 
facilitation.  Through Narration the qualities, nature, practice, and facilitation of Gaze, 
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Glance and Leaving Go have been theorised, and in their facilitation, it has been identified 
how established work on play, creativity and improvisation can be utilised; alongside 
building a language for and awareness of bodied and embodied knowing; and uniquely 
drawing on Gendlin’s focusing, all within an approach of contemplative pedagogy, dialogue 
and critical phenomenological inquiry.  
Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go have vibrancy in their illumination of what has become the 
‘troublesome knowledge’ (cf. Meyer & Land) of reflective practice, and of a ‘vision for what 
might be’ (cf. Hicks) that reclaims its role as action (cf. Arendt) in service to others.  The 
percipients Describe Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go as interwoven, which led me to consider 
them as a rhythm, subsequently theorised through Lefebvre’s work on rhythmanalysis.  
Mittere offers a frame, a structure to the process for the rhythm of the radical reflective 
practice, comprising Starting, Capturing, Curating, Describing and Narrating, which became 
the chapter headings (and in the final spiral of the doctoral period I took Mittere in to my 
teaching and demonstrating/disseminating, for critical feedback and refinement, see Trelfa, 
2016c; 2016d; 2017a; 2017b). 
Starting Out again 
This thesis is now ending.  As Trimingham (2002:57) puts it, like the ‘arbitrary starting 
point’,  
the point of exit or ‘pausing’ in the spiral is [also] arbitrary: the research 
could continue indefinitely and may well be picked up again later, but 
for the purposes of a writing-up we ‘exit’ the spiral temporarily. 
In such terms, the end of this doctoral research and thesis is the Start for what comes next.  
With that in mind, it is pertinent to critically consider the activity so far.  
In chapter 1, “intersubjective agreement” (Velmans, 2007, in 2017:68) was emphasised in 
its value to the research endeavour, where views and descriptions are shared and converge 
in the expressions of lived experience.  Thinking with Reich helps here, explaining 
intersubjective agreement as “a device for coordinating interdependent social actions” 
(2010:60) based on turn-taking and time for “repair” but also individual responsibility to 
make oneself understood (2010:59).  This was all evident in the RPRGs, moreover, it was 
emphasised as strong – and there is a risk in this: it can be considered as a device for 
‘groupthink’ (popularised by Janis, 1972), i.e. where agreement is assumed and 
disagreement made invisible through compliance and conformity.  Added to this, as 
reminded throughout the thesis, I am ‘in’ the process too, not just as author but present in 
the RPRGs.  The transcripts attest to my careful attention through my requests to “say 
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more” to encourage reflecting back all that has been said in equal terms, and deliberately 
playing devil’s advocate to offer alternative possibilities.  But of course, by simply being 
there my presence will influence groupthink (Roberts & McGinty, 1995).  
Sunstein & Hastie (2015) discuss three key elements that counter groupthink: active 
participation of all present; women in a group; and, members who can read others 
emotions.  These increase the likelihood of “collective intelligence”, dynamics the authors 
refer to as ‘Factor C’ (citing Woolley et al, 2020).   
It is reasonable to consider reading emotions will be present in the percipients inclination 
towards this in their choice of degree programme in the social professions, and indeed 
because it is inherent to the radical reflective practice being explored.  The other two 
dimensions can be observed in the RPRGs, but importantly women members was by 
accident not design, and all participating the result of my own community work 
background.  Therefore, facilitating the radical reflective practice through Mittere going 
forward must deliberately factor in these elements, including identifying what it is that 
‘women in a group’ bring if membership is to be all men to ensure this is enabled in other 
ways. 
 My role and power is relevant in other ways too, discussed within Narrating already, but 
also it should be noted that at the stage of analysis Miles & Huberman (1994:56) warn 
“what you ‘see’ in a transcript is inescapably selective”.   
In relation to analysis and thesis writing, I addressed the tensions and challenges thrown up 
by this critique by close adherence to the transcripts, honouring individual difference whilst 
at the same time declaring Describing is where I am not asserting that all percipients agreed 
but identifying similarity because that is what required to advance ‘catalytic validity’ (cf. 
Lather).  Furthermore, putting out a call to percipients I was still able to locate, one 
volunteered to read the thesis to offer comment regarding detail and findings to check if it 
met with their remembered experience.  They also happened to be taking a PhD 
themselves and so by happy coincidence were also able to scrutinise it with research 
inquiry standards in mind.  Therefore, although it is only the view of one percipient, I have 
confidence that ‘what I see’ honours the research inquiry.   
It is also important to consider in facilitation as part of higher education programmes that 
time can – and should – be given to exploring the felt sense handles of individual subjective 
experience to the full, for example, by drawing on the nature of dichotomous corollaries (cf. 
260 
 
Kelly) referred to in chapter 4, to appreciate, for instance, how shared similarity of 
experiences expressed in agreed words, like ‘click’ or ‘interruption’, are also different. 
Furthermore, and linked to this, in consideration of future application and facilitation of the 
threshold concepts of Gaze and Glance, insight cultivator of Leaving Go, and their 
theorisation, it has been insisted that that they should not be used to ‘colonise’ (cf. 
Erdmans) lived experiences and processes of others.  This will be achieved by utilising them 
in support of a radical reflective practice through practices that assert the individual’s own 
authority and subjective experience; they are vehicles, not stages, held so by rhythm and 
the frame of Mittere.  To ensure that this does not become a return to interiority and 
isolated acts of reflection, it has also been asserted that this should take place within a 
context of dialogue and sharing, with the intention of action (cf. Arendt) and service to 
others.  Given the power of rhythmanalysis (cf. Lefebvre) in the expression of this radical 
reflective practice and its untapped scholarship, there is room to continue to explore this 
going forward.  
Finally, in building evidence that ‘this works’, critique and refinement are invited as this 
thesis is disseminated, through adopting the redefined and reclaimed rhythm of radical 
reflective practice and carry out one’s own research into its concepts, theories, and 
practices.  As a closing epilogue to this thesis, this too is my Starting, as I continue to work 
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Mainstream literature That which is taken for granted and 
commonly understood in relation to the 
principles, aims, practices and facilitation 
of reflective practice in professionally 
qualifying programmes, continuing 
professional development, and 
graduateness in higher education. 
 
Mittere 










Latin word, etymology of ‘mess’, meaning 
‘letting go’, adopted to name the process 
through which the radical reflective 
practice emerged.  Mittere facilitates the 
rhythm (cf. Lefebvre) of this reclaimed and 
redefined understanding and practice and 
comprises five elements, utilised as the five 
main chapters.  Brief definitions of each 
element appear immediately following the 




Describes a particular approach to research 
and involvement of those more typically in 
research referred to as ‘participants’, or 
even ‘subjects’, percipients being 
recognised in terms of their “active, 
embodied and sensorial engagement” in 
process and outcomes (Myers, 2008:173). 
 








- Connected Practice 
- Being Prepared 
- Performance 
- Qualities of Me 
- Reflective practice 
 
 
Heuristic tool that captures the complex 
“discipline” (cf. Clark) of professional 
practice in the social professions.  It 
comprises six elements, introduced in 
chapter 1, and the focus of chapter 2 
where they are discussed in turn and in 
depth. 
The heuristic tool enables a rich 
appreciation of and for reflective practice, 






Props Metaphor as a device for descriptive effect 
to convey influences that run throughout 
the research inquiry and therefore thesis.  
The props support the strands. are the 
props of  
▪ radical research (cf. Neill; Freire; 
Schostak & Schostak) 
▪ liminoid space (cf. Turner) of art 
with social science  
▪ Practice-Led research (cf. Candy) 
▪ value and significance of emerging 
research method from the 
research process itself 
 
Spiral  
Based on Trimingham (2002), a metaphor 
as a device for descriptive effect to convey 
influences that run throughout the 
research inquiry and therefore thesis, that 
conveys the progress of a doctoral journey 
as   “circular, a spiral which constantly 
returns to its original point of entry but 
with renewed understanding” 
(Trimingham, 2002:56).  My research with 
its thesis comprises five spirals of activity, 
described in the prologue and chapter 1. 
 
Strands  
Metaphor as a device for descriptive effect 
to convey influences that run throughout 
the research inquiry and therefore thesis.  
The strands weave through the spirals of 
the research doctoral journey, and are the 
strands of: 
▪ overall structure and style of the 
thesis 
▪ deliberate (judicious) use of 
personal pronoun  
▪ ‘strong theory’ (cf. Sutton & Staw) 
▪ deliberate adoption and siting of 
‘percipients’ (see above) 
 
RPRG  
Abbreviation of Reflective Practice 
Research Group, the core action of the 
research inquiry, comprising the 
percipients and myself as facilitator, and 
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